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PART ONE
A REVIEW OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1.1., GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Introduction; One aspect of the analysis of regional pro­
blems is that it is easier to describe the symptoms than 
to point to the causes.
We begin this chapter by highlighting a few of the most 
evident "symptoms" of the regional problem. Some of the 
possible causes are then discussed. Thirdly we look into 
the overall pattern of regional development at the European 
Community level. This is discussed, (i) at a theoretical 
level with reference to location theories and theories of 
spatial competition; (ii) at an empirical level with res­
pect to regional employment and industrial structures, and 
(iii) at a dynamic level, taking into consideration factors 
which may explain the process of economic growth at a 
regional level.
Fourthly, we consider the implications of greater inter- 
EC trade links and direct foreign investment on the pattern 
of regional development. This leads on to a discussion of 
the regional implications of the multinational enterprise
—  the locational aspects, the distribution of their eco­
nomic surplus, and their linkages with firms in the domes­
tic sector.
Fifthly, some alternative strategies for regional har­
monisation are outlined. Policies to reduce regional dis­
parities can be divided into two groups; firstly macro­
policies working at either a national or Community level, 
such as public spending or fiscal integration; secondly 
micro-policies such as financial incentives and disincen­
tive policies.
Perhaps it is first of all worthwhile to distinguish
z.
between regional problems at the level of member states 
between themselves and regional problems at the level of 
individual regions within member states.
A fuller discussion of these important differences is 
mainly reserved for chapter 10. However, two in particular 
should now be mentioned. Firstly, factor mobility is likely 
to be greater within countries than between them. Secondly, 
individual countries may directly control their monetary, 
budgetary and exchange rate policies wheras the same is not 
true of regions within countries.
As a result, if exchange rates are flexible trade bet­
ween countries will take place under conditions of comparat­
ive cost (McCrone 1968, Robson 1980)•  ^ Exchange rate adjust­
ments may partially offset inter-country differences in factor 
costs giving some control over the national level of employ­
ment.
Between regions however, intra-country trade takes 
place under conditions of absolute advantage, and there is 
little possibility of adjusting factor earnings to match diff­
erences in regional productivity. Since factors are more mob­
ile between regions than between countries, adjustment may 
take place mainly through capital and labour mobility, resul­
ting in lower levels of output in some regions.
However,if, in a dynamic context, increases in labour 
productivity in the fast growing regions are not fully matched 
by increases in wage costs (Kaldor 1971), it is likely that 
the resulting fall in unit labour costs would attract both lab­
our and capital to the high growth regions. As a result it is 
possible that economic activity would become more concentrated, 
income disparities would widen and labour and capital flows 
would persist from the less developed regions.
The above argument may of course be applied to groups 
of countries which join together in economic and monetary union
However,even if exchange rates are not flexible trade flows 
may be influenced by comparative costs - the comparative (or 
opportunity)costs 'rule' requiring perfect competition assum­
ptions .
2with fixed exchange rates or a common currency. Since, 
however, factor mobility is somewhat less than in the above 
case, differences in productivity growth between countries 
may tend to cause greater divergencies in unemployment lev­
els. This tendency will be particularly apparent if, as a 
number of authors have argued, monetary integration destr­
oys the 'money-illusion' which at present allows that trade- 
unions be content with lower real-wage rates in some member 
states than in others.
Finally, within countries, depressed regions often ob­
tain substantial automatic fiscal transfers"*" in the form 
of unemployment benefits and other income maintenance paym­
ents. Between member states within the framework of full 
economic and monetary union one could imagine a similar 
system operating. For reasons stated above, the absence of 
any such automatic transfer system within the present Europ­
ean Community, must certainly place in some doubt the ability 
of existing arrangements to cope with the potential regional 
problems arising from further European integration.
Others such as central government grants to local or reg­
ional authorities may or may not be largely automatic.
C H A P T E R  O N E
1.2.
REGIONAL PROBLEMS -.INCOME DISPARITIES, UNEMPLOYMENT,
MIGRATION AND STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES.
1 .2 .1 . Income_disgarities_
Although there are many difficulties in making inter­
country comparisons,^ the overall situation between the memb­
er states of the present Community appears to be one of signif­
icant and persistent disparities in economic well-being.
As table 1 shows, whilst there was some small tenden­
cy towards convergence towards the late 1960's, after 1973 
the situation was abruptly reversed, and disparities (measured 
by the weighted coefficient of variation) at a national level 
weœ greater after 1975 than they had been in the early 1960's. 
Moreover relative progress, if any, made by the two 'poorest' 
countries - Ireland and Italy - was certainly very small ind­
eed.
tf-
Indices of per capita gross domestic product at m arket prices (in purduwmg power standards and a t current prices and 
purchasing power parities)
j l%0-«4 tto? IT4 W75 (■**4 I97T \9~9 IMO
9 ' 97J 9S.9 99.1 103.2 109.6 107.4 IC’ ft tOA_2 104.7 !M .T :07_5
OK 117.9 121.4 121.2 119.6 115.0 117.2 118.4 117.3 II5J 114.7 113.0
D 114.0 114.9 1119 1I4J IM J 114,4 115.2 i 16.3 113,0 117.7 II7.«
K IC0.7 101' £04.1 107.3 ¡09.6 111.5 111.5 111.3 1)2.7 ill.2 111.7
Itti 58.2 57.2 58 9 61.0 59.3 59.4 58.1 Î9.0 60.4 58.9 56.5
1 75.9 75.6 79.0 M.2 *4.1 78.1 7J.2 77.9 74.8 77.9 79.6
L 1 : 6.5 117.1 116.9 12^2 I3»> IU .2 114.1 lll.l ¡10.9 113.7 1119
NL i02j 104.0 104.4 105.6 107.2 106.4 106.8 106.3 105.2 102-2 100.8
UK 107.9 I W J 101.9 H Z 91.8 92,9 92.Ü 9IJ 91.3 92.0 «9.8
CouTictcru of variation (EC 6) 14.5 14.6 12.9 1? .J 17.0 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.6 13.1
CuciTictcm of variation j EC 9) 2 !J :o.8 19.6 22.2 19.7 20.3 19.9 I9J 19.8 20.4
Weifijiid coètïicicni of varai ion (EC 9) 14.7 14.9 13.1 13.4 14J 14.9 15.2 15.6 15.2 15.' 15.7
Source: European Economy, July 1981,p.112.
Disparities at the E.C. 83 region level, which were 
even more marked than for the (9) member states, showed a
1 See for example, E.C.(1971), pp.109-114.
r.
similar tendency towards convergence between 1960-71, and
growing divergence therafter. 1 In 1978 gross value added
2per inhabitant varied from 191% of the E.C. average in Ham­
burg, 164% in Bruxelles and 160% in Paris, to 52% in the 
Naples region, 51% in Sicily and 43% in Calabria.
Apart from the poorest Community regions (West of 
Ireland and Southern Italy), whilst even the most prosperous 
countries contain regions where economic capacity is low by3Comirunity standards , the most significant grouping of rel­
atively low-income regions (60%-81% of E.C. average) is to 
be found in the South-West of France, Central Italy, Wales,4Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland.
Two points are of note with respect to the poor and 
low-income regions of the Community. In the first place, they 
are almost exclusively situated at the periphery of the E.C.. 
In the second place, their relative position has remained 
substantially unchanged, as far as comparable statistics in­
dicate, for a period stretching back over one or two decades 
at least. The U.K. regions, apart from N.Ireland, are newcom­
ers to this grouping, and their relative performance at the
1
The weighted coefficient of variation fell from 24.8 in 1960 
to 22.5 in 1971, but rose steadily to 25.1 in 1977 (E.C.'The reg­
ions of Europe, 1st periodic report1,1981, table D.28).
2
At purchasing power standards (p.p.s.). Gross value added 
differs from G.D.P.in that taxes linked to exports (around 3% to 
9% of GDP are not included.
3
eg. for W.Germany, Luneburg(81%);Netherlands, Friesland(78%); 
Belgium,Luxembourg(80%),Hainault(79%) .
4
Respectively: Midi-Pyrenees(81%), Limousin(80%), Bretagne(79%), 
Marche(78%), Umbria(75%), Abruzzi(61%), Wales(80%), Northern 
Ireland(69%),Irish Rep.(61%). If gross value added per employed 
person is taken as a measure, it is worth noting that the main 
difference in the listing is that almost all U.K. regions(apart 
from the S.East and Scotland)are then included, and the afore­
mentioned regions in W.Germany, Holland and Belgium are excluded.
<l
at purchasing power parities (EC = 100)
Table 2. Qross value added per person in 1978
Country/region 1970 1978 + or 
> 2%
W. Germany (115) (118) +
Luneburg 79 81
Netherlands (106) (103) -
Friesland 81 78 -
Belgium (101) (104) +
Hainault 87 79 -
Luxembourg (B) 74 80 +
France (105) (110) +
Bretagne 72 79 +
Midi-Pyr£n£es 74 81 +
Limousin 75 80 +
Italy (82) (78) -
Umbria 71 75 +
Marche 73 78 +
Lazio 88 80 -
Abruzzi 57 62 +
Molize 46 55 +
Campania 56 52 -
PugIi a 56 54
Basi licata 47 57 +
Calabria 43 43
Sicilia 55 51 -
Sardegna 63 60 -
U.K. (96) (92) _
Ir ' "
Wales 86 80 -
N. Ireland 76 69 -
Ireland (Republic) 59 61
Source: E.C. "Yearbook of Regional 
1st periodic report", 1981.
1 .....
Statistics" 1981; E.C. "The regions of Europe
where below 81% of E.C. average in 1978.
7.
Community level would appear to be closely linked to the dec­
line in relative performance of the U.K. as a whole since 
around the early 197 0's.
To document and define the long-term nature of the 
regional problem we have therefore chosen to present two ser­
ies of figures; the first covering regional disparities at 
the E.C. level, and the second tracing regional disparities 
relative to the national average(for which figures are avail­
able over a much longer time period).
As figure 2 shows, whilst in France the relative impr­
ovement in the position of the low-income regions appears to 
be closely related to the performance of the country as a 
whole, in the U.K. and the South of Italy, the same argument 
applies in the reverse sense, and the decline in relative 
national performance has probably restricted the extent to 
which these regions have been able to improve their pos­
ition within the Community.
On the other hand the more central Italian regions 
(Abruzzi, Molise, Umbria, Marche) all appear to have improved 
their relative position both in Italy and within the Community 
over the 1970's.
However, as table 3 makes clear, whilst the French 
problem regions may have improved their relative position 
in the Community over the 1970's, this fact can hardly be 
attributed to any particular form of region-specific dynamism 
given that in none of the regions considered was G.D.P. rel­
ative to the national average consistently higher over the 
1970's than it had been in 1962. In general, available stat­
istics regarding regional income disparities within countries 
suggest that there has been little systematic improvement in 
the relative position of the less-developed regions within 
the countries considered in this survey (France, Italy, Rep. 
Ireland).
8.
Table 3 below gives a broad comparison of trends in reg­
ional product and personal income over time for the above- 
mentioned countries. Since G.D.P. figures do not include 
transfer payments to households at the regional level, we 
have also included estimates of disposable incomes (France, 
Ireland) and final consumption (Italy). In general there are 
considerable difficulties in obtaining such figures at the 
regional level. The figures available do however show that 
such transfers may be very important in reducing interregional 
differences in regional incomes and standards of living.^-
TABLE 3.
G.D.P. at market prices in relation to the natior- 
nal average ( per inhabitant).
1962 1973 1976 1977 1977(dispos-
FRANCE "Languedoc 82 73 75 73 89
able in 
come)
Limousin 79 70 74 69 88
Poitou-Charentes 75 76 82 75 ‘ 85
Midi-Pyrenées 74 71 75 71 83
Bretagne 72 74 72 73 84 i
ITALY: 1969 1974 1976 1977 1977(final
Puglia “72 "7 i “ TS” 71 73 cons.)
Sicilia 70 70 66 69 81
Campania 67 67 66 67 76
Molise 58 61 63 60 72
Basilicata 53 63 65 63 67
Calabria 52 56 52 55 67
IRELAND; (Personal in­
come) 1969-1973 
Midlands 
West
North West 
Donegal
Source: (i) Basic statistics of the Community
(ii) NESC Report No. 30.
(iii) E.C. "The regions of Europe",1981, p.167
78 83
76 • 82
75 79
73 76
'Disposable income1 is probably a better measure than 
'final consumption' where there may be a tendency to inflate 
consumption figures, if for example tourism or second resid­
encies are important in the area. Moreover the latter measure 
does not take into account the extent of regional savings - 
a low propensity to save may produce a misleadingly high level 
of final consumption.
3Another important point to note is that very sub­
stantial differences often arise between measures of GDP per 
inhabitant and GDP per person employed - these differences 
being attributable to varying regional levels of economic 
activity. One measure of such involvement is the dependency 
ratio which represents the ratio of working-age population 
to non-working-age population(0-14, and over 65).
In general, dependency ratios tend to be higher in 
many of the less-developed regions (and countries) than else­
where, with the result that income per person employed has to 
be spread over a proportionally greater non-active population.^- 
Whilst the approach here has been to take GDP per inhabitant 
rather than per person employed - which implicitly includes 
dependency effects - .it is perhaps worthwhile to make some 
comment on overall trends in dependency during the 1970's. 
Clearly, if dependency ratios are seen to be increasing in 
the less developed regions this will substantially limit the 
extent to which gains in income per person employed may infl­
uence regional income per inhabitant. In other words, where 
dependency ratios are increasing, income per person employed 
must increase at a faster rate relative to national or Comm­
unity rates in order to avoid regional divergence in terms of 
per-capita G.D.P..
Comparison of dependency ratios in 1970 and 1977
brings out very substantial differences at both national and
regional levels. Whilst these ratios were particularly low in
Germany, France, Denmark and the U.K.(from 1.09 to 1.37 in
21977), and somewhat higher in Holland and Belgium (1.86 and 
1.55 respectively), by 1977 the dependency ratio in Italy had 
moved up to 1.88, and in Ireland(Rep.) 1.80.^ Even greater 
differences were notable in Southern Italy which by 1977 rec­
orded the highest levels of dependency within the Community.
Three examples are of note; the Naples region(Campania), where 
this ratio increased fr0m 2.08 in 1970 to 2.43 in 1977, Calabria
 ^ This is brought out by comparing the weighted coefficients of 
variation for GDP per inhabitant and per person employed. For 
the E.C.(9) the figures were 15.7 and 14.4 respectively.
2 Whilst GDP per person employed in NL was 21% above the E.C. 
average in 1980, GDP per inhabitant was barely 1% above. The 
Dutch case seems to be somewhat of an exeption in the northern
European context. 3 source; E.C."The regions of Europe"t.D.5.
I G»
with an increase from 2.43 to 2.69^ " and Sicily(2.35 to 2.66).
Clearly then it is important to take into account
levels of dependency when assessing regional per capita incomes
and observation of movements in the level of dependency may
help explain some part of the relative changes that have
occured in the past, as well as providing some insight into how
2things are likely to change in the future.
1.2.2. Unemployment, migration and population movements.
The unemployment situation in the three "peripheral" 
countries of the E.C. is given in Table 4 . Again there are 
a number of problems J.n comparing the figures for different 
countries. However, the E.C. sources are broadly comparable.
The figures in Table 4 show marked disparities in unemploy­
ment rates, not only for the peripheral countries but especial­
ly for the peripheral regions within these countries. In the 
past such regions were typically characterised by high out­
ward migration rates and until the mid-70's this is the 
csise for most of the abovementioned regions (table-'5} .There 
are obvious links between the proportion of the active re­
gional population that is unemployed and the propensity to 
migrate. However, the tendency, at least for France, Italy 
and Ireland seems to be towards declining rates of interre­
gional migration in more recent periods. The cause is likely 
to be lower "pull" effects in the central regions due to the 
development of labour surpluses in these areas rather than 
an actual improvement in the labour market situation in the 
peripheral areas. In all three countries the situation is
Representing the maximum figure recorded at the E.C. regional 
level over the 1970's. Figures for Basilicata are 1.99 and 2.36, 
and for Sardegna 2.45 and 2.46 for 1970 and 1977.Note, Friesland 
(NL) and Luxembourg{B) mentioned in table 2, also recorded ex- 
eptionally high dependency ratios over this oeriod(2.25 and 
1.83 in 1977).
2
Obviously it is the underlying demographic movements
rather than trends in dependency themselves which are import­
ant here.
11
Table 4. National and regional rates of unemployment^in the 
European Community problem regions - 1979.
Country : E.C .(1979) = 5.8% (14-24yrs • = 1 0.1%).
W. Germany = 3.0% (3.8%) Italy = 7. 9% (21. 0%)
France = 6.9% (14.2%) U.K. 5. 2% (6 .8%)
Netherlands = 6.7% (6.4%) Ireland = 9. 8% (1 1 .4%)
Belgium = 7.3% (1 2 .8%) Denmark = 6 .9% (11. 2%)
ITALY: % unempl. (14-24)% FRANCE: % unempl . (14-24
Campania 14.2 (39.3) Nord 9.1 (17.9)
Abruzzi/Molise 8.5 (28.8) Bretagne 6.2 (1 1.8 )
Puglia 8.7 (25.2) Poitou-Chts . 7.2 (17.8)
Basilicata 14.8 (42.7) Midi-Pyrénées 6.3 (15.2)
Calabria 15.6 (40.9) Aquitaine 7.6 (13.7)
Sicilia 10.9 (27.1) Limousin 3.7 (8.3)
Sardegna 13.5 (36.4) Auvergne 8.4 (19.9)
IRELAND: (1977) = 9.3% »«gaaia
North East = 1 0 .0% Donegal/N.W. = 16.6%
Mid-West = 1 0 .1 % West = 11.5%
•
Source: E.C. "Yearbook of regional statistics",1981; vis.Ire­
land, E.C."Regional Development Programme-IrelandTannexes)1977.
 ^ Extended concept: no main occupation, seeking paid employment. 
This would seem to be a’ more realistic measure, as opposed to 
'registered unemployment', since - especially under present econ­
omic conditions - there may often be very little incentive to 
actually register as unemployed.
further compounded by the increasing return of migrants, either 
unemployed or retired to their region of origin.
In the French case,regioml unemployment and migration 
may not always fully reflect the actual situation in the reg­
ional labour market. On this point it is notable that relative 
migration rates for the French regions in table 5 were highly 
negative over the period 1968-75 for the age-group 20-29yrs -
fX.
-4.5% to -9.7%; furthermore, rates of female(active) net emig­
ration were in all 7 cases well above rates for males. 1
Low unemployment rates may, for instance primarily result 
from low or negative rates of population growth. The relativ­
ely low level of unemployment found in Limousin(4.6 % in 197 9) 
must for example be seen against an almost stagnant growth in 
employment in industry(0.5% from 1968-7 5 as against France = 
7.4% overall) and a negative rate of population growth over 
the same period.
Such areas, which are of some geographical importance 
in France, covering most of the Massif Central and some 
areas in the South West and Centre, appear to have gone full
-cycle in the migration process (see schema below). After
2many years of continual depopulation (migration mainly but 
also due to the catastrophic implications of the 1st World 
War on the development of largely isolated rural popula­
tions^), population age-structures have become decidedly
biased towards high age groups and birth rates have fallen
to the point where it seems that only a new inflow of youn­
ger persons can avoid a collapse of the geographically 
sparse regional population.
Schema;
Structural - poor agricultural structures(esp. moun- 
factors : tain regions)
- lack of or deficiencies in industrial 
structure
- poor urban structure
Resulting in._ migratj_on Qf active population......
- negative influence on age structure....
- fall in birth rate..........  .
- continuous selective migration....
- negative rate of natural population growth....
- population decline
1 E & S (INSEE) No.107.
2 See Beaujeu-Garnier (1976),"La population fran?aise",p .95.
3 ibid. p.1094 mainly active population 20-29 in the French case.
Table 5. Migration and population movements in the E.C.
problem regions over the 1960's and 1970's.
average yearly rates c/oo
1961-69 1970-74 1975-78
ITALY : (-2 .0 ) (1 .1 ) (1 .1 )
Campania -8.9 -4.8 -1.5
Abruzzi -10 .6 -0 .6 2 .8
Molise -18.0 -2.4 0 .1
Puglia -10 .1 -4.1 0 .1
Basilicata -18.6 -10 .6 -5.1
Calabria -16.7 -9.4 -3.6
Sicilia -12 .2 -5.1 -0.2
Sardegna -10.3 -2 .0 0 .1
natural movement o/oo av.annual
1961 1970 1978
(9.2) (7.1) (3.1)
16.3 13.3 9.7
7.9 4.6 2.8
8 .6 4.0 2 .2
15.5 12.6 9.5
15.2 9.3 6.4
16.4 10.3 7.5
13.2 9.9 6.7
15.6 11.3 7.8
FRANCE : (4.1) (2 .2 ) (0 .1 ) (7.3) (6 .1 ) (3.6)
Nord -2.3 -4.4 -5.4 10.2 8.3 5.4
Bretagne -0.4 1.9 1.6 6.7 5.2 2.7
Poitou-Cts. -1.7 -0.2 -1.2 7.2 4.9 1.7
Aquitaine 5.6 2 .8 1 .8 3.9 2.9 0.2
Midi-Pyrnés. 5.7 3.7 0.6 3.5 2.3 -0 .6
Limousin 1.5 2.0 1.9 0 .1 -1 .2 -3.9
Auvergne 1.9 0 .1 -1 .8 3.3 2 .0 -0.3
IRELAND (-5.6) (3.2) (3.8) (8.9) (10.4) (1 1 .1 )*
1966-71 1971-79 / 1971-79
North East 
Mid-West
Donegal 
North West
West
fCavan -3.0 5.6-3.7 (Monaghan 3.2 7.5
-5.2 fClare 7.3 8.2
1 Limerick 1.5 12.7
^Tipperary -0.7 9.9
-6.3 Donegal 7.2 7.6
-9.7 (Sligo(Leitrim
4.6
-2.3
5.7
0 .0
(Galway 4.6 10.1
(Mayo 0 .2 4.8
* max. E.C. in 1978.
Source: E.C. "The regions of Europe-lst periodic report ", 1981,
"Census of population of Ireland", 1979, vol.l, C.S.O.Dublin.
In Ireland (early 1970's), the situation appears to 
have been fairly similar in the development areas of 
Donegal, N. West and West. Many of the structural fea­
tures are similar —  poor agricultural structures, low 
levels of industrialisation and lack of urban infrastruc­
ture. Moreover, the Massif Central and West of Ireland 
share the lowest levels of population density in the pre­
sent E.C.
However in Ireland the demographic situation appears 
to have improved considerably in the course of the 
1970's1, only one county (Leitrim) experiencing an 
absolute fall in population over the period 1971-19 79. 
Furthermore, most counties in the West, N.W. and Done­
gal now have positive net migration balances. A com­
parison of the 1975 Labour force survey and 1979 popu­
lation census suggests that these major changes have
2come about since 1975 . Whilst there may be a case for 
attributing part of these migration shifts to the succ-<
sessful implementation of regional policy*, it is prob­
able that the larger proportion is however due to the more 
recent net inflows of migrants returning from abroad(mainly 
tne U.K.) as unemployment rises elsewhere.
1The key figures are as follows: 
total population change (1971-79) D.A.s 8.2%, Ire 13.1% 
natural " " " D.A.s 5.6%, Ire 9.4%.2It is notable that for most D .A. counties net male immi­
gration far exceeds female immigration which is often 
negative (4 cases).
* One aspect for example has been a shortage of skilled 
labour in some new industries in Ireland.
The situation in S. Italy is by contrast one of rela­
tively high population growth rates by both E.C. and 
national standards . Given the greatly reduced possibili­
ties for outward migration both abroad and to the regions 
of the North and Centre, the resultant pressures on the 
supply side of regional labour markets are unlikely to
find an escape-value in migration as was the case in
2previous periods .
Although the above description generally fits the 
overall demographic situation in S. Italy, a number of 
mountain regions along the Appenines and in parts of 
Sicily and Sardegna are more aptly described by our pre­
vious analysis. This result is of course due to the level 
of aggregation at the "regional" level, and, as is often 
the case, a much more detailed impression is obtained by 
turning to statistics at the "provincial" or sub-regional 
level.
The above discussion has been brief but sufficient to 
show that many diverse factors may explain trends in re­
gional unemployment and migration. In some cases the re­
sult is a dwindling of the already sparse regional popula­
tion which only serves to further limit the prospects of 
economic growth and the attractiveness of the area for 
new industry. In other cases, migration can no longer 
relieve the pressure arising from continuously high rates 
of population growth. Under these circumstances either un­
employment will increase or people will increasingly be­
come drawn into the secondary or dual labour market^ cha­
racterized by low levels of productivity and wages.
In one way or another most of the abovementioned problem
^Note, this is also the case for the RepuHic of Ireland as 
a whole over the 1970's.
^The evidence is now that for S. Italy it is interregional 
rather than international migration which is of major im­
portance in net migration: M.D. Antonio(1979), p. 6 8 .
^See V. Lutz (1962) and G. Bull(1978) for further discussion.
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region*; can be fitted into the schema above. Some regions 
however, appear to have more or less circumvented the later 
stages by maintaining consistently high population growth 
rates. In the case of Italy, such regions often contain some 
of the most densely populated areas of Southern Italy.
Table 6 .
(see schema)
Classification of the less developed regions 
of the European Communities(9) in terms of 
unemployment, migration and population growth
- reference to mid/late 1970's.
Net immigration 
and +ve nat.pop. 
growth.________
Abruzzi
Molise*
Irish Develop­
ment Areas.**
Nat.population 
growth good but 
emigration or 
selective migrn.
Bretagne ★ ★
Basilicata**
Calabria**
Sicilia**
Sardegna**
Puglia*
Campania**
Cavan(Ire)na
Nat. pop. Full-cycle; stag- 
growth slov* nant or declining 
net emig. or population(contin- 
selec. emig. uing net migration 
or selec. migrn. 
Aquitaine* Limousin+ 
Poitou-Chtsi*Midi-Pyrenees** 
Auvergne+
Leitrim(Ire)na
Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 3 Cat. 4
Source: See tables 4 and 5.France(1980)Sept.,INSEE série R,N°45, 
Mai 1981.
* Unemployment rate high relative to national average(1979/80). 
+ : : : : :  similar to national average : : :
** : : : : : very high and/or above 1 0%.
1 Figures for post 1978 period for Italy used where available,E.C. 
data.______________________________________________________________
Whilst regions in category 1 above have probably avoid­
ed cumulative population decline to a greater extent than else­
where, certain care must be taken in assessing the background 
to migratory flows. Hence, whilst in Abruzzi/Molise such dev­
elopments probably indicate a relative improvement in the local 
labour market, for the Irish D.A.'s the situation is clearly the 
reverse given that in some cases, changes in unemployment may act­
ually have been positively related to net immigration(eg.Donegal).
Perhaps at this point a few words are in order to 
clear up the somewhat ambiguous role of outward migration. 
Although migration may benefit those who are moving, the 
economic condition of the region of origin may either im­
prove or worsen depending on how the local labour market 
adjusts. On the one hand outmigration may reduce the com­
petition for available jobs (e.g. S. Italy). On the other
hand, as in the case of the West of Ireland and the Massif
Central, migration may bring about a process of cumulative 
decline. This would occur (i) through the selective nature 
of migration, especially those in the 20-29 age group> that 
is the young and skilled with direct and indirect effects 
on population growth; (ii) through adverse multiplied ef­
fects on growth and employment in the local economy and
(iii) through a reduction in the regional tax base, re­
sulting in either an increase in local taxation or a de­
terioration in the level of public services —  in any case 
reducing the relative attractiveness of the area for new 
industry and resulting in a lowering of regional welfare.
The effect would be enhanced, if there are important eco­
nomies of scale in the provision of public services since 
this would tend to increase the overall per capita cost of 
such services.
It should be borne in mind that even in the case where 
high birth rates are maintained, the above processes may 
be present to a greater or lesser degree. In particular, 
as we have noted, the selective nature of migration may 
lead to a distorted population ace structure with relatively 
high proportions of old persons and children, entailing 
a high degree of regional dependence on national income 
support programmes.
1.2.3. Structural factors
Here we come to some of the more fundamental issues 
involved in the origins of the regional problem. More 
precisely, the observed disparities in employment rates 
and levels of per capita output can be viewed as the 
symptoms of such problems, factors dealing with growth 
rates and economic structure being at the heart of the 
problem.
The problem will be analysed at two levels; firstly, 
the distribution of economic activity and employment be­
tween the three major sectors —  agriculture, industry and- V
services; and secondly, at the level of individual sectors.
—  The impact of economic structure (primary, secon­
dary and tertiary sectors) on regional growth can ea­
sily be judged by giving a few key statistics on re­
cent trends in these sectors.
Firstly, in terms of employment, below we give a 
broad outline of trends in sectoral employment over 
the period 1970-1977.
The high share of agricultural employment in the 
LDRs means that their economic structure has a severe 
negative bias in employment terms, especially consider­
ing that rates of decline in agricultural employment tend 
to be high and fairly uniform as between regions.
Table 7 gives a breakdown of sectoral and total em­
ployment for the period 1970-1977 for the less developed 
areas in France, Italy and Ireland.
We may firstly point to a number of general characte­
ristics; (i) agricultural employment as a share of total 
employment in the LDRs is in general between one and a 
half to over twice the national average in the three coun­
tries considered; (ii) the share of industrial employment
Table Employment structures ( 1977) and % change in employment by 
sector of activity, 1970-1977
Agriculture Industry Services
%Ù. (share country) %(sharé % (share)
■rance: - 2l%(9.7) -7% (37.6) + 11% (52.6)
:taly: - 34%(12.9) -10% (39.5) + 30% (47.6)
;re( 71-75) : - 16%(22.0) +1.3% (31.4) + 5.61(46.6)
Employment by sector of economic activity —  Absolute
shares 1977 and % change in employment 1970-1977
agriculture industry services total **
TRANCE
West 1 19.2 34.1 46.6 = 100
i A (70-77) -■19% + 3 % + 8 % = r_ 1^ .53
S.West 18.6 31.5 49.8 = 100
■19% ______ .tli.i______
Auvergne 16.3 34.6 49.1 = 100
■24% ______ ______ = -.2-41
Trance = 2 .2% (overall)
[TALY
:ampania 19.8 26.7 53.5 = 100
■28 % -23 % +41.0% .2%
^bruz zi­
tolise 25.3 26.4 48.4 = 100
P "1 L __________ ______ .-¿44 . Oi_____ 5 - . 1%-iud 24.6 27.5 47.8 ss 100
36 % _-lQ.A______ ______ = „ 1 .8%
Sicilia 21.9 25.9 52.1 = 100
26 % -22 % +41 £ = __Q.7%
Sardegna 16.2 28.5 55.4 = 100
40 % -16 % +42 % = 1.7%
[taly = 5.7% (overall)
[RE LAND
)onegal/NW 37.5 22 .6 39.9 = 100 (1975)
s à 1971/75 -27.1% -5.81 ._+§._%.______ = =1 1.0%
iest 49.2 19. 1 31.8 = 100
- 9.2% +9.3% ..-iJLl______ = Z-i.ll
'lidwest+ 25.7 31.4 42.9 = 100
-28% +1 0.2% + 9 % — - 3.4%
«. E. T4'T---------- 13.2 32.2 = 100
+ 0.5% -5.6% -9.6% = -4.9%
Ireland =
- 1.3% (overall)
it: only partly classified as D.A. +: largely classified as D.A.
Own estimates based on E.C. data.
^ Although these have been aggregated for easy reference, it should
be noted that % ag. enplpyinent in Molise and Basilicata is respecti-
vely 40% and 32% of the workforce.
varies between one fifth and one third of total employment, 
and is in most cases well below the national average;(iii) 
employment in services (the only major growth sector over 
the period considered) is relatively low in the French 
DAs and markedly below the national average in the Irish 
DA*s. In Italy however, the situation is the reverse, and 
at our present level of aggregation service employment is 
in general well above the national average. Furthermore, 
employment growth rates in this sector for both Italian 
and French DAs in general appear to be well above the na­
tional average1; (iv) growth rates in total employment 
are in all cases below the national average. For France 
and Italy the overall employment situation in the D.A.*s
1A number of-factors should be borne in mind in the Italian 
case. Firstly, in relation to regional population/tertiary 
activities are somwhat underrepresented in S.Italy (location 
quotient 0.8 1976)§—  the difference arises because of low 
participation rates in S.Italy c o m p a r e d  to the centre/North. 
Furthermore southern tertiary employment grew much more slow­
ly than southern population levels over the same period. 
Secondly, public administration was overrepresented in em­
ployment terms in 1976 in the Mezzogiorno as a whole (l.q.
= l.lt)). Thirdly, in terms of employment increase in the 
tertiary sector, the biggest gains came from public admini­
stration (3.1% per year from 1970-76), and financial ser­
vices (4.8% per annum). Rates of employment expansion in 
commerce, credit/insurance and the civil service were higher 
than for the rest of Italy (surprisingly employment growth in 
hotels, communications, restaurants, bars etc., was lower).
In terms of population, there was however no overall impro-. 
vement in the South's tertiary employment during the 1970's. 
Fourthly, given that "tertiary employment expansion ... in 
the seventies was not accompanied by any marked efforts at 
capital accumulation" (E.C.SO3^, it is possible that part of 
the employment take-up in this sector conforms to the dual- 
labour market theories of underemployment (Lutz '62,Bull '78).
*The role of the tertiary sector in regional policy. A Com­
parative study, pp. 82-83 and pp. 197-201.
§ Location quotient 1 = share of sector x employment to 
total employment(or population) is the same as for the 
country as a whole.
1^.
appears to be one of zero growth and for Ireland absolute 
decline. It is clear that in most cases employment gains 
in services have not been sufficient to compensate for 
losses in other sectors, particularly agriculture;
(v) As concerns employment growth rates, for France and 
Ireland there are few generalisations to be made. The N.E. 
of Ireland experienced net employment losses in industry 
and services, whilst only the mid-West of Ireland and West 
of France experienced gains in both. In Italy all regions 
in the South appear to have experienced employment losses 
in the industrial sector, equal to or greater than the 
national average. It is however worth pointing out that a 
large part of these losses are accounted for by the con­
struction sector, due to the completion of a number of in­
dustrial complexes in the early 1970'si- Another part is
due to the general secular decline in employment in small-
2scale firms in South Italy over the period considered .
In the case of Ireland the decline of tertiary employ­
ment in the West and N.E. is quite remarkable and very 
much in contrast to trends observed elsewhere. Moreover 
these two regions are the most underrepresented in tertiary 
employment levels (location quotients 0.68 and 0.6 9 respe-3ctively ).in 1975. In the Irish case the problem largely 
derives from (i) the concentration of tertiary activities 
in the Dublin area (48.8%in 1975) and (ii) the lack of si­
zeable urban populations elsewhere. In 1971 only five ur­
ban areas exceeded 30,000 inhabitants. This is important 
given that there is "a very close relationship between
^Employment in construction and public works fell by 10 3,000 
between 1970-75(ISTAT).
2For a detailed analysis of employment in manufacturing ind. 
in France and Italy see later, (ch.9).
3E.C.(1980), op. cit., p. 80.
a l .
urban size and the scale of tertiary activities in re­
gional centres"1.
The above comments lead us finally to consider the im­
plication of the above discussions regarding the l.d.r.'s 
labour market position and prospects. As we have already 
noted, the demographic and migratory balances in the West 
of Ireland and South of Italy imply growing labour market 
disequilibrium unless migration or the demand for labour 
increases significantly. The case of the Italian Mezzo­
giorno is presented below and concerns the estimated in­
crease on the supply side of the labour market over the
2three-year period 1978-1980(inclusive both dates ). The 
figures also bring out the extent to which employment de­
cline in the agricultural sector may aggravate this dise­
quilibrium.
3Estimates of the growth of the working population 1978-80 
( ' 0 0 0 persons)
Centre/North Mezzogiorno Italy
Increase in the la­
bour force 20 230 250
ESiplcyment loss in
agriculture 180 120 300
Total 200 350 550
Over the same period labour demand in the non-ag. sector 
in the Centre/North is expected to exceed supply by around 
150-200(ths), mainly due to expansion in the service sec­
tor. As for Southern Italy, the situation is clearly one of 
growing disequilibrium in the labour market. In order to
^Ibid. , p. 194.
2Casa per il Mezzogiorno - Programma quinquennale per il 
Mezzogiorno e direttive di attuazione. Rome 1977, p. 10. 
For discussion see M. D 'Antonio(1979), pp. 175-177.
3 ¿76 ibid.
give an impression of the overall situation i.e. with res­
pect to both supply and demand aspects, the table below 
relates changes in employment up to 1980 with our above 
figures on labour supply.
Changes in labour supply and demand 197 8-1980 ('000)
Centre/North Mezzogiorno Italy
Estimated increase in
labour force 200 350 555
Actual change in
employment 3 99 130 529
% Ain employment 2.7% 2 .1%
XS of L employment over '
A  labour force 199 -220 ~
Unemployment 1980
(July) 881* 932 1,813
Given that, overall, gains in industrial employment appear 
to have been more than offset by the decline of agricult­
ural employment (at the national, level and for both "regions"), 
it is clear that tertiary employment growth constitutes the 
major component in explaining the net- increase in employ­
ment in the late '70's. Employment gains in this sector 
were, in absolute terms, more than three times those of the 
industrial sector. As concerns S.Italy, the present and grow­
ing problem is mainly one of access labour supply. In general 
growth rates in services and industry have however become
4more favourable relative to the rest of the country . How-
*M. D'Antonio(1979), p. 176. Note: the estimates of employ­
ment loss in agriculture appear to be fairly accurate.
2July 197 8-July 1980. Own estimates based on ISTAT survey 
figures (Boll. Mensile, various issues).
^Persons actively looking for a job. However, the relative 
situation is not changed by taking a tighter definition of un­
employment. ISTAT survey figures.
*0f which around 50% were looking for their first job.
4 Between 1978 and 1980 employment in industry increased by 
4.4% in the South and 2.2% C/N, in absolute terms 71,000 
and 171,000 jobs respectively.
ever, relative to developments in the supply side of 
the labour market, such gains are clearly insufficient, 
and, unless measures can be taken to effectively stimulate 
labour demand, the net result m a y  be growing unemployment 
and a renewal of internal migration.1
The above discussion has hopefully served to outline 
the nature of some of the major factors underlying the 
regional problem in the less developed regions of the E.C. 
The analysis has been fairly general —  we have considered 
the regions at a high level of aggregation and given a 
broad overview of sectoral employment trends, together with 
some speculation as to the labour market situation in some 
of the regions considered. We have also attempted to clas­
sify some of the different regional problems or "scenarios" 
in the light of varying demographic trends.
However, it is clear that there are also a number of 
problems specific to particular regions, or even to areas 
within these regions. One obvious example is the problem 
of poor agricultural structures in the mountain areas of 
the Italian Appenines, the Massif Central in France and 
the West of Ireland. Such areas are often characterized by 
subsistence farming, outmigration and abandonment of poor 
agricultural land. In many cases these problems are com­
pounded by difficulty of access, weak urban framework (and 
corresponding lack of specialized services), and inadequate 
industrial structure. The existence of these factors only 
serves to make such regions even less attractive for new 
industry. Some types of problems may be directly dealt with
—  for example, Dublic expenditure to imorove urban struc-
x
ture, roads, telephone services and general living standards,
1 Migration figures for 19 7S(E.C.data) suggest that this is 
now in fact the case. For the French D . A .' s of the West and
S.West,such pressures are less evident in view of their rel­
atively low population growth; and for France(1979; net emig­
ration was highest in the northern industrial regions of 
Lorraine and Nord.
2
See E.C. (1973) Report on the regional problem in the enlarged 
Community; see also E.C. (1979) The Regional Develooment Pro­
grammes, esp. pp. 87-89(France), pp. 136-143(Italy) and po. 
118-125 (Ireland).
Others may require intervention in particular sectors —  
for example financial aid to Improve agricultural structu­
res and investment grants/loans to attract industry. Final­
ly, from a welfare point of view it may be desirable to 
provide income-maintenance programmes for the less well- 
off. This may occur partly through automatic transfers (pen­
sions, unemployment benefit, child allowances), or through 
other direct income support measures . Apart from welfare 
arguments, there are also a number of straightforward eco­
nomic arguments in support of such programmes. Firstly, 
income transfers reduce the(negativë multiplier effects of 
cyclical and secular demand variations and thereby help 
maintain the local.level of economic activity and employ­
ment in a downturn.
Secondly, income support for small-scale fanners in 
a sense helps to compensate for natural handicaps and pre­
vent the abandonment of land in often sparsely populated 
areas. Apart from helping to maintain population levels in 
local communities, there are a number of other side-bene- 
fits in the form of land-use economies (drainage, preven­
tion of erosion) and the provision of rural amenities and 
access. In other cases financial incentives to older far­
mers to withdraw from farming may enable agricultural struc­
tures to be improved and lead to more profitable land use.
So far we have analysed the regional problem in a some­
what general and static framework. Almost no mention has 
as yet been made of the factors which may influence the 
economic growth of a region or the overall pattern of re­
gional economic development, and we shall now turn to this 
question.
^Sg. directive 268/75 on selective income maintenance in 
hill farming and least favoured agricultural areas.
1.3. The spatial pattern of economic development.
In this section we shall consider whether the evidence 
would suggest any broad systematic pattern of economic 
activity in the European Community(9).
Close inspection of data on regional incomes, popula­
tion and the proportion of the workforce in industry/ser­
vices , provides some evidence for a systematic geographi­
cal pattern at the level of the E.C. The overall pattern 
of population distribution is itself one of fairly high 
concentration —  at the regional level, around 25% of the 
E.C. population lives on 6% of the total area, and about 
50% lives on 20% of the total area. "A few areas of high 
concentration stand out; one wide belt among them, the 
north-western European megalopolis, accommodating some 40% 
of the total population of the E.C. on no more than 20% of 
its total area"1.
As a guide to spatial growth patterns Map 1 provides an 
overview of average annual growth of GDP(volume) for the 
period 1950-70. The advantage of this approach is that it 
provides us with some idea of the concentration of economic 
activity over time; a process which may not be so evident 
when considering GDP per capita or per employed.
Very substantial differences appear, with the southern 
German regions recording av.annual growth rates of over 7% 
and other regions experiencing rates of between 1-7%.
One tendency is clearly that regions with similar
growth rates often belong to the same country - suggesting
that "national factors determine to a large extent the
2growth of GDP in theregions of a country".
1 Molle et al(1930),p .153.
2 ibid p.37.
Map 1. Average annual volume growth of GDP 195Q-70(%)
Source: Molle et al(1980),Regional disparity and economic 
development in the European Community, p .38.
^ Thus for example, developments in the East of France 
appear to be largely related to growth in France as a who 
and totally unrelated to growth in the contiguous regions 
of southern Germany.
Secondly, in terms of GDP per inhabitant,1 regional 
income appears to decline rather systematically with dis­
1 E.C. Atlas (1979); Biehl et al, Weltwirtschaft(1972). 
See also annex to this chapter.
tance to the west of an axis, roughly between Düsseldorf 
and Oberbayern in South Germany (the Paris region being an 
exception ). In general the poorest regions in terms of per 
capita income are to be found at the European periphery, 
that is, the West of Ireland, Brittany, South-West France 
and Southern Italy.
Conceptually the industrial axis 
in Europe is concentrated around a line drawn roughly 
from the North of England to Milan1, with a large concen­
tration in what may be ^ termed the economic centre of the
E.C., that is the Rhine/Ruhr area.
2According to one.study , the overall pattern of indus­
trial development in this central area may be generalized 
as follows. Over the period 1950-60 employment growth in ex­
panding manufacturing industries was highest in the area 
largely encircling the economic centre as described above3, 
and markedly lower in regions situated towards the Euro­
pean periphery. By 1960-65 there appeared to be some 
evidence of improved growth in the outlying areas, however • 
the peripheral regions continued to make much slower pro­
gress which was furthermore compounded by relatively high4employment losses in declining industries .
Although the position of many of the peripheral areas 
appears to have markedly improved since the late 60's^> it 
is doubtful whether such improvement can be largely attri­
buted to purely market forces given the high levels of ex-
I .See annex. Within continental Europe the axis would appear 
to run from Düsseldorf to Milan.
2C. Clark et al., R.S. 1969, no. 2, esp. pp. 208-209.
3pp. 20 3 and 208. Largely excluding the Benelux countries. 
"In these countries the disadvantages of the tariff bar­
riers to trade and the comparatively small home markets 
have outweighed the advantages of location in the centre 
of Europe”.p. 20 3.
^For more detailed figures see for example (Italy) Pcdbielski 
(1978)SVIMEZ (France)Chapter 5 in present text(and referen­
ces) , (Ireland) NESC Report no. 4.
 ^That is, in terms of employment growth(see Ch.9).
penditure on regional policies in these areas. Furthermore 
it seems to be the case that the intensity of industrial 
spread from the core-regions is inversely related to dis­
tance1. Hence the regions at the periphery are often the 
last to gain.
Fourthly, systematic patterns in tertiary employment are 
a more complex matter to untangle. This problem arises from 
a variety of factors; firstly, the tertiary sector is it­
self composed of a number of diverse sectors (public admi­
nistration, "producer" services and "consumer" services). 
Some types of servicfes are specifically related to the lo­
cal market, others, especially producer services may rely 
partially or largely on demand well outside regional boun­
daries. Briefly we may categorize the various sectors as 
2follows :
- consumer services, defined as final services provided 
directly to consumers, essentially serve local po­
pulations, and their location normally follows a rela­
tively dispersed pattern. Within this sector we may 
distinguish publically and privatelj provided servi­
ces. Concerning the latter, it appears that in many 
cases the provision of services is closely related to 
the size of the market* served3. This sometimes results 
in marked deficiencies in some regions. In other cases 
these deficiencies appear to be explained more by 
factors such as age-structure, socio-economic struc­
ture and proximity to other large towns rather than
* See Chapter 9.
2E.C.(1980) The role of the tertiary sector in regional po­
licy.
3Ibid., p. 160.
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by variation in income and the overall level of ur­
banisation1 ;
- producer services, defined as intermediate services 
provided to other firms, are almost all heavily con­
centrated in larger urban areas. Furthermore, there
2is evidence of increasing concentration in such areas .
In general it seems that producer services are more
usefully analysed in the context of tertiary activi-
ties within secondary sector firms3. There appears to
be some evidence that larger multiplant firms tend
to make greater use of internalized services than
4smaller oneplant firms which have to buy in most of 
the services they use. Furthermore it is probable 
that the recourse to business services outside the re­
gion in a number of peripheral areas reflects insuffi­
cient local producer service provision^. Lastly, 
firms in urbanized areas tend to promote demand for 
more specialized technical services such as engineers 
and market monitoring^.
- public administration, which on the whole tends to
be distributed in a relatively even fashion, although 
with some notable exceptions. In S. Italy, for exam­
ple, the population based location quotient for public
1Ibid., p. 155.
2Ibid., p. 194. No such trend was found for consumer ser­
vices as a whole.
3Ibid., p. 160.
4Ibid., p. 153, and J.N. Marshall(1979),R.S. no. 6 .
^See J.N. Marshall{1979), p. 556. The dependence on central 
areas appears to be fairly high, for example, 50.2% of all 
service supplies located outside the Northern region(U.K.) 
were situated in London or the South East, ibid., p. 544.
6D.C. Rich(1980), R.S. no 3, p. 171.
31
administration(.94) is higher than for any other ter­
tiary sector . In France, although concentration is
high in the Paris area, public administration quotients 
show a more even regional pattern than all other ter­
tiary sectors apart from trade and commerce. In the 
case of Ireland, however, employment in public ad­
ministration (incl. defence) is overwhelmingly con­
centrated in the Dublin area3. A similarly concentra­
ted pattern of public administration employment is4found in Denmark . In the U.K., although there 
is certainly a high degree of concentraion in the 
Greater London-area and the South East (population 
based 1. g. 1.45 and 1.14 respectively^), it is dif­
ficult to determine whether this degree of concentra­
tion is higher than for services as a whole. Finally 
for West Germany it appears that employment in local 
government (incl. social insurance) is more highly con­
centrated in agricultural than in industrial zones**.
This suggests a compensatory tendency given it is 
predicted that, overall, tertiary sector employment 
will grow especially in highly industrialized zones7.
The overall position is therefore that whilst employ­
ment in public administration conforms to the general pat­
tern of tertiary employment i.e. concentrated in urban and 
central areas, there is some evidence for several countries 
(France, Italy and to some extent W.Germany) that this ten- 
dency is less pronounced for public administration than
1E.C.(1980), op.cit., p. 83.
2Maximum 1.27(Paris) minimum .80(Nord) population based.
3In 1966, Dublin accounted for around 47% of employment in 
public administration as against 2 8% of total employment 
ESRI(1975), Report no. 81, p. 68 appendix 2.
4E.C.(1980), p. 76. 5Ibid., p. 87.
6Ibid., p. 79. 7Ibid., p. 178.
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for the tertiary sector as a whole.
Finally, taking an overall view of the tertiary sector 
for the E.C. as a whole, it is notable that, compared to 
primary and secondary employment, "regional differences 
for employment in services are the least and the propor­
tions the most similar, in every country."
To sum up the above discussion, firstly there is a high 
concentration of industry along what may be termed the 
E.C. development axis (North of England, Düsseldorf, Mi­
lan) . Employment in services however shows a much more 
dispersed pattern, the main reasons for which should be 
clear from our previous discussion. It would seem that, 
although a substantial part of the tertiary sector is 
linked directly or indirectly with manufacturing indus­
try, factors determining the location of tertiary ac­
tivities as a whole are very diverse and no single theory 
appears to be sufficient.
The general impression is therefore one of very substan­
tial and long term regional disparities in economic perform­
ance. However, the above discussion leaves a number of impor­
tant points unanswered. For example, if, in relative terms 
regional income differences have remained fairly persistant, 
can it be argued that in real terms everyone has achieved a 
higher standard of living and therefore regional differences 
are now of less importance than in say, 1950 or 1960 ? On the 
other hand can it be argued that interpersonal income differ­
ences have even widened so that any ’real' gains have been ach­
ieved by some to the exclusion of others ? It is to such 
questions we shall now turn in the following chapter.
E.C.(1978), "Regional Statistics - main regional indicat­
ors", p. 29. However, given the important influence of 
urbanisation it may rather be argued that the sub-rpgional 
level is a more appropriate basis for analysing spatial 
differences in tertiary employment.
ANNEX
Industrial employment as % 
cf total employment(E.C.= 1 0 0)
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Foreword
Whilst in Chapter 1 we were able to point to several 
indicators of the economic capacity and performance of the 
less developed regions in Europe, from another point of view 
it cannot be said that any great insight was obtained into the 
distribution of incomes(or living standards) within such reg­
ions - in other words, the geography of welfare.
In point of fact, very little appears to be known 
about the distribution of incomes within regions, or for that 
matter, whether intra-regional disparities are greater than 
inter-regional. The question is however of some importance in 
the present context; if it is seen to be the case for example 
that low-income regions(measured in G.D.P. per capita) are 
characterised by rather insignificant intra- regional disp­
arities, whilst the reverse is the case for relatively high 
income regions, then, at the limit, it may result that those 
persons with the lowest incomes are almost entirely situated 
in the latter, and the 'regional problem' as such may have 
been unduly overstressed. Of course, if the opposite holds, 
traditional indicators will tend to underestimate the regional 
problem and the spatial nature of income disparities.
In a dynamic context even more questions of this 
nature remain to be answered. Conventional wisdom would have 
it that as the average level of economic well-being in a 
country increases, so the problem of poverty and destitution 
in certain sectors of society should gradually fade in impor­
tance. Poverty as such would then become primarily a relative 
concept ('relative deprivation'), in the ser.se that for a per­
son to be m  poverty would simply imply being below some min­
imum standard of living regarded as acceptable for the society 
in question. A report of the British Social Science Research 
Council defined the relativistic view as follows,*
" Peoole are'poor' because they are deprived of the 
opportunities, comforts and self-respect regarded 
as normal in the community to which they belong.
It is,therefore, the continually moving average
-------------------  cont/
S.S.R.C., ’Research on Poverty", London, 1365, p.5.
.. standards of that community that are the 
starting points for an assessment of its 
poverty, and the poor are those who fall  ^
sufficiently below these average standards".
Nevertheless, the notion of poverty in some 'absolute' 
sense cannot be dispensed with so easily, even in some of 
the most highly advanced western economies. For example, 
one official U.S. study reads,
"Our analysis thus tends to cast some doubt 
on the wisdom of relying too heavily on 
aggregate demand or the job market as a means 
to combat poverty... it is... surprising to 
find such a large number of families whose 
economic status remained impervious to the 
general prosperity of the time".l
In part to avoid, this type of confusion, an essentially 
'absolutist' approach (see introduction) towards defining 
poverty will be taken in the country studies which follow, 
the reasons for which will be made clear shortly.
The second main aim of this study is to provide a better 
understanding of the (potentially numerous) causes of poverty. 
Specifically, it will be instructive to see whether such in­
equalities take on an essentially socio-economic nature (ie. 
only some groups of workers, unemployed or retired), in which 
case sectoral or(household)income-maintenance programmes are 
called for; or, whether inequalities are primarily of a reg­
ional nature - that is, socio-economic groups are equally 
'poor' in particular regions - in which case policies to prom­
ote regional economic development might be more appropriate.
Of course, the actual result may in fact suggest the necess­
ity for some combination of the two. Furthermore, it should 
also be born in mind that in practice, the implementation of 
income-maintenance programmes towards certain sectors of the 
community may have a significant influence on the local level 
of disposable income in certain regions, and on the spatial 
distribution of incomes in general.
In essence, the case for regional policy is dependent
not only on its ability to promote industrial development, but
moreover, on the ability of the latter and economic growth in
T.F. Kelly, article in Report to Presidents Camussion on Income 
Maintenance Programs, Technical Studies, Washington D.C. 1970, p.47
3*.
general, to achieve convergence in terms of the spatial 
configuration of welfare, and it will be interesting to 
see whether the following studies suggest any link between 
the two.
2.1. Introduction to country studies on the extent of
poverty and low-incomes in the less developed regions.
To deal with the background and thinking behind present 
policies of many Western European administrations and instit­
utions towards the poor often entails tracing back their 
origins for a great number of years. Very little attempt 
appears to have been made by such bodies in recent years to 
take a new look at the problem of poverty, to redefine the 
concept, or to examine the actual living conditions of those 
firmly situated at the bottom of the economic and social 
ladder - let alone to consider any possible regional dimen­
sions of the problem. Poverty it would seem, is a question 
with which few governments really appear to want to get to 
terms.
In part perhaps,the very difficulty of defining 
'poverty1 may provide one explanation for such reticence
- and in the discussion which follows on alternative concepts 
of poverty, the alternatives put forward should perhaps be 
interpreted more in terms of different definitions that are 
possible, rather than in terms of a search towards some 'true' 
or scientific concept of poverty, which quite simply, does 
not exist.
In dealing with the definition and measurement 
of poverty in an operative context, certain major issues 
arise, of which the most important are;
(i) definition of the concept used,
(ii) definition of the poverty line and the unit in question 
(ie. household, family or individual),
(iii) examination of the data available and the extent to 
which such data are amenable to the analysis at hand 
(eg. level of aggregation),
(iv) attempts to measure the depth of poverty ('poverty-gap') 
overall, or for particular groups in society.
S3.
Much of the following discussion will be taken up with the 
first two issues, without however attempting anything more 
than an overview of the main questions involved.
~ _£he_E2Y?EtY_line ■
There are essentially two fundamental positions
which can be taken towards the definition of poverty. The
first is to define poverty in absolute terms, which generally
implies some definition of the minimum level of consumption
or access to certain necessities which are essential to sur-
t
vive. The second is to define poverty in relative terms, given 
a particular ’strategic' ratio in terms of consumption/income 
for the unit chosen to the average level for the society in 
which that unit is living (eg. 50% of average income). Certain 
difficulties arise in defining and assessing both of these 
approaches. Compromise solutions exist and some will be men­
tioned below.
-'absolute^ poverty measures,
Concerning the absolute approach problems arise partic­
ularly in defining what represents a minimum necessary level 
of consumption or income. If consumption(food and other ess­
ential items) is taken as a reference point,then some decision 
on what constitutes a minimum-subsistence diet has to be reac- 
ed . Unfortunately, much room for discussion still remains 
concerning such diets; in particular with respect to the minim­
um levels of certain nutrients required for good health1. Even 
granted the possibility of arriving at some minimum cost diet 
by maximising the combination of individual nutrients (calories, 
minerals, vitamins, fats etc.) subject to given budget con­
straints and minimum levels for any paricular nutrient, the 
poor themselves can hardly be expected to be very proficient
at such an excercise. Apart from such obvious questions of
2efficiency in purchasing an equally important consideration 
is that consumption will often be largely dictated by taste 
and nationalfor even regional) custom, and quite clearly 
the two questions are even to some extent interconnected.
ho.
Consequently, a good case can be put forward for 
basing the poverty line (even where an absolute approach is 
adopted) on some observed consumption pattern (that is, of low 
income groups) typical of the society considered. By taking 
account of actual consumption it is then possible to arrive 
at some minimum subsistence level which satisfies not only 
physical needs but also allows some marginal element to cover 
additional expenditures which derive from customary practices3 
as well as some acceptable degree of inefficiency in purchasing.
If this general approach is adopted (eg. Italian study), 
there are a number of reasons to prefer the use of consumption 
as against income statistics (this is also true of other appr­
oaches to measuring poverty - see on).
In the first place, and in general, short-term variations 
in income are unlikely to be fully reflected in terms of 
equivalent changes in consumption patterns, since to some 
extent individuals or households may be able to draw upon 
savings or borrow money from other sources.
Secondly, apart from particular difficulties which often 
arise concerning underreporting of incomes, the process of 
arriving at disposable income (total income less direct tax­
ation plus transfers) is rarely straightforward - often simply 
because non-taxable income is not stated in declaration of 
taxable income.
Thirdly, and most important, the transition from def­
ining poverty in terms of consumption (food and other ess­
ential items) to arriving at some minimum level of income 
presents a number of additional problems, not least that 
of allowing for other budgetary items (e. housing), actual 
expenditure on which may in practice vary substantially from
4case to case even amongst 'poor' households .
Lastly, whilst measurement of poverty in terms of(food) 
consumption essentially limits the 'efficiency' problem men­
tioned earlier to this sector of expenditure, adoption of 
an income measure probably extends this problem to a much 
greater degree(to the extent that less-essential items are 
ipso facto included). The 'efficiency' problem was at an early
b 1.
stage recognised by Rowntree(1901)^, who distinguished 
between 'primary' poverty where total earnings were insuff­
icient however efficiently consumers allocated their incomes, 
and 'secondary' poverty resulting from some portion being 
absorbed by expenditure on other non-essential items.
Hence, if an absolute definition of poverty is adopted, 
there are certainly good reasons to prefer measurement in 
terms of consumption.
Alternatively, some sort of semi-absolute measure
- which implies acceptance of the fact that what society 
regards as 'necessary' changes over time - may be adopted in 
preference to tighter definitions which of necessity require 
calculation of minimum subsistence diets. This approach may be 
particularly useful if, for example, income data only are 
available(e.g. France), or in the case where poverty is meas­
ured by reference to certain essential goods.
- relative_poverty_measures,
Relative definitions usually imply the measurement of 
poverty in terms of some ratio of consumption or income of 
the unit in question (household, family or individual) to the 
average level for the society in which that unit is living.
When studying relatively advanced societies, and also to enable 
broad comparisons to be made on a similar basis, it now seems 
fairly generally accepted that some type of relativistic def­
inition is more appropriate. In this sense, a person could 
be somewhat above a mere subsistence level but still be class­
ified as 'poor' relative to the average standard of living in 
the society to which he/she belongs.
It goes almost without saying that adoption of this 
definition will imply very different standards of living 
for the 'poor', both over time where real income is rising, 
and between countries where average income differs signific­
antly. Moreover, the term 'poverty' itself tends to lose 
significance and meaning since there is no longer any logical 
connection made between the definition of poverty, and what 
the 'poor' actually consume or the living standards they 
actually experience.
w*.
- 'official^ definitions of_poverty,
Official ’poverty' lines are rare, but more often var­
ious public income-maintenance programmes or minimum-wage 
legislation may provide some insight into what the state at 
any one time regards as a minimum acceptable standard of living.
Such 'definitions' are useful in that they provide a 
fairly objective means of defining poverty, and , of course 
the question to what extent official objectives have in fact 
been achieved is, in itself of some importance.
Nevertheless, certain problems again arise when compar­
ing results over time and between countries. Some countries 
may be more 'generous' than others^, or again, the use of 
different official benefit levels (eg. pensions, unemployment 
benefit, minimum wages etc.) relating to different groups in 
society may imply that inter-country comparisons should be 
interpreted with a great deal of care.
Another problem is that, over time, upward movements 
in the real value of official 'poverty lines' may result in an 
increase in the observed incidence of poverty even though, in 
some sense, the 'poor' as a group may have become better off.
To take one example, in the U.K. concern has been noted over 
the failure to reduce the proportion of the population (around
3 to 4 % of households) below the official poverty line( ie. 
Supplementary Benefit scale rate). And as one author has rem­
arked, "it is often forgotten that in real terms... this pov­
erty line is twice as high as in 1948".7 However, in this 
particular case, the actual facts are somewhat more complex 
than they would first appear. Whilst the above statement is
0
certainly quite correct , it should also be noted that the 
1948 scale rates were in fact based on Beveridge's 1938 cal- 
culations of minimum subsistence which were, in turn based 
on Rowntree' s 1937 'subsistence diet (untested). Moreover, 
the resulting 1948 benefits actually turned out to be lower 
than those proposed by Beveridge, being updated by only 56% 
in spite of the fact that the cost of living had actually 
risen by 73% between 1938 and 1948^. More recently it has 
been argued, (i) that the Retail Price Index(RPI) does not 
adequately reflect changes in the cost of living for low-
hZ.
-income households11, and (ii) that the scale-rates for dep­
endents (again,based on Beveridge 1938) grossly underestimate
12the actual cost of maintaining a child . Lastly, rent is not 
allowed for in payment (by D.H.S.S.) of the Supplementary Ben­
efit (together with other major items of bedding and furnishing), 
and, although an allowance is paid separately by the Supplem­
entary Benefits Commission, the amount of this allowance in 
practice rarely reaches 100% of actual rent, and is often 
considerably less. 13 Taking this reasoning to its logical con­
clusion, it seems quite clear that an individual who is tot­
ally dependent on Supplementary Benefit (plus rent allowance) 
and therefore at the 'official' poverty line, is either, (i) 
supposed to do without furnishing, or (ii) deduct such expen­
ses from his/her allowance for food and other necessities.
Hence, in the case of the U.K., whilst an official 
poverty line can be said to exist, many doubts remain when 
assessing whether in fact it can be termed adequate. Moreover 
the U.K. system provides an instructive example in that, in a 
unique sense it can be seen to derive from some 'scientific' 
basis. In many other countries (including those covered in 
the present survey) it is often extremely difficult to inter­
pret equivalent benefit payments, either because there is 
little information on what types of expenditure they are act­
ually supposed to cover, or more simply because there is little 
indication of how they were arrived at in the first place.
As a result, whilst on the one hand official or quasi­
official poverty-lines might seem to present a fairly objec­
tive standard on which to base an analysis, on the other, the 
interpretation of benefit levels must always be treated with 
a great deal of care.
In conclusion, choice of the operative concept to be 
adopted will depend very much on,(i) purpose of the analysis,
(ii) type of country or countries under consideration, and
(iii) available data. Generally speaking, in the following 
studies on Italy, Ireland and France, a fairly restrictive 
approach (semi-absolute) has been adopted, the main reason 
being that a purely relativistic approach would almost certainly
have abstracted from what is a very real problem - that is, 
the existence of a substantial degree of hardship amongst a 
very significant proportion of the present population of 
the European Community(9).
Nevertheless, certain problems have arisen with this 
approach - not least of these being that the respective poverty 
lines adopted must certainly be expected to represent rather 
different real values and standards of living (although con­
siderably less than if a relativistic definition had been 
adopted). Given the problems involved, it was not however
considered feasible to compare the real values implied by the
14respective poverty lines . The broad lines of approach 
may however be classified as follows in descending order of 
restrictiveness or severity;
- for Italy, an absolute approach was taken based on a min­
imum subsistence diet (untested) and consumption data,
- for Ireland, income(survey) data were used and the poverty 
line was based on U.K. Supplementary Benefit levels(see above),
- for France, disposable income data were used, and the pov­
erty line was calculated on the basis of minimum-wage legis­
lation .
Broadly speaking, the French poverty-line 
almost certainly corresponded to a somewhat higher standard 
of living than that adopted for Ireland or Italy - however, 
this is in some sense unavoidable given that real per capita 
income in France (PPS) was around 40% higher than in Italy 
and 80% higher than in Ireland around the mid-1970' s, "*and 
that minimum-wages and benefit levels must,to some extent,be 
expected to reflect such differences. In turn, the Italian 
poverty-line being based on a minimum subsistence diet, is 
probably somewhat lower than that for Ireland, and some adjust­
ment has been made to facilitate a rough comparison between 
these two countries'^.
Hence, with certain qualifications (mainly relating 
to data sources) the abovementioned poverty lines may be 
considered to be broadly comparable, if, at the same time one 
takes into account the very substantial differences in average 
levels of G.D.P. per capita of the respective countries. In 
this sense a semi-absolute evaluation of poverty may best 
describe the overall approach adopted.
I^ i .
Having examined the theoretical considerations in­
volved in the following surveys, it now remains to enlarge up­
on some of the more important methodological questions.
- unit_of analysis,
In deciding upon the unit of analysis to be adopted, 
data availability is often in practice one of the major det­
ermining considerations. However, since this in turn raises 
certain inteipretive problems, it may be useful to discuss the 
alternatives available.
Basically the choice of unit is limited to three poss­
ibilities; the individual, the family, or the household. How­
ever, since a large part of consumption in most cases involves 
a joint-decision(apart from single persons living alone), 
measurement of poverty in terms of the individual ('head-count' 
measure) will necessarily imply some form of disaggregation 
from one of the other two alternatives. As will become clear, 
this transition itself presents certain difficulties, mainly 
related to the question of income-sharing.
In general, the household unit is often chosen, being 
considered as the most appropriate unit as concerns spending 
decisions. However, at this level the unit may in fact comprise 
two or more sources of earnings such that resource-sharing 
may be present to a greater or lesser extent. Equally, the 
absence of resource-sharing in households situated above the 
poverty-line may lead to neglect of individuals in the anal­
ysis who, to all intents and purposes may in reality be sub­
ject to some degree of poverty. More evident perhaps, where 
the size-distribution of households in poverty does not corr­
espond to that for the population as a whole, there may clearly 
arise certain numerical differences as between household and 
head-count measures.
In moving from household measures to head-count est­
imates, detailed information is required on household compo­
sition, and again,problems arise concerning income-sharing. 
Inevitably, summation of all household members will include
Mi.
some individuals who are better-off(ie. above poverty-line).
On the other hand, and perhaps more important(at least insofar as 
not reflected in poverty-gap measures) certain 'poor' will be 
excluded simply because they do not belong to a 'poor' hcus- 
hold (see above).
- adjustment_of goverty-line,
Definition of the poverty-line for any particular house­
hold or family unit presents another set of problems. It is 
intuitively clear for example that if the poverty-line for 
a single adult is estimated to be £x per week,the equivalent 
line for a couple with three children cannot be deduced simply 
by multiplying £x by a factor of five. In general it is agreed 
that the individual needs of children are somewhat lower than 
those of adults, and "that there are certain opportunities for 
achieving economies of scale when several people live together 
(e$. housing, purchasing and food). Adjustment to take account 
of these factors is achieved by means of 'Adult Equivalent 
Scales'(A.E.S.) which are applied to the family or household 
unit. The precise nature of A.E.S. varies somewhat depending 
on which type of approach is adopted(ie. absolute, relative or 
'official' based) and whether the poverty-line is set in terms 
of food(or 'essential') expenditure, or total expenditure/in­
come. However, the basic idea remains the same.
Determination of appropriate A.E.S. is an extremely 
complex affair, and the approach adopted in the following sur­
veys has been to use 'official' scales when dealing with income 
-based poverty-lines(Ireland, France), and medical scales 
when dealing with food consumption estimates(Italy). Whilst 
there may always be some disagreement on the adequacy of such 
scales (see back), a process of re-estimation would quite 
clearly have been outside the scope of this paper.
- the poverty-gag,
Finally, we come to consider measures of poverty which 
also take into account the degree to which the unit considered 
actually falls below the adopted poverty-line. This difference
is defined as the 'poverty-gap', and alternatively, represents
the amount of additional income or consumption which would be
required to bring the unit in question up to the poverty-line.
From an analytical viewpoint such estimates are clearly of
18great interest in assessing the depth of the problem , and 
making comparisons between countries, over time, or between 
socio-economic groups at a given time.
Secondly, from a policy viewpoint, head-count measures 
used alone may give a somewhat misleading impression of the 
effectiveness of redistributive policies or other changes 
which may affect the distribution of incomes. For example, a 
policy aimed at improving the incomes of certain groups very 
largely situated just below the poverty-line, may have a sig­
nificant impact in reducing the number of poor but result in 
very little change in the absolute poverty-gap. Again, changes 
which resulted in a transfer of income from households below 
the poverty-line to those above, would leave the head-count 
measure unaffected but result in an increase in the poverty- 
gap measure.
In conclusion, the poverty-gap approach prov­
ides an important policy tool in defining, i) the depth of 
the poverty problem, ii) the socio-economic groups mainly 
concerned, and, iii) the likely magnitude of resources nec­
essary to achieve a given reduction in poverty . Needless to 
say, statistical sources often pose restrictions to the type 
of analysis one would like to perform, and this problem is 
particularly relevant for poverty-gap measures which require 
more detailed information than is always necessary for head­
count estimates. Consequently, we have included poverty-gap 
measures where this has been possible - otherwise relying 
on partial analysis to estimate the depth of poverty for part­
icular groups where figures are available.
One point of emphasis in the following studies 
concerns the potential role of the state in eliminating pov­
erty. As a number of previous studies have pointed out, although 
in many Western European countries poverty is by no means neg­
ligible in terms of the numbers involved, in terms of resources 
required to eliminate poverty(ie. based on poverty-gap measures) 
relatively small amounts would be required, either in relation 
to total government expenditure or for that matter in relation
to existing levels of expenditure on income-maintenance prog-
19rairanes . However, given the need for specific programmes to 
eliminate such conditions at their source, a number of appr­
oaches may be required, including for example the whole array 
of income-maintenance benefits, as well as sector specific 
programmes and subsidies(eg. viz. mountain-farming areas), reg­
ional development programmes for less-developed areas, and var­
ious types of legislation ranging from minimum-wages to land- 
use control.
The following studies will hopefully serve to high­
light the nature, causes and spatial dimension of poverty, as 
well as pointing to some directions relevant policies could 
perhaps best follow. In the last instance it is to be hoped 
that the necessary political will to alleviate poverty shall 
not be lacking, and that just concern for the poor will even­
tually find some expression in future Community policies.
NOTES
1) For example, even with respect to simple energy requirements 
it has been found that there is a wide range of necessary 
energy intakes within any age-group. Widdowson, 1947, "A 
study of individual children's diets", London, H.M,S.O..In 
a historical context, an example deriving from analysis of 
the accounts of a charitable institution in Normandy and 
conditions therein (hôpital general de Caen, 1725), shows 
up some of the possible consequences of inadequate diets 
on physical conditions;
"Bread and peas provided in the hôpital nearly 90% of total calories, 
some 3,000 per capita daily; the diet consisted thus of an excess of 
vegetable proteins and a gross deficiency of fats. Moreover tvro vit­
amins in particular were lacking. The diet as a whole provided scar­
cely half the required amount of vitamin D. This serious deficiency had 
fatal consequences because it encouraged rickets, skeletal calcification 
with associated deformities. Above all, the children and adolescents 
who had to work so young suffered___ Even worse was the near total ab­
sence of vitamin C. This explains the vulnerability of the poor to scur- 
vey, as well as their low resistance when faced with heavy exertion, 
cold, or infection." Lis and Soly(1979),"Poverty and Capitalism in 
Pre-Industrial Europe", Harvester Press.
The link between physical condition and poverty was also 
stressed by Rowntree, 1901, in his anthrometric study of 
children.
2) From one U.K. survey it would appear that very substantial 
differences in purchasing efficiency arise as between house­
holds, although in general, low-income groups and larger fam­
ilies would seem to purchase foodstuffs more efficiently than 
other categories. See, Walker and Church, "Poverty by admin­
istration: a review of supplementary benefits, nutrition and 
scale-rates ", Journal of Human Nutrition, li37§, No. 32 , pp. 5-18 .
3) For example, in Rowntree's calculation of the minimum subsis­
tence level, the least-cost diet adopted included some allow­
ance for the consumption of tea. Rowntree, 193 7, "The Human 
Needs of Labour", Longman, London.
4) An analysis of low-income families in France for example found 
that whilst some 40% occupied rented dwellings, the remaining 
60% either owned their dwellings or paid nothing. The quality 
of housing occupied is, of course another matter. INSEE, serie 
M, no.8 6 . Jan. 1981, p.145.
5) B.5. Rowntree, 1901, "Poverty; A Study of Town Life", Macmillan, 
London.
6) eg. O.E.C.D., "Public Expenditure on Income-Maintenance 
Programmes", Paris, 1976.
7) Ibid., Table 26.
8 ) W. Beckerman, "The impact of income-maintenance programmes on 
poverty in four developed countries", I.L.O., Geneva, 19 79.
9)_See, Social Security Statistics - 1975 , Dept, of Health and Social 
Security, 19 77'. Since 1943 the Supplementary Benefit Level has 
been continously adjusted in line with changes in the average 
wags of male manual workers, and more recently, in line with 
the R.?.I..
W. Beveridge, 1942,"Social Insurance and Allied Services",
H.M.S.O., London. As a number of authors have argued, it was 
quite an unfortunate and unexpected event that Rowntree's 0.937) 
restrictive definition of poverty - adopted in order to support 
his argument that poverty did exist - subsequently evolved 
into the administrative basis around which the post-war social 
security system was eventually constructed. See, Walker and 
Church (1973), Atkinson, 1970, Camb. Occ. papers, No. 13,
Kincaid, 197 5,"Poverty and Inequality in 3ritain", Penguin,
George(1973).
V, George, 197 3, "Social Security and Society", Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London. Furthermore, 3everidge had allowed less 
for an individual at subsistence level than Rowntree(by ommit- 
ting the allowance for sundries), and made no allowance for 
the increased cost of living between 1935 and 1938. He did 
however allow an element of 6% for inefficiency in purchasing 
(in respect of adults only). Walker and Church, 1978, p.11.
Low Pay Unit, 197 7; evidence to the Royal Commission on the Dis­
tribution of Income and Wealth, unpubl. paper.
Piachauc D. 1979, "The Cost of a Child", Child Poverty Action 
Group, London. See also, Walker ar.d Church(1978) .
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12 ) 
~ 13)
so.
14) No allowance for furnishing is made, since the amount of the 
subsidy is based solely on rentable value less furnishing.
15) The difficulties involved in such a task are quite substantial - 
adjustment purely on the basis of current exchange rates, would 
not take into account differences in purchasing power as between 
countries, and, even if adjustment were possible in this latter 
respect, the end result would certainly not reflect cost of liv­
ing differences for low income families, given, in particular 
that consumption patterns may differ substantially between 
countries for such groups.
16) "European Economy", July 1981, table 7.2.(in purchasing power 
standards and at current prices and purchasing power parities).
17) See text; reference relates to the Italian poverty-line + 20%.
18) The relevence of this point(especially concerning retired per­
sons sharing a household) is brought out in one of the studies 
quoted viz. France. In general however, very little is known 
about the important question of income-sharing.
19) For example, M.C. Sawyer,"Poverty in some developed countries"
O.E.C.D., 1975, - "Estimates based on our 'standardised' poverty- 
line indicate that a shift of resources equal to 1% of GDP to 
the poor could virtually eliminate poverty(as defined by that 
poverty-line) in most countries ..."(viz. BelCanada,Australia, 
France,Ire.,U.K.,U.S..). p.10. See also present text with res­
pect to study on Italy which largely confirms this order of 
magnitude.
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ITALY
The approach adopted in this survey is similar to that 
for Ireland. Consumption statistics form the basis of 
the study and are supplemented by regional and provinc­
ial figures for net domestic product per person.
The reasons for this should perhaps be explained. Al­
though national expenditure surveys are generally of 
wide geographical coverage, problems of statistical 
significance are encountered when these are broken down 
not only by region, but by income category and family 
size. For Ireland we were able to give statistics by 
region and income category and by region and family 
size. For Italy, we must use consumption figures by 
consuirption category aidfamily size, by region and family 
size, by employment sector and region, and by employment 
sector and family size. The first of these statistics 
enables us, once having determined the poverty line in 
terms of consumption, to give an accurate estimate of 
the number of persons below this line. The last three 
groups of statistics enable us to give an idea of the 
magnitude of regional variations in consumption.
The statistics used in this paper are derived from the 
annual I.S.T.A.T. survey1 "I consumi delle famiglie” for 
1975.*
The first set of figures we have derived are shown in 
table 1. They give an overall view of national dispar­
ities in total consumption levels. Over 14% of the 
population belonged to households where consumption 
per person was below Lit. 50,000 per month. In other 
words their consumption was less than 46% of the national 
average.
1This annual survey covers 36,000 households, by means 
of a .rolling monthly sample of 3,000 households.
*Autoconsumption of farm produce is one of the main problems 
encountered in such surveys - particularly important 
with regard to Italy, where this is very common. The 
ISTAT survey correctly measures such consumption at 
market prices. ./.
TABLE 1
Household consumption per person by family sire. <I975> .
(a) Household consumption per person per month under L . 30,000
N° persons 
in tiousenoLd
%  of households 
in ca teqory ^  L.2: N°households
2 persons 1.5 54,255
3 persons .74 27,343
4-5 persons 1.14 62,050
6+ persons 11.78 186,006
Total
Household consumption per person per month under L.40,000
2 persons 4.5 163,000
3 persons 2. 38 88,000
4-5 persons 5.0 272,000
6+ persons 20.0 316,000
Total
(c) Household consumpti on -oer verson per month under L.50,000
N°per<sons
108.510
82,029
273,020
1,264,841 
I,728,400
= 3.05% of 
popula t ion
326.000
264.000
1.197.000
2.149.000
3.936.000
«* 6.95% of 
population
1 person 6.5 138,000 138,000
2 persons 8.7 315,000 630,000
3 persons 5.6 207,OOO 621,000
4-5 persons 12.64 688,000 3.027,000
6+ persons 34.8 550.000 . 3,740,000
Total
Note: av. consumption per person per mon+-h
in J975 for the whole of Italy was L .110,200
8 ,156,000
= 14.5# of
population
•30.000L. „ 
40,000L. *• « 
50.000L...
represents less thsn 27.2of this figure.
w n H N H n N N w •» 36.3 H ■ *
MM MM 45 *4 * M MM M M •» M M
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Table I is not meant to give any more than a general idea 
of the distribution of low income households. In practise 
we should look at consumption not in terms of lire per 
person, but per adult equivalent unit. In other words 
we must recognise the fact that adults and children have 
different consumption needs. This procedure is effected 
quite simply by the use of coefficients which will be 
described shortly.
We shall return to total consumption figures later 
when we compare regional and occupational consumption levels. 
For the purposes of estimating with more precision the 
number of persons in poverty we have used only food con­
sumption statistics and the method adopted is outlined 
below. for mainly descriptive purposes# the poverty 
line in terms of total consumption is then estimated by 
assuming that food expenditure is equal to 56% of total 
expenditure (this is the observed ratio for a three person 
household at the margin).
This approach was thought to be most correct for the following 
reason, that it is impractical to make any meaningful 
estimate of the necessary expenditures on non-food 
goods (largely housing). If a family spends Lit. 18,000 
per month on rent, this tells us next to nothing about 
the type of accommodation they are likely to be renting.
The problem is due to the existence before 197 8 and the 
"equo canone" law relating to rents, of two separate 
housing markets. Tenants who had occupied their dwellings 
for any length of time generally benefited from long 
periods of stable rents whilst those new to the market 
or changing accommodation had to pay the market rate
su.
which was often substantially higher. The general con­
clusion is that only a very broad correlation exists 
(at least at the lower end of the scale) between ex­
penditure on housing and its quality. Since expenditure 
on housing forms a large part of total non-food expend­
iture, it was not thought useful to include any such 
estimates in the calculation of the poverty line. This 
has therefore been calculated solely on the basis of 
fcod consumption.
The method involved was to estimate the minimum necessary
daily food requirements to maintain the health and
activity of an average male adult. The resulting basket 
of goods was then expressed in 1975 prices using price 
estimates for 1974 made by Carmela d'Apice , adjusting 
them by the retail price index. An alternative source 
of price statistics (although not really sufficiently 
comprehensive in terms of its coverage of types of food­
stuffs) , is to be found in the "Annuario Statistico"
(19 77). These are calculated over time for each of the 
fifty-one provinces and therefore give some idea of 
the regional variations in price levels. A comparison
of the two sets of data leads us to make two observations.
Firstly, although prices are generally slightly lower 
in the southern provinces, for foodstuffs of major im­
portance such as meat, milk, cheese and pasta, the 
difference, if any, is negligeable.* Secondly, the poverty 
line calculated with these figures would appear to be 
up to 14% higher than we have estimated, although this 
is not surprising given that the coverage of foodstuffs does not 
necessarily correspond to the types of goods purchased by low-inacme households.
There are also some striking cases where prices for some 
goods were actually higher in some southern provinces 
than in the northern centres. Tomatoes for example were 
more expensive in Potenza than in Turin. ./.
The estimated monthly minimum food expenditure level 
derived from the previously mentioned survey is found 
to be Lit. 31,500. Again we must emphasize that this is 
a minimum figure which may be increased from 10% to 
30% in the case of a person undertaking heavy or intens­
ive work. To convert this figure into a family estimate, 
various coefficients must be used - .8 for women and 
for men over 59 and between .2 and .8 for children under 
14 years. The estimates of the poverty line for various 
household sizes (see table 2) were thus made using the 
following assumptions as to household composition:
1 person - 1 adult male (coeff. 1)
2 persons - 1 adult male + 1 adult female (coeff. 1 .8)
3 persons - 1 adult male 1+ 1 adult female * 1
child (coeff. 1 .8 + .6)
4-5 persons - 1 adult male + 1 adult female +
2.4 children (coeff. 1.8 + 1.44)
6+ persons - 1 adult male + 1 adult female +
4.8 children (coeff. 1 .8 + 2.88)
The coefficient used for children assumes an average age 
of around 6 years. We have not assumed that there may be 
more than two adults (over 14 years) living in the house, 
altnougn for large families this may often Le the case.
On the other hand it seems probable that poorer families 
would have fewer such dependants than richer ones - not 
only because they are less able to provide such assist- 
ar ^ e, but also because in the case where several members 
of the household are working the household as a whole is 
less likely to be in the poorest group. Our coefficients 
would therefore seem reasonably accurate for the poorest 
households which we are considering - it should however 
be borne in mind that there may be a number of individual 
households (especially in the larger size groups) where 
the coefficients, and therefore the poverty line, should 
be a little higher.
u .
To examine the actual consumption pattern of households 
as opposed to the "optimum” nutritional basket of goods 
we used to estimate the poverty line, we compared the 
actual with the estimated basket for a 2-person household 
at the margin (i.e. Lit. 56,640 per month). The results 
are as follows:
Product Actual Estimated
Expenditure Expenditure
Bread, pasta 
rice 9,000 9,650
Meat & fish 18,600 11,950
Butter/oil 4,000 3,670
Milk, cheese
eggs 8,450 9,270
Vegetables/
fruit 7,300 13,400
Coffee, wine 9,280 8,700
The actual and expected figures are fairly close in four 
cases out of six; the exceptions being that consumption 
of meat and fish is somewhat higher than one would expect, 
and that of vegetables and fruit somewhat lower. In practice 
one could find several explanations for this - if we have 
estimated the relative prices correctly the difference 
must be explained by personal tastes, on the other hand, 
if these have not been correctly estimated, this could 
equally provide an explanation. Say for example, the price£of meat/fish has been underestimated - this could result 
in higher expenditure on meat/fish (in fact, the price 
elasticity for these is normally less than unity) at the 
expense of other foodstuffs. The outcome is probably 
partly explained by both prices and tastes, but it does 
raise the important question that even if a family 
is spending slightly over the poverty line, it may not 
be optimising its intake of calories, proteins and vita- 
mines and that in terms of nutritional value, it may well 
be below such a line.
r
‘It should be remembered that the prices used were minimum 
prices in that they referred to the most commonly con­
sumed or basic types of foodstuff and that the ISTAT 
prices - esoeciallv of meat, were somewhat hicrher.
Table 2a outlines the basic figures and assumptions 
on which our calculations were based. Figures are also 
given for a 20% variation on either side of the poverty 
line (see tables 2c and 2d).
Table 2b gives the distribution of households estim­
ated to be below the poverty line in 197 5. The poverty 
line, it should be recalled was estimated solely on 
the basis of food consumption, which also formed the 
basis for the poverty estimates themselves.
From table 2b we see that the incidence of poverty is 
highest in the largest and smallest household sizes with 
respectively 16.1% and 9.1% of households in these categ­
ories, irf poverty. In terms of the numbers of persons in 
poverty, 74.5% of those in poverty belong to households of 
four persons or -more. Given our assumptions on household 
composition we may deduce that around 50% of those in 
poverty are children. Undoiibtedly one of the main reasons 
for this is the low level of family supplements - a point 
we shall discuss in the comparative analysis in the next 
section (see annex).
Another category which has a relatively high, incidence of 
poverty is the elderly. Given figures by Beckerman on 
the distribution of elderly people in the poor population 
(Beckerman 1978 p. 13), and relating them fco our own 
figures in table 2b, we may estimate that 15.4% of those 
in poverty are over 65. This compares with their share of 
1 2% in the total population.
The absolute numbers of those below the poverty line are 
quite startling-around 4 1/2 million persons in poverty 
in very much the narrow sense of the word. But as we shall 
see in the surveys on other countries, to be poor is not 
only to have little to eat, it often entails a combination 
of social inferiorities such as poor housing, education 
and narrower employment opportunities. It is not by chance 
that the dependent agricultural workers in Italy who, on 
average, have the lowest levels of consumption, are also 
the category for which one finds the highest incidence of 
illiteracy (31. 2%) and the highest levels of housing over­
crowd ina .
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ESTIMATED POVERTY LINES
TABLE 2 a.
(FOOD ONLY) 197 5
Household size Adult Poverty 
n Lire PL
line Poverty line 
month + or - 2 0%
1 person 1 31,460 37,75025,170
2 persons 1 .8 56,640 67,97045,310
3 persons 2.4 75,500 90,60060,400
4/5 pers. 3.24 102 ,000 122,40081,600
6+ pers. 4 .68 147,300 176,760117,840
- TABLE 2 b.
HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LINE IN 1975
Household
size
Number of 
households 
below the 
poverty line 
' 000s.
% of house­
holds in 
group m  
poverty.
Number of Poverty 
persons in profile 
poverty.
'000s.
1 person 193.3 9.1 193.3 4.3
2 per. 282.1 7.8 564.2 12.5
3 pers. 130.8 3.54 392.4 8.7
4/5 pers. 367.4 6.75 1,616.6 36.0
6 + pers. 254.2 16.1 1,728.6 38.5
TOTAL = 4,495.1* 100.0
* = 8.05% of total population.
TABLE 2 c.
HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LINE - 20% IN 1975.
Household No.households % of hshlds. No.of per Poverty
size below pov.line in group m sons m profile
' 000s poverty poverty
1 per. 95.58 4.5 95.58 5.7
2 pers. 115.74 3.2 231.48 13.9
3 pers. 40.64 1.1 121.93 7.3
4/5 . . 103.42 1.9 455.05 27.3
6 + . . 112 .11 7.1 762.35 45.7
- TOTAL = 1,666.4 100 .0
= 2.98% Of population
HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LINE + 20% IN 1975.
TABLE 2
Household
size
No.households 
below pov.line
% of hshlds. 
in group in
No.of per 
sons in
Poverty
profile
' 000s poverty poverty
1 per. 365.33 17.2 365.3 3.8
2 pers. 585.95 16.2 1,171.9 12.3
3 pers. 321.46 8.7 964.4 10.1
4/5 . . 849.11 15.6 3,736.1 39.1
6 + . . 487.91 30.9 3,317.8 34.7
TOTAL = 9,555.5 100.0
= 17.1% of population
- bO -
Finally, tables 2c and 2d give, respectively, the estimated 
numbers of persons consuming less than 20% below the poverty 
line. Comparing all three tables it is clear that;
(a) the distribution of those in poverty (poverty profile) 
varies little from one table to another, except that the 
position of the smallest and largest household sizes 
becomes -more unfavourable as- one moves from table 2d to
2c - a greater proportion of these households are well 
below the poverty line;
(b) the number of persons in poverty is very sensitive 
to one's choice of poverty line - the range is from 3% 
of the population at 20% below, to 17.1% at 20% above, 
our estimated line. From our earlier remarks, it should be 
fairly clear that the poverty line represents a truly 
minimum subsistence level diet. The hardship Imposed on 
those consuming less than 2 0% below this level, must indeed 
be great. In this context it can be seen that a level of 
consumption 20% above our poverty line in no way gives 
cause for complacency;
(c) the incidence of poverty within each household size 
group remains' highest for the largest: family size group 
ranging from 7% to 31%. Next comes the 1 person size group 
with between 4.5% and 17.2% of households below the' + 20% 
consumption lines. Referring back to Beckerman’s study, we 
find that around 95% of these one person households are 
likely to be composed of persons over 60 years (75.6% are 
probably over 65 yeats) . Certainly, as we go down towards
the poverty line -20% we find an increasingly disproportionate 
share of children and elderly persons in poverty.
Estimation of the poverty gap
The previous section has been concerned mainly with giv­
ing a "head-count" measure of poverty. Tables 2c and 2d 
have enabled us to make some comments about the' depth of 
poverty and its distribution between household size groups, 
and young and old age groups within the population. In 
tables 3a and 3b we give figures on the poverty gap. This
-  U '
TABLE 3a
TILS POVERTY GAP (?OOD CONSUI.IPTION ONLY) IN 1975
HOUSEHOLD TOTAL POVERTY POVERTY GAP POVERTY GAP
SIZE GAP - MILLION PROFILE PER A.E.U.
LIRE PER YEAR (LIRE)
1 person 15,360 6.6 79,462
2 .... 39,408 17.0 77,605
3 .... 18,684 8.0 59,522
4/5 • • • 62,628 - 27.0 52,611
6+ ••.• 96,420 41.5 81,048
TOTAL *= 232,500 100.0
AVERAGE POVERTY GAP PER ADULT EQUIVALENT
TABLE 3b
UNIT PER MONTH
HOUSEHOLD AVERAGE GAP POV. GAP AS
SIZE PER A.E.U.(LIRE) #  OP POV. LINE
1 person 6,622 21 .0
2 .... 6,467 20.6
3 .... 4,960 15.8
4/5 ... 4,384 13.9
6+ .... 6,754 21.5
bX  .
is defined, for any individual household, as the difference 
between the income/consumption of that household and the 
corresponding income/consumption poverty line. In pract­
ice, one must consider both types of poverty measures.
One obvious reason for this this is that, for example, an 
income transfer to someone below the poverty line would 
clearly reduce the poverty-gap -measure although the "head­
count" measure of poverty would not necessarily be affected. 
This Is especially important when making international 
comparisons. According to Beckerman's estimates, for example, 
the proportion of households below the povsty line in 
Italy is similar to that in Belgium, Britain and Norway*, 
whilst at the same time, the poverty gap in Italy would 
appear to be proportionately twice as large. Hence the 
poor in Italy "are about twice as poor, relative to 
their compatriots, than the poor in the other countries".
Table 3a gives the total poverty gap and the poverty-gap 
per A.E.U. From the poverty-gap profile we see that 41.5% 
of the total poverty-gap is accounted for by households 
of more than 6 persons. This particular measure is important 
in that it gives a good guide as to necessary expenditure 
by central administration for the purpose of eliminating 
the gap. If we assume perfect functioning of the social 
security system then, for example, 15,360 million lire is 
theoretically the amount which would have to be handed 
out in transfers to 1 person households to raise all persons 
in this category above the poverty line.
^ote: All these studies use the relative poverty concept 
the results of which are not directly comparable 
with the present author's estimates.
This reasoning is admittedly, somewhat simplistic. A better 
approach is to calculate, say, the total poverty gap for 
elderly persons and relate this to the required expenditure 
on pensions/income supplement.
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The poverty gap per A.E.U. is found to he. highest in the 
6+ category - it is of similar proportions, in the two 
smallest size categories, with regard to the'l & 2 person 
households It should be remembered that 95% and 83.5% of 
household heads In poverty in these groups areever 60 years 
The depth, of poverty is therefore greatest where children 
and the elderly are concerned.
Table 3b in addition, gives the average poverty-gap as a 
share of the poverty line. The average gap is around 19% 
of the poverty line. Given that our estimated line is 
aieady very severe, such a shortfall must clearly be a 
cause of great hardship. Indeed, if we look back to table 
2c we find that well over 1 1/2 million persons are still 
below this level. The last column in table 3b gives a 
good idea of the average depth of poverty for each house­
hold size group.
The regional and occupational distribution of poverty
Tables 4a, b and c give details of estimated average con­
sumption per A.E.U., by household size, region and em­
ployment sector. For purposes of comparison it should be 
recalled that the poverty line in terms of total consumpt­
ion is equal to Lire 56,200 per A.E.U.per month.
From table 4a it is clear that southern consumption levels 
are well below the national average for all sizes. In 
particular consumption in the 1 , 2 and 6- categories in 
the Mezzogicrno is lowest relative to the North, where it 
is less than 69% of the Northern figure. Average consumpt-
./.
HOUSEHOLD CONSüMPriON BY REGION AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE IK 1975
THOUSAND LIRE PER ADULT EQUIVALENT UT¡IT PER MONTH
Household size TABLE 4 a
REGION: 1I)er 2per 3per 4/5per 6+per
ITALY 169.2 159.7 165.1 138.5 103.7
NORTH-OCC. 178.4 1 8 3 . 0 1 8 1 .5 153.7 123.4
NORTII-OR. 189.9 1 6 5 . 6 174.0 152.0 125.5
CENTRE 200.4 172.9 172,6 144.2 116.7
KEZZOGIO-
ENO 124.9 118.6 131.1 116.5 87.0
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION BY EMPLOYAIENT SECTOR AND HOUSEHOLD
SIZE IN 1975 THOUSAND LIRE PER. A.E.U. PER MONTH
SECTOR:------  1 ncr
Household 
2per 3üer
size
4/5aer
TABLE
6+per
4b
INDEP.NON-AG. 344.0. 213.2 199.0 165.3 133.4
DEP.NON-AG. 258.7 211.0 172.9 138.8 96.9
INDEP. AG. 165.0 125.8 139.8 119.5 110.3
DEP. AG. 138.3 116.4 119.3 97.2 78.3
NON-ACTIVE 134.8 127.6 140.9 128.3 112.5
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION PER A.E.U. BY ET.'IPLOYICENT
s e c t :;r a n d r e g i o n (t h o u s a n d  l i r e p e r ijonth)
REGION: Employment sector TABLE 4c
INDEP. DEP. INDEP.________PEP. NON
NON-AG. NON-AG. AGRICULTURE ACTIVE
ITALY 174.2 148.3 120.4 96.7 125.9
NORTH-OCC. 199.2 167.7 151.6 1 3 0 . 6 140.9
NORTII-OR. 194.5 1 6 0 . 1 128.3 140.7 134.9
CENTRE 177.4 158.0 1 1 0 . 6 113.3 136.5
MEZZOGIORNO 142.0 115.0 105.4 8 1 . 1 1 0 1 . 2
icn levels are by far lowest in the 6+ category, especially 
in the Mezzogiorno where the average level is only 50% 
above the poverty line.
Turning to table 4b we find that the agricultural and non­
active sectors are generally well below the non-agricult- 
ural sector. In particular the lowest consumption levels 
are almost all to .be found in the dep.ag. sector, where 
for the largest size group,average consumption is only 
39% above the poverty line. It should be noted that average 
consumption falls off faster for the dependent than £>r the 
independent agricultural sector. This suggests the exist­
ence of a strong positive relationship between total farm 
income and farm-household size (see also Irish survey) in 
the indep.ag. sector. Such a relationship is much less 
evident in the non-agricultural sector, certainly when one 
compares the largest and smallest household sizes. One 
should however note that for the last three categories con­
sumption per A.E.U. is higher for 3 person than for 2 
person households, suggesting a rather large increase in 
total household income between these size groups. Finally, 
we must note the rather large fall in consumption for 6+ 
households in the dep.non ag. category, where it is clear 
that the pressure of dependency is not compensated by a 
corresponding increase in total income.
Table 4c gives average consumption by region for each of 
the employment sectors. The Mezzogiorno has the lowest 
levels of consumption for all categories. Consumption 
in the dep.ag. sector in the Mezzogiorno is by far the 
lowest being some 23% below that of the indep.ag. sector 
for this region. Low levels of consumption within the agric­
ultural sector are also to be noted in the centre region. 
Finally, of particular interest is the non-active sector 
in the Mezzogiorno (this sector is mainly composed of
it.
retired persons) where we find that average consumption is 
somewhat lower than even the indep.ag. sector, although 
this is not the case at the national level.
A last general point is that there is much less variance 
between consumption levels in the various employment sectors 
in the North than in the South. This clearly reflects the 
persisting marginal character of much agricultural labour 
in the South. TABLE 5,
ESTTL1ATED HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION (TOTAL) PER A.E.U.
Household size per month)
SECTORS:
1 uer. 2 -per. 3 "Der 4/5t>er 6+ner
DEP. AG. 116.0 _ 97.6 1 0 0 . 1 81.5** 65.7 *
INDEP. AG. 144.4 1 1 0 . 1 122.4 104.6 9 6. 6
NON-ACTIVE 108.4 1 0 2 . 6 113.3 103.1 90.4**
Note: the estimated poverty line (total consumption)
(a) = 56,200 Lire per A.E.U. per month.
(b) est. conpumrtion tier A.E.U. for:* = 1.17
poverty line per A.E.U. ** = 1 . 4 5
*** = 1.61
(c) av.household size : clep.ag. = 4.27
indep.a", = 4.19
non-active = 2 . 45
Table 5 is derived from tables 4b and c. Given the ratio 
of av. consumption between Italy and the South for the 
three categories considered (4c), we may adjust the 
figures in table 4b for these categories to obtain estim­
ates for the Mezzogiorno. Since there is very little differ­
ence in av. household size between the South and Italy 
as a whole for these three categories (max. difference =
.12 persons), no adjustments have been made. We may note
t>?.
that the largest households in the dep.ag. sector are, 
on average, only 17 percentage points above the poverty 
line - the incidence of poverty within this group must 
surely be very high.
A comparison of poverty estimates and methods
A discussion of poverty estimates in Italy would not be 
complete without reference to a study on this subject 
recently made by W. Beckerman for the I.L.O. Although 
Beckerman bases his study on the same household survey, 
the method employed and therefore the results are somewhat 
different to the present survey. A comparison of both 
studies is therefore of some interest.
In brief, the I.L.O. survey uses the international standard 
poverty line, which, for a couple without children is 
defined as 100% of average personal disposable income.
For the purposes of the I.L.O. study this was expressed 
as 115% of average consumption.
The next stage is to set the poverty line for the different 
household size categories. The method employed, once the 
poverty line for the 2 person household mentioned above 
has been estimated, is to calculate the ratio of food to 
non-food expenditure for this marginal 2 person household.
Say this ratio is x:y. The poverty line for any other size 
group will therefore be where one finds the same ratio x:y 
for that group.
The reasoning is that since food exp./non-food exp. increases 
for any group as total expenditure falls, at the income 
level at which the share of food consumption has risen to 
that of the 2 person household (i.e. x:y), one can say that 
the household concerned is no longer "poorer" relative to 
the marginal 2 person household. It will be spending the
./.
same proportion of its income on food and will have a lower 
expenditure on less essential non-food items relative to 
other households above the poverty line in the same size 
group. Below we reproduce a table of the poverty lines
derived from the two surveys.
TABLE 6
Household
size Beckerman Bull
Poverty lines based 
on~share of food in 
total consumotion
Poverty line based 
on min. subsistence 
diet and given AEUs
1 person 80,000 56,200
2 persons 128,000 101,200
3 persons 154,000 134,900 ’
4/5 persons 
(av. 4.4)
190,000 182,100
6+ persons 
(av. 6 .8)
255,000 263,000
Beckerman table A2, p. 52.
As a result of the difference in poverty lines, the over­
all results relating to the head-count and poverty-gap 
measures of poverty are somewhat different in the two surveys. 
Mainly this is due to the I.L.O. poverty line being 
much higher for the 1 and 2 person size groups. In fact 
the overall difference between the two surveys for these 
two groups is around 30%.
This results in (a) a higher head-count measure of poverty - 
1 2.5% of the population as against 8 .1%; (b) a very differ­
ent poverty profile - a greater proportion of those in
61.
poverty are from 1, 2 and 3 person households in the
I.L.O. survey, whereas the present author finds that over 
38% of the poor are in households, of over 6 persons (viz. 
9.6% I.L.O.); (c) the poverty gap profiles show a similar 
relation ship to (b) on comparison, (d) The poverty gap per 
AEU shows similar tendencies in both surveys - it is high­
est for the 1 , 2 and 6+ categories; (e) on average the 
poor are around 28% below the poverty line in the I.L.O. 
survey whilst they are approximately 19% below this line 
on the present author's estimates. This is not surprising 
given that the latter survey uses a somewhat lower overall 
poverty line.
One advantage of the I.L.O. method is that it is possible 
to make some rough estimates of poverty by region and em­
ployment category ( see Beckerman, pp. 15-17). The general 
results are as follows:
(a) 22.6% of households in the South are poor compared to 
less than 8% in the Centre-North. Furthermore, two- 
thirds of the Italian poverty gap can be attributed to 
the Mezzogiorno. Not only does the South have a higher 
share of its population in poverty, but the poor there 
are on average poorer than elsewhere (see below).
TABLE 7
Region
N.W.
N.E.
Centre
Mezzogiorno
Total
Average poverty 
gap per poor
24,450 
20,760 
34,930 
36,270
32,170 Beckerman table 5b,p. 20
%0.
(b) The employment category with the highest incidence of 
poverty is that of the dep. ag. households where 32.3% 
of households are in poverty. This compares with an 
incidence of 2% for employees outside agriculture.
The incidence of poverty is aLso very high for non-act­
ive households (28.2%) - and this group also accounts 
for 6 9% of the total poverty gap. We should however 
mention that the main reason for this group accounts for 
such a large share of total poverty is due to the 
comparatively high poverty line set for smaller house­
hold sizes, which we discussed earlier. As it happens, 
this concerns above all the non-active category whose 
average household size is only 2.4 persons. Since this 
mainly concerns retired persons it is worthwhile making 
a few comments about the levels of Italian old age 
benefits. In 1977, the minimum old age pension (with 
contributions) was Lit. 86,300 per month. The means 
tested ’social' pension(non-contributory) 1 was Lit. 
53,300. For a single person the former thus falls 21.6% 
below the I.L.O. poverty line (expressed in 1977 prices) 
wheras it is only 1 1.6% above the poverty line implicit 
in the present survey(again, at 1977 prices). On the 
other hand, the 'social* pension turns out to be 51.6% 
below the I.L.O. poverty line and 31.1% below our own 
estimates. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that 
the dependents allowance of Lit.9,880 per month is 
clearly of only token value.
Certainly, the low level of pensions over the 
period in question must have been a significant cont­
ributory factor to the high levels of poverty we have 
previously discussed.
1 In 1975 840,000 persons received this social pension.
*1.
To conclude this section, we may emphasize the main points 
of agreement in the two surveys.
(i) Poverty in Italy is mainly concentrated in the South.
In terms of the poverty-gap the depth of poverty reaches 
very high proportions (over twice that found for other 
European countries by similar studies);
(ii) The incidence of poverty is highest for dep.ag. house­
holds. Apart from the non-active category, poverty is 
mainly an agricultural and especially a Southern agricult­
ural phenomenon. Even in the non-active sector, as Becker- 
man points out, many of the poor are likely to have been 
involved in agriculture during their active working life 
(and hence receive lower pensions than ex-non-agricultural 
workers);
(iii) Apart from low incomes, the pressure of large house­
hold size is another major factor in explaining Italian 
poverty;
(iv) In view of the above findings, we have speculated that 
the low level of welfare benefits, viz. pensions, depend­
ent's allowance, family allowance explains the high 
levels of poverty observed for several categories. Certain­
ly, without a review and real increase in the levels of 
these benefits, poverty and in particular, the severe 
depth of much of Italian poverty is unlikely to receed 
within the coming ye^rs.
Some comments on the agricultural sector in the Mezzogiorno
In view of the high incidence of poverty observed in the 
agricultural sector in the I.L.O. survey, and given the low 
levels of consumption for this sector, especially in the 
South (see tables 4 and 5) , observed by the present author, 
it seemed desirable to give some more details regarding, 
specifically, the Mezzogiorno. Of particular interest is
the regional distribution of farm incomes of the self-em- 
ployed, and the distribution' of dependent agricultural 
workers within the Mezzogiorno. We should thereby obtain 
a rough idea of the: regional incidence of poverty within 
this area.
The importance of dependent ag. employment should not be 
underestimated - in some provinces of the Mezzogiorno over 
40% of the employed workforce were found to be in this cate­
gory. Of 1,312,000 dependent agricultural workers in 1971,
950,000 (72.4%) were employed in the Mezzogiorno - for this 
region they represented 16.6% of the employed workforce. In
map 8 , we give the regional distribution of dependent agri­
cultural workers throughout the Mezzogiorno. Since this is 
by far the poorest employment sector we may assume that the 
incidence of poverty is probably highest in this group. In 
view of the substantial regional and provincial variations 
in the importance of this group* it was considered that the 
proportion of dependent agricultural workers in the total 
employed, workforce might give a broad indication of the 
possible regional incidence of poverty. There are of course 
many reservations and qualifications to this approach. In 
particular it might be argued that earnings in industry or 
commerce may be considerably lower in some regions than in 
others and that there may be a high incidence of poverty in 
these sectors for certain regions, especially in the south.
In practice, however, at least for the secondary sector, 
we know that regional variations in hourly earnings in many 
industries have, over the last few years; narrowed consider­
ably. 1
Another objection is that the independent agricultural sector 
should also be taken into account, as this sector also has 
a very low average consumption level in the Mezzogiorno 
(see table 4 (c)). If one turns back to table 5 it will, 
however, be clear that the decline in average consumption 
as family size increases is much less in the independent agri­
cultural sector than for dep.ag. workers - this is undoubt-
x In the Mezzogiorno the proportion of dependent agricultural 
workers in the total employed population varied between 4 3.5% 
(Brindisi) and 2.3% (Chieti). in the Centre-North this 
proportion varied between 6.7% (Emilia-Romagna) and 1% (Piemonte) .
^Eurostat - "Hourly Earnings" IX 1977.
x i  . . 1 .
V 
*
MAP 8
workers sis ^ of ’to'tsûL employed
workforce by province 1971
source: Population census 1971
edly due to the fact that larger households in agriculture 
are more likely to have two or more, working members*. The 
possibility of making use of family labour on the family 
farm (which does not of course exist for dep. ag. workers) 
may, by increasing the total farm output, enable many farm 
households which would otherwise be on the poverty line to 
consume somewhat above it. On the other hand it must be 
emphasized that, as in the case of France and Ireland we 
are likely to find substantial regional variations in farm 
incomes**, reflected in a varying regional incidence of 
poverty within this sector.
Hence, although, according to map 8 , the proportions
of dep. ag. workers is highest in parts of Sicily, Puglia 
and Reggio Calabria, we should bear in mind two things.
Firstly, the share of agricultural employment in total em­
ployment is highest in Molise (39.1%) and Basilicata ' (35.8%)* 
although the former has a very low proportion of dep. ag. 
workers and the latter only an average share. Being at the 
same time the two poorest farming regions in Italy it is 
reasonable to assume that the incidence of poverty in these 
regions may be unduly high.
*For households of 5+ persons, only 25% in the primary sector 
have only one breadwinner compared with nearly 50% elsewhere.
**Gross value added per agricultural worker was lowest in Molise, 
Basilicata and Puglia - expressed as a percentage of the nation- 
al average the respective figures were £2%, 52% and 71%(1977) .
11975, EEC data
The second point to bear in mind concerns the ratio 
of dependent to independent agricultural workers. The main 
reason we find such a large share of dep. ag. workers in 
Puglia ( map 8 ) is because the agricultural system is biased 
towards this type of employment - there are four times as 
many dep. ag. workers as there are indépendants1. In both 
Calabria and Sicily we find two and a half times as many. 
Sardinia, Basicilicata and Campania have roughly equal pro­
portions. Abruzzi and Molise, on*the other hand, have rough­
ly six and four times as many independent as dependent agri­
cultural workers, respectively.
In a sense this implies that the employment structure in some 
regions is more biased towards a relatively higher incidence 
of poverty than in ethers (exceptions, as we have noted being 
Molise and Basilicata).
In map 9 and table 10 we give the most recent estimates 
of income per person by province. Before going on to look 
at trends in income by province it is interesting to make a 
comparison between maps 4 and 5. Although it is of course 
possible to attempt finer comparisons, we shall merely 
point out several provinces with high dep. ag. employment 
ratios and low personal incomes. In these provinces we may 
expect the problem of poverty to be particularly pronounced. 
In ascending order we have Agrigento, Lecce, Reggio Calabria, 
Cosenza, Catanzaro, Brindisi - we might also mention Isernla 
and Potenza. Comparing income per person in 1964 and 1974 
one finds that several of the aforementioned provinces have 
made disappointing progress. In ascending order of per ca­
pita income in 1974 the bottom 4 provinces were Avelllno,
lin 1971
TABLE 10
by region and province in S. Italy
1974
Provinces Million Italy
k  Regions Lire Lire = 100
Giieti 428 115
L’Aquila 360.529
Pescar* 344.876
Teramo 279.768
Abruzzo 1.413288
Cimpotuijso 228.30S
Iicm ii 7-1.910
Moine 303 ’ 18
Avellino 2 S 0 2 3
Bcr.s-.sr.ro 246.140
Ci>eru 685.652
Xapoii 2.8S9.9Î9
S ileno 941.384
Gtmptr.ta 5.053638
E>ri 1362.122
Brìndisi 35C.979
Foggi» 695.947
Lecce 564 856
Taranto 812-263
Pulii* 3.7S6.Ì67
Ma ter* 254 762
Potenza 325245
Brulicata 58C.007
Catanzaro 615.952
Cosenza 535.470
Reggio Cai. 496.S92
CiUbnt 1.656.314
Agrigento 346.164
Caltanissetta 271.833
Catania 884.101
Enna 179 491
Messina - 689.518
Palermo 1.265.590
Ragusa 26C.Ö40
Siracusa 497.047
Trapani 430.563
Sicilia 4.827.347
Cagliari 1.038 637
N’uoro 263 42 Î
Sassari 465 809
Sjrde;na 1.767.921
luti«  sett. 43 40S.7t)C
Itali« cent. 16.202.400
Italia mer. 12.792.632
Italia insul. 6.59526?
Nord-Centro 59.611.100
Sud-Isole 19.3S7.90i)
itétLt 78.999 OOC
1.185.448 S3.5
1205.952 S4.9
1236.199 87.1
1.065276 75.0
1.176.06S 82,3
975.333 63.7
794.911 Î6.0
923 347 65.1
657.120 463
8492% 59 5
966 940 6S.1
1.027 245 72.4
960.868 67.7
966.065 68,0
971170 6S.5
921210 64,9
1.035.901 73,0
776.270 54.7
1.503203 105.*
1.017.130 71,6
1272.315 89.6
790.446 55,7
948.181 66.8
853.649 60,1
762296 53.7
844.688 59J
819.072 57.7
736.8S4 51.9
94C.Î04 662
910.453 64.1
882.701 622
1.031235 72,6
1.09S 489 77,4
984.176 69.3
1.306.200 92,0
1.038 552 732
1.002.355 706
1224272 862
960-JÌ4 68.!
1.123.027 79.1
1 151.176 Sl.l
1.697.116 119.5
1.52S.983 107.7
975 237 68.7
1.038.337 73,1
1.647.864 116.1
995.S24 70.1
1.419.722 100.0
S O U T C 6 - : G. T»j:!iacarnc • Unione Italiana Camere di Com­
mercio. Editore, Franco Angeli. Milano
-INCOME PER PERSON BY PROVINCE ( 1974 )
tlAP 9
Income class 
(TH. LIRE) As ItalU|
Q ] 6 6 0  TO 800 46-56 *
□  800 TO 900 56-63 *
TO 1,000 63-70 * 
1,000-1,200 70-85 * 
above 1,200 85 +
Aqrlqento, Cosenza and Lecce. Considering that the Mezzogiorno 
as a whole gained 5.5 percentage points on the national in­
dex between 1964 and 1974, the fact that Avellino gained 
merely 2.3 percentage points and Lecce actually lost 2.9, 
gives great cause for worry. As for Agriger.to and Cosenza, 
they gained 6 . 6 and 6.5 percentage points respectively - 
just enough to keep pace. Although it should be said that 
many of the other low income provinces made significant 
gains over this period the fact remains that the relative 
position of the poorest provinces was at best stationary.
CONCLUSION:
The most significant finding of this survey is that 
one person in twelve in Italy was underfed in 1975. More 
than one person in six was only marginally above this level.
Furthermore we have found that the incidence of poverty is 
highest for children and the old.
Would a national minimum wage or similar legislation be 
effective in reducing poverty, we may ask. Unfortunately, 
unless such an increase was very substantial the impact would 
probably be of only marginal importance (given present levels 
of unemployment benefit the effect might actually be negat­
ive!). A national minimum income brought about by say, a neg­
ative income tax system would however create fewer problems 
in the labour market, but the full cost would of course have 
to be borne by the State. Given that a substantial part of 
poverty is probably due to either (i) dependency pressures 
at large household sizes, or (ii) low incomes of retired pers­
ons (and the unemployed), the remedy would thus seem to lie 
firmly with the Italian social security system.
Where there is only one breadwinner whose income is 
insufficient to feed, clothe and house a large number of chil­
dren, the sole determinant of whether the family as a whole 
sinks to poverty, is the level of state assistance. On 1.7.76 
this amounted to Lit. 9,880 per month - less than sufficient 
merely to feed a three year old child and roughly a third
of that required to feed an eight-year old. At the same 
date, unemployment benefit amounted to an'absurd Lit. 800 
per day for up to six months1 - not sufficient to feed an 
eight-year old, let alone an adult. Under such circumstances 
it would appear that those in poverty are more or less 
left to sort things out themselves.
In the latter half of this paper we gave evidence to suggest 
that poverty should also be seen in a regional context. In 
several Southern provinces with low average incomes we found 
high levels of dependent agricultural workers in the total 
workforce - the employment sector in which we may assume the 
risk of poverty is highest. In other such provinces, although 
this share was much lower, the share of indep. ag. workers 
was much higher and the agricultural sector as a whole was 
relatively depressed-(the mountain farming provinces of 
Isernia and Potenza).
How may such findings serve to enhance our analysis of 
regional development policies? Firstly, we have added a new 
dimension to the analysis of regional imbalance - the reg­
ional incidence of poverty. Secondly, and following from 
this point, we have added another tool with which to assess 
effectiveness of regional policy - the degree to which such 
policies reduce or are capable of reducing spatial differ­
ences in the incidence of poverty. In the Italian case there 
are certainly many difficulties involved in such an approach
- if one considers for example that in 1971 1 in 4 independent
farmers and almost 1 in 3 dependent agricultural workers were
2effectively illiterate , the full magnitude of the problem 
of converting subsistence agricultural economies into indus­
trial' growth poles', becomes somewhat clearer.
1E.C. -'Comparative tables of the social security systems in 
the member states", Bruxelles.
2 Population Census,1971.
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SO.
IRELAND: Introduction
The statistical basis for this section is provided 
by the 1973 Household budget survey of the Republic of 
Ireland. This is the most recent survey of expenditure 
available and covers a random representative sample of 
7,748 households throughout the country.
It should be clear that the reliability of results obtained 
by such surveys depends on the accuracy and consistency 
of the information provided by respondents. In the present 
case the expenditure estimates were found to be more 
reliable than those derived for incomes. The income estimates, 
are in general lower than corresponding national accounts 
levels indicate. Taking all households, average expenditure 
exceeded disposable income by some 13%. The extent of this 
understatement varies with the type and source of income, 
and this of course makes difficult any comparison of in­
come levels where income sources differ appreciably.
The low income figures reflect the difficulties often 
encountered in such surveys, of respondents being reluctant to give 
full details of their personal incomes. Furthermore, whilst 
the expenditure data was largely based on records kept during 
the survey period, the income figures were often less firmly 
based. Own account non-farm income and investments and the 
earnings of small scale farmers, were all based on retrospect­
ive data relating to a twelve month period preceeding the 
interview.
Or. the ether hand, it should be recognised that a
large par* of the apparent deficit in the income figures 
may be due more to conceptual problems rather than actual 
understatement. By definition, income excluded certain 
money receipts such as withdrawals from savings, loans or 
gifts, and indeed it was the case that some households 
were living on there savings during the survey period.
2 1 .
In spite of the problems outlined above, part (i) of 
this paper introduces estimates of poverty in Ireland based 
on gross income figures. The reason for this choice is 
simply that gross household income is used for classific­
ation in the survej'. Our estimates are for both urban and 
rural households and are disaggregated by household size.
Given the size of the survey it is not possible to 
obtain results for the various planning regions, or even 
for particular employment categories. In part (ii) there­
fore, we try to fill in the gaps with some overall obser­
vations.
To begin we look at-the position of the lowest income groups 
for each region. We find that low income households are by no 
means a homogenous group - their composition varies greatly 
according to the region and family size we are considering.
We then turn to consider the question of family size in 
more detail. In terms of income and consumption we find 
substantial regional disparities for all family sizes. Old 
dependency ratios vary somewhat between regions and we con­
sider the effect this may have on the economic well-being 
of large sized households in particular.
The position of the unemployed is considered next and here 
too, we find significant variations. In the poorest regions, 
the unemployed, on average, have very few resources to fall 
back on.
The problem of low incomes in agriculture is then pur­
sued in some detail. Figures for 1976-77 suggest a widening 
gap between rich and poor farmers which is leading to large 
regional imbalances.
To conclude we summarize our findings on a regional basis. 
There would appear to be a strong connection between the 
strength of the agricultural sector and the degree of de­
privation.
Some maps are included in the annexes for reference, 
which give income figures by county, and the spatial dis­
tribution of urban centres.
B2.
Poverty estimates
Using the 1973 Household Budget Survey previously 
described, some reasoably accurate estimates of poverty in 
Ireland can be obtained, although it is not possible to 
estimate the regional incidence of poverty, it is possible 
to calculate directly the results for urban and rural areas.
For reasons which will shortly be explained, we are 
constrained to content ourselves with a head-count measure 
of poverty in terms of a gross income poverty line.
The poverty line
Since households were categorised by gross household 
income , the poverty line was defined in terms of disposable. 
income , the difference between the two being insignificant 
as, of cource, most households in poverty are unlikely to 
be paying much, if any income tax (see figures in part ii ).
The survey definition of gross income naturally included 
social security and other state transfer payments, although 
certain receipts of an irregular and non-recurring nature, 
such as loans and retirement gratuities were excluded. Home 
grown garden/farm produce and housing costs paid by outsiders 
were also included in household income.
The poverty line adopted was 10$ above the U.K. supp­
l e m e n t a r y  benefit level, applicable from October 19721 . It 
is, ineffect the official U.K. poverty line. The question 
of whether U.K. rates are applicable to Ireland must of course 
be asked. We should firstly explain the absence of an official 
Irish poverty line.. Although there are a number of small
see Social Trends 1973 P« 205. For a discussion on the
inadequacy of Irish rates of social assistance in the early 1970's 
see, V.George and R.Lawson(1980), pp. 131-136. The poverty line in 
their survey is partly based on the line suggested at the Kilkenny 
Conference on Poverty in 1971, and the latter turns out to be almost 
identical to our own estimates of the poverty line (adjusted for prices).
assistance payments, and poverty alleviation programmes, 
there is no equivalent of the U.K. Supplemental Benefit.
Other social security "benefits have somewhat different aims 
and may operate on the tacit assumption that other sources 
of funds are available, if only savings. Comparing benefit 
levels in the two countries, one has the impression that 
since the m i d - 7 0 ’s at least, there is very little difference 
if any, between benefits in comparable income maintenance 
programmes."*' *non-conn- 
butory oldThe poverty line we have used is as follows, age pension
1972
Married couple £12.40 per week (£10.35)
Single person £7.85 p.w. (£ 6.20)
Child £3.00 p.w.
The child supplement varies from £1.90 to £5.20pw. The benefit 
for an 11-12 year old (+10$) is £3, and is the sum we have 
arbitrarily chosen as the average child payment. For reference 
a comparison is given in the table above with the minimum non­
contributory old-age pension available in 1972.
The estimates
The estimates of the numbers below the poverty line 
were calculated separately for urban and rural areas. Since 
the procedure was not entirely straightforward, only the 
main elements will be discussed. A tecnical appendix is 
available from the author on application. It is not included 
here for reasons of space and continuity.
S3
The main figures are obtained from tables which give 
the distribution of sample households by gross income cat- 
-egory and household size. Unfortunately the income cate- 
-gories are rather wide (<£20 pw , £20-40 pw, etc.), and
the lower income category therefore reo.uires further dis­
aggregation. This is facilitated by two other tables which 
give much finer income categories (<£7, £7-10, £10-15 etc.)
1 See'Economic activity in Ireland’, article by J.W.O'Hagen
2 See tables 17 & 19 for urban,and tables 26 4 27 for rural 
^areas.
The non-contributory pension was payable at age 7 0,subject 
to means-test. In addition free travel on public transport 
was available to all persons over 70, and free electricity 
was available to some.(OECD working paper 1975).
but for which only average household sizes are given. The 
task was then to estimate the distribution of households 
by size within these narrower income categories ( given that 
the overall number of households in any size category under 
£20 pw was known). The number of households for any size 
group below the poverty line could then be found with a good 
degree of accuracy. The overall poverty-gap could not howeve: 
be estimated, since the income of households below £7 pw 
was not known.
The final results are given below :
URBAN
RURAL
household
size_
$> of persons 
in group in poverty
poverty
profile
1 person 34.4 9.3
2 per. 16.3 11.5
3/4 per. 6.5 13.7
5/6 per. 9.2 22.2
7 + per. 17.9 43.4
Overall 12.6 100 fc
household
size
#  of persons 
in group in poverty
poverty
profile
1 person 39.3 7.1
2 per. 31.8 18.4
3/4 per. 15.6 20.0
5/6 per. 15.1 19.5
7 + per. 20.6 35.0
Overall i o Q 100 1°
- B 5 “ -
STATE household
size $  of persons in group in 
poverty
poverty
profile
1 person 36.6 8.1
2 per. 23.9 15.2
3/4 per. 10.2 17.1
5/6 per. 11.5 20.7
7 + per. 19.1 38.9
Overall 15.7 100 $
Clearly the incidence of poverty is much higher in rural 
areas (19.9$ as against 12*6%), although it should be noted 
that by international standards, the level of poverty in 
urban areas is still very high. Otherwise the pattern of 
poverty is fairly similar in both areas, being relatively 
high for small family sizes, decreasing, and then increasing 
again for large family sizes.
The incidence of poverty clearly has a much larger var­
iance in urban areas, perhaps reflecting the overall depr­
essed state of the rural economy.
The high incidence of poverty in 1 person hshlds. ( and
2 person hshlds. in rural areas ), is almost certainly due 
to the high share of retired persons in these categories( 53$ 
of persons in 1 to 2 person hshlds. are over 65 years old ). 
This share is somewhat higher in rural hshlds. where, overall, 
12.6$ of the population is over 65 years, as against 7 . 4 (urban).
Furthermore, it would seem that the share of retired per­
sons in poverty ( in the 1 to 2 person groups ), is much 
higher than 53$ , and probably nearer 70$. From the available 
statistics, we may estimate that around 20.5$ of those in 
poverty are over 65 years( they form 7.4$ of the total pop­
ulation) , and that around 44$ of this group fall below the 
poverty line.
One might expect thatone reason for such high figures 
could be that a large proportion of this population falls 
fractionally below the poverty line (due to say, a small 
shortfall in state penshions). A closer analysis of 2 person 
hshlds. in poverty reveals, however, that 42$ of the urban 
and 45$ of the rural population receive less than £ 7 pw. _  
the poverty line for this group being £12.40 pw.
Turning to large-sized hshlds. we know that .of those 
in poverty, many are largely dependent on unemployment ben­
efits and childrens allowances (see part ii). Furthermore 
it is also clear that the depth of poverty is once again 
very great in many cases. For the 7+ category (poverty line 
£31.20 pw, ), 17$ of the urban and 24$ of the rural population 
receive less than £20 pw.
To conclude this section, we may note a few points 
of comparison with the Italian survey on poverty. In terms 
of overall results the Irish figure (15.7$), is comparable*with the present authors estimate of 17.1$ for Italy, or 
alternatively, the I.L.O. estimate of 12.5$.
see Italian survey table 2d. This is in fact the Italian 
poverty line (+20$), which as it transpired, came very 
close to the Irish suppl. ben. based poverty line(adjusted 
for prices and exchange rates).
a?.
Certainly, there is an interesting similarity between 
the Irish results for rural areas (19•9#)» and the I.L.O. 
estimate of poverty in southern Italy at 22.6$ of all 
households.
At another level, it is clear that for both countries 
the depth of poverty can be quite severe. As for the incidence 
of poverty it is also clear that children and the elderly 
fare worst in both cases. Although a detailed examination 
of income maintenance programmes is outside the scope of 
this paper, we may note that the concept of a minimum income* 
is virtually non-existent in both Italy and Ireland. The 
result is that elderly persons solely dependent on minimim 
"social pensions',' or low income working households with 
dependents, may consequently fall below the poverty line, 
and by a considerable extent in many cases. At the risk of 
repetition, we should add that apart from the positive wel­
fare effects of i n c r e a s i n g  or introducing) such benefits, 
the regional impact would probably be considerable, given 
that the distribution of poverty is regionally (and rurally) 
biased in the countries considered.
In part ii of this survey we shall consider the regional 
aspects of low incomes in more detail. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to estimate the regionaldistribution of poverty, 
however we are able to determine which regions are likely 
to have a relatively higher incidence of low-incomes. We 
are also able to give some idea of the rural/urban imbalance 
within regions and of the extent of low incomes in the agric­
ultural sector.
It is hoped that the overall analysis will lead to 
a better understanding of the different causes and types 
of poverty within Ireland.
It is of note that no official govt.estimates of poverty 
exist for Ireland, Italy or France.
P?*.rt (ii). Some comments on the regional, and sector*^ 
aspects of low incomes.
Table 2 deals with direct incomes, state transfers, direct taxes, 
average disposable income and average expenditure for each of the 
eight planning regions in Ireland in 1973. In order to concentrate 
on the low-income problem we have limited the analysis to households 
earning less than £ 4 0  per week.
Although there are some rerional differences in total 
direct income per household, it car. be seen that state 
transfers have an eoualisinc effect , so that only very 
smell differences in total disposable incone remain. This 
effect is, however, somewhat imaginary since when we take 
household size into account (ie. disposable income per per­
son), these imbalances reemecge. The introduction of, for 
example, higher family supplements would help reduce such 
differences, as would the establishment of a system similar 
to the U.K.'s supplementary benefit.
Since the poorer regions tend to have larger families 
and, presumably, a higher proportion of households with 
very low inccaes, social security payments not only have 
welfare effects, but also important effects on the regional 
distribution of incomes.
Using statistics from other tables we may add the following notes 
to table 2. In the under £ 20 per week category we may note that 
direct income from self-employment (farming) and own garden/farm 
produce constitutes over 50% of total direct income in the four 
last regions. It is lowest (9%) in the Eastern region. In the East, 
retirement pensions and wages and salaries account for over 50% 
of average household income. Hence, the sources of direct incomes 
(low incomes) vary considerably between regions. The composition 
of low income families rv»y therefore be assumed to vary accordingly.
In the Eastern region 
a higher proportion of households under £ 20 per week are composed 
of wage and salary earners and retired persons whereas in the four 
last regions it is clear that the proportion of households com­
posed of farmers, part-time <r full-time, is relatively higher1.
For the category £ 20-40 per week earned income (wages/salaries} 
is by far the major component of total direct income except for the 
Western region where wages/salaries and farm income each represent 
about 40% of total direct income.
seetable 9 Household Budget Survey pp. 113— 116
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Considering the figures for the whole country, of the under £20
per week category, classified by household size \ one finds:
- in the 1-2 persons households pensions account for about half of 
disposable income;
- in the 3-4 person households there is no .clear major source of 
household income;
- in the 5-6 person households unemployment benefits aad children's 
allowances represent about 40% of disposable income;
- in the 7+ persons households these represent about 60f- of dis­
posable income.
For the other income"groups, wages/salaries are the main component
of average disposable income (in all household size categories).
Average consumption per head is found to decrease with family size 
for the £ 20 or less category, being ¿4.04 per week per person in 
the largest families.
Table 3 gives inccme and expend!ture per person by region aruf house­
hold size. This gives us a much broader picture of regional dis­
parities. Not surprisingly the larger families are, on average, 
the poorest. Generally, the poorest regions are so for all house­
hold categories. Hence, N.w. and Donegal have the poorest families 
in all family size categories, average consumption per head (7+)' being 
only 31% of that for the smallest households in the Eastern region. 
Surprisingly, although the East has the highest level of personal 
income per person, it is clear that this is due to a higher distri­
bution of households in the 1-4 person categories. Larger families 
in the East are clearly no better off, on average, than elsewhere 
in the S.E., S.W. or Mid-West.
Whether one coiapcrss the poverty lines in table 3c srith 
either expenditure or income, it is clear that, or. average 
several regions are onl" marginally acove the poverty' line 
for sor.e or all sue categories. In particular, we -ay assur.e 
that the regional incidence of poverty is lilcely tc be very 
high ir. the tf.W.¿Donegal region for all categories.
1 see table 6 of H.3. survey
- ^  í
TABLE 3
3(a) D m o o ü a b l e  income ter ncraon b> region arid Household sxze.
household N.W.&
1M
iici
1-2 14.0
*13.4 13.0 12.75 11.1 9.4^ 10.9 12.6
3-4
*
12.5 *11.6 11.1 10.5 9.7 7.6 9.24^ 10.9
5-6 8.7 *9.1 8.76 7.56 7.4 5.9§ 7.1 3.1
7+ 6,66 7.2
m6.7 6.44 5.2 „ -§ 4.o J 5.6 5.8 
£ per week
(Note: rooms per inhabitant
"Highest §Lowest )
1 Average total expenditure per person by region and househo'
size.
household 
size. E. S.E S.W MidW
N.W.&
W. Donegal Midlands N.E.
1-2 16.7 12.7 13.4 11.6 11.3 10.3 00«o.CMT—
3-4 14.8 11.4 12.2 11.7 11.0 10.6 10.5 11.1
5—6 10.8 9.6 9.6 8.9 8.9 7.6 8.4 9.9
7+ 8.1 6.7 8.1 7.9 7.1 5.5 7.3 6.9 
£ per week
Poverty lines in terms of income per person per week
household
size 1--2 3-4 5-6 7+
£ per week 7 .0 4.80 4.20 3.80
32.
Larger families not only have the lowest inc./cons, levels, but they 
are on average more poorly housed. For the 1-2 persons category 
the regional minimun?5 is 2.46 and maximum 2.93. For the 7+ category 
the figures are .58 and .69 respectively. As shown in table 3, 
in general / the regions with the highest and lowest levels
of disposable income per person have also the highest and lowest 
figures per rooms per inhabitant within each household size cate­
gory. The N .W. and Donegal region fares worst in both respects.
Before going on to assess sone aspects of the economic situation 
of the out of. work it is worthwhile to make a few comments on 
family size. Statistics are available in the aforementioned survey* 
which enable us to look at incomes and consumption by household 
composition and gross weekly household income at a national level.
In the under h 20 per week category we find that for households 
with "two adults and children", average disposable incor.e per per­
son is & 3.05 per week. For “other households with children" the 
figure is h 2.54 per week per person(or 28 % of the national average 
Although state transfers form over half of disposable income in 
both categories (54% and 63% respectively), it is clear that such 
transfers are not capable of pulling up low income households to a 
satisfactory level.
Regarding family size it was thought instructive to calculate the 
value of the marginal increase in direct income as household size 
increased. The method used was to calculate changes in average 
direct income per household between the 3-4 and 5-6 person categories 
and between the 5-6 and 7+ categories, and to divide this by the 
change in the average number of persons in each category. This gives 
us a rough approximation of the marginal value. The figures for 
the eight regions are as follows:
Estimates of the marginal chance in direct income by household size 
ana region (b ner week)
E . S.E. S.W. Mid W. w. NW4D. Mid . N.E .
rron ca­
tegories 
(3-4)to 
(5-6)
1.24 3.95 4.25 2.17 4.12 3.45 3.5 2.75
?rcm ca­
tegories 
(5-6) to 
IU)
1.43 3.41 2.0 4.14 .98 .83 2.02 .92
*Vol 2, table 20
93.
Although, as expected, in general marginal revenue falls as family 
size increases/ there are two exceptions - the East and the Mid- 
West.
In many cases one would expect large households to be extended 
families, with dependants in the form of young children and aged 
relatives, and other active members contributing to total household 
direct income. As the age distribution of household heads is 
fairly similar fcs between regions for each household size category 
(apart from the Eastern region) , we may assure that these figures 
reflect to some extent employment possibilities for active family 
members in agriculture, industry and services. These figures 
have been included in the text because it was considered that 
the variations were such that they required an explanation. 
Considering the (5-6)to (7+) category it seems impossible to 
assume that for the S.E and Mid W. (and also probably the S.W. 
and Midlands) the marginal values could be attributed to higher 
household-head earnings alone. We must therefore assume that 
such high marginal values are due to contributions from family 
members other than the household head. This could either be in 
the form of contributions to household-farm work or from earnings 
in other sectors. In the cases of the West, N.W. & Donegal and 
N.E., such contributions either to domestic enterprises or from 
outside sources are clearly not substantial due to either the 
poor structure of the former or the unavailability of the latter.
In other words, as a footnote to table 3 we may add that there 
seems to be some evidence to suggest that for larger families 
there exists a higher ratio of active to non-active (or underem­
ployed) household members in some regions than in others. This 
would appear to give some explanation for the low figures for 
large sized families in the West, N.W. & D. and ME. regions in 
Table 3. It also suggests that income per person falls off rapidly 
for the largest households in most regions (i.e. if we could 
disaggregate the 7+ category further).
The reasoning behind these observations is supported by the fact 
that the N.W. & D. and West regions have extremely high old de­
pendency ratios of over 14% (national average is 10.8%), whilst 
the Mid-West region is somewhat below the national average.
Although figures for the East region are given, it is not in-
!K.
eluded in the analysis because of the much younger household 
head age distribution in all household size categories - this 
implies a younger age distribution within the family, and 
higher young dependency ratio - in consequence the marginal es­
timates are somewhat lower than for other regions, especially
in the case of the smaller size groups.
One of the themes so far has been to evaluate the magnitude
of low incomes and consumption levels in large-sized families 
and assess the extent of regional variations. It now seems 
desirable to give some indication of such variations by liveli­
hood status as well.
Not surprisingly, disposable income per person is lower for all 
household sizes in the-category "out of work*, varying from 
h 6.7 per week to b 3.76 per week for the largest households1.
It would have been interesting to have had more information 
about this category, for example, to assess whether the out of 
work were so for a longer period, on average, in some regions 
than in ethers. However, in the absence of such statistics we may 
still make some assessment of the regional variations within 
this group by considering average disposable income and expen­
diture figures. For those out of work, average state transfers 
per household are roughly the same for all regions; however, 
average household direct income varies substantially, being under 
h 6 per week in the West, Midlands and NW & D . regions, above 
h 13 per week in the S.W. and N.E. regions and above h 16 per 
week in the Eastern and Mid-W. regions. This seems to suggest 
wide regional variations in the economic well-being of the un­
employed. It would also seem to support our previous remarks re­
lating to the economic capacity of the extended family - clearly 
in some regions the out of work have a not insignificant direct 
income to fall back on (probably other members of the household 
are employed), whilst in others this is not the case. Average 
disposable income per person of the out of work category is 
lowest in the N.W & D. region (h 3.3 per week) and highest in 
the N.E. region (6 5.7 per week).
jjnot including retired persons.
1Vol 2 Table 15
9 *
Tables 4 to 10 give some indication of the rural/urban imbalance 
and the extent of low incomes in agriculture.
Table 4 is a good overall indicator of regional variations in 
average household expenditure per person. Some significant rural/ 
urban divergencies appear within certain regions. The Midlands 
is unique in that rural and especially rural farm expenditure 
is higher than urban expenditure - the latter being the lowest 
for all regions (although the Midlands is not amongst the bottom 
three regions in Table 1). The N.E. region is another case 
where the rural farm/urban divergence is relatively large with 
relatively high urban expenditure and relatively low rural and 
rural farm household expenditure.
For the East and S.W. expenditure is relatively high for all 
three categories. For the West and NW 4 D, the opposite is 
true. The S.E. and Mid-W. are intermediate cases. Statistics on 
average family size are included for reference. There are some 
quite surprising variations in average urban/rural family size 
within each region. One point to note is that if rural farm ex­
penditure per person is lowest in the N.W. & D. and N.E. regions, 
this is not mainly due to large average family size but,moreover, 
to lower average rural farm household income.
Finally, one should remark that more recent statistics suggest 
(seetable 8) that the variance in regional rural farm incomes is 
at present greater than is implied in table 4. We shall discuss 
this at greater length presently.
Table 5 gives the incidence of low income households as between 
urban and rural locations. Average gross household income was 
estimated by the survey to be B 40.27 per week. Almost 1 in 4 
rural households have gross incomes below 37% of this figure.
The proportion of low income households is significantly lower 
in urban locations. Table 7 shows that there would appear to be 
some correlation between the degree of urbanization (town size) 
and average earnings, although only towns above 1,500 inhabitants 
are above the national average in terms of average weekly house­
hold expenditure. The figures give some idea of the extent to 
which the ability of a region to develop a sound urban structure 
may influence the level of average earnings for that region, the 
reason clearly being that larger towns generally have a higher 
percentage of highjncome occupations.
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TABLE 5
Distribution 02' household incomes
House­
hold i~^ conie
%diü ûrioution.
£10p.w. or le33
£T5p.w. 
or less
UIÎ3A2Î
8 .S
15.5
RURAL
>4.0
24.5
£20p.w 
orless 20.4 32.0
TABLE S
Acerajre- householdav.exo. (£
ia_-ieu %of totalïf fains av.sa.ae perperson v.e-
30 CELZSS 34.3ÇS 3.43 7.9
30-50 26.3# 3.96 3.47
50-100 25.9> 4.39 9.6
100+ 13.0 4.7 10.6
10.3*IEE.
TABLE 7
Average wee-cly household expenditure b.v tov.-n size.
Dublin and Punlc.oghsi.re -43.34
Other towns over 10,000
inhabitants ¿43.47
1,500 to 10,000
inhabitants £43.1
under 1,500
innabitanis £35.13 
£41.3*17-2
Source: Tables 2-7
Household 3udget 
Survey 1973.
QS
Table 6 gives average expenditure per person by size of farm.
* )Only for farms of over 100 acres is average expenditure/aiove 
the national average, although obviously there are wide variations 
within each size group according to type of production system. 
Another point to remark upon is the correlation whieh would 
appear to exist between farm size and household size, which suggests 
greater use of family labour as farm size increases.
Tables 3-10 are largely self-explanatory and need little comment. 
It should be noted that the two poorest agricultural provinces, 
Connacht and Ulster comprise, esentially, the West, N.W. & D. and 
N.E. regions which when compared with 1973 expenditure figures 
for rural farm households in table 4, suggest little change in 
rank between the regions, but growing regional divergence.
It is clear from tables 8-10 that there is a widening gap 
between the rich and poor farmers which is leading to large re­
gional imbalances. As the I.A.I. comments, "there is clear evi­
dence that there are two quite different sectors emerging within 
farming - the one dynamic and prospering, the other static". The 
explanation for such sweeping changes is that income from the 
most common farming system (mainly creamery milk production) 
went up by 47% from 1976-77. This was as a result of a swift ad­
justment of production to a 35% rise in prices in this sector.
In contrast, income from mainly drystock systems, which includes 
over 25% of all farms, declined in real terms. This is even more 
serious given the long-standing association between this farming 
system and low incomes and begs the question of how long low and/or 
declining incomes and standards of living will be acceptable to 
the majority in this area of production. Even more serious, how­
ever, is the situation of hill sheep and cattle farms (table 9).
Not having the same possibilities as the milk producers to in­
tensify production, and in the absence of large price increases 
it is almost inevitable that they will continue to lose ground.
The remark of the I.A.I. that "... it is likely the system will be 
extinct before the end of the century", is of little comfort in 
the short/medium term. In this context it is of note that, accor­
ding to one survey(in 19o) "approximately 55% of farms provided 
a labour income per labour unit from farming... of less than the
TABLE 8
IRISH PASIi INCCuES: (1S77).
% of farms I'-Cull-t.iae' earning income oe;
at least as hi<rh as ov."i.3ide iarming. *
av.fm. ino- ji change
$> orae 19~7. 1 *-76—~7.
»UTtSTZR 66.5 £6494 +44
LEISTER 46.8 £5583 +44
COIxTACHT 28.4 £2374 +1
ULSTER 30.7 £2336 -16
I3ET.AIQ 43.0 £4742 . +31
*2i°full-time farms "t
TABLE 9 35,000
Principal oroduction systems: av.farm income in 1577.
Liquid mi lie £8757
Creamery £4530
""4 tillage £6255
I I  1« H  I t  t l  11 I I  »» —  - i - e . £6556
Drystock & tillage £5556
Drystock ¿*2 j ^0
HILL SHEEP i CATTLE £1550
TABLE 10
Distribution of fann income on £ basis (full-tine farms or.lv'.
INC0J.IE: 1575 I2ZL
less tiiaa £1,000 11.5 11.5
£1 ,000 to £3,000 41.4 32.1
£3,000+ 47.1 56.4
Source: F«*.rm I'.;
(Irish
ar-agesent Survey ' — ' 
v  # /
poverty line for asingle person.... and less than 20% 0
farms provided a 'farming' wage above the poverty line for1
a married couple with three children".x
V.George and R.Lawson, 1980,p.140. The 'poverty line' in 
this context is however somewhat higher in real terms (around 
1/3) than that used in the present analysis.
A measure of the degree to which structural change is desirable 
in the agricultural sector is to compare income per labour unit 
employed in agriculture with that earned outside farming. From 
table 8 it can be seen that this indicator varies considerably 
between regions. A point to note is that even in Munster where 
average farm income is well above the national average for 
wages/salaries in the non-agricultural sector (B 3410 in 1977) , 
over a third of the farms earn an income per labour unit below 
that earned outside farming. This suggests wide aesparities in 
income exist within the agricultural sector, even in regions which 
may be considered most successful in farming.
Table 10 confirms oiy: observations on disparities in farm in­
comes. The farms in the middle category are quickly moving up 
the ladder whilst those at the bottom are staying put and even 
losing ground in real terms.
A final point which must be discussed relating to farm incomes
*is the extent of non-agricultural farm income. We may note first­
ly, that, although the incidence of part-time farming in Ireland 
is relatively low by international standards (only around one 
in five farmers are part-time), nearly 90% of these farmers are 
on holdings of under 50 acres1. One may therefore estimate that 
roughly 4 3% of farmers with holdings below this size have some 
form of non-agricultural income to augment their farm income. 
Secondly , although for all farm size groups the average farm 
income of part-time farmers was found to be less than for full­
time farmers, on farms up to 75 acres the non-farm incomes of 
the farmer, on average, exceeded this income difference. Although 
part-time farming generally results in a lower net product per 
acre** for farms below 50 acres, it also results in a considerable 
increase (1 0 0% in some regions) in net product per labour
*note: tables 8-10 do not include part-time farmers.
^OECD "Part-time farming" 1978, p. 32.
2J. SCULLY, Agriculture in the West of Ireland: a study of the 
low farm income problemi 1971) S .0., Dublin
**mainly because such farms generally use less labour intensive 
production systems.
/Of.
On the whole, part-time farming can be seen as a rational 
answer to the problem of low farm incomes caused by the under­
employment of agricultural labour. Indeed, the low level of in­
come in some agricultural sectors is often mentioned as one 
of the primary reasons for seeking off-farm employment.
In certain areas where such alternative employment is scarce 
some income support measures are provided. One such measure 
is available for small-holdings in the Western regions. The 
smal 1“holder1 s means are assessed on a notional income per h 
land valuation, allowing the farmer to maximize his resource use 
without being penalized. Such payments are generally short term 
but often permanent in the case of, for example, elderly farmers 
who cannot obtain off-farm work. On the one hand such a measure 
has an obvious appeal in that it provides direct support for 
low income farmers, as opposed to, say, price support measures 
which are inefficient for this purpose. On the other, if in 
certain areas such support becomes widespread it should be con­
sidered a sign of failure in rural development. The necessity, 
then, is to ensure that regional development policies work 
towards providing alternative employment, if not in manufacturing, 
at least in tourism, where possible, or craft industries.
O
o o
By way of a conclusion to this section, table 11 summarizes 
the main indicators with which we have dealt. A quick glance 
back at the text will provide more detailed background information 
in all cases.
Together these indicators give a much more comprehensive picture 
of the regional variations in the economic well-being of the least
unit1.
^OECD, p. 34.
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privileged sectors of society. Essentially, these sectors comprise 
low income households, large households, households where the 
household head is out of work, and rural/farm households. For 
the first four regions in Table 11, we have no -ve signs. Doubtless 
one of the reasons for this is to be found in the strength of 
the agricultural sector and the fact that these four regions also 
had the lowest levels of employment in the primary sector in 
1975, whereas the West and N.W. & D. had the highest (49.2 and 
37.5% respectively). The West and N.W. & D. are clearly the two 
most disfavoured regions in all these respects. The case of the 
Midlands is not so clear cut - presumably because the region it­
self is probably one of the least homogeneous.
The N.E. is again a region with much <ivers ity, 
there being a significant rural/urban gap in expenditure. This 
is mainly due to (i) a poor agricultural sector and (ii) a rela­
tively high concentration of the workforce in industry (33.2% - 
state =31.4%).
Taken as a whole, Table 11 tells us two things: firstly, on 
average the "poorer-" region's underprivileged groups are more 
so than in the "richer" regions. It follows from this that the 
"poorest" region (N.W. & D.) had the most underprivileged groups. 
Secondly, there is a strong connection between the strength of 
the agricultural sector and the degree of deprivation. Poor agri­
cultural regions have the highest levels of deprivation. The 
link between agriculture and poverty is well known in the context 
of development economics; later on we shall discuss in depth the 
implications of this link for regional economic policies.
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Studies on poverty in Prance,
Of the many books and studies written on the subject, 
every one comes to a different conclusion; 15 million poor 
according to J-P Launay in "La France Sous-Developpee"(l970); 
one in ten, or around 5 million is the figure quoted by 
R. Lenoir in "Les Exclus"(1974); according to L. Stoleru the 
true figure is nearer 10 million (Vaincre la pauvrete dans 
les pays riches. 1974)
It is difficult to attatch much weight to any of the 
above estimates, especielly since the perception of poverty 
is different for each study. Perhaps the study by Stoleru 
is rhe most instructive, as it is essentially a review of 
many previous works on the subject. However his estimate 
is ultimately based on a totally subjective estimate of 
the shares of those "in poverty" within each employment cat­
egory! His concept of poverty is somewhat general and inc­
ludes a number of social indicators, the quantification of 
which is necessarily rather arbitrary.
One important remark of Stoleru is that the annual 
consumption survey which tries to estimate the real incomes
of 11,000 households, only improves our knowledge of average2 — incomes for any category, without allowing any estimates of
poverty to be made. Given it's size, it is impossible to obtain 
the type of breakdown found in say, the Italian budget survey 
of 36,000 households. This is unfortunate since for many cat­
egories, especially independent farmers, consumption estimates 
are probably less biased than income estimates (see also intr­
oduction to Irish survey), which are admittedly somewhat low
see Stoleru table 21 p. 52 
op.cit. p. 47
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The O.E.C.D. report,"Public Expenditures on Income 
Maintenance Programmes" (1976), using a poverty line of 66% 
of average disposable income, estimated at 16# the level of 
poverty in Prance (compared to 3# '<V. Germany and 7.5# in
the U.K.). According to this study the figures for Prance 
were largely due to poverty in the agricultural sector and 
the retired category (attributable z o the low level of the 
minimum pension)• This high level of poverty occured in 
spite of a relatively high level of public spending on such 
programmes (12.4# of G.D.P., which is similar to W. German^.
A reconciliation of these various estimates of pov­
erty in Prance is difficult because each starts from a diff­
erent definition, not all of which are entirely scientific 
in character.
It is therefore to be hoped that: our following study will 
serve to shed new light on the problem of poverty in France. 
Finally, in view of the important rural aspect of French 
poverty, pointed out in a number of previous surveys, it may 
well prove worthwhile to consider rural poverty in more detail 
and to asses whether there is any justification for the view 
that low-incomes in the agricultural sector continue to rep­
resent a source of poverty in rural and regional society.
- toy -
Introduction to the present analysis.
The method of analysis adopted in this section is 
somewhat different to the previous section on Ireland. One 
is always constrained by the statistical sources available, 
and this in turn necessitates a slightly different approach.
Some preliminary comments should therefore be made on 
the statistical material available.
In the first place it should be noted that very little 
information is available on incomes at a sufficiently dis­
aggregated level to enable any straightforward assessment of 
the distribution of incomes, either within employment categ­
ories or by household size.
The most amenable source .of information on incomes is 
probably that based on the "enquete sur les revenues fiscaux 
des ménagés", augmented by several other surveys on non-tax- 
able incomes and savings.1 However, whilst this method enab­
les us to obtain a fairly accurate impression of average dis­
posable income by employment category, it tells us next to 
nothing about the distribution of income within these categ­
ories .
Our approach to assessing income distribution in Fran­
ce , is therefore to take the basic survey results on taxable 
income - adjusted for household transfers and direct taxation. 
Whilst there are certainly drawbacks insofar as taxable inc­
ome is often undereported and no account is taken of non- 
taxable income(apart from state transfers), these figures, 
disaggregated by household size, probably probably represent 
the closest approximation attainable to the actual distrib­
ution of disposable income in 197 5. Moreover, on the basis 
of other surveys which have determined the average extent to 
which taxable income is underreported(by employment category) 
and the extent of non-taxable income? it is of course possib- 
le to adjust the basic survey results to take account of such
1 The survey figures are then adjusted with the use of nat­
ional accounts statistics to assess transfers and correct
for the underreporting,of taxable, and non-taxable income. See, INSEE, EaS, No 117, 1979,"Les disparités de revenu 
entre categories sociales en 1975".
* This is in general of les^t importance than the underrepor­
ting of taxable income.
no
factors(table 1). Problems arise however when considering 
income distribution by employment category since the extent 
of underreporting of income varies substantially from cat­
egory to category- In particular, this tendency is more pron­
ounced for farmers and the self-employed than for other empl­
oyment categories. In these cases, whilst state transfers 
are taken account of in the survey we have adopted, the und­
erreporting of primary income is not, and, given the fact 
that(at least for farmers) primary(agricultural) income tends 
to fall as aproportion of total income as total income dimin­
ishes^, it is not clear to what extent the figures should be 
adjusted so as to obtain a true estimate of the number of 
households below a particular level of income within each of 
the employment categories. For the analysis of income distr­
ibution by employment category we have therefore chosen to 
provide the survey figures as they stand, and merely indicate 
the (average) extent to which primary income is underreported 
for each of the individual categories (table 2).
Poverty estimates.
Before turning to these tables we must first of all
consider the estimation of an overall povery line (in terms 
of disposable income) for France.
Examination of income-maintenance programmes in Fran­
ce, however, provides few guidlines on which to base some 
appropriate poverty line. Old-age allowances(min.'solidarity'), 
benefits for the disabled and widows pensions vary from a 
minimum of Fr 4,300 to 4,700 per annum(1975), and are clearly 
intended as an income supplement rather thanas a minimum lev­
el of income in themselves^ (in contrast for example to Supp­
lementary Benefit in the U.K.). Unemployment benefit(min. 
means tested) is a more realistic candidate, and this amount­
ed to a figure of around Fr 1,170 per month in 197 5(short-term*benefit, single person). Another possibility is to take the 
national minimum wage - the SMIC(salaire min.interprofession- 
el de croissance) - and we should perhaps consider this in 
more detail.
 ^ See, "les ressources des menages par categorie socio-prof- 
essionelle en 1975", INSEE, 1980, p.39.
 ^ "les revenues des agriculteurs en 1975",INSEE,E4S(1980)p.30> 
conversely, the share of pensions tends to rise. The known 
nature of these changes is not howeversuch as to albw adjustment. 
0ECD{ 1976 ) ; dependents allowances are considerably lower.
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In 1975 , the SMIC was fixed at Fr 7.7 an hour - for a 42 
hour week, this amounted to Fr. 16,800 a year or Fr. 1,400 
a month. According to the C.E.R.C.1 around 5% of employees 
in industry and commerce earned incomes in the immediate 
vicinity of this level. Some 6.7% earned below this level.
Of this 6.7% however, over 47% are estimated to be people 
paid at the SMIC level but who are absent for part of the 
year - another 44% are under 18, apprentices or handicapped 
workers for whom the SMIC applies with certain reductions.
The rest are part-time employed or are partly remunerated in 
kind (eg. free housing). The SMIC by the way, also applies 
to farm labourers, the salaire minimum agricole being re­
placed by the SMIC in 1968.
In the present context the main problem in using the 
SMIC as a poverty line revolves around the question of whet­
her it is to be considered adequate for one or two persons, 
or indeed more. A further problem is that the SMIC is defined 
in terms of gross earnings, and we should therefore consider
whether net disposable income of families earning the SMIC
2is substantially different after tax. As Sawyer(1975) has 
pointed out, disposable income for a two person family with 
a gross income equal to the SMIC in 197 2 turns out to be 
92.4% of gross earnings. For a household with two children 
the effect of addind child allowances raises total household 
disposable income up to a level approximately equal to gross 
earnings.
Given the various alternatives to defining the pover­
ty line, a reasonable compromise would be to take disposable 
income for a two person household where gross earnings are 
equivalent ot the SMIC? Such an approach can hardly be
 ^ "Les revenues des français" CERC, 1977, pp.222-225.
2 "Poverty in some developed countries", prelim, paper, CECD, 
Paris, 1975, table 9.
 ^ This approach also avoids the problem of assessing depen­
dents allowances, which arises due to cne fact that in many 
countries such allowances are not always designed to meet -he 
full cost of an additional dependent. Moreover in France, 
their real value has increased significantly over recent years
- perhaps indicating that such allowances were considered too 
low in previous periods.
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accused of being too 'lenient' even considering that we are 
here defining poverty in absolute rather than in relative 
terms. Hence, the approach is largely equivalent to that used 
in our prevoius studies on Ireland and Italy.
As such, the poverty line would represent a minimum 
disposable income of Fr.1,294 per month for a two person fam­
ily. On official unit consumption scales(unite de consommat- 
ion)1 such a household would represent 1.7 consumer units(or 
1.7 Adult Equivalent Units) - hence disposable income at the 
poverty line would amount to Fr.761 per month per A.E.U., or 
Fr.8,628 per year.
Certain problems arise when attempting to adjust the 
income categories in table 1 for general underreporting of 
income; and whilst the extent of such underreporting is known 
with a fair degree of accuracy on the average, for particular
income categories information is insufficient to adjust ind-
2ividually for each category.
On average however, primary income would appear to be 
underestimated to an extent of around 20%, and family all­
owances to an extent of around 10%.^ Whilst for the lower in­
come families(table 1), net transfers in general account for4a higher proportion of total disposable income it cannot be 
excluded that such households(simply due to their employment 
composition) may also tend to underreport primary income to 
a greater extent than on average.(see table 2.).
1 See INSEE, Econ. & Stat. No.117, 1979, p.27. The two concepts 
are identical.
•s
"Donees statistiques sur les families", INSEE, 1981, p.243. 
Whilst the average degree of underreporting of (taxable) inc­
ome is known for each employment category, the employment com­
position of any income category in table 1 is not known with 
any degree of precision.
 ^ Ibid. 4 op.cit. table 102.
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However, it seems reasonable to assume that on balance, 
the result of applying average estimates of the degree of 
underreporting of incomes will certainly not be far from 
reality at least for the lower income categories in table 1; 
Whilst primary income for the lowest income families(below 
4,500 fr.) may be slightly underestimated relative to other 
families, the fact that a larger proportion of disposable in­
come ie. state transfers, is overall, underestimated to a less­
er extent than primary income, will tend to operate in the 
opposite direction.
Taking the above considerations into account, the appr­
oach adopted to estimate the number of families below the pov­
erty line, has been to adjust the poverty line itself rather 
than the individual income categories for which adjustment on 
the basis of average estimates of underreporting would yield 
results with a greater or lesser degree of accuracy(particul­
arly for higher income categories where net transfers are neg­
ative). Adjustment of the poverty line has therefore been car­
ried out on the basis of available statistics relating to aver­
age primary income and average transfers for households in the 
income range Fr 6,500 to 15,000.^ Adjustment of average disp­
osable income to take account of the factors mentioned above 
would suggest that the lowest four income categories in table
1 should be multiplied by 1.1846 to obtain actual disposable 
income in 1975. Alternatively, taking the figures as they 
stand, the poverty line should be lowered to Ffr. 7,283 per 
annum per A.E.U. or Fr. 607 per month for purposes of analysis. 
Table la) gives a breakdown of the number of households below 
this level in 1975. Finally it should be borne in mind that 
even within the income categories given in table 1 differences 
may appear between adjusted survey figures and actual incomes 
due to the fact that transfers can be assumed in general to
constitute a higher proportion of disposable imcome as family
2size increases.
1 2Ibid. Hence if anything, there may be a tendency to
underestimate the number a larger sized families below the 
poverty line in the following analysis.
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Distribution of families in France(1975) by 
family type and category of disposable income
per Adult Equivalent Unit.
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Source: INSEE,"Données statistiques sur les familles",op.cit.
Including the estimated proportion of families in income categ­
ory Fr.6,500-3,000 which fall below the poverty line, we arrive 
at the figures given in table la), which gives the estimated(tota 
number of households and persons below the povety line in 1975.
-//r-
Distribution of family units and persons 
below the poverty line - France 1975.
* * *
1 ) % of: families in No.of fam.un- No.of per- Poverty
Couples with- group in poverty its in poverty, sons in pov.profile%
out c h i l d r e n : --------------- ---------------(household)
Spouse employed: 5.1 81,059 146,074 4.6-------(24,067)
...not employed: 6.9 205,192 354,356 11.8
----------------  (84,042)
2 )
Couples with
* spouse empL: 5.35 175, 592
1 child 3.5 55,948 '167,844 4.9
"" (14,840)of
which: 2 children 4.5 49,289 181,962 5.4
----- (18,990)
3 + j^iJLdren_ 12 .1 71,184 394,678 10.6
(n.av.)
spouse not empl: 9♦8 389,168
1 child 9.7 112,976 299,730 9.5
(52,264)of
... 2 children 8.3 110,506 403,048 12.2
whlch: ---------- (48,721)
3 children 9.6 75,082 347,616 10.3
(33,350)'
4+_children 12.5 86,613 563,850 15.2
_________________ 1 n^av^l___________
3)
Single parents: 12.05 61,672
1 child 10.5 31,385 52,269 1.8
------- (15,750)
2+ children 14.15 30,125 114,870 3.1
(n.av.)
Single persons 4 Other (estimate) 394,200 10.6
TOTAL = 7.3% 1,303,559 3,712,520 =100.0
TABLE la).
Figures underlined in this column may not correspond to sub­
totals due to rounding.
* Figures in brackets in this column relate to families with 
adult dependents. For some categories it was not possible to disag­
gregate the statistics, and dependents have(as in other cases)been 
included in the total figures. This approach recognises the fact
cont/
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Several points should however be borne in mind when ass­
essing table la). In the first place, the figures used for 
the analysis(table 1) relate to family units of two or more 
persons, and single persons are therefore not included. This 
unfortunate statistical gap presented a rather substantial 
problem, especially since the number of such cases is rather 
high. To obtain a rough estimate of the number of persons in 
poverty within this group, and in the absence of any other in­
formation, it was decided to apply the average incidence of 
poverty (7.3%) to this category. Whilst this group is likely 
to be composed of either retired or 'working' persons, it 
should furthermore be pointed out that a substantial number of 
family units below the poverty line also contain dependent 
active or non-active adults at the household level, and these 
have been included in table la). Following from the above dis­
cussion it should be made quite clear that the extent of pov­
erty amongst single person households cannot be known with 
any degree of precision.^"
A second problem concerns estimation of the poverty- 
gap. Such estimates have not been possible due to the level 
of aggregation in the available statistics. This presents a 
certain difficulty in interpreting the figures in table la) 
since, for example, whilst the incidence of poverty may appear 
higher for larger household sizes, it may of course be the 
case that the average poverty-gap for this category is higher
 ^ However it is instructive to note that in 1976 around 20% 
of retired persons (ie. 2.3 million) received the 'minimum 
vieillesse' means-tested F.N.S. Supplement, which implies 
that their total income in 1976 did not exceed Fr.l3,000(or 
Fr.11,500 in 1975 prices). This is to be compared with the 
1975 poverty line of Fr.8,600, and certainly a significant 
proportion of the 2.3m would have been at or below this level.
-------------------- C.E *.C(J977 ) .
cont/
that family units in table 1 may sometimes include other dep­
endents within the household. A further reason for this appr­
oach is that family size categories are not sufficiently dis­
aggregated to estimate the number of persons in larger family 
sizes. Whilst such dependents may of course have additional 
incomes which arenot taken account of in table 1 (and which 
may have the effect of raising total household income above 
the poverty line), it should also be remarked upon that a num­
ber of households will not have been included in the poverty 
estimates because, whilst family income may be above the pov­
erty line, total household income, where there are non-earning 
dependents, may well fall below it. However, the extent of any 
such biais will not be substantial given that our figures 
would suggest that the number of adult dependents(excluding 
spouses) in table 1 comes to around 93,000.
- //i -
or lower than for the poor overall.
TABLE lb)
Distribution of persons below the poverty line 
in 1975.
No.persons in Poverty profile 
poverty.
Single persons (approx)_______________  394,200 10.6
Couples without
children_____________________  608, 539 16.4
Couples with,
1 child_______________________  534,678 14.4
2 children____________________ 652,720 17.6
3+ children________________  1,339,494 36.1
Single parents________________ 182,889 4.9
Total = 3,712,520 100.0
Nevertheless account being taken of the aforementioned 
limitations, a number of important conclusions can be drawn 
from the above analysis.
In the first place the incidence of poverty would 
appear to be highest within single parent households where 
around one in seven with two or more children fall below the 
poverty line, and for larger families (4+) where the spouse 
is not employed(one in eight below the poverty line). In gen­
eral the incidence of poverty would appear to rise fairly 
abruptly as family size increases after the 3/4 child, and 
this result is very similar to the findings of our previous 
surveys on Ireland and Italy. Also, the addition of a second 
income appears to have a significant influence on the incid­
ence of poverty for each of the family size categories - such 
that for families with one or two children, the incidence of 
poverty is around 3-4% compared to 8-10% where the spouse is 
not employed.
Finally, we should perhaps mention one institut- 
utional factor which may have influenced the distribution of 
poverty by family size. Whilst certain reforms in child ben­
efits were introduced in 1978(see annex), in 1975 the sit­
uation was that no benefits were available for the first child, 
and benefits for the second and subsequent children increased 
up until the fourth child, decreasing slightly thereafter.^- 
This may help to explain why for example, in the category 
'couples with children-spouse not employed', the incidence of 
poverty is actually higher for single child families than for 
families with two children.
In conclusion it would seem that in part, poverty
in France can be ascribed to high levels of dependency{see
table lb.), and in part to insufficiency of earned household2income. On first reflection the second point may appear 
somewhat surprising especially given the existence of minimum 
-wage legislation in France(which is also the basis for the 
present poverty line). However, the following points should 
be noted;
i) The SMIC is set in terms of hourly(gross)earnings 
rather than some form of monthly or yearly income. A large 
number of workers earn an annual income at or slightly below 
the SMIC 'rate', and where there are dependents may thus 
fall somewhat below the present poverty line.
ii) Independent professions clearly are not affected 
by the SMIC, and have no minimum guaranteed income.
iii) Concerning retired persons, the minimuminon­
contributory ) pension amounted to Fr.6,800 per person in 1975 
(pov.lineFr.8,600), and was means-tested such that total in­
come of the receiver would not exceed Fr.11,500. It seems 
reasonable to assume that a certain proportion of the 2.3 mil­
lion persons who recieved the means-tested supplement in 1975 
lived on this income.alone. Hence,if anything, the rough fig­
ure given for the number of single persons in poverty is prob- 
ably an underestimate.
 ^ See annex  ^ This pension is divided into two parts - the
AVTS which is automatic, and the FNS which is discretionary 
and means-tested.
-119
Sectoral analysis
The attempt to obtain estimates of the incidence of 
poverty by employment category faces difficult and largely 
unsumountable problems in a number of cases - the major 
difficulty again being the underreporting of taxable income. 
By comparing the primary(taxable) income survey figures 
with national accounts, it is however possible to deduce the 
average extent of such underreporting for each employment 
category. Whilst it is possible to adjust overall survey res­
ults for this factor (as was the case in table 1), a number 
of difficulties arise in so doing for the income categories 
(by sector) given in table 2. In the first place, available 
estimates on underreporting do not coincide precisely with 
the employment categories used vis. disposable income. Secon­
dly, whilst the composition of average disposable income is 
known for each employment category, these shares can hardly 
be assumed to be reasonably applicable to each of the income 
categories in table 2. Thirdly, it seems tenuous to assume 
that underreporting is likely to be of an equivalent extent 
in all income categories, especially since direct taxation 
in France is progressive, and as the C.E.R.C. itself points 
out, "plus le taux d’imposition marginale est élève'. . .plus la 
fraude est grande"^".
Given the above problems, we have decided in table 2 
to present figures on(unadjusted) annual disposable income 
(per housdhold), together with estimates of the average ext­
ent to which primary income is underreported for each empl­
oyment category. As can be seen from this table, this factor 
is particularly high for the independent occupations, and 
especially so for farmers. For the latter category, this fact 
alone must certainly 'explain' the very large proportion of 
of 'expl. ag.1 households below an annual income of Fr.15,000 
(per household) in table 2 , although as the statistical
1 Le NouvelObservateur,"L'annee économique et sociale 1980", 
1951, p'.$6.
 ^ Representing some 313,400 households. Available figures for 
the other categories(again below Fr.15,000) are; sal.ag.12,900, 
employes 31,300, inactifs(retired) 473,300.
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source itself points out, "..il (est) clair que cela doit 
correspondre a une certaine realité dans un nombre appreciable 
de cas".^ For this category it is probably better to take a
 ^ However the extent of underreporting at the lower end of the 
income scale should not be exaggerated either - a survey of
647,000 farms by the Inst.National de Recherche Agronomique 
came to the conclusion that one farmer in four in 1975 disp­
osed of an income below Fr.13,000(including social security 
payments). The study also pointed to marked regional disparit­
ies, and the most deprived farmers were to be found in Limous­
in, Auvergne and Midi-Pyrénées. Agra Europe,August 18, 1978.
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sectoral approach(using other sources), and we shall turn to 
consider this matter in more detail shortly.
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the special problem of 
farm incomes, the figures available from the abovementioned 
statistical source are usefull in providing a rough guide to 
the sectoralincidence of low-incomes. Such considerations are 
quite important as we move on to discuss the regional dist­
ribution of low-incomes in France. Taking the number of fam­
ilies below a level of disposable income of Fr.12,000 per AEU 
per annum1, one finds that 15% belong to farm households, 38% 
to manual and agricultural worker households, and 30% to ret­
ired households.
3 • 5§2i2ü§i_§ËE®2!:Ë_2f _E2Y§EËY_§2d_low^incomes_in_Françe •
Whilst figures are available at the regional level 
with respect to average household income, the results are 
based on the primary income survey mentioned earlier and are 
not adjusted for state transfers, direct taxation or under­
reporting. Hence at the regional level, the figures given for 
France in Chapter 1, based on national accounts data, prob­
ably represent the most accurate overview of regional income 
disparities.
Nevertheless, such figures are still of interest part­
icularly given that the results are available at the sub­
regional level (département and commune). However it should 
be born in mind that relatively low income figures for certain 
départements may in some cases result from a very high share 
of farming population whose incomes are particularly underrep­
orted. On the other hand there is no reason to believe that 
such underreporting does in fact follow a systematic pattern 
at the regional level, and as it turns out, the relative pos­
ition of most regions under this measure is very much the 
same as that produced from the national accounts figures in 
Chapter 1.______________
1 Some 30% of all families, that is around 5,318,000; the avr 
erage level of disposable income per A.E.U. came to Fr.18,500 
per annum.
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Several important remarks can be made concerning these 
figures. In the first place, greater spatial income inequal­
ity is apparent at the 1departsment' level than at the 'region' 
level, and this would appear to be largely due to the fact 
that very substantial differences often exist within regions
- particularly in the South West and Massif Central(see Map 1).
Map 1 ♦
Average income per house­
hold, by departement.Aver­
age oi 1970 and 197^
France = 100
n  Oe 53 a 74,9
( Ü  Oe 75 4 82.3
ÜÜ De 83 1 39,9
E U  De 90 â 99,9
H  Oe 100 I 109,9 
□  'De 110 1 1S7
Source: C.E.R.C.(1979), p. 170. 
(Enquete Revenues des Ménagés) C t /\tri l
In point of fact, whilst the Massif Central constitutes a 
geographical whole, it does not conform to any administrative 
or general statistical boundary, ana , whilst the area covered 
is quite considerable(l/6th of the country),the actual situat­
ion of the araa in terms of income, population movements etc. 
is often overlooked as the relevent figures are invariably 
aggregated with the five 'regions' which overlap this area.“
In 1968 the population of the Massif Central amounted to 
3.4 million, having declined from some 3.8 m. in 1351 - that 
is whilst the French population as a whole increased by some 
35%. See, CIout(1974) table 1.
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In the second place, substantial income differences 
would also appear with respect to the level of urbanisation, 
although the size of such differences varies very much from 
case to case. Table 3 gives an example drawn from two regions, 
Limousin and Alsace. Figures of 101 and 118{France =100) for 
the two capital towns of these regions (Limoges and Strasbourg 
respectively), must however be compared with the very sizeable 
differences in average income between rural 'communes' in 
these regions (index 54 and 98 resp.) which in large part ref­
lects differences in wealth of the surrounding countryside 
outside these two towns.
Table 3. Average household income in 1975 by size of commune. 
Region/ Limousin Alsace Paris region
Size/
Rural communes 54 98 117
Urban communes:
below 10,000 per. 80 99 129
10,000 - 50,000 102 92 126
50th.- 100,000 108 108 119
100th.-200th. 101 112 135
Over 200,000 - 118 -
Paris (agglomeration) 138
Overall (77) (106) (136)
Source: Enquete sur les revenus de 1975. CERC(197 9)
France 
=  100
Thirdly, a similar pattern to the above arises if we con­
sider household income by socioprofessional category and 
commune size, with larger urban communes (in most cases) ex­
hibiting substantially higher average incomes than rural 
communes for any category (see table 4). Such differences are 
particularly noticeable in the case of 'inactifs'(retired) 
households, which suggests that for this category, the incid­
ence of low-incomes and poverty may be of a pronounced rural 
character.^-
Differences in price levels should however be taken into 
account; whilst spatial differences can be assumed to be fair­
ly small for goods and services, in the case of rents, if the 
price per square metre in a rural commune is expressed as 100, 
in the case of medium/large size towns the index rises substan­
tially to 139. However qualitative differences are not taken 
into account. See CERC(1979),p.l91.
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Similar findings obtain when we consider average region­
al wages and salaries(Map 2) and the low-income regions are 
essentially the same (ie. Massif Central,S.West) as those out­
lined in Map 1 above, although the range, as one would expect 
is somewhat smaller. Moreover, the figures contained in Map 2 
can hardly be accused of presenting a biais in one way or an- 
other^as was the case for the household income estimates.
Map 2. Net earnings by département 
average 1973,74,75. 
Francedess Paris) * 100
□  0« 78 i 89,9 
ED 0« 90 * 92,9 
E3 0« 93 1 97,9 
E3 CX 98 1 103,9 
O  0( 104 1 109,9
□  0« 110 1 149,9
Source: INSEE, Exploitation des declarations 
de salaires. CERC(1979),p.178.
Again rural communes appear to fare worse on average than 
urban communes, and markedly so as table 3 brings out(see over).
Finally, table 4 summarises the results of the various 
income surveys at the regional level for 1975. The most strik­
ing point in table 4 is that five regions between them manage
 ^Although of course, composition effects may be substantial.
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Table 3. Average household income and net earnings (wages 
and salaries), France 1975.~
Household income Net earnings*
Rural communes:
Urban communes : 71 74
under 10,000 per. 93 82/83
10th. to 50th. 98 87/90
50th to 100th. 102 94
100th. to 200th. 103 100
over 200,000 107 100/123
Paris(agglomeration) 138 Paris(centre)14 0
France = 100 = 100
Source: CERC(1979),pp.197/179. *Size categories do not always 
correspond to those in column 1.
to take almost all the bottom rankings in each of the five 
columns - in other words they are characterised by low aver­
age incomes, low wages, low farm incomes and low incomes for 
retired persons. These regions, most of which are contiguous 
comprise Auvergne, Bretagne, Limousin, Languedoc and Poitou- 
Charentes.
TA3LE 4. Average earnings and incomes of non-
wage earners by region in 1975. France=100.
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Source: INSEE, Exploitation des déclarations annuelles des 
salaires en 1975; INSEE, Enquete sur les revenues de 1975, 
CERC(1979)p.l88.
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Given the comments made in our previous section regarding 
the likely socio-professional incidence of poverty and low- 
incomes in France, and the results of this section pointing to 
the very marked regional concentration of low-level indicators 
for such groups, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that 
poverty in France may well take on.a very significant regional 
dimension. With respect to the category of retired persons,the 
results would indeed seem to point clearly in this direction. 
Again, for the category of farmers regional income differences 
would appear to be very marked. For the category of dependent 
employees(salaries), regional differences in earnings, alth­
ough substantial are clearly less marked than for the above 
two categories. Furthermore, whilst low-earnings together with 
large family size were, both factors which could be assumed to 
explain poverty within this latter group, there is very little 
to tell us whether low earnings in particular were primarily 
due to low hourly wages, or more the result of part-time(or 
non-full-time) employment. Indeed, if it were the case that 
temporary employment was more prevalent in certain regions 
than in others, it might even arise that the incidence of pov­
erty within this group would in fact be highest within some 
of the relatively high income regions. This of course presents 
a limit case, but in general the final result may indeed be 
very substantially influenced by local conditions within the 
regional labour market. In the absence of further information 
nothing more can unfortunately be said regarding the likely 
spatial configuration of poverty within this group.
The rural aspect cf poverty and low-incomes in France.
It goes without saying that the level of economic well­
being in predominantly rural areas is often heavily dependent 
on the economic performance, productivity and income deriving 
from the agricultural sector.
In France this sector continues to exhibit very substantial 
regional inequalities in agricultural earnings as figures for 
1979 show(see annex)*. Moreover, whilst some regions(eg.Bretagne)
* Main-living farms only are considered.
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appear to have substantially improved their position in recent 
years , other areas have continued to lag behind. As a result,
France would now appear to be effectively divided into two separate 
'blocks' as far as agricultural earnings are concerned.
In the Massif Central for example, seven départements out of 
nine have average gross earnings below 62% of the national average 
(the remaining two being below 80%). In the South West and Pyrenees 
almost all départements are below 80% of the national average.
Although poverty in agriculture is not limited to the small- 
scale sector it is true to say that if there is a problem of poverty 
in French farming, it is primarily within this sector. Not all farm­
ers below 20 ha. have low .incomes though; intensive farming for in­
stance can be quite profitable at this size; furthermore, a certain 
number also have jobs outside agriculture (below 5 ha. over 1 in
3 farms . are run by people whose main job is outside farming).
Detailed consumption statistics would have proved helpful in 
this analysis. The problem here is that the consumption of farmers 
is not generally measured according to farm size - the most recent 
survey which does, dates from 1965 and only covers two départements. 
Moreover, no survey permits us to isolate small farmers as none 
taxes into account the production system and the farmer's age . We 
may note, however, that in the 196 5 survey of Eure-et-Loire per­
sonal consumption on farms of less than lOha. and less than 20 ha. 
was respectively 40% and 50% that of farms above 50 ha. Given that 
personal consumption for agricultural households was 20% below the 
national average (in 19 72) and the sizable disparities in income 
and consumption in this sector, one may guess what order the priv­
ations of many small-scale farmers may attain.
If the disparity in consumption between the agricultural and 
national populations appeared to remain the same between 1965 and 
1972, in practice it increased since part of the increase in average
*.i"Superficie minimum d'installation" - less than 20 hectares. 
^"La condition sociale des petits paysans”, p. 393
f 2*.
farm consumption was due to the disappearance of a large number 
of small-scale farmers.
In spite of their low incomes, many small farmers are the 
owners of their property. One may therefore ask the question 
whether this factor is able to significantly improve their 
status. "The analysis of the size of this fortune, of its 
structure, the conditions of its acquisition and its utilisation, 
lead to a negative reply.."1. Not only is their capital modest 
in comparison with other categories of farmers but its resale 
value is even less (in many cases close to zero).
As for housing, national statistics show that the proportion 
of families occupying sub-standard accommodation is much higher 
in agriculture than for the nation as a whole. According to a 
survey of Ille-et-Vilaine (1970) , households with less than 
10 ha. were in all cases without bath or central heating, in one 
case in two without running water, and in some cases lived on a 
floor of beaten earth. The proportion of dwellings with only 
one room was 33% below 10 ha. and 13% between 10 and 20 ha. The 
conditions were worse in the case of rented property under 10 ha. 
'In which one found one roomed houses (42% only had one room) in 
ruinous condition with floors of beaten earth and without any 
facilities
Another aspect in which fanners find themselves at the bottom 
of the social scale concerns education. The cases of "no schooling" 
or "only primary education" are more frequently found on farms3below 20 ha. . Although the statistics available are somewhat
4dated , they are still of importance as the figures given are by 
age, hectarage and level of education and are for France as a 
whole. They show firstly that in each age group, small-scale farm­
ers are significantly worse off than medium/large scale ones.
^Les petits paysans et la pauvreté 
^Les petits paysans et! la pauvreté 
"La condition sociale des petits paysans" p. 394
4S.C.E.E.S., enquête structures, STATISTIQUE AGRICOLE 1967r
The 1975 census in Limousin found that in agriculture,only 28% of 
dwellings had a bath or shower,and only 16% central heating.
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For example in the age group from 50-64 years, 16% of farmers 
over 50 ha. and only 3% of farmers from 5-20 ha. had some second­
ary or higher education. In the under 35 years category the figures 
were 22% and 5% respectively. One would perhaps have expected the 
difference between age groups to have been more marked. The fact 
that it was not allows us to draw the second point from this 
survey - that the general level of education of small-scale farm­
ers today (in the middle-age category and over) is probably 
little better than that of their predecessors ten years ago.
"As a result, at least in part, of their low educational 
level small-scale farmers are rarely engaged in union or pro­
fessional representation"" . * Recent research suggests that not only 
the share of farmers engaged in such activities but also the im­
portance of such engagements varies proportionally with farm size.
There is every reason to believe that under-education con­
cerns not just the fanners themselves, but their children as 
well. In other words, the backwardness is cumulative. According 
to a survey made in Finistère by the I.N.E.A. for the generations 
1945-55, whether one considered school leavers or those in appren­
ticeship and at work, the percentages in these groups were much 
higher from 16 years onwards in the smallest farm size categories. 
At 18 years of age only one child in four was still at school in 
non-specialized farms under 10 ha., and one in three from 10-20 
ha., compared to one child in two in the most favoured group.
For the children from the smallest farms, working apprenticeships 
predominate: for those from larger farms, secondary and higher 
education is the rule. As for agricultural training schemes, "the 
higher the level of instruction the lower the recruitment from
agriculture and the less it has to do with the children of small- 
2scale farmers" .
Perhaps it is such studies of social heredity which point out 
most vividly the disfavoured position of the small farmer. As Je- 
gouzo and Brangeon conclude, "Invariably excluded from agriculture,
"La condition sociale des petits Daysans",o. 305
op. cit., o. 396/72
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children born into small farm households more often than not 
become manual workers; not only the probability of becoming 
manual workers but also that of not being able to go any higher, 
are indoubteidly higher for the children of small farmers than 
for those of manual workers."
Another measure of social deprivation which has been used 
concerns prolonged or total celebacy. In agriculture, as for 
the rest of society, the probability of getting married increases 
as a function of a person's economic and social rank. The ob­
servation of a general inverse correlation between the frequency 
of celebacy and a person's social position and the existence of 
a high degree of celebacy amongst small-scale farmers serves to 
confirm the low social rank of this group. In this sense the 
degree of celebacy is also an indicator of deficiencies in a 
whole series of spheres.
Figures available from the 1968 population census make this 
point quite clear. For farmers between 40-49 years the average 
rate of celebacy (13%) is about that of manual workers and lab­
ourers. This average figure though, is misleading as the chances 
of remaining unmarried are high only for farm sizes below 20 ha.
Fanners with 50 ha. or more marry as often as those in the middle
and upper classes. By contrast for farmers with less than 15 ha. 
the rates of celebacy are abnormally high and increase as the 
size of the holding diminishes, such that for farms under 5 ha. 
one farmer in three is unmarried. Figures for younger age groups 
give no reason to believe that the situation for them is any 
better - indeed, for all farm categories above 10 ha. the rates 
of celebacy in the 30-34 years group are somewhat higher than for 
any of the older age groups.
Lastly, in this section, we should briefly consider the 
social security provisions for farmers. It is worth mentioning
that in many instances the agricultural sector, and particularly
*0 0 . cit. p. 385
n7.
the self-employed farmer has only recently been awarded the 
same provisions as the rest of society*. There remain, however, 
certain points on which the self-employed farmer (and other 
self-employed persons) finds himself at a distinct disadvantage. 
These points mainly concern the loss of earned income, against 
which risk the farmer finds himself poorly insured.
In the case of illness the AMLXA provisions are limited to 
medical expenses: they do not include daily payments in the 
case of cessation of work. As for invalidity pensions, these 
are only awarded when the degree of incapacitaion exceeds 66%, 
and then not in all cases. It should also be mentioned that the 
value of this pension is generally less for farmers than fer 
salaried workers (who receive half their average salary) - its 
value in 1977 was a more Fr. 5 ,598 in the case of total incapa­
citation. We may also add that aLthough family supplements and 
medical insurance apply equally to all persons at a national level, 
there is evidence to suggest that a significant degree of non 
take-up exists for farm households in these sectors. This is 
due not only to the failure to claim family allowances but also 
to a lower level of consomption of medical services1.
Farm income and the regional distribution of incomes
In this section we intend to look into several aspects of 
farm income - fluctuation, saving, debt, income support and 
part-time farming. To conclude we shall look at farm income in 
a regional context.
In many respects the insecurity of farm income may be as much 
a source of hardship as its low level - net income may sometimes 
be negative and of course those farmers with few resources are 
least able to make provisions against such loss. There is no 
minimum guaranteed inccme for fanners, unlike waqe/salary earnersAlthough
*For a detailed survey see Droit Social No. 9 — 10,1977 : "L1 évolution.' 
des revenues sociaux en agriculture".
p. 350, op. cit.
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many farmers benefit from fixed minimum prices, prices are only 
a small part of the problem - output may vary substantially or, 
as has been seen in recent years, the prices of certain inputs 
may rise faster than prices for final output.
In any case, given such variability it is clearly necessary 
for the farmer to have a higher savings ratio than his salaried 
counterpart in industry or commerce. Furthermore, the mere cont­
inuation of agricultural production requires the farmer to 
make investments from time to time. In many instances such out­
lays may entail a substantial compression of personal consumpt­
ion. "In cases where the capacity to save is restrcited the lack 
of capital resources may be a source of further privations - or 
of overwork - that is, diverse forms of poverty."1
In fact small-scale farmers have greater recourse to self- 
financing than their larger counterparts - partly because they 
tend to be refused credit more often. In spite of this many of 
them find themselves in heavy debt. For beef and dairy farms 
from 5-10 ha. short-term credit alone averaged half of gross 
farm income (in 1973) , and one third for farms from 10-20 ha^ .
A final point to consider is the flow of farm income. On 
some types of farm (mainly dairy) this flow is fairly regular, 
but in general the opposite is true. It should be clear that 
this in turn implies a high ratio of savings for transactionary 
purposes where such irregularity is pronounced.
Having considered some of the factors to be taken into account 
when assessing farm income, it seems clear that its value in 
terms of consumption possibilities is generally lower than would 
appear from net income figures. A relatively large proportion must 
go towards savings - where this is not possible consumption may 
be periodically reduced to very low levels.
In view of the hardships associated with low farm incomes it 
would seem surprising if nothing at all were done by the govern­
ment In cases Of real need. Indeed, in the case of very unfavourable
condition soeiale des petits paysans, p. 392
35.6% of farmers had long term deists of over 3 years.2
movements in farm income there exist special measures which 
give some degree of compensation. Essentially these consist 
of. a V.A.T. allowance and a direct payment per animal. The 
latter is of greatest importance and has become a permanent 
measure in mountain regions. It corresponds to the "compen­
satory allowance" in the European Community directive on 
mountain farming and farming in certain less-favoured areas, 
and applies to main-living farms of over 3 ha. The allowance 
amounts to Fr. 200 per cattle unit up to a maximum of 40 
units per farm. For a typical herd of some ten units1, Fr.
2,000 a year is hardly likely to make more than a small con­
tribution to the farmer's relative income position. Further­
more retired persons and part-time farmers earning more than 
50% of their total income outside farming do not qualify for 
this grant. Hence the paradoxical situation arises where the 
lower farm income, the lower must be the farmer's non-farm 
income in order to qualify! In other words the situation may 
arise where a small-scale farmer who needs an off-farm job 
to live, either is excluded from the scheme (because his 
farm income is not high enough or his off-farm income not 
low enough) or must give up his off-farm job.
A measure of the coverage of this scheme is that over a third 
of these grants may go to valley fanners with little difficult 
terrain , due partly to the factors we have just mentioned and 
also because of the failure to specify mountain regions as close 
ly as would be desirable.
Undoubtedly, the provision of direct payments to low income 
farmers represents a potentially powerful method of eliminating 
rural poverty at its source. In view of its limitations, perhaps 
a better method than the one mentioned above would be to supple­
ment family incomes below a certain level. This approach, by 
the way, has been used in Switzerland since 1954, together 
with a series of indirect grants.
*V7hy 3 ha. is something of a mystery - presumably farmers with 
only 2.9 ka. are ift mad of £ucti i  supplimtnt:
*For Francs as a whole 30s of nerds are below this sise ana in
such cases would consequently receive proportionally less.
^According to a survey of the Vog®s in i?ays, Paysans, Pays&ges, 
INRA 1977. •/•
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The final section of this paper aims .to give some idea 
of the regional distribution of low incomes in agriculture.
For this we use the "réseau d'information comptable agricole" 
(RICA) which, since 1968 provides statistics on net agricultural 
income by unit labour input*. The survey covers about 3,000 
farms for which farming is the main activity. Although the 
survey does not take into account non-farm incomes, as we shall 
see later, this does not directly affect our present analysis.
If anything, the survey as a whole tends to underestimate 
the weakness of incomes in some sectors. Not only are farms 
under 5 ha. excluded from the survey, but the less intensive 
categories from 5-10 ha. are severely under-represented (as 
can be seen in table 6).
Table 5 gives the results obtained from the surveys of 
incomes in 1970 and 1971**. The production categories chosen 
in the table exalude the most intensive types of farming which 
are not of immediate interest here.
Unfortunately the regions are grouped together in most 
instances - however, this is done for regions which are broadly 
similar in any case, so the comparison remains valid. It 
should also be noted that the production systems as classified 
in table 5 between regions - hence, for example cattle farming 
may be more extensive in some regions than in others - and 
accounts for the wide income variations within each category.
Four earnings groups are given in table 5 . Agricultural 
earnings in terms of income per unit of family labour (per 
annum) are compared to the S.M.I.C. estimated on a yearly basis, 
the average annual earnings of labourers and the average earnings 
of semi-skilled workers1. The groupings are as follows:
Zx^  80% of the S.M.I.C.
80% S.M.I.C.< Z 2 ^S.M.I.C.
S.M.I.C. < ^ 2  ^average earnings of labourers
*one unit = 280 days work per year
**After this date the small-farm sector's representation in this 
survey declined
^'Calculated by Jegouzo & Brangeon in "La Condition sociale des 
petits paysans" •/•
average earnings labourers ■Cj^ v. earnings of semi-skilled
^  labourers
average earnings of semi-skilled <C[z5
Although table 5 is essentially based on statistics for 
1971, the figures for 1970 have also been indicated where the 
grouping has increased by at least two groups cr where there has 
been a decline in the period 1970-71.
The results are rather striking. The regions of the north 
and north west (the last five regions in Table 5) are clearly 
most favoured. Only the smallest farms (5-10 ha.) in cattle 
production are earning less than the S.M.I.C. rate and no categ­
ories are earning on average less than 80% of the S.M.I.C. The 
situation is the reverse for Auvergne and Limousin, and all the 
more worrying because the categories examined cover the most 
typical types of farming undertaken in these areas*. Here, 
only farms which have turned, at least partly, to more intensive 
pig or poultry production are earning, on average, over 80% of 
the S.M.I.C. level.
Although, of course, there are farmers to be found with 
very low incomes in all regions, the low average figures for 
Auvergne and Limousin suggest that the extent of low incomes 
in agriculture is likely to be relatively high in these regLms.
It is indeed surprising that there should be so much 
variation in farm income between regions, for almost all the 
categories considered. It would seem to point the way for the 
eventual disappearance of small-scale farming in such poor 
agricultural areas. Indeed, the problem of rural decline is 
closely linked to this question - to which we shall return in 
a later chapter. For the moment, as regards income we may 
suggest three measures which may be (and to some extent, are) 
used to solve this .problem. Firstly, income support to supplement 
low incomesas we mentioned earlier. Secondly, structural policies
*with the exclusion of sheep farming which is always on much 
larger surfaces. .anyway.
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to promote farm enlargement, by providing credit and by removing 
some of the imperfections of the land market. Thirdly, policies 
to improve production techniques and especially to promote more 
intensive lines of production (e.g. pigs) which yield higher 
labour incomes per hectare.
Unless such policies are actively implemented, the problem 
of low incomes in agriculture will remain for some time to come, 
and will only be reduced, at length, by a reduction in the agricult­
ural population - which in many poor farming areas will imply sub­
stantial depopulation. In other words, in view of the fact that 
the problem must be faced in the present, and that the structural 
measures mentioned above are mainly of value in the medium/long 
term, the necessity arises to implement farm income support in the 
short-term. The alternative spells the continuation of rural pov­
erty far into the foreseeable future.
Another method of determining the regional dis­
tribution of low incomes in agriculture is to consider the 
results of the surveys of agricultural production in the 
mountian regions. These surveys were conducted for 1970 and
1975 by the Ministry of Agriculture.1
Although all departments with classified mountain 
farming communes were included, it is worthwhile noting that 
many of these areas were fairly small, and were widely dis­
tributed over most of southern and eastern France. In fact 
there are only six major mountain farming zones as classified 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. In order of size these are:
(i) the Massif Central, (ii) the Alps (north and south),
(iii) the Pyrenees, (iv) Corsica, (v) the Jura, and (vi) the 
Vosges.
Thesesix areas have the status of "unfavourable
Ministere de 1 ’Agriculture. Collections de statistique 
agricole 1978 N°15S.
/2g,
farming areas" and "rural renovation zones", both of which 
bring additional financial benefits, which we shall return 
to at a later point.
By far the largest grouping of mountain farms is 
to be found in the Massif Central ; this area alone accounts 
for over 50$ of such farms.
Before considering in more detail the survey results 
broken down by department and farm size, we should make a 
few general points concerning the overall development of 
mountain farming from 1970-75*
Mountain farms, which represent 13,2$ of all farms 
in France, contributed only 6.7# of final agricultural prod­
uction in 1970. In 1975 this proportion was virtually unch­
anged (6,8$). The result was that average output per moun­
tain farm in 1975 remained unchanged relative to the average 
for all farms, at half the value of the latter figure.
Farm income however, increased at a faster rate for 
mountain farms than for the agricultural sector as a whole. 
This development was mainly due to an increase in mountain 
farming subsidies, principally the I.S.K.(indemnite spcial 
de montagne) and other aids to husbandry. By 1975 such sub­
sidies accounted for 15.6# of mountain farm revenue, as 
against only 2.7% in 1970. In 1975 average gross farm rev- 
anue of mountain farms had reached 63% of the national 
average.
Of the main mountain farming departments, some appear 
to have ¿one better than others over the period 1970-75. The 
three most favoured departments, found in Bourgogne and Franc
13*.
— Comte, easily maintained their lead. Average income here was 
well above the national average for all farming. At the other 
end of the scale, departments such as the Vosges, Haut-Rhin, 
and Savoie (av. income per farm around Fr.12,000 per annum), 
registered average annual increases in income "between 5*8$ 
and 12.2$ ; well above the average for all farming (3.8$).
The exeption here was Ariege in the Pyrenees where income 
in real terms was almost stationary.
Although it is not possible to go into great detail, 
we may safely make a few generalisations of major interest 
concerning the various regions and sectors. All mountain 
farming regions had departments both at the upper and lower*ends of the middle range. In the eastern Alps however, three 
departments registered declining real incomes. Only Savoie 
made good progress, but here,aswe have seen, average income 
was still very low. The Alps appears to be the only mountain 
farming region not to have benefitted from the very positive 
developments experienced elsewhere.
On the other hand, in the Languedoc, apart from 
the Lozere department, the remaining four experienced aver­
age annual increases in income of between 11$ and 21.5$.
In the Massif Central, most departments were close to the 
average increase of 7.6$ per annum.
Turning to the sectoral results for 1970, one finds 
that on average only (mountain) farms above 10 ha.had a gross 
farm income per labour unit equivalent to or above the S.M.I.C.1 
level. Around 47$ of all mountain farms were below this size,
ie. 16-38,000 Fr. per farm in 1975. Note though, that 
the average income for all fanning was Fr.36,842.
1 Given the fact that this source includes part-time farmers 
and covers (gross) agricultural income only, 'farm income1 
cannot be considered to be equivalent to disposable or even 
gross total income, and comparison with the SMIC is only put 
forward as a rough guidline. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable 
to assume that availability of other forms of occupation or 
earnings will probably be quite limited in many of the mountain 
regions considered, although in a number of cases farm house­
holds will certainly be in receipt of various forms of state 
transfers(pensions, child benefits etc.)..
• 11+0.
which indicates to some degree the extent of the low income 
problem in mountain farming.
In general, stock-farming or mixed stock-farming 
gave the lowest incomes per labour unit for all farm sizes. 
Here, only for sizes above 20 ha* did one find average 
incomes above the S.M.I.C. level, and then only marginally 
so.
\7here crop farming, fruit or vine growing predom­
inated, average incomes in even the smallest farm sizes ( inc­
luding 0 to 2 ha. in some cases ) were generally above the 
S.M.I.C. level.
These results suggest that with crop, fruit or vine 
production a policy which promotes farm enlargement may have 
a significant impact on farm incomes. On the other hand, where 
stock-farming is concerned, the scope is probably limited. 
Although large, many farms are clearly so extensive that 
incomes are correspondingly low. In these cases much of the 
land is very poor and probably better suited to forestry.
Clearly income support measures are called 'for, alth­
ough , as in the case of a subsidy per animal (eg.the I.S.M.), 
the effect is often regressive unless some type of means- 
tested benefit is used.
To conclude, as we have seen, mountain faming sub­
sidies have played a major role in improving the relative 
position of the mountain farming sector. However since det­
ailed results are only available for 1970 we are unable to 
tell whether the overall result has been more or less equality 
vrithin this sector. Given that, by their nature most hill 
farm subsidies tend to favour the larger farm sizes, it is 
likely that many mountain farmers at the bottom of the scale 
have not progressed as fast as the overall results would
seen to indicate. Furthermore the poor results of several 
departments in the Alps snow that such subsidies have had 
very diverse regional inpacts.
If the m a m  aim of hill farm subsidies is to raise 
low farm incomes, then a means tested benefit which is not 
sector specific is more cost effective than an I.S.Li, type 
subsidy and also more equitable in its regional impact.
A final point we must mention concerns part-time farming.
The figures in Table 5 as was stated, are solely related to agricult­
ural income. We know that a certain proportion of farmers earn 
incomes from off-farm employment. How could this change the picture 
we have presented above?*
Firstly, we know that a greater proportion of small farms 
are run part-time. From 5-10 ha 24% c£ farmers have an off-farm 
job - the figure is 12.4% for farms between 10 and 20 ha.1. The 
above survey however treats main living farmers, and only around 
7% of these have secondary occupations. One may therefore conclude 
that the addition of an off-farm income only affects a small minor­
ity in the survey.
Perhaps we should also mention that the off-farm activities
of small-scale farmers are also ai a smaller scale. As we look at
the various categories of off-farm jobs and the average farm
sizes attached to them, we find that the occupations with the
lowest accompanying farm sizes are (in ascending order) farm
2.labourers, factory workers and forestry workers .
If, lastly, we consider the numbers of farmers in the 1-20 
ha. category we find that they are in fact in the majority. 5 9%
OECD op.cit. p.12.  ^ Ibid. p.22.
*From recently gained statistics which cover r.on-agricultural 
earnings of (all) farm households we may gather that a very subst­
antial number of units disposed of very low agricultural and non- 
agricultural incomes. In 1975, for the category of main living 
farms (without pensions), some 307, 000 units from 10-35 ha. (ble*1- 
£quivalent) disposed of an average gross -axable income of only 
Fr.14,400. Some 78,000 units disposed of an average income of ar­
ound Fr.12 , 300. E S. S, INSEE ( 1930 ) , ? . 37 .
of all farms in France are in this category, some 709,000 in all. 
Over a third (36%) of all farms are below 10 ha.
Of these we know that many are indeed viable, and others 
are run in combination with a part-time job. Indeed of these
709,000 farmers around 178,50c1 have an off-farm job of some des­
cription. On the other hand, a similar number in this category 
are underemployed on the farm (below 5 ha. well over a third of 
all fanners are underemployed).
If the possibility of finding an off-farm job is one 
method of augmenting a low farm income, it is not always the 
case that such jobs are most readily available where they are most
needed. The Massif Central in particular, is badly off - Limousin2has the lowest figures for part-time farming, followed closely 
by several other départements of the Massif Central and surround­
ings.
Summary
Although, given the existing statistics, it is not possible 
to define more closely the regional incidence of low incomes in 
agriculture, the general impression'is one of wide regional dis­
parities. It is also clear that rural poverty is by no means 
limited to a few regions as some of the aforementioned surveys 
on living conditions show.
Apart from the income support and structural measures prev­
iously discussed the need for regional development policy to 
provide opportunities for part-time employment in some of the
£more depressed areas such as the Massif Central is also clear.
For without such long-term policies the continuity prospect of 
rural poverty is unlikely to be averted.
If the present survey has concentrated on poverty within 
the agricultural sector it is witti due cause, for as we have seen 
the state provision of a minimum income or standard of living has 
not yet reached this sector. Furthermore, the farming population 
is invariably to be found at the bottom of the social scale whether 
we look at education, housing or other social indications. It is 
for these reasons that their particular situation merits special 
attention.
*Own estimate using OECD & EEC statistics
20ECD, pp. 15 and 41
^Essentially Limousin and Auvergne
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Conclusion
Since we have already summarised our findings for the 
three countries at the end of each survey, we shall limit 
this section to the main points only:
(1) It is clear that, as far as the working population is 
concerned, poverty is particularly evident in the agri­
cultural sector for all three countries considered. We may 
make several qualifications; in Prance this is largely due 
to the existence of a minimum wage (the S.M.I.C.) covering 
the whole of the (adult) dependent workforce. In Italy and 
Ireland the poor quality of much of the utilised farmland 
and the backward structure of many farms (small size and 
fragmentation) are clearly contributory factors. It must 
however be stressed that the high levels of poverty in urban 
areas and occupations in Ireland and Italy are evidence of
a high incidence of low incomes in these sectors also. It 
is significant that in some regions of Ireland the urban 
areas were no better off (in terms of av.income per person) 
than the rural areas.
(2) In general the national income maintenance programmes 
(or lack thereof), were a major factor in determining the 
overall level and distribution of poverty. ?or the employed, 
family supplements in Ireland and Italy clearly had only 
minimal impact on the disposable income of low-paid workers 
relative to the actual cost of additional dependents. In 
France however, these benefits would probably finance a 
large part of the extra cost of providing for children.
In all three countries the minimum (non-contributory) 
old-age pension was very low, and in the case of Italy and 
Ireland this resulted in a large proportion of retired house­
holds falling below the poverty line. The situation was
probably similar in France where around 30$ of retired per­
sons received the”minimum vieillesse"pension.
(3) It would appear that the extent of poverty is much grea­
ter jn the so-called less developed regions than for the nat­
ions as a whole, in all the countries considered. The diff­
erences in the incidence of poverty between northern and 
southern Italy were so great that one had the distinct impr­
ession of dealing with two separate countries. In Ireland 
although the incidence of poverty was still high by inter­
national standards for urban areas, the position of several 
predominantly rural regions was markedly worse. In partic­
ular the region N.'tf. & Donegal could be singled out as hav­
ing probably the highest incidence of poverty.
In France the analysis was more problematic. It appeared that 
the regions with the poorest agricultural structures were 
undoubtedly the mountain farming regions. One might therefore 
expect relatively high levels of poverty in regions where- 
this type of farming predominated. As it happened the larg­
est concentration of such farms was to be found in the Massif 
Central.
(4) Following from the above, we have largely been able to 
identify the poorest regions within the LD R ’s we have con­
sidered. It has been possible to attribute a large propor­
tion of poverty in these areas to the weakness of the agri­
cultural sector and the rural economy as a whole. Certainly 
an income support programme for low income farmers would not 
by itself provide a long term solution to the problem, alth­
ough it would undoubtedly remove some of the harshest forms 
of rural poverty. Clearly more effective structural policies 
for -agriculture are needed, combined with real efforts to 
stimulate the urban framework within these regions.
There is perhaps one explanation why so little has been ach­
ieved as far as agricultural reform is concerned* namely that 
many of the rural economies we have considered would lose a 
large proportion of their population as a result of such ch­
ange. In a sense this is already happening as younger gener­
ations are becoming more unwilling to submit themselves to 
the physical rigours of farming under difficult conditions 
and in isolated areas.
Certainly at the present time it is difficult to imagine 
any national government would contemplate radical measures 
which would tend-to increase the outflow of labour from ag­
riculture. Perhaps one alternative is to promote prospects , 
for part-time employment outside agriculture. This could be 
done via tax and aid incentives to farmers and by promoting 
industries which could be identified as suitable for this 
purpose. In a sense this implies a new look at regional pol­
icies and a scaling down of objectives to fit in with rural 
needs. It is a subject to which we shall return in later 
chapters.
Conclusion
2 . 5
In assessing these chapters it is important to stress to the 
reader that our purpose was essentially to show, beyond doubt 
that poverty does exist, and emphasise the regional dimension 
of this problem, rather than to provide any hard and fast inter­
country comparisons. Given the procedure adopted and the data 
available, it was quite simply not possible to make such c o m p a r ­
isons. The reader should therefore bear this point in mind when 
assessing the main conclusions of our study, outlined below. 
Detailed results relevant to the respective countries are to be 
found in the summaries to each study.
1. It is clear that, as far as the working population is c o n ­
cerned, poverty is p a r t i cularly evident in the agricultural 
sector for all three'countries considered. We may however make 
several qualifications; in France this was largely due to the 
existence of a minimum wage (the S.M.I.C.) covering the whole 
of the (adult) dependent workforce. In Italy and Ireland, the 
poor quality of much of the utilised farmland and the backward 
structure of many farms(small size and fragmentation) were 
clearly contributory factors. It must however be stressed that 
the high levels of poverty in urban areas and occupations in 
Ireland and Italy are evidence of a high incidence of low-incomes 
in these sectors also. It is significant that in some regions
of Ireland, the urban areas were no better off(in terms of a v e r ­
age income per person) than the rural areas.
2. In general, the national i n c o m e-maintenance programmes 
(or lack thereof), were a m a j o r  f a c t o r  in d e t e r m i n i n g  the 
overall level and d i s t r ibution of poverty. For the employed, 
family supplements in Ireland and Italy clearly had only m i n ­
imal impact on the disposable income of low-paid workers 
relative to the actual cost of additional dependents. In 
France however, these benefits would probably finance a 
large part of the extra cost of providing for children.
In all three countries the minimum (non-contributory) 
old-age pension was very low, and in the case of Italy and 
Ireland this resulted in a large proportion of retired h o u s e ­
holds falling below the poverty line. The situation was
ANNEX
One of the major findings of this survey was the link 
between poverty and large family size. It is therefore in­
structive to make an international comparison of femily benefits. 
The statistics are drawn from the "Comparative tables of the 
social security systems in the Member States", published by 
the Commission, and were correct on 1.7.76.
In Italy the family benefit amounted to Lit. 9,880 per 
child per month. If we translate the Italian poverty line in
1976 prices the levels are:
Lit. 7,450 for a two-year old
Lit. 18,625 for a five-year old
Lit.29,800 for an eight-year old
Lit.37,250 for an adult (note: food only)
For a family with several children the 
benefit would only make a small contribution to the necessary 
food expenditure and no contribution to clothing or housing 
costs.
The weekly Irish allowance varied from h 2.30 for the first 
child to £ 3.60 for the second and h 4.35 for each further 
child. If we make a rough comparison with Italy the poverty 
line would be somewhere around n 2 0 per month. In other words 
the allowance would be just sufficient to feed a two-year old 
but only about a quarter of that required to feed an eight-year 
old.
In France however, the child allowance amounted to Fr.(mnth) 
153 for the 2nd child, Fr. 257 for the 3rd and 4th, and Fr.
229 for subsequent children. These figures are increased by 
9% for children between 10 and 15 years and by 16% for children
over 15 years. In 1978, the various other family allowances 
were grouped together into the "complément familiale", which 
is paid in addition to the child allowances and which benefits 
families with a child under 3 years or at least three children 
In 1978 it amounted to Fr. 340 per month.
Quite clearly, even taking account of the fact that pur­
chasing power may vary between countries does not alter the 
impression that French family benefits are by far the highest 
and most comprehensive of the three countries considered.
Under these circumstances one might not expect a signific­
ant link between poverty and family size in France although 
for the other two countries the reasons for this link would 
seem self-explanatory, in the light of the preceeding comments
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
3.1. Spatial factors: dynamic considerations on the 
regional growth process.
Although the discussion in chapters 1 and 2 was
not intended to provide any hard and fast explanations
for the observed pattern of economic development, it did
serve to show that the overall situation in the Community
is one of very unequal development at a spatial level; the
less developed regions of the E.C. - almost invariably
situated at the periphery - being categorised by low
incomes(often a high incidence of poverty), a high share
of agricultural employment, deficiencies in the industrial
and service sectors, and low or lagging regional growth
1rates.
This overview qualifies our definition of centre- 
periphery relations in the discussions that follow, and 
furthermore, provides the central reason for particular 
interest paid to regional problems and policies in parts 
of Ireland,France and Italy.
The present task is therefore to provide some explan­
ation for the observed tendencies towards concentration of 
economic activity. For the moment we shall limit ourselves 
to a more general discussion of the issues involved. In 
the following section a formal model will be developed on 
the basis of which we will be in a better position to 
analyse policy implications.
 ^The 'standard' migration measure(not mentioned here) must 
by now have lost much if its significance due to problems 
of interpretation - see back, chapter 1.
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In the first place, certain press­
ures leading towards the polarisation of economic activity 
may result from external economies and economies of 
urbanisation. The former derive from firms in the same or 
related sectors establishing in the same area. Such bene­
fits take the forms of (i) a specialised and skilled la­
bour force? (ii) a better provision of specialised aux­
iliary services; (iii) minimisation of transport and 
information costs with regard to supplier firms. Econo­
mies of urbanisation (or agglomeration) are more general 
and relate to the size of the agglomeration and the level 
of different services or related activities that are avail­
able. These include for example (i) accessibility to a 
large pool of labour1; (ii) availability of general ser­
vices e.g. banking, accountancy; (iii) greater scope for 
the division of labour and effective separation of acti­
vities2.
Secondly, there are strong arguments to suggest that 
once economic activity becomes concentrated in a parti­
cular area or areas3, it will remain there. The important 
and growing share of replacement investment in total in-
*It is enough to think of a simple example. Assume unem­
ployment averages 5% and a firm is looking for a new lo­
cation for a plant with say, workforce of 500 employees.
In a town with a workforce of 50,000 there would be an 
ample reserve of skilled and unskilled to choose from i.e. 
(circa 2,500). In a town of 10,000 (i.e. circa 500 unem­
ployed) , it would probably be necessary to attract skilled 
labour from other firms and activities and this would 
possibly involve paying higher wages.
2See W. Isard (1956), Location and Space Economy, Cambridge, 
p. 182.
3Clearly this depends on the nature of the spatial system, 
that is whether it is largely polycentric (West Germany) 
or monocentric (France).
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vestment1 constitutes one of the main reasons for reduced
flexibility in the spatial pattern of economic activity.
If a firm has to reinvest it is likely that it will do so
on the spot where the original investment took place.
Furthermore, both micro and macro studies suggest that
when a firm has to move, distance from the original lo-
2cation is minimised as far as possible . The point here 
is, that it is really only net new investment which is 
potentially mobile, and which regional policy can effec­
tively influence. Given present low levels of net in­
vestment in many countries of the E.C. we are unlikely 
to see any important shifts in industrial location in the 
near future.
3Thirdly, as has been pointed out , industrial and 
related economic expansion in central areas has, in the 
past proceeded at relatively low private costs because 
of the lack of effort to charge producers and consumers 
appropriately with the net social costs of further ex­
pansion. As a consequence/ the degree of economic con­
centration in western Europe (and the level of labour mi­
gration that accompanied it) continued unhindered at 
socially sub-optimal levels. Movement of work to the wor­
kers, or investment and expansion in peripheral regions 
was retarded by the downward pressure on wages at the 
centre brought about by a large and flexible supply of 
migrant workers. At the periphery, a source of migrant
4labour, there were undoubtedly some benefits in the form 
of remittances from migrant workers. However, the impor­
tance of these flows should not be exaggerated —  in the
1This averaged 40% in 1972, 51% in 1.975 and 48% in 1979 
(EUR 9). SOEC National Accounts Aggregates 1960-79.
2See studies and references in Chapters 5 and 6.
3M. Streit (1974), p. 279-282.
^However we should distinguish,i)where migrant workers come 
from the E.C. periphery, and,ii) where they come from'out­
side'. The effects on the'core'and on the'periphery'may be 
rather different in the two cases(see esp.Ch.10).
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Italian case they amounted to 171,4 00 million lire in 
19721, that is around 1% of regional income. Against this 
one should somehow balance the cost to the region in terms 
of loss of human capital —  a point which is rarely men­
tioned in discussions on migration.
However it is worth noting that in the past, recog­
nition of this problem has tempted some governments to
2devise plans to recover these losses in some way .
It is indeed strange that such costs are so easily 
avoided by the regions which make use of migrant labour
—  they receive workers without paying for the initial 
costs of development and education, and furthermore manage 
to largely avoid unemployment costs in periods of reces­
sion by sending the workers back to their country of ori-3gin . Such factors can only serve to promote the concen­
tration of economic activity and maintain the competitive 
advantage of central regions through low labour costs 
and ready adjustment to adverse movements in the busi-
4ness cycle .
Having discussed some of the factors which may lead 
to and perpetuate the spatial concentration of economic 
activity to the detriment of the outlying areas, we 
should now move on to consider the process in a more dy­
namic framework. To begin with we may briefly outline a 
number of theories concerning centre/periDhery relations 
and associated development.
Whilst on the one hand there appears to be no great
^Ufficio centrale per 1'Emigrazione Italiana, Roma, Paper 
No. 4, 1974 —  "la distribuzione regionale delle rimesse", 
G. Lucrezio.
2For example, the Indian government proposals for a pass­
port tax in the early '70's.
^eg present W.German proposals for compensating migrant 
workers to return to their country of origin.
^For further discussion see chapter 10.
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theoretical disagreement as to the factors which may 
lead to concentration, on the other, there are some 
very wide ranging views concerning what is likely to 
happen at the periphery.
In general, neoclassical theories tend to emphasise 
the role of market forces in achieving regional balance; 
increased demand for labour at the centre and interregional 
migration viewed as tending to put upward pressure on 
the wage rate and average earnings at the periphery.
Similar arguments apply to other markets. In part­
icular, one eguilibrating tendency is sometimes expected 
to arise from growing demand at the centre for raw materials 
and agricultural produce from the periphery.
However, the likely impact of this possibility
should not be exaggerated since (i) relatively few in­
dustrial activities may be termed "natural resource 
based", (ii) althougn an increase in demand for agricult­
ural products may be an important ¿actor in tne economic 
development of backward economies, agricultural 
structures at tne periphery are often very poor and out­
put is often destined for own consumption or local mar­
kets1. Given such limiting supply factors it seems pro­
bable that a large part of any increase in demand is
likely to be met either through imports or from regions
2where agriculture is more highly developed .
1For the Italian case see for example Bull(1973).
2For example between 1971 and 1978 total agricultural 
vaiue added (at factor cost ) actually fell by 1.5% 
(constant 197 0 prices) in Southern Italy. In the Centre/ 
North it increased by 14.9%. ISTAT 3oll_.Mensile 1980 
no. 3. See also Hirschman(1953),p. 129 for a similar view.
Theories based on factor-price-equalisation 
again lead to similarly ambivalent conclusions. In general 
labour migration from peripheral to central regions is 
expected to exert downward pressure on wages in the latter 
and upward pressure in the former. Wage differentials not 
equalised through labour flows are expected to lead to 
locational cost advantages at the periphery which will in 
turn induce firms to invest in such areas - tending to 
bring about an equalisation of regional wage levels(and 
returns on capital investment) . 1
In the first place, such arguments abstract from 
factors likely to have caused economic concentration in 
the first place. Specifically, where such concentration 
occurs and production is subject to external and internal 
economies of scale, there may tend to develop a competit­
ive advantage in the production and provision of a wide 
range of goods and services. As a result, these central 
areas can be expected to attract complementary flows of 
labour and capital from other regions which, in the presen­
ce of increasing returns, may lead to a widening rather 
than a narrowing of competitive advantage as between reg­
ions .
If movements in regional wage rates adequately
reflected such changes the problem might eventually resolve
itself, at least in terms of employment, as outlined above.
However, as one observer has remarked, " the dispersion in
the growth of money wages as between industrial areas tends
always to be considerably smaller than the dispersion of
2productivity movements". If this is indeed the case,then 
the competitive advantage of fast-growing regions over more 
slowly growing regions is likely to increase over time.
In the second place, a lot depends on 'how' regional 
wage rates are raised at the periphery and whether such
For graphical analysis and further discusión see Ch.10.
2 Kaldor(1971), p.64 . It should be noted that this could 
arise simply from the dynamic adjustment of wage claims to 
productivity increases. Moreover, a comparative(static)/cont.
increases actually reflect regional changes in productivity.
If such movements are due to capital inflows or improvement 
in local competitivity, then regional divergence may be 
avoided. However, this is by no means the only possible or 
even the likely outcome. There are at least two alternatives;
(i) if labour mobility is greater than capital mobility, 
the increase in the average regional wage rate may result 
more from the migration of low-paid or unemployed workers 
than from any general increase in earnings of those employed. 
Moreover, population loss may tend to reduce local demand 
for labour through the multiplier effect.
In practice, labour would indeed appear to be more mobile 
than capital, and firms often tend to be reluctant to cons­
ider relocating new.or existing activities at any great dis­
tance from their original or headquaters location. Hence 
the need for regional incentives to induce movement of prod­
uctive investment to the peripheral and less developed areas.
(ii) wage rates at the periphery may be increased through 
collective bargaining to levels similar to those existing in 
more developed high-productivity regions, such that labour 
markets in the former are not in fact cleared. In the Ital­
ian case for example, as one author has noted, the regional 
levelling of wages(1961-69) clearly exceeded productivity
differences, and led to improved profitability in the North
2relative to the South.
Also,whilst the average wage rate in l.d.r.'s may still re- 
ain below that in the high-productivity regions, the differ­
ence may in fact be of little or no importance as far as 
capital mobility is concerned. The tendency towards collective
cont/anaiysis of productivity levels and wages&salaries for 
the 9 E.C. member states since 1960(at purchasing power par­
ities) largely substantiates this observation. As a measure 
of dispersion, the weighted coefficient of variation was 
estimated at 9.4 and 14.4 for productivity between 1965-69 
and in 1980,respectively. For wages & salaries the figures 
are 7.7 and 12.9, respectively. Between 1960 and 1964 such 
differences were even more marked - with c.v.'s being 10.5 
and 6.7 for productivity and wages & salaries respectively. 
Whilst Germany, and to a lesser extent France have consisten­
tly maintained productivity levels (relative to the E.C. aver­
age) well above wages&salaries, the opposite is true of Ire­
land andltaly. (E.C.'European Economy ' No9 ,1981 July, tabs . 7. 3/. 4 . )
 ^ See empirical discussion in Ch.9 vis distance factor.
2 Stahl ( 1974 ) ;note'.collective bargaining at a national level 
in Italy only became the rule after 1969.
(national) agreements and regional wage equalisation will 
probably be most felt in 'modern* and unionised sectors, 
such that for new firms establishing in a less developed 
region, regional wage rate differentials may be more 'app­
arent' than 'real'. As a result, there may in fact be 
very little net advantage in terms of wage costs from loc­
ation in a l.d.r. ; and although labour availability may 
in some cases provide a positive incentive, the importance 
of this factor can be seen to depend crucially upon the 
existence of tight labour markets in more central industr­
ialised regions.
Apart from the above problems, the factor-price- 
equalisation argument rests on a number of perfect compet­
ition and rationality assumptions which are equally open 
to question. For markets and producers at the centre are 
expected to be perfectly competitive so there exists no 
discrimination against firms or products from the periph­
eral regions and no monopolistic control over peripheral 
markets or producers.
From an empirical point of view these assumptions 
appear highly suspect. In particular, the high degree of 
industrial concentration within Western Europe suggests 
that oligopolistic rather than perfectly competitive 
markets are the rule, and the highly organised distribut­
ion networks of large companies (which for the major part 
have their headquaters in central or core regions) sugg­
ests that it is probably easier for products from central
regions to find retail outlets at the perphery than vice-
1versa.
Secondly, the assumption that transport costs are 
negligable is obviously one that depends very much on the 
type of product and the distances involved. The assumption 
is certainly tenuous concerning heavy goods industries and
For an example concerning the Italian case see Seers 
(1979), p. 201.
certain types of agricultural produce. 1 Moreover, it is 
not just final transport costs which are important but 
total transport costs(including intermediate products), 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that in a wide var­
iety of cases, such costs may well build up to rather
2sizeable levels.
Given the possibility that, in the presence of 
increasing returns, trade between regions may actually 
serve to widen rather than narrow differences in regional 
growth rates, it seems clear in conclusion, that the in­
discriminate promotion of factor mobility does not provide 
a long term solution to the regional problem. To rely 
on the 'equilibrating' forces of the market mechanism 
provides no remedy in a situation where regions are at 
very different levels of economic development. Whilst it 
is of course true that diseconomies of various types, 
such as congestion costs may eventually impel firms to 
move outwards from the centre to the periphery, these 
effects are likely to be of limited value for several reas­
ons. Firstly, as we have previously mentioned and as some 
authors have emphasised3, the'spread'or beneficial .effects 
of growth will initially be stronger near the centre and 
it may take some considerable time before their influence 
is felt at the periphery.
Secondly, when firms are constrained to set up 
branch plants in peripheral regions, it is often the case 
that headquater functions and research and development 
activities are retained and strenghtened in the central 
regions. In this way, regional development patterns may 
show not only quantitative but also qualitative differen­
ces with adverse effects on the innovation and develop-
See Bowers(ed.), Essays in honour of A.J.Brown(1979), 
p. 245. In the U.K. transport costs as a% of net output 
were found to vary from 1.72%(instrument engineering) to 
13.7% for food,drink & tobacco and 15.4% for building 
materials. For a discussion of how spatial pricing methods 
may influence regional development, see Ch.6 .5.3..
2 Attempts at dispersing production in the U.K. motor-car 
industry ran into this problem.See Holland(1976).
3 Richardson (1969 ).
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raent potential of the less developed regions.
Thirdly, the process of economic polarisation may 
continue in spite of rather significant gaps between the 
social and private costs of production. When such exter­
nalities exist, a suitable tax on the use of the external 
diseconomy creating good would reduce, and at the limit 
abolish the amount of the good or factor used . In such 
cases an attempt by central or regional authorities to 
charge producers accordingly the estimated value of the(net) 
marginal effect of the external diseconomy, would operate 
to redress locational imbalances and lead to a more so­
cially optimal distribution of economic activity.
The general conclusion of the above discussion is that 
substantial government intervention may be necessary to 
redress the quantitative and qualitative imbalances that 
have been shown to be likely to result from the process 
of economic development. As such we may define a number 
of fields in which Government policy presently operates, 
including ; public control (including taxation) of in­
dustry in areas of high industrial concentration (e.g. 
deglomerationpolicies); public expenditure on infrastruc­
ture, expenditure as public services and inccme-mainte- 
nance programmes (including the general redistributive 
element of the central government budget); industrial anc 
regional policy, including financial incentives to firms 
to locate in depressed or less developed regions, and con­
trol over locational and procurement decisions of state- 
owned firms. We shall discuss these alternatives in mere 
depth ir. subsequent chapters.
^A.C. Piccu, "The Economies of Welfare", Macmillan 1924.
We define an externality as the favourable or unfavourable 
effect of an economic agent on the economic welfare of 
another such agent (individual or firm) , for which legis­
lation or custom does not permit or require the payment 
or receipt of a price for the benefit or harm which re­
sults from that effect.
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3.2. A formal model of regional growth.
To establish how regional policy may effectively 
work to bring about a more balanced spatial pattern of 
regional growth, necessarily implies an examination of 
how such imbalances may arise in the first place. It is 
to this question we shall now turn.
We have already mentioned some of the factors inherent 
in the process of economic development which may tend to 
result in the persistence of long-term regional disparities, 
and it is now time to formalise the main arguments under­
lying this hypothesis^
The main questions to be answered are ;
(i) What is the role of regional structure in determining 
regional growth,
(ii) Will regional growth rates, under given assumptions, 
tend to converge or diverge over time,
(iii) What are the resulting policy implications - how
may investment incentives, labour subsidies aad(in the 
case of country groupings) exchange rate changes affect 
regional growth rates.
The essential features of the model may be summarised as 
follows:
(i) the growth of autonomous demand determines the long run
rate of growth of output to which consumption and invest- 
2ment adjust . In the regional context the main component 
of autonomous demand is the demand for exports.
The model, presented in a slightly modified form, is taken 
from Dixon and Thirlwall(1975),ch.lO.
2 ie, all investment is induced. See ibid.,p.208 footnote 7, 
for further discussion of the reasons for this approach.
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(ii) The level of regional exports is determined by firstly, 
the relative price of exports, and secondly, the overall 
level of trading partners income.
(iii) The level of domestic(regional) export prices is 
determined by the level of money wages and the average 
product of labour (plus the level of 'mark-up' on costs ).
(iv) Labour productivity in a dynamic setting, is determined
in part by the rate of growth of output(Verdoorn effect) and 
in part by the rate of autonomous productivity growth.
The above approach is clearly demand oriented and 
implicitly assumes that supply factors do not act as a con­
straint on growth. We shall return to this question shortly.
At the regional level however, this assumption, at 
least with respect to labour mobility, may broadly be expec­
ted to hold true. If the model were to be applied at a coun­
try level however, one might expect a number of capacity 
restrictions to arise. It is well known that factors are 
more mobile within countries than between them.
Essentially, the model presents a dynamic explan­
ation of growth rate differences which suggests that once 
a region gains a growth advantage, it is likely to keep it. 
This occurs due to the circular and cumulative nature of 
the model - a high rate of growth of output induces a fas­
ter rate of growth of productivity and, other things being 
equal, a lower rate of increase in unit costs. This in turn 
leads to a faster rate of growth of exports, output and 
induced investment, and so on.
We shall now examine in more detail the properties of 
the model. The four functional relationships are outlined 
on the following page.
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(1) gt = y(x)t
(2 ) 1 xfc = <\(Pd )t + + ^ (2)t
(3) p d t = ct - qt
( 4 ) qt = <* + X gt
where, g = rate of growth of output in time t,
x = ................  exports in time t,
y = the (constant) elasticity of output growth 
with respect to export growth (equal to 1 
if exports represent a constant proportion 
of output),
p d = rate of domestic price inflation in time t,
p^ = ......  foreign .......................... ,
z = rate of growth of world income*,
•X. = price elasticity of demand for exports,
cross elasticity .................... .
★
£
€• = income elasticity ................. . . ,
c = cost inflation, ie. wage inflation plus
the rate of change of profit mark-up on 
wage costs,
q = rate of growth of average labour productivity,
** = rate of autonomous productivity growth,(a)/
^ = the Verdoorn coefficient**
1 This equation is an approximation of the export demand
function : X. = p}. P* zf - Lower case letterst dt ft t
represent discrete rates of growth of the variables.
★ Both taken as exogenous to the region.
** See annex for further discussion.
We expect \  i f£ and y to be positive and n to be negative. 
Solving for the equilibrium growth rate g^ we obtain:
= y /R (c-a) + £ (pf) + £(z27
1 + yj^X
The equilibrium growth rate can therefore be seen to vary 
positively with a, p^, z,<T, £ and X and negatively with 
c.
The condition for a disequilibrium situation is 
that (■^ ’ry>X ) > l .  However, given reasonable values for 
the parameters this situation is unlikely although not 
inconceivable. For instance (various surveys at national 
level —  see annex) a reasonable estimate for the Verdoorn 
coefficient would be around .5 and the price elasticity 
for exports is rarely above -2.0. However in the case of 
a fairly open and specialised regional economy, it would 
not seem unfeasible that a high price elasticity for ex­
ports combined with a growing share of exports in total out­
put (i.e.J>l) might lead to a cumulative divergence from 
the equilibrium growth rate.
Essentially, the main use of this model lies in 
explaining different regional equilibrium growth rates 
rather than in general predicting cumulatively divergent 
growth rates. The key factor in this scenario is clearly 
the Verdoorn coefficient which reflects both the influence
*of economies of scale (external and internal) on the growth 
ci labour productivity, and the extent to which technical 
progress is embodied in capital accumulation. The Verdoorn 
effect itself operates through the price elasticity of de­
mand for exports. Hence, a region which gains an initial 
cost advantage in the production of a particular good will
%See annex for further discussion.
^ However, McCrcmbie(1981) has recently argued that the use of data subject 
to measurement errors mat yield a regression(Verdoorn) coefficient that 
is biased upwards and in favour of accepting the hypothesis of increas­
ing returns to scale. Caves(1970), has furthermore suggested that the 
causal link may run frcm productivity to output rather than vice versa 
(pp. 247-9), but goes on to point out that "several compelling lines 
of argument remain to support the proposition that fast growth of
output.... encourages both an increased rate of capital formation and
increased efficiency in capital formation". Ibid..
/&f .
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be likely to keep and expand that advantage through a higher 
growth of output and induced growth in productivity.
Equally Important, the equilibrium growth rate can be 
seen to depend on the income elasticity of demand for 
regional exports. This suggests that the key to improving 
a lagging region's growth rate involves changing the re­
gional structure of production to commodities with high in­
come elasticities —  whether it be from agricultural to 
industrial production or an internal readjustment of indus­
trial (or tertiary)structure1.
As concerns poiicy implications, the above model may 
help us to examine the role of various alternatives, such 
as capital and labour subsidies, or regional 'devaluations'. 
The question of wage subsidies is dealt with in more detail 
in the annex to this chapter. However, it seems clear that,at 
most, wage subsidies can only affect the level of employment and
At a national level, it has been shown that the income 
elasticity of demand for imports may exert ~ significant 
restrictions, via balance of payments constraints on the 
equilibrium growth rate. Under certain assumptions and 
with a built in balance of payments constraint the model 
may be reduced to g^ = x (~^ ~= income elasticity of
demand for imports). It Tk assumed that there is no change 
in relative prices measured in a common currency and/or 
the sum of the export and import price elasticities is 
unity to obtain this result (Dixon & Thirlwall 1979).
An application of this simple model to 18 industrial coun­
tries (1951-76) produces a striking approximation to ac­
tual growth experience. This suggests that the link be­
tween exports and growth via the Verdoorr. effect may not 
be so important at the national level, possibly because 
there is very little change in relative (export) prices 
(S la law of one price), or that price elasticities are 
not sufficiently high (or have fallen in recent periods 
which may explain why the model is less successful for later 
periods —  based as it is on 1951-66 elasticity estimates. 
For a similar view see Crip$s & Tarling 1973, p. 31). Hence 
at this level there may be a weaker link between the price 
of exports and the growth of output and productivity. How­
ever, the point remains that the structure of production 
and the characteristics of the goods produced, reflected in 
the income elasticity of demand, may exercise a large, if 
not the major influence on growth rates at both a regional 
and national level.
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not the'equilibrium growth rate^ : Furthermore, the extent 
to which employment levels will increase depends critically 
on the extent to which such a subsidy is distributed be­
tween profits and prices (see chapter 8 ). The impact of
capital subsidies is not readily analysed in the above mo-
2del, however a few remarks may be made. Most importantly, if 
the aim of regional policy is to attract new industries and 
produce a radical change in industrial structure and capi­
tal vintage, there may be a case for preferring capital sub­
sidies which may have greater influence over the actual 
investment decision, and choice of techniques.
 ^For consideration of the impact of devaluation at a natio­
nal level see annex. In general however, the question of 
whether a devaluation could generate a faster rate of 
growth is somewhat open to doubt. To obtain this result 
one would have to assume that the rate of growth of ex­
ports is dependent on the absolute difference between do­
mestic and foreign prices, which hardly seems reasonable.
We may at most hypothesize within the context of the given 
model that a devaluation will lead to an overall increase 
in the level of employment in much the same way as a labour 
subsidy (again, see annex). However, somewhat outside the 
above framework, one might suggest that a devaluation could 
cause shifts in the functional relationships of the model 
and cause an increase in the equilibrium growth rate. This 
could be the case, if, for example devaluation caused a 
change in production towards goods with higher price elas­
ticities and higher Verdoorn coefficients attached to 
their production processes. However, there seems little 
way of stating, a priori, whether this would be likely to 
occur.
For further discussion of capital and labour subsidies, 
see chapter 8 .
2
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Although labour subsidies may be effective in attrac­
ting relatively labour intensive industries and exploiting 
the labour resources of l.d.r.s there are a number of 
drawbacks; firstly is the problem of how to allocate the 
subsidy —  if it is applied to all employment units (e.g. 
ex-R.E.P. U.K.) there is the risk that it will undermine 
structural change and tend to ossify industrial structure 
and output. Furthermore it is likely to be disproportionately 
expensive (see chapters). If it is based on marginal i.e. 
additional employment units there may also be competitive 
disadvantages to existing firms1, and the expense may any­
way be large (for example in the Italian case, (Chs. 8 andy ) 
Secondly, it is not at all clear that the encouragement 
of more labour intensive techniques in general, is entirely 
beneficial for the long-term competitive position of deve­
lopment areas. It may result in a "second-best" solution, 
with the adoption of outdated techniques and capital, dis­
criminating against the innovative element in production and 
placing the l.d.r.s firmly at the latter stages of the pro- 
duct-cycle investment. Even worse, regions may be stuck with 
relatively labour intensive techniques, only to find that 
regional wage differentials, due to union pressurisation, 
subsequently decrease, tending to reduce competitive ad­
vantage more than might otherwise have been the case. In 
general, rationalisation and the implementation of new 
techniques (and products) may imply a maintenance or even 
reduçtion of the workforce, at least in the short-term; 
labour subsidies may only hinder such adaptation and the 
prospects for long-term growth.
1For further discussion of this point see chapter^ . Basi­
cally the problem is that whilst the decision to invest or 
reinvest in a development area is open to both indigenous 
and extra-regional firms, and the effect is (more or less) 
neutral, marginal labour subsidy confers a significant net 
competitive advantage on new firms to the area.
l£s.
A number of limitations of the model, which are also 
important with respect to policy implications, should 
however be pointed out.
Firstly, given problems of defining interaction rel­
ationships between primary,secondary and tertiary sectors 
which may anyway differ substantially between regions, the 
above analysis the above analysis is probably best able to 
explain regional growth differences within manufacturing 
industries. On the other hand, as Kaldor(1966,1970,1971) 
has argued, at a regional level the manufacturing sector 
may have important induction effects on other sectors 
arising from, (i) direct effects on the demand for local 
raw materials, agricultural produce and service inputs,
(ii) induced effects on productivity in non-manufacturing 
sectors due to the transfer of 'surplus' labour from such 
activities, and representing a net addition to the effective 
use of regional resources.
Secondly, it should be noted that the above model takes 
no account of the spatial configuration of inter-industry 
linkages and spilfc-over effects. If a large or major share 
of intermediate goods must be 'imported' to satisfy export 
demand, any induced effects on local production may be sev­
erely restricted. Hence, it may not be sufficient to induce 
fast-growing industries to locate in depressed areas if 
corresponding linkages remain firmly outside the aided reg­
ions .
Thirdly, whilst the equilibrium growth rate can be 
seen to depend in part upon the rate of autonomous produc­
tivity growth - and hence to a large extent essentially 
exogenous factors - no specific mention is made of the 
factors involved. Such factors, mainly relating to supply- 
side aspectsieg. infrastructure), may in practice place 
severe restrictions on regional growth. Similarly, diffic-
Recognition of this point and discussion is given in, 
Thirlwall (1974), pp. 8-9.
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-ulty of access to capital markets(or differential interest 
rates to the disadvantage of l.d.r.'s) may restrict the 
adjustment process of output to autonomous or export dem­
and (therby placing restrictions on the endogenous growth 
of productivity - see model). Again, the existence of dis­
economies of scale or urban diseconomies may affect cost 
and productivity, and such factors are not allowed for in 
the model.
Lastly, the model would appear largely unable to ex­
plain the actual performance of many of the ageing indus­
trial regions, for example in the U.K. or Belgium. In the 
first place location-specific handicaps are not taken into 
account(eg. vis. inland steel-works). In the second place, 
short and medium term economic performance, particularly 
in capital goods industries subject to cyclical fluctuat­
ions in demand is probably better explained in terms of 
changes in the rate of growth of extra-regional income 
(that is, the second derivative), than by the growth of 
income( £(z) ) itself.
However, insofar as the model is more concerned 
with explaining the persistence of regional growth differ­
ences in general, than the performance of individual regions 
in particular, the above criticisms should not be taken as 
a refutation of the central argument. The line of reasoning 
is however at odds with the neo-classical approach to the 
extent that interregional factor flows can, under given 
circumstances, be seen to increase rather than diminish 
competitive advantage as between regions.
Moreover, a compromise solution taking into account 
some of the abovementioned supply-side factors may be 
adopted to provide a more balanced approach to explain 
the economic performance of individual regions - this is 
in fact the approach adopted in Part III and chapter 9.
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As mentioned earlier, the above model would 
in general be best interpreted as predicting different 
equilibrium growth rates, rather than cumulatively diver­
gent rates.
However, even if the resulting overall situation is 
one of constant not increasing growth rate differences as 
between regions, this outcome by itself is enough cause 
for alarm. If the l.d.r.s initially have lower equilibrium 
growth rates, assuming population movements are similar in 
all regions, this by itself is a sufficient condition for 
absolute and relative divergence in regional per capita in­
comes. In the absence of policies to modify the structure 
of regional output, regional income transfers and subsidies 
may then have to be applied at an increasing rate by cen­
tral authorities, to maintain an equitable balance in re­
gional living standards.
Already, at a national level, the MacDougal report(1977) 
established that public expenditure has had a considerable 
redistributive impact in all of the major E.C. countries. 
Such transfers, whilst representing only a relatively 
small proportion of each country’s GDP (eg. 3.7% and 4.2% 
in the case of the U.K. and Italy respectively), were 
found to offset interregional income differences by a sub­
stantial amount, varying from 39% in West Germany and 31% 
in the U.K., to 44% in Italy and 52% in France. 1
XMacDougal report(1977), Vol. II, ?•.127 Table 2. The figures 
presented represent the change in Gini-ccefficient of re­
gional income inequality(i.e. regions weighted by popula­
tion) .
In the Italian case we may briefly point to a few in­
dicators which highlight the quasi-fixed nature of inter­
regional transfers over quite considerable lengths of time, 
and despite active measures to improve economic structure.
The relevant figures are presented in the tables below. 
Table 1.
1965 1973 1970 1977 1970 1977
trade/fis-•^  
cal balance,- trade/
S S b e
Total consuroticn as 
% of Gross Regional 
Product
Investment as % 
G.R.P.
Centre-North
Mezzogiorno -16.2/17.0 -24.0/18.5
73.5 73.0 
91.0 93.0
19.2 15.4 
28.3* 22.4**
A. Graziari & E .Pugliese( 1979) ,p. 50. Trade balance .= net 
exports of goods and services. Fiscal balance = (net) pu­
blic expenditure, subsidies, pensions and migrants remit­
tances. Figures derived from ISTAT, Annuario di contabilità 
Nazionale, Roma, 1975. All figures as % G.R.P.
2Both private and collective consumption. Investment and 
consumption figures derived from ISTAT. Bolletino mensile 
di statistica no. 3, March 198 0.
*of which around 55.7% accounted for by public administra­
tion, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (direct and incentivated) 
and state-holding enterprises.
of which around 5 3.3% accounted for by above. Source:
A. Accornero and S. Ancriani(1979), p. 138.________________
In general there is quite a close relationship between 
the (net) regional trade balance and the (net) fiscal ba­
lance as shown in table 1. It is also clear that a large 
share of the fiscal balance must be made up of extra-re­
gional investment from the public sector. With total con­
sumption (1977) running at 9 3.0 % of G.R.P. and invest­
ment fluctuating at around one quarter cf G.R.P. there is 
no doubt that Southern Italy continues to rely heavily on 
the Centre-North for resources to maintain regional living stan­
dards and levels of investment.
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Furthermore, over time the net fiscal balance appears 
to have been steadily increasing —  from 8 .6% of G.R.P. 
in 1951 it averaged 16.2% over the 1960s, and 19.0% from 
1970-74. Similarly, the Southern trade gap also appears 
to be increasing, at least up to the mid-1970s.
The situation varies, of course, between regions and 
table 2 gives a breakdown of trade deficits for the eight 
southern regions from 1970-77. The most striking aspect 
of these figures is the consistently.high level of the 
trade gap for the three regions with the lowest G.D.P. per 
capita (Calabria, Molise, Basilicata). The fiscal balance 
for these regions was of similar proportions and averaged 
29.0% of G.R.P. between 1971-19731.
There is an obvious logic in this, since a persistent 
trade deficit which is not balanced by a corresponding 
fiscal transfer, cannot be indefinitely covered by borrow­
ing from the rest of the country (or elsewhere).
Furthermore, the high share of gross fixed investment 
in G.R.P. (up to 50% in Basilicata) suggests, (i) consider­
able state involvement in regional investment programmes 
in these areas, and (ii) that a large, and probably the 
major part of transfers to these three regions is in the 
form of public or subsidized (private) investment —  hence 
the correspondingly large trade gap.
It is worthwhile noting that in Italy, social security 
payments constitute the major singlr component of such 
transfers, accounting for around 42% cf total public expen­
diture ( including investment expenditure). Southern Italy 
receives almost twice as much in social security payments 
than it contributes(Seers et al 1979, p.207)
2 MacDougal Report (1977) voi.2, p.112. Not including mig­
rants remittances.
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Table 2
REGION 
Index GDP 
per capita 
1970
Net trade 
deficit as 
% G.R.P.
Gross fixed 
investment 
as % G.R.P.
Index of G.D.P. 
per capita 1970- 
1976 =<+ 2% 
points)
1970 1976 19 77XX 1375 ]“i977 '
Calabria 52 37.0 38.0 24.9 33.5 i 21.7
Molise 58 36.6 29.2 32.5 35.2 j 39.7
Basilicata 53 35.0 37.8 33.1 38.5 ! 50.2
Sicilia 68 25.5 24.1 25.0 30.5 \ 21.0 *
Sardegna 78 23.9 21.5 16.6 35.9 J 30.1
Abruzzi 71 21.8 15.0 11.9 27.7 i 21.4
Puglia 68 20.0 16.3 11.7 29.2 j 24.9
Campania 68 9.1 - 8.6 8.4 20.3 | 15.3 %
Mezzogiorno 20.9* 19.1 16.5 28.3 ! 22.4 i i
--=--k--— ^
statistics, various.
*The fiscal balance for this year was equal to 19.0% of 
G.R.P.
^^Whether 1977 was an atypical year or the start of a new 
trend will only be clear when figures for 1978, 1979 become 
available.
NOTE: G.R.P. = G.D.P. +/- net factor income transfer
For three of the five remaining regions (apart from Campa­
nia and Sicilia) there would appear to be a case for attri­
buting part of the decline in the negative trade-gaps <1970— 
1977) to the fall in investment shares, that is, to the 
falling state involvement in industrial investment over the 
1970s. Campania and Sicilia are the two largest regions, and 
one may therefore expect the link between investment and 
the trade-gap to be somewhat weaker, since presumably a 
high proportion of inputs are supplied from the region 
itself.
Finally, if the trade deficit for the three poorest 
regions (Calabria, Molise, Basilicata) can be said to re­
flect the extent of fiscal transfers to these regions, then
it seems clear that their relatively good performance in 
terms cf GDP per capita, must be largely due to the subsi­
dies themselves rather than to any process of export-led 
growth. On the other hand, in Abruzzi and Puglia, the trade- 
gap narrowed substantially but was accompanied by either 
stable or increasing relative levels of GDP per capita.
It may therefore be the case that whilst some regions 
in the South are continuously dependent on state transfers, 
other have been able to circumvent this process and have 
achieved self-sustained growth.
The preceding discussion has emphasised the relation­
ship between economic structure and growth. However, ana­
lysis of regional economic structure can be undertaken at 
various levels of aggregation; from the overall view of 
primary, secondary and tertiary production, to an analysis 
of differences within each of these branches themselves.
Moreover, even where economic structures may appear to be 
similar as between regions various qualitative or functional 
differences may still remain with substantial implications 
concerning the potential for regional growth. We shall ret­
urn to consider such questions in Part III.
3.3. The rationale for regional policy.
Taking into account the various arguments put forward 
so far, we should perhaps at this point summarize the main 
arguments concerning the desirability(or otherwise) of 
regional policy.
At a national level the case for regional policy revolves 
mainly around the following considerations.
Firstly, the resource allocation argument which stresses 
that government intervention is necessary to internalise the 
negative (net) externalities brought, about by the operation 
of the free-market mechanism, which may otherwise result in 
divergence between the private and social costs of production. 
If economic concentration continues well beyond the point 
that is defensible on grounds of economic efficiency and wel­
fare maximisation, then intervention is necessary to correct 
the balance. Regional disincentive(or deglomeraticn) policy 
involving permit systems or taxation of new(or even existing) 
developments, is an example of one possible method of deal­
ing with this problem.
Secondly, full utilisation of the economy's resources 
may require for its attainment, some intervention on the 
part of the central government.
The presence of unemployed or underutilised labour 
in certain regions may require government intervention to 
bring about a reallocation of industrial investment to­
wards such areas. This may occur if private firms fail 
to react fully to market signals such as relative wages 
and labour availability. Furthermore, if wage bargaining 
takes place at a national level, as is the case in many 
western European countries, regional wage rates may r.ot 
adequately reflect the true opportunity cost cf labour 
and regional unemployment may result. Whether the private 
sector would fully react to changes in labour availability 
i.e. relative unemployment rates, is open to some consi-
derable doubt1 —  even if labour supply constraints force 
firms to move from central areas it is likely that alter­
native locations will be found without the need to under­
take long-distance moves to the peripheral areas.
The third main argument for regional policy partly 
derives from the abovementioned factor utilisation pro­
blem, and concerns the transmission of wage inflation. 
There would appear to be some empirical support for the 
argument that wage-inflation is largely determined in
regions which face a relatively high pressure of demand,
2that is the low unemployment areas , and transmitted at 
the sectoral level to the high unemployment regions. Ac­
cording to this view, a diversion of jobs from the cen­
tral, low unemployment regions to the peripheral areas, 
may be accompanied.by macroeconomic policies to restore 
the overall pressure of demand at a lower overall level of 
unemployment and higher level of aggregate output (in­
flation rate unchanged). Hence there is a net production 
gain to the economy as a whole. This occurs because (i) 
there are underutilised factors at the periphery (which, 
as we have seen tend to be high unemployment areas) which 
are brought into use; and (ii) as a result of relieving 
pressure of demand at the centre, a reduction in the 
overall rate of wage inflation maybe possible.
It should, however, be recognized that the above ar­
gument is mainly valid in periods of fast growth where 
factor shortages at the centre may produce inflationary 
tendencies in the economy as a whole. Where unemployment 
is also running at high levels in central areas (as is 
presently the case in many countries of the E.C.), it 
seems clear that there will be fewer benefits of the type 
mentioned above to be drawn from redistributing produc­
tion and employment to the high-unemployment areas. The 
problem is then one of the overall level of aggregate 
demand rather than its spatial distribution.
1As far as the present author is aware, there is no empiri­
cal evidence to suggest that differences in regional unem­
ployment rates have any general influence on the location 
of manufacturing investment (see chapters 9 and 10).
Mackay & Hart(1975). This question is discussed in more 
detail in the annex to chapter 9 .
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The fourth argument in favour <£ regional policy relates 
to welfare and social considerations. Even where regional 
income disparities may be reduced through factor mobility, 
the social costs resulting from labour migration on a large 
scale may be so great as to rule out the desirability of 
this option as a long-term solution to the regional problem. 
Furthermore, if we include as a regional welfare measure, 
accessibility to public goods and services(hospitals, sch­
ools, public transport etc.) and private services it can 
be seen that population decline resulting from migration 
may lead to a considerable welfare loss for local communities 
as a result of falling levels of provision of such services.
This is particularly relevant for 
the peripheral regions where population is often widely 
dispersed. In such cases, given that there are economies 
of scale in the provision of public services, a decline 
in the local population would tend to increase per capita 
public costs and lead to the choice between higher local 
taxation or a reduction in public services —  in either 
case leading to a reduction in regional welfare.
The above arguments supporting the pursuit of active 
regional policies may also be applied at the level of the 
E.C. as a whole. Here, however, we must distinguish two 
lines of argument; firstly, the case for a coordinated 
regional policy at the Community level; and secondly, the 
case for an increased allocation of funds (broad definition 
of r.p.) at this level. How the various E.C. funds actually 
operate and their official "raison d'etre" will be dis­
cussed in a later chapter.
Perhaps one of the main considerations for a Community 
regional policy relates to political and social cohesion 
of the group. To quote the Thomson Report1, "No Community 
could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the peoples 
which belong to it so long as some have very different 
standards of living and have course to doubt the common 
will of all to help each Member to better the conditions 
of its people."
1E.C.(1973), Report on the ’regional problems in the enlarged 
Community, p. 4.
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Equality of opportunity is seen as a related concept 
in this respect, specifically, "if capital is not moved 
towards the less developed regions in order to enable 
labour to find employment in conditions which are compa­
rable to those existing in the regions of greater develop­
ment, workers will not have a real choice on which the 
free circulation of labour in the Community can be based. " 1
Following from this line of argument we may specify 
the following main reasons for a Community regional po­
licy:
1) To ensure an equal distribution of long run bene­
fits and opportunities from the economic develop­
ment of the Community. Especially relevant here 
are the dynamic implications of the integration 
process which may be of a general nature(income dis­
parities, unemployment) or specific to certain sec- 
tors(eg. steel), and it nay be desirable to avoid
some regions being seen to gain at the'expense'of others.
2) To ensure compatibility and consistency with other 
Community policies. This may consist of either (i) 
mitigating the adverse regional effects of certain 
other B.C. policies or (ii) ensuring that regional 
policies in the Member States are consistent with 
the overall objectives of the group, particularly 
with regard to competition policy.
3) Controlling the possible escalation of regional 
aids which could result from "outbidding" between 
countries for available international investment. 
Guidelines and maximum levels of financial assis-
^Ibid., p . 4.
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tance may be useful for this purpose, although 
there are notable difficulties with comparing the 
effective value of different incentives.
Apart from the above questions there are also a number 
of additional reasons why a Community policy should be 
to a large degree additive to existing financial aids 
rather than just a coordination of national policies;
4) A Community policy should supplement national re­
gional incentive policies. It is a rather obvious 
(but not often stated) fact that the worst off 
members of the E.C. are in the least advantaged 
position to provide the necessary resources to 
follow active regional policies (Ireland and Italy). 
Indeed in the case of Ireland (and certainly Greece) 
it is not unreasonable to consider that the whole 
country, or a very large part of it, should be 
covered by regional incentives,in vhich case there 
may be some justification for the Community to under­
take a large or even majority contribution to (national) 
regional policy expenditure.
5) To help overcome bottlenecks to regional development 
which may occur at a national or international level.. 
Particularly obvious examples could be lack of 
provision of general infrastructure and lack of 
available investment capital (for example due to 
imperfect capital markets). For example the major 
role of the European Investment 3ank may be seen as 
the provision of finance for certain (industrial in­
vestment) projects which may have difficulty in 
raising funds elsewhere1.
1E.I.B. loans are independent of the riskiness or location 
of the project. The other major advantage of the E.I.3. is 
its role in channelling back capital which may have been 
siphoned off in the form of savings from the l.d.r.'s.
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Other types of approach are also conceivable in 
this respect. Two examples could be (i) joint Community 
projects with regional implications and (ii) joint policies 
with respect to the location of leading multinational firms 
in key sectors1 (although the latter may not have finan­
cial implications) .
In conclusion, the role of E.C. regional policy must 
be seen in the light of persistent and (under some measures) 
widening regional welfare disparities over the 1970s. This 
in itself provides a strong case for the continuation and 
reinforcement of Community regional policy in the 1980s.
As we have mentioned, the possible adverse effects 
of integration (large-scale labour and capital flows, po­
larisation of economic activity) are one of the main rea­
sons for a Community policy per se. Insofar as it can be 
said that such problems are likely to increase and change 
in nature as the degree of integration increases, it is 
clear that the nature and scope of Community regional policy 
will have to adapt. By this we mean that the appropriate 
type of regional policy, in the broadest sense, will de­
pend on the level of integration undertaken. In general, 
the transition from Customs Union to Monetary Union can be 
visualised as accentuating the integration problems we 
mentioned earlier. This occurs mainly because governments 
no longer have the power to adjust exchange rates to com­
pensate for adverse movements in efficiency wages. Further­
more, discipline imposed by fixed exchange rates on natio­
nal monetary policies may pose severe adjustment problems 
for the weaker members. Recognition of this fact is shown 
by the arrangement to provide Italy and Ireland, on their 
joining the E.M.S. in 1979, with loans of up to 1,000 
million EUA per annum (for five years at 3% interest dis­
count) to strengthen their infrastructure and industrial
1See for example S. Holland(1976), Chapter 8 .
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The final point we should make here is that, in the 
long run, if the Community is going to become fully in­
tegrated, its finances and budget will have to play a 
role similar to that in national integrated economies, 
where public finance operates to even out, to a very sig­
nificant extent, regional differences in incomes and li­
ving standards.
In this sense, full economic union can be seen as 
an essential follow-up to monetary union. The importance 
of interregional transfers within all the Member States 
of the present E.C. bears witness to this necessity, and 
the European Community itself is hardly likely to be an 
exception.
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ANNEX 1
It should be kept in mind that the Verdoorn relation by 
itself does not explain differences in regional growth rates.
It is a source of such differences to the extent that (i) initial 
differences exist with respect to other parameters or variables- 
in which case the Verdoorn effect serves to exaggerate such 
differences ; (ii) the Verdoorn coefficient varies between 
regions (other factors equal).
It is at the basis of models of 'cumulative causation'in the 
sense that once a region obtains a growth advantage(for example 
due to a high income elasticity of demand for exports), the 
Verdoorn effect ensures that the region will maintain it.
As regards the value and statistical significance of the 
Verdoorn coefficient, most empirical studies have yielded 
estimates of between .4 and .64 (for various countries and 
periods) . 1
Using regional data for the U.K., (1958-68), Dixon & Thirlwall 
(1975), estimate a coefficient of .512 which is significant at 
the 99% confidence level. From their regional estimates the 
above authors conclude that " just under one half of the rate 
of technical progress and capital deepening combined must be 
autonomous, and just under one half induced by the growth of 
output".
From whatever viewpoint, it is hard to deny the signif­
icance of the Verdoorn relationship. Specifically, for the 
value of the coefficient to be zero, one would have to assume,
(i) constant returns to scale, and (ii) that technical progress 
and capital deepening were strictly autonomous .
Set especially : - P.J. Verdoorn, "Fattori che regolano lo
sviluppo della produttività del lavoro".
L'Industria, 1949.
- N.Kaldor, "Causes of the slow rate of econcmic growth in the U.K."
1966.
- W.Beckerman,"The British economy in 1975".
- K.A. Kennedy, "Productivity and industrial growth", 1971.
-Cripps & Tar ling, "Growth in advanced capitalist economies 1950-70','CUP 1973
The importance of internal and external economies has recently been 
confirmed in a study of the regional and sub-regional impact of these 
factors on the performance of manufacturing establishments in the U.K. 
(Tcwnroe and Roberts 1980). Cross sectional regression analysis relating 
size of plant to various measures of efficiency and performance provided 
significant coefficients for the majority of sectors in manufacturing 
industry. Concerning external economies the availability of specialised 
services and skilled manual labour recorded positive and significant 
coefficients for a wide range of industries. There was however same 
indication that size of agglomeration may have resulted in diseconomies 
for particular sectors,(ibid. pp. 163-167).
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(1) g
(2 ) x
(3) Pà
(4) q
note: X , £-and y >0 see text for definitions.
>1 < 0
The equilibrium growth rate g =
(5) g = y Duc-a) + &(pç) + ¿(z)1
i + yafc
We wish to consider the growth rate in disequilibrium and 
discover what conditions determine whether we have convergence 
to or divergence from the equilibium growth rate.
Method : specify exports in time t as a lagged function of its 
determinants, ie,
(6) xt = /Up ¿)c_,+ £(P+)C-, + £(z)c-*
Combining (6) with the original set of equations, and assuming 
the rate of growth of the exogenous variables to be constant, 
gives the first order difference equation,
(7) 9c = y [¡Uc^,- a) + C(p4 )t_l+ £(z)fc-3 - y^A (gt()
The general solution to which is :
(8) gc = A (- yaA ) + yj^ rLÎCe.j- a) + £ (pf )<_,+ ¿ ( z ^ .  (I-i-ya^)
I + y
Where A is the initialcondition.
Hence, the behaviour of g is determined by the value of ( y ^  ) , 
(note : since ^<0, then (-y'VÀ) will be >0 ). The condition for
cumulative divergence is that,
( - y n \ ) > I
ANNEX 2
= y (x)
= ) + £  (Rp ) + £.(z)
= c-q 
= a + X g
To show the effect of wage subsidies and currency devaluation 
on the equilibrium growth rate, let the price of domestic exports 
in terms of the overseas currency be Po , then ,
Pot = P^t * exchange rate or,
(9) pot = ^t + p^t
Where pot = the rate of change of home prices expressed in
overseas currency in time t .
&  t = the rate of change of the exchange rate in time t.
p«i t = the rate of growth of prices in domestic currency
in time t.
Expressing the domestic price in terms of the overseas currency, 
equation (2 ) becomes ,
(10) xr = + Pit ) + £(zt) + £(Pfc)
and the equilibrium growth rate is ,
(11) g c = y [ a ( c cr- a + £ ’(r) + £ ( z e) + £ ‘(pfc)J
I + y/]_A
Partially differentiating (II) with respect to Ogives,
(1 2) g = y*y
^  I + yfiK
and with respect to c gives,
(n) 3c,
® c I + y 'vA
Hence, 2c[ = £cf which shows the equivalence of wage sub-
35' sidies (c ) and devaluation (£■) on the
growth rate.
However, the effect of a currency devaluation or wage subsidy 
on the rate of change of money wages or the exchange rate is 
once and for all. ^  and c become zero in subsequent periods. In
^ This analysis is admittedly oversmplified for purposes of expo­
sition. In particular one might argue that c and are inter­
dependent. On the assumption that a change in the exchange rate 
has no effect on inflation (ie.-c), we have dc/df = 0 , and the 
analysis is as outlined above. If however we take a monetarist 
view, ie. dc/dO- = -1 , a devaluation will have no lasting effect 
on the level of output or employment. In this case a wage subsidy 
would appear more effective. However, as we shall see later, the 
effectiveness of a wage subsidy depends crucially on its dist­
ribution between profits and prices.
order to have a permanent rise in the growth rate by either of the 
abovementioned methods, we would need to postulate that the 
rate of growth of exports is determined by the absolute difference 
between domestic and foreign prices. Beckerman1 has suggested 
an additive function, but does not give a full explanation of 
the process involved. Indeed, in its present form, our model 
would suggest that diverging regional growth rates would only 
be possible if the determinants of the eguilibium rates were 
themselves time dependent. This could occur if, for example, 
price or income elasticities of demand changed over time with 
changes in the structure of production.
It should be emphasised, however, that a devaluation or 
wage subsidy wil have a permanent effect on the level of empl­
oyment. This is simply due to the once and for all increase in 
the level of output in the initial period.Although the growth 
rate reverts to its equilibrium level in subsequent periods,it 
does so from a higher level of output and therefore employment. 
Furthermore, a regional wage subsidy may have an additional impact 
on employment by inducing the use of more labour intensive 
techniques.
Finally, it should be made clear that stable growth rates 
may lead to continuous regional divergence, and this is serious 
enough in itself. If the low income regions also have a lower 
equilibrium growth rate, then we wil have both absolute and 
relative divergence in regional incomes. Even if growth rates 
are equal, divergence in absolute terms will occur. Furthermore 
there is good reason to believe that the former case is more 
likely in the absence of effective regional policies, since a 
higher proportion of output in low income regions is invariably 
made up of agricultural products, for which price and income 
elasticities are generally very low.
Although productivity and price factors do indeed play an 
important role in our model, the absence, in particular, of the 
income elasticity of demand in previous authors works undoubt­
edly explains their over-preoccupation withrelative prices and 
exchange rates. The importance of the present approach is that 
it emphasises the role of structural factors; in particular 
the nature of export specialisation and the income elasticity of 
demand for exports.
V7. Beckerman "Projecting Europes Growth" E.J. 1962

C H A P T E R  F O U R
European centre-periphery relations in the 
context of European integration.
It goes without saying that any substantial study of 
regional development in Europe would not be complete without 
some discussion of the integration process and its regional 
impact. Furthermore such analysis is indispensable if one 
wishes to fully understand the precise nature of the regional 
problem in Europe and the forces at work.
In this section we consider how the establishment of a 
Customs Union may affect the location of industry and accen­
tuate existing tendencies towards specialisation in produc­
tion. This in turn raises the question of what impact these 
events are likely to have on the spatial distribution of 
regional growth and employment.
4.1.
Location thecrv and economic polarisation .
During the 1960s the main concern was clearly over the 
customs union issue. The analysis was generally based on 
standard concepts of location theory.
In the Giersch1 model for example one assumes a homoge­
nous economic space with regard to population, resources 
and cost levels. To illustrate the model we assume that 
a firm supplying the entire market for a particular good 
within this economic space finds it economic to do so from 
a single plant in the centre of the market. (We are therefore 
assuming that the economies of scale in single plant produc­
tion outweigh the reduced costs cf transportation which 
might result from dispersed production and plants in other 
parts of the area.)
The addition of a second firm in this case dees net 
substantially alter the analysis since both firms are likely 
to find a central location preferable, each supplying one half
‘Giersch H.(i950), "Economic union between nations and the 
location of industries", R.E.5., vol. 17.
I & .
of the market (see Hotelling1).
In this simple framework one can analyse for example the 
impact of a customs barrier in a two country firm model.
Under free-trade the optimal location for both firms in 
the industry might well be situated on the border between 
the two countries (assuming for example that each country 
constitutes a hemisphere of such a homogenous economic space). 
The introduction of a customs barrier will then decrease 
the market radius for each (national) firm and both firms 
will move away from the frontier to more central (national) 
locations.
The opposite occurs when two countries join a customs 
union and one would expect the pattern of location to approach 
the frontier zone.
The fact that the basic assumptions of the analysis with 
regard to homogenous economic space, are not seen to exist 
in reality, rather serves to increase the usefulness of the 
model, in the present context. Given the existing concen­
tration of population and markets in the E.C. the effect 
of a customs union may be visualised as speeding up and ac­
centuating the process of polarisation towards the centre. 
Gradually the importance of national markets would be re­
placed by a European market and firms would come to prefer 
locations near the centre of the E.C.*
Correspondingly, the regions at the periphery would be­
come even less attractive. Their economic distance from 
the new 'centre* being greater and not being able to offer the 
attractions of a large market.
Support for this argument comes from a study on 'economic
2potential1 in Europe by Clark, Wilson and Bradley (1969) .
^'Stability in competition", E.J. 39, 1929, pp. 41-57. For a 
different approach see also N. Devletoglou(1965), "A dis­
senting view of Duopoly and spatial competition", Economica 
32. A more up-to-date analysis is provided in a subsequent 
section. Location theory is very broad and we have chosen to 
limit our present discussion to a simple analysis of the 
salient points i.e. a reduction in tariff barriers.
2Regional Studies vol. 2, 196 9. * that is, abstracting from
any internalised costs of agglomeration(seeon).
Clark et al make use of a 'gravity' model in which the 
economic 'potential' of any region is arrived at through the 
summation of incomes in the remaining regions, each being 
first divided by the hypothetical 'distance' costs of reach­
ing it. Distance costs in this context are measured as trans­
port costs by the most economical route. Other studies howev­
er , have prefered to adopt an absolute measure of distance 
as a more general indicator of other locational influences(eg. 
E.C. 1981). In either case, the economic potential of a region 
is intended to measure factors such as its capacity to act as 
a supplier of inputs and its desirability as a market for fin­
al products. In the Clark study economic potentials before 
the Treaty of Rome (1950-1960) and over the period 1960-1965 
were compared, and it was clearly established that increases 
in regional economic potential were positively correlated 
with changes in regional manufacturing employment in expanding 
sectors. In the peripheral regions (S.West France, S. Italy,
N. Germany) employment either declined or grew more slowly 
in 1960-1965 than in the earlier period.
More recently, another study on economic potential in 
the E.C. 1 came to the conclusion that the gap in relative 
accessibility between the most central and peripheral* regions 
widened further over the 1960's and early 1970's.
At the very least, the above findings would certainly 
appear to indicate quite clearly the existence of forces 
tending towards economic polarisation, and the probable link
with with the process of integration.
We should however make two qualifications, both related
to factors which might limit the polarisation process.
Firstly, it is conceivable that growth at the 'centre' 
could eventually run up against labour supply constrains which 
would force firms to seek out alternative locations. This how­
ever does not appear to have presented a real problem so far 
for most countries of the E.C. mainly due to a large and flex­
ible supply of migrant labour. In the second place, urban 
diseconomies may eventually induce firms to move away /cont
E.C. "The regions of Europe-lst periodic report", 1981, p.61.
* Mainly, Southern and central Italy, S.W. France, Ireland 
and some U.K. regions.
from the most central areas. However/the importance of this 
phenomenon is probably much less at the periphery, since, 
...in;practice, when firms move, distance from the original 
location is often one of the main factors involved. In 
other words, rather than negating the concept of the 'centre' 
recent trends would tend moreover, to point to its gradual 
enlargement. A further problem which is worth considering, 
is that the greater level of competition induced by the 
integration process may have unfavourable effects on firms 
at the periphery.
It is well known that firms in l.d.r.'s are on average 
much smaller than competitors in m.d.r.'s and are therefore 
less able to reap the benefits of scale economies in pro­
duction or large scale distribution.
Furthermore, Holland (1976) has argued that dominant 
firms from m.d.r.'s may actively encourage the decline of 
small scale competitors in certain markets by using 'no en­
try' or 'limit' pricing techniques. What the precise magni­
tude of such effects may be is obviously a difficult question 
to answer.
Hence, the integration process may have a twofold effect 
on the periphery; firstly with the reduction in tariff bar­
riers, industrial location near the European centre may be­
come more profitable; secondly, by promoting concentration 
and the development of transnational, European-market orien­
ted companies1 with already substantial market power, inte­
gration may also result in the undesirable elimination of 
firms which remain in the national or local market.
We shall deal with these questions in turn, and in sub­
sequent sections we shall examine hew the growing dominance 
of large-scale enterprise in international trades may be 
seen to have important repercussions on the economic devel­
opment potential of the peripheral regions.
1 See, E.C.(1980), Ninth Competition Report, p.141.
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The previous sections have placed considerable im­
portance on the theoretical underpinnings of the relation­
ship between regional structure and regional growth. The 
purpose of the following four sections is to relate this 
"structure-performance" paradigm to the economic actuality 
of the 1980s. An analytical framework of reference is 
therefore needed and we shall now proceed to outline the 
main issues involved.
The_changing nature* of the (E.C.) regional_problem:
During the 1960s and up until the early 1970s, the 
efforts of regional policy mainly centred around attrac­
ting new firms to the depressed areas with the general aims 
of improving employment opportunities and industrial struc­
ture.
However, the general decline in net new investment in
the late 1970s1 —  more pronounced in some countries than
in others —  has led to a sharp decline in industrial mobi-
2lity , often reflected in a falling number of cases coming 
up for national regional aids. In a number of countries such 
aids have been increasingly used to prevent the closure of 
firms and the reduction of industrial employmentP
Under these circumstances regional policy must be in­
creasingly directed towards indigenous firms located in the 
development areas. For these purposes, straight financial
1In real terms (constant 19 7 5 prices), net new investment 
in the E.C.(9) has been lower in every year from 1975-1979 
(inclusive) than in every year from 1970-74. Furthermore the 
share of replacement investment in total investment has con­
stantly increased —  hence there is a greater tendency for 
what investment there is to remain on the spot of the ini­
tial investment. Source: Eurostat-National Accounts ESA- 
Aggregates(1981).
2 In the U.K. the fall off in industrial movement was espe­
cially noticeable after 1970(Ashcroft 1978). In France, ce- 
centratization from the Paris region(no overall figures avail­
able) fell sharply after l972(Tuppen 1980).
0 See chapter 8 .
4.2.
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incentives may not be enough, as the problem is likely 
to be more complex than it may seem at first sight. If 
the aim is. to develop the growth potential of indigenous 
firms and their ability to adapt to sectoral structural 
change, more attention must be paid to their capacity to 
adopt product and process innovations.
Whilst in the 1960s the competitive advantage of many 
assisted areas was to be found in the low cost and avail­
ability of labour, and the key bottlenecks were those of 
general infrastructure and investment capital, the present 
situation is somewhat different. In many cases wage diffe­
rentials as between regions have narrowed considerably as 
a result of union pressures^ Infrastructure has been stea­
dily improved by concentrated efforts on the part of natio­
nal governments. The main restrictions on regional growth 
are now more likely to be the lack of indigenous innovation 
and adjustment potential on the part of the less developed 
regions, as reflected in certain well-defined qualitative 
spatial disparities .
Tlie_determl;xiants_of _re2iona.l_±nnovation_and> adjustment p o ­
tential :
Regional innovative capacity may be divided into gene­
ral characteristics and firm-specific characteristics. Ob­
viously there is some interconnection between the two, but 
for the purposes of exposition we shall treat them in this 
order. In practice it will be necessary to consider separa­
tely, (i) the potential of indigenous small and medium-size 
firms, and (ii) the impact of multiregional (MRE) and multi­
*In this respect we may point to a number of studies rela­
ting to the employment impact of regional policy in the 
1960s and early 1970s. In many cases it was found that 
the major employment effect of r.p. arose through firm 
movement to the development areas rather than improved per­
formance of indigenous firms. See for example vis. Scot­
land, Moore & Rhodes 1974 Ts’.J.P.E. Vol. 21, p. 227), vis 
U.K., Mackay & Thomson 1979 (S.J.P.E. Vol. 26, p. 252), 
vis Italy (chapter 5 of this volume) visIreland(I.D.A.
1977 Annual Report); vis France, the case is somewhat unclear 
(but see chapter 8 ) . * eg. Italy (see back, Ch.3.1.).
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national (MNE) enterprises on local development and adjust­
ment potential. Again however, the classification is not 
complete since external control not only relates to branch 
plants but also, in general, to a large number of supplier 
firms —  hence the concept of external dependence may in­
clude a large number of "linked" indigenous firms which 
are not truly "independent" in the above sense.
General determinants of regional adjustment and_innovation 
potential
A number of factors external to the firm itself and 
related to general locational advantages/disadvantages may 
be listed under this heading;
- the quality of the regional labour market(skill and edu­
cational levels, age structure)
- the technical capacity and adaptability of local sup­
plier firms
- the general availability of related business services
- the existence of good communications and information net­
works (proximity to final markets may also be an important 
factor here)
- availability and cost of risk capital.
Firm sgecific_characteristics
These factors relate to the type of firm considered 
and the qualitative intra-firm characteristics for given 
firm types.
The adaptive and innovative capacities of a given region 
may be limited by the nature of its firm structure, par­
ticularly if the latter is dominated by, (i) small firms, 
oriented to local markets and "traditional" products;(ii) 
supplier firms, linked to the demands of larger enterprises;
(iii) branch plants of MREs or MNEs, where standardised pro­
duction is prevalent.
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The above firm types and their adaptive and innovative 
impact on the regional economy may be further subdivided 
into a number of intra-firm factors. Thus the following 
considerations may be borne in mind when analysing regional 
enterprise structure:
- rates of job and firm turnover
- type of product; degree of standardisation or differen­
tiation: semi-finished, component or finished manufacture
- type of production process; capital intensity1;
- use of R & D, measured directly by in-house spending and 
reflected in product and process innovation;
- skill and employment structure of regional enterprises; 
this will also tend to reflect qualitative aspects of 
production;
- organisational factors; quality and style of management, 
degree of decision-making autonomy and decentralisation 
of headquarters (vis branch plants). A measure of the 
latter may be obtained by examining the extent of exter­
nal control of regional enterprises and the degree of 
centralisation of headquarters functions of MREs.
Furthermore, several inter-firm characteristics may. be re­
levant in this respect, notably:
- overall industrial structure and concentrdion, may have
a number of implications for other firms operating within 
the same region and sector. Although as we have seen, re­
gional economies are generally highly open, and this may, 
to a large extent, mitigate competitive distortions, cer­
tain spatial problems may nevertheless arise. This may 
be the case where (i) indigenous and new firms compete in 
local markets and (ii) where they compete for specialized
It is generally■recognized in the context of "dual" eco­
nomies that firms producing essentially the same product 
may exhibit markedly different capital/labour ratios in 
the production process. Although difficult to. quantify 
at the empirical level, the theoretical implications re­
garding economic development (at‘ micro and macro levels) 
have been analysed by'Lutz(1962) and Bull (1978) . A fuller 
discussion is not, however, within the scope of this paper.
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and skilled labour1;
- the extent of inter-industry linkages within the region, 
and the extent to which such linkages promote technical 
innovation and diffusion of new products and processes 
(with resulting spin-off benefits for supplier firms);
- the extent to which indigenous firms have recourse to 
local business services. Demand creates its own supply; 
the range of business services available to small firms 
in peripheral regions is often limited which is at once 
both the cause and effect of lacking market research and 
product development on the part of indigenous industry"3. 
The degree to which new establishments place their ser­
vice demands locally may therefore be an important fac­
tor in developing a broad business service sector resul­
ting in beneficial spin-off effects on smaller firms for 
which such services may present major bottlenecks to 
the growth and development of the firm.
The above analytical framework has, of necessity, 
been brief and many of the elements will be taken up in 
more detail in the sections which follow. The most we can 
hope for, however, given numerous statistical limitations, 
is a general overview of the salient points and possible 
implications, rather than any detailed analysis. I'n the 
following chapter we shall therefore attempt to examine at 
a regional level the following indicators of innovation and 
development potential;
(i) Firm size structure, ownership and implications for the 
regional economy
(ii) The spatial and sectoral distribution of research and 
development activities.
As a general rule, it has been suggested that new enter­
prises should net employ more than 10% of the labour force 
in any catchment area. Atelier de Recherche et d 1Etudes 
d'Aménagement(AREA), "La vie rurale dans le bassin Parisien", 
Paris 1970.
2Ewers l Wettman (I960), p. 177. Often to tax consultant 
and non-specialised lawyers.
3J.N. Marshall(1979), p. 556.
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(iii) Qualitative aspects of regional employment
(iv) A case study of differences in sectoral structure as 
between regions
(v) An analysis of the business service sector as a bottle­
neck to innovative capacity.
As we have mentioned, it will be necessary to make 
the conceptual distinction between indigenous enterprises 
and externally owned branch plants and subsidiaries. The 
reason-being that with regard to the latter, the corporate 
headquarters and therefore the decision-making factors 
upon which innovation and adaptability depend, will to 
a greater extent be external to the region itself.
At a more fundamental level, the current preoccupation 
with such issues should be fairly clear; whilst manufactu­
ring employment was expanding, and being effectively di­
verted to the development areas, the net addition to em­
ployment levels in these areas was considered all well and 
good. With the advent of static or declining levels of ma­
nufacturing employment, and the need for increasing struc­
tural adaptation, more emphasis must be put on qualitat- 
ative aspects of regional development.
More precisely, it may be asked whether 
the transfer of productive capacity to the l.d.r.s that 
occurred over the 1960s and early 1970s, in the form of 
branch plants and subsidiaries, will have long-lasting re­
percussions on the development potential of these regions.
Furthermore, in the context of integration and the in­
ternational division of labour, cr.e should consider the 
likely impact of subsequent developments on the overall 
strategies of multi regional and, especially, multinational 
enterprises. Since one characteristic of assisted areas is 
often the high level of external control of regional enter­
prises this question is clearly of some importance. The
growth strategy of such corporations is relevant not only 
insofar as concerns locational decisions, but also with 
respect to questiors related to input and output markets 
(vertical and horizontal growth) and market dominance. Such 
factors will also depend on the external macro-economic and 
international environment. Specifically, whilst the rapid 
expansion of markets in the 1960's led to the proliferation 
of branch plants in l.d.r.'s, largely for standardised prod­
uction, the contracting market conditions of the late 1970 's 
and 1980's may, (i) result in the closure/scrapping of 
branch plants in these areas, or (ii) lead to horizontal 
takeovers of competitors in similar markets. One should 
therefore consider the competitive aspects of MNE's and MRE's 
growth strategies at a spatial level, and this point will be 
taken up in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
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PART III
Regional structure and performance.
Chapter 5. Unequal structures.
5.1. Firm_size £ true ture r_owners hip_and_th.e_iinpl.icat io n£ 
for the reaional_economy.
As a general consideration on the structure of industry 
in the l.d.r.'s , we may note that there is a common ten­
dency for the average size of production units to be rather 
small by comparison with those elsewhere. One explanation 
of this phenomenon is clearly the labour pool constraints 
in often sparsely populated areas, and a number of studies 
have found a positive correlation between town size and the 
size of industrial units(Spooner 1972, Commissariat General 
du Plan 1971, Hansen 1974,p.111).
Whether this is, by itself, a positive or negative 
feature is in general open to discussion. It should however 
be pointed out that such firm structure*ofter. results in a fairly fragile
Whether or not they are applicable in general, we should 
perhaps point to the following findings of a number of 
U.K. studies on small firm development. Firstly, rates 
of firm turnover tend to be higher than those of larger 
firms - both with respect to closures and openings (Scot. 
Econ. Bui. 1980). Secondly, only a very sma-ll propor- 
-tion of small firms eventually reach medium size prop­
ortions - one study found that only 1.4% of new firms in 
196 3 (in one region, Clydeside) had reached the 100 emp­
loyee level nine years later(Firn and Swales). Thirdly, 
whilst small firms may play an important role in gross 
job creation (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979), a closer 
look at the figures for the Midlands region shews that 
this growth was in fact attributable to relatively few 
firms - 85% of gross gains were in 10% of the snail establishments 
considered (Storey, 1979).
2.0 I.
industrial employment base. Rates of turnover in job 
creation tend to be relatively high under such circum­
stances. For example, the rural areas of France, whilst 
gaining 256,000 new industrial jobs between 1962-67, at 
the same time lost another 202 ,000 due to industrial clo­
sures (Cazes and Reynaud, 1973). In Ireland, the major 
development areas1 between 1973 and 1977 accounted for 
18% of the total number of industrial job losses whilst
representing only 15% of national industrial employment 
2(in 1975) . Whilst firm size is clearly not the only 
factor involved, it would however seem that such job los­
ses can often be traced to a generalised decline in empl­
oyment in small firms which tend to be predominant in the less 
developed or rural regions. For example, whilst employment 
in large and medium sized establishments in France increased 
by 5% and 12% respectively between 1962-68, it decreased by 
10% in small establishments(less than 50 employees) over the 
same period(Hansen,1974,p .60).
3In Italy, the small-scale manufacturing sector is 
largely composed of firms producing "traditional", largely 
consumer goods (58%) and engineering firms (30%). Whilst 
between 1961-71 in the Centre-North, employment in this 
firm-size category increased by 18,600 (+ 2 .0%), in the 
South employment fell by 36,800 (- 11.0%) over the same
4period . Furthermore the South exhibited a much lower share 
of employment in medium and large sized enterprises^.
^I.e. those regions wholly classified as such; Donegal,
N.W., N.E., West.
2I.D.A. ana Labour Force Survey.
3
10 or less employees —  the available figures do not 
unfortunately allow a broader definition of this
term.
4SVIMEZ(1978), p. 152-155.
^In the South(1971) around 34% of manufacturing employment 
was in units of over 101 persons, compared to 4 7% in 
the Centre-North. Moreover in the South, these large 
units were more highly concentrated in particular sectors 
than was the case in the Centre-North; for example around 
63% of southern employment in units of over 500 employees 
was in base sectors (largely metallurgy, chemicals and
loi.
There are essentially two alternative approaches to 
this problem: (i) aiding employment growth in profitable 
indigenous firms and (ii) attracting new firms to the area. 
As we have seen, the necessary job creation targets may be 
particularly high in the peripheral regions. Moreover, as 
labour-intensive traditional industries are gradually re­
placed by technologically more advanced enterprises with 
relatively capital intensive processes, it becomes clear 
that, as total employment is concerned, a region may have 
to run hard to stand still.
A fourth point we should make is that the introduction 
of medium and large sized manufacturing establishments in 
an environment of predominantly small-scale, "traditional" 
(i.e. viz. labour intensity and products) firms, is likely 
to lead to relatively (viz.m.d.r.s) high levels of concen­
tration in particular sectors, with quasi-monopoly positions 
in product and labour markets, being obtained by the (larger) 
newcomers. This may especially be the case where regional 
wage differentials subsequently (and perhaps as a result) 
become narrower.
An example of the Italian case will serve to bring out 
the extent of regional differences in this sphere. In 1975, 
Southern Italy accounted for 12.1% of Italian manufac­
turing employment in establishments of over 20 persons, and
11.6% of the total number of establishments1. This is to 
be compared with a share in total manufacturing employment 
of 18.9% in the same year. However, a sector by sector ana­
lysis brings out even more striking differences. Taking 
four of the largest "modern" sectors the table below gives 
the total number of enterprises in the south and the south's
1The following figures are derived from Eurostat-Structure 
and activity of industry in 19 75 (1978, vol. XIV).
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share in the overall number for any given sector.
Sector Number of firms in South 
(+ 20 employees)
Number of firms in 
South as % total number 
for sector, in Italy
Manufacture
of metal ar­
ticles 333 CO•CO
Electrical
engineering 158 9.8
Mechanical
engineering 120 3.9
Motor vehicles
& parts 47 00 •
All manufac­
turing — 11.6
Source: Eurostatx ogj. cit., p. 59
In the case of electrical engineering it is to be noted 
that 70 out of these 158 establishments are located in the 
Naples region with four out of the remaining seven regions 
having between one and seven establishments each. Turning 
to smaller more specialised and technically advanced sec­
tors, the deficiencies are even more pronounced. For ex­
ample in instrument engineering, less than 7.0% of all 
firms (i.e. 27) are located in the south (and less than 
4.0% of employment in this sector). 10 of these establish­
ments are in the Naples region and three regions have no 
firms at all in instrument engineering. The contrast with 
more traditional sectors is clear; for example in food/beve­
rages/tobacco, 25% of all firms were located in the south, 
as was 19% of employment (in this size category).
Another aspect of firm structure in the l.d.r.s 
is the degree of external ownership and dependence that 
this entails. One should then look at the overall corporate 
strategies of such enterprises and examine their relation­
ship with indigenous firms.
Some idea of the degree of external (in this case 
foreign) ownership is obtained when one considers that 
for the manufacturing sector in Southern Italy, around one 
in five jobs were in foreign owned branch plants or sub­
sidiaries1. For sectors such as chemicals and rubber, the 
figure was well over one in three.
In the case of France, more detailed figures are
available on the extent of extra-regional enterprises
in terms of industrial employment and investment. One of
the major factors here is the dominant role of Paris. In
1971, firms based in the Paris region controled 39.9% of
2employment in the provinces . In terms of investment this 
measure of dependency ran to 56.3%. As one author put it: 
"One of the paradoxes of decentralisation ... is the in­
creased degree to which Paris now controls and influences 
industrial development in provincial France. This has re­
sulted from the outward movement of manufacturing plant, 
while the control and management operations of companies 
have tended to remain in the capital"3.
In some development areas the term "indigenous- 
firm development" seems hardly applicable. In Basse-Nor- 
mandie for example, only one fifth of regional investment 
was undertaken by local firms, nearly four fifths being
1M. Benetti et al(l975), Table 2, p. 47. The figures relate 
to 1972 and concern enterprises with over 20 employees.
2Figures obtained from Economie et Statistique(1976), no.
80,"Dépendence et domination économiques inter-régionales", 
pp. 3-12. It should be noted that the reverse does not 
apply —  only 3% of employment in the Paris region is 
attributable to firms based outside Paris.
3J. Tuppen(1980), p. 128.
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attributable to enterprises based in the Paris region. The 
Languedoc region, far removed from Paris, is a similar ex­
ample.
That such external control is essentially limited
to Paris-based firms is shown by the fact that only 3.5%
of total industrial employment in France is in the form of
extra-regional employment of multiregional firms based in
the provinces. No other region even approaches the level
of external ownership exercised by Paris-based firms —
whilst these control some 1.3 million jobs in the provinces,
provincial firms employ less than 160,000 persons outside
their own region. These figures might suggest that local
enterprises have not, in general, reached a sufficient
size to warrant operating additional plants in other re-
1gions .
The importance of the previous discussion lies not
so much in the degree of external ownership per se, as in
the type cf investment and plant which it entails.
A good deal of evidence suggests that much of the
investment by externally owned firms in the deveiop.iusnt
areas of many E.C. countries over the 1960s and 70s was
of the branch plant type which involved the opening
2of new plants or extension of existing ones .
There are several reasons for expecting that the 
linkage effects and induced development effects on local 
industry from this form of investment may be somewhat limited.
ibid., p. 7.
2Vis. U.K., Mackay & Thomson(1979), vis. Ireland, McAleese
& McDonald(1973), vis. W. Germany Hansen 1974, 3ace 1979, 
vis. France Hansen 19 74 and Ch. 9 of this volume,vis Italy 
see Ch.9.
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Firstly, in the context of corporate strategy, 
production in such plants may only relate to intermedi­
ate stages in the final production process (for which 
the region may have some specific cost advantage), with 
sub-contracting kept to a minimum; components being bought 
in from other regions or countries, and the semi-finished 
product going for assembly or completion elsewhere1.
This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in fo-
reign-owned enterprises where intra-firm linkages and
specialisation exist to a higher degree. In the case of
Ireland for example, it was found that in the (non-food)
manufacturing sector, new enterprises in the foreign-owned
sector on average purchased only 11% of their materials
and components from Irish producers compared with 22% in
2the case of domestic enterprises . Of these overseas en­
terprises 74% conducted some trade with affiliates. Sales 
to affiliates amounted to 55% of these firms exports and 
purchases from affiliates averaged 29% of imported mate­
rials3.
Secondly, to some degree, the reasons determining 
plant mobility and therefore to some extent their poten­
tial for location in development areas, suggest that local 
linkages may be less important for such mobile enterprises. 
In industries where specific linkages are important there 
will be relatively few alternative locations, and plant 
mobility will consequently be low.In other words, plant
1For example in the case of the decentralisation of the French 
automobile industry, Paris has still remained the major 
centre for vehicle assembly with decentralisation affecting 
specialised operations rather than the full range of manufac­
turing and assembly activities(Tuppen 1980), pp.125-6.
^McAleese and McDonald(1978),p.328. The figures relate to 1974.
^McAleese(I.D.A. 1977). For the linkage effects of MiE-awned plants in 
France & Italy see DATAR, Livre blanc(l974) esp. pp.59-60, and Busi­
ness International, I.A.S.M. report (1974) —  out of 44 canpanies sur­
veyed, only 7 expressed that they had made contributions to fostering 
growth of supplier or customer industries. See also Bennetti et al(1975) 
esp. pp. 79-84. For the U.K. (northern regicn) see Marshall(1979)p.541.
mobility may be highest in sectors where industrial lin­
kages and local external economies are least important. 
Indeed, evidence for the U.K. suggests that there have been 
few backward linkages between mobile and local established 
firms (Townroe 1975).
Another factor affecting mobility may be the degree 
to which internal economies of scale in general and econom­
ies of integration in production are important. If these do 
not constitute an overriding factor, the production process 
may effectively be split up between various plants to take 
advantage of certain local or regional locational advantages 
(eg. labour costs or availability in the area of labour int­
ensive processes). There is some evidence to suggest that, 
as far as internal economies are concerned, the electrical 
engineering sector in particular may largely conform to 
this pattern1 Indeed it is notable that the electronics ind­
ustry has been at the forefront of many regional development
2programmes.
However, a study of the electronics industry in 
Scotland (which has a somewhat longer history and greater 
size than in the Irish case), suggests that although sig­
nificant employment gains have been achieved by attracting 
M.N.E. branch plants to the area3, linkages with local 
firms in the same sector have not been great. Specifically, 
"the very small pool of employees in indigenous firms sug­
gests that the long term achievements of the policy, and
2o?.
See the aforementioned study by Townroe & Roberts(1980), 
"The electrical engineering industry represented the only 
sector in which the internal economy variable was generally 
either insignificant or negatively related to performance" 
(ibid., p. 165). Furthermore, external economies also 
appeared to have little impact on the performance of enter­
prises in this sector(ibid.,p. 167).
2See IDA(1979), Industrial Plan 1978-82,p. 38 and ch.5 of 
this volume.
3 McDermott (1979). 91% of enplcyees in this industry belonged to ex­
ternally owned firms. Furthermore, "the largely undifferentiated 
branch plant, as opposed to the enterprise", was found to dominate 
erploymerrt in the industry (ibid., p. 293).
the contribution of multinationals to the local economic 
base, in so far as these are reflected in the develop­
ment of indigenous enterprise, has not been significant"1. 
In particular, "purchasing linkages between multinatio­
nals and Scottish suppliers were not pronounced, despite
the fact that indigenous firms were heavily dependent
2upon local market opportunities" .
In conclusion, the spill-over effects from branch- 
plant in many development areas of the E.C. have in gene­
ral been very weak, and as such lead us to doubt the long­
term effectiveness"of regional policies in the 70s to 
achieve significant induced development in local indige­
nous industry.
However, the demand created by mobile plants for 
intra-regional industrial inputs represents only part 
of their actual or potential impact on the local economy. 
In addition we must consider the demands placed on the 
local economy by these firms with respect to such factors 
as skilled labour, business services and in general their 
contribution to transferring technological progress and 
innovation to indigenous sectors of the economy. In an 
analytical framework this process may be schematised as 
follows:
1Ibid., p. 293.
2Ibid., p. 304. "While the multinationals were an import 
ant element in the environment of indigenous firms, the 
converse was apparently not true."
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In addition, government policy may be instrumen­
tal at various stages of the above process in either at­
tracting new firms to the area or in promoting supply 
adjustment to accommodate particular demands of the sys­
tem. Examples could be financial aids to small-medium 
sized supplier firms and service sectors, training grants 
and provision of facilities, grants towards R & D and 
the implementation of new techniques and products (in­
cluding grants for re-equipment). In other words, the 
above analysis would suggest that regional policy should 
be more oriented towards the long-term development po­
tential of the regions and the problems of short-term ad­
justment and innovation.
The discussion in this section was limited to
firm structure and industrial linkages. We shall now turn 
to consider the remaining determinant factors of regional 
development and adjustment potential.
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5.2. A_case_study of differences in sectoral structure
One result of external dependence is the division 
of labour at a spatial level, deriving from the internal div­
ision of activities between the component parts of the integ­
rated firm. A notable example is the West German case, where 
it has been observed that the functional diversity of indus­
trial establishments tends to diminish with increasing dist­
ance from the core of the urban agglomeration1. As a result, 
one characteristic of the industrialisation of more distant 
rural areas has been, "the often subsidised spread of relativ­
ely unfavourable organisational or industrial structures
rather than ...an improvement of local and regional location
2qualities" .
A key question in this context, however, is 
whether the involvement of integrated firms operating in sev­
eral regions necessarily implies a different outcome from 
what would have obtained with production based on non-integ- 
rated firms. For example, we may ask whether, if region A is 
"good" at activity Y, will it not be the case that, with or 
without the integrated firm, activity Y will still be located 
in region A ? Whilst it is always difficult to predict what 
would have happened if things had been otherwise, there are 
reasons to believe that the outcome would indeed have been 
different. In the first place, the type of activities 
concerned are often well out of the range of indigenous l.d.r. 
firmsieg. electronics, automobiles, chemicals, refining, etc.) 
and more typical of the larger integrated corporation(about 
which more will be said later). In the second place, even 
in the event where it could be said that the final result 
would be similar - that is in respect of final production, 
and,for example,where existing firms are acquired by 'outside' 
firms - the point remains that the integrated newcomer is 
certainly more likely to locate a greater proportion of it's 
management, service and R & D activities outside the region, 
and this, in itself,would lead to marked differences in the 
qualitative demands for labour as between the two cases.
1 Hansen<1974),p.132. In a study of intra-regional differences in wages 
and salaries in Baden-WUrttemburg, it is claimed that the organisational 
structure resulting from the abovementioned industrialisation process, and 
the differentiated distribution of growth industries, were largely resp­
onsible for sustained regional inccme disparities in this area. Ibid.
2 Ibid. p.133.
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This type of functional division of tasks within 
the context of larger corporations may be partly ex­
plained by the product life-cycle hypothesis (Hoover and 
Vernon 1962) , according to which products and plants in 
production at the earlier stages of development will 
more often than not, be located near the central areas, 
where proximity to high-level headquarters functions (in­
cluding research and development facilities) and various 
external economies may be of overriding importance. On 
the other hand, products which are at the later stages 
of the "life-cycle" and for which standardised production 
processes are possible may more conveniently be delegated 
to branch-plant production in less central areas.
Alternatively, if the production of the good 
involves several intermediate stages of production which 
are vertically integrated into the firm, the geographical 
spread of branch plants and subsidiaries may be determined 
by locational region-specific advantages, whilst the lo­
cation of final product plants may be determined by mar­
ket demand factors, such as proximity to customers.
In short, in the case of both horizontally and 
vertically integrated firms there are reasons to believe 
that the spatial outcome of production activities will 
result in a functional division of tasks as between re­
gions. If this is the case one should be able to distin­
guish qualitative spatial differences in production pro­
cesses and products, including labour and service require­
ments, research and development activities and the dele­
gation of headquarters functions.
In the following pages, we shall apply the analy­
tical framework outlined above to a.particular area, that 
is, the industrialisation process in Southern Italy from 
the mid-1960s to the 1970s.
Three manufacturing sectors will be considered, 
and the aim is to outline, within each sector, the essen­
tial differences in industrial structure as between the 
Centre/North and South, and assess the implications for 
Southern development potential.
In many of these sectors the major spatial diffe­
rences in development trends can be summarized as follows; 
in the Centre/North industry was largely preoccupied with
rationalising production both in terms of production pro­
cesses and products in an attempt to maintain levels of 
international competition and "move up market" to satisfy 
demand for more sophisticated products, resulting from 
fast rates of growth and rising standards of living in the 
Italian economy1. Increased international competition 
and the need to expand, coupled with growing rigidities 
in the labour market and substantial wage increases, led
to an increased propensity to expand basic and standar-
2dised products in low-cost southern locations .
Whilst Northern industry managed to rationalise 
with lower levels of investment than in previous periods 
and obtained substantial productivity gains, in the 
South high levels of investment in basic and standar­
dised production, resulted in much smaller gains in pro­
ductivity relative"to investment. In other words, de­
velopment in the South occurred through a quantitative 
spread of production plants rather than any qualitative 
restructuring of industrial capacity. It is therefore un­
derstandable that there were few examples of productivity 
gains that were not directly attributable to investment in 
fixed capital3. When, after 1974/75, the pace of industrial 
investment in the south slowed down and declined in real
Z I X.
See Amendola & 3aratta, SVTME2(1978), p. 100. In the C/N 
rationalisation of essentially "traditional" industries 
(food, clothing, footwear etc.), was however marked by 
falling levels of investment and faster rates of growth of 
productivity.
^That S. Italy continues to act as an intermediate production 
base rather than an active competitor in international mar­
kets is shown by the fact that even in 1979, S. Italy ac­
counts for less than 5% of Italian manufactured exports 
(SVIMEZ,1980, p. 32).
3Ibid. , p. 106. The relevant figures fcr manufacturir.c in­
dustry are as follows (average annual changes at constant 
1963 prices)
South Centre/North
1951-63 1963-73 1951-63 1963-73
Gross rixea in­
vestment 12.1 9.1 8 .0 2.4
Value added 7.0 7.6 8 .6 6 .5
Employment 1. 1 1 .0 • 2.4 1 .0
V.A. per employee 
Source: Ibid., p.
5.9
n t .
6 .6 6 .0 5.4
terms1 (and relative to the C/N), the result was a wide­
ning gap in productivity differentials between the two
2are as .
Although the relatively weak secondary effects of 
extra-regional industrial investment on growth in output 
and productivity of the indigenous sector can in part 
be attributed to the poor structure of the latter3, the 
fact remains that to a large extent, such investments as 
took place were incapable of creating the necessary in­
dustrial linkages for that purpose.
(a) Chemicals
By the late 1960s it became clear that the 
size and location of existing basic petro-chemical plants 
was unsatisfactory for the purpose of further expansion. 
The new requirement was for "productive structures based 
particularly on ethylene which can only be produced eco­
nomically in very large plants, and the formation of 
interconnected ... areas of chemical development in 
which are concentrated a series of plants going from 
the refining of crude oil through plants for the produc-
4tion of basic intermediate goods . "
On this basis, it was decided to locate two of the 
new plants in Sicily where petro-chemical and chemical
industrial investment (constant 1970 prices, 1973=100) in 
S. Italy fell from 103.3 in 1974 to 60.3 in 1979, and in 
the Centre/North from 107.0 to 99.6 (5VIMEZ, 1980, p. 90).
2As a percentage cf productivity in the C/N, the relative 
figure for S. Italy declined from 78.6% in 1973 to 77.0% 
in 1979 (ibid., p. 91).
3"The relative fall in southern productivity ... is partly 
explained by the fact that small and medium sized pro­
duction units in the Mezzogiorr.o, especially in tradi­
tional sectors, are not able to maintain the same rate of 
progress as similar sized units in the Centre/North in 
terms of technical and organisational innovation"(ibid.,p.
4- - _ (own -ran.Dunford(19/7), p. 32.
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■ plants already existed. However, apart from the low labour 
intensity of these projects1 (which were anyway intended 
to be accompanied by rationalisation and reduction of em­
ployment in existing plants in the area), any secondary 
employment effects through forward linkages were more 
likely to accrue to firms in the C/N, than those in the 
South. In 1971, around two thirds of southern employment 
in this sector was in base chemicals and refining. There 
were only 15 major establishments of over 100 employees
in secondary chemicals in the South as against 250 in
2the Centre/North .
What the figures from 1963-73 bring out is that 
whilst rationalisation in northern industry allowed 
substantial growth of output with relatively little in­
vestment, in the south, the "reproduction" of base che­
mical plants offered few advantages for growth in asso­
ciated activities. Whilst proximity to backward linkages 
is important in base chemicals, the same does not appear 
to be the case with secondary chemicals and there has been 
no rush to relocate in the South.
1 Ibid.
2SVIMEZ, 1978, p. 59. In the former case with less than 
5,000 employees as against 90,000 in the latter. Fur­
thermore there would not appear to be a high degree of 
locational proximity regarding the largest plants (+
500 employees) in base and secondary chemicals; in base 
chemicals there are several plants with a total of 24,400 
employees in Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna.
In secondary chemicals there are only two plants (1,400 
employees) in Abruzzo (the northernmost region) and 
Basilicata. Source: SVIMEZ, 1980, table 55.
In any event, over the period mentioned north/south 
differences in incremental capital/output ratios were 
more marked in chemicals than for practically any other 
industrial sector1. The rate of growth of southern value 
added in this sector (annual average 11.5%) appears re­
latively modest considering that annual investment in
the south averaged an amount equal to the entire value
2added of this sector . With a rate of accumulation of 
less than half that in the South, the Centre/North managed 
to achieve a substantially higher rate of growth of
3productivity .
b) Transport equipment
Although this sector is composed of such diverse 
elements as shipyards, rail equipment and automobiles, 
the major new developments in the South have been in 
automobile assembly, resulting from the decision of Alfa- 
Romeo and FIAT to locate new assembly plants in that area 
in 1970.
Although these events resulted in a fairly steady 
increase in employment, the same cannot however be said 
with regard to output and productivity. Whilst the annual 
rate of accumulation in the South averaged 19.7% between 
1963-73, as against 3.9% in the Centre/North, value added 
increased by only 10.7% compared to 8.1% in the C/N.
1SVIMEZ (1978), fig. 7, p. 58.
2Ibid., p. 56.
35% per annum as against 3.9% (value added per employee). 
It is also to be noted that "a not insignificant part 
of the additional value added created by these invest­
ments (in base sectors) was transferred via factor remu­
nerations, or in any case through the accounts, of firms 
outside the area" (ibid., p. 58). See also vis automo­
biles .
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Moreover productivity increased at a substantially slower 
rate in the South (2.5% as against 4 . 2 % ) The relatively 
slower productivity performance in the south may however 
be traced to the type of investment in the decentralisation 
process. By far the greatest part of this investment took 
place in automobile assembly, which typically presents 
lower average levels of productivity as compared to ear­
lier stages of the production process (partly due to the 
relative labour-intensity of automobile assembly).
Lastly, as in the case of the chemicals sector, 
it should be noted that a certain proportion of produc­
tivity gains resulting from decentralised investment ac­
crue to the enterprise as a whole. In the first place 
factor remunerations such as general services and dis­
tribution costs, will in part be allocated outside the 
plant. Secondly, the "capacity" effects in terms of in­
creased efficiency and productivity and investment in re­
lated activities, will extend to the whole enterprise,
2in terms of rationalisation of production structure .
In short, an important part of the benefits.resul­
ting from relocation, may be internal to the firm, and 
when the major share of productive activities are loca­
ted elsewhere, external.to the region.
c)Food and Tobacco^
Unlike the two sectors examined previously, the 
food and tobacco sector does not appear to have expe­
rienced any significant degree of plant relocation by
^Ibid., p. 69, table 31. Southern productivity fell from 
91.6% of the C/N average between 1961-63 to 84.2% 
between 1971-73.
For further discussion of these points see ibid., pp. 73-75.
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firms based in the Centre/North.
In fact, the number of plants with over 100 em­
ployees fell substantially between 1961-71, from 120 to 
9 3 whilst some increase was recorded in the C/N. Over­
all, employment declined by 24% in the South, although 
subsequently, employment levels have remained almost 
stationary in both areas.
Between 1963-73, the Centre/North experienced a 
rate of growth of output of more than double the Southern 
average together with a significantly higher rate of 
growth of productivity. This occurred in spite of the
fact that average annual investment remained more or less
2unchanged in real terms in both areas over this period 
and that the South continued to account for a greater 
share of national investment relative to national value 
added in this sector (31% as against 24%) .
Whilst in the C/N investment was used to rationa­
lise and diversify existing productive capacity, in the 
South investment in modern plant still remained relati­
vely labour-intensive in nature and oriented towards 
slow-growing traditional markets^. Apart from the relati­
vely small productivity gains derived from this form of 
investment process, the failure of Southern plants to di­
versify production has been reflected in low levels of 
penetration of external markets and increasing competition 
with foreign producers. In the face of increased costs of
1SVIMEZ, 1978,p. 38 table 14. Although we have no figures 
on the average level of external ownership, the degree 
of foreign ownership in the South is much lower than in 
practically every other sector, that is, less than 8 ,000  
employees or around 8% of sectoral employment. Benetti 
et al., p. 47.
^Ibid. , p. 31 and pp. 121-2’.
3See discussion in ibid., pp. 37-42.
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primary products there has been an increasing tendency 
to use imported raw materials.
This, in a sector which is already notable for lack of 
diversification and seasonality with respect to back­
ward linkages in primary production1.
Similar developments to those outlined above may 
be traced in other major sectors of Southern manufac­
turing industry. The structure of the mechanical engi­
neering sector for example, characterised by a high pro­
portion of small and very small enterprises linked al-
2most exclusively to local demand , may explain the re­
latively slow development of this sector in relation to 
its level of accumulation3.
In conclusion, although the very considerable new 
investments in the aforementioned sectors have undoubted­
ly served to increase employment and production capacity 
in Southern manufacturing industry, their impact has in 
many cases been severely limited by a number of factors. 
To briefly summarize these we have noted, (i) a lack of 
backward (automobiles) and forward (chemicals) linkage 
capacity, (ii) insufficient product diversification in
Ibid., p. 42. It is notable that foreign-owned capital 
has been at the forefront of this process (in which ver­
tical intra-firm linkages presumably play a role). For 
an account of cases relating to frozen foods, baby foods 
and pasta (Unilever, Heinz and Barilla), see Benetti et 
al.(1975), pp. 83-84.
2In 1971 around 68% of employment in this sector was in 
mechanical repair shops of a predominantly service na­
ture and in metal work linked almost exclusively to the 
building sector. The corresponding figure for these sub­
sectors in the Centre/North was 32% (1971 Census of Pro­
duction) .
^Comparing the years 1967-68 and 197 2-73, annual invest­
ment in the South increased by 226.3% in real terms whilst 
output increase by 33.9%. The corresponding figures for 
the C/N were 23.8% for investment and 26.8% for output. 
Moreover by 1972-73 the South accounted for more than 
one fifth of gross fixed investment and less than one 
tenth of total value added in this sector.
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many sectors, but especially food and tobacco, and (iii) 
a general scarcity of supplier firms in key manufactu­
ring sectors such as mechanical engineering.
Although part of the low secondary impact of 
new investment is to be explained by the sheer lack of 
presence of firms in the indigenous sector capable of 
exploiting industrial linkages, it is also true that 
the linkage demands generated by these investments were 
either not of the type to promote such development or 
could easily be accommodated by firms located in the 
Centre/North. The above reflections seem to indicate the 
necessity to move towards a more Mdective type of de­
velopment policy capable i) of determining final product 
markers which could be profitably exploited by local firms 
from l.d.r. locations, and ii) promoting supplier firms 
where local production could readily be expanded to substit­
ute for 'imports', or more generally, where certain tech­
nical, financial or manegerial difficiencies arise in the 
small/medium size firm sector which impede the development 
of industrial linkage. As such, more emphasis may need to 
be put on indigenous firm development and defining relevant 
bottle-necks to small/medium sized firms adjustment and 
development potential.
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5.3. Qualitative aspects of regional employment
Although the evidence on this point is somewhat 
limited, what there is suggests that the employment ef­
fects of new plants located in the development areas of 
the l.d.r.s may have been essentially restricted to growth 
in quantitive terms. In qualitative terms, their contri­
bution to the average skill level of the working popula­
tion has often been negligable.
As we saw in the previous section, there are reasons 
to expect that the functional division of tasks within 
the context of large, multi-establishment corporations 
may be likely to result in qualitative differences in the 
demands for different types of labour at a spatial level.
It is worth noting however, that the final outcome 
may depend less on specific locational factors such as re­
lative labour costs and availability than on the internal 
production and marketing strategy of the firm. For example 
if headquarters functions, R & D, product development and 
production and marketing of final products are carried out 
in the central agglomerated regions, only the remaining 
intermediate and standardised processes may be left to 
be divided out amongst the rest. In other words locational 
factors may only be important with regard to high-level 
functions, whereas there may be no obvious reason not to 
locate other functions on a wider spatial level (especially
if investment grants are widely available outside the cen- 
2tral regions } . As such standard regional policy may play
1In this respect the results of our study on France in Chap­
ter 9 suggest that labour cost and availability has only 
a weak impact on industrial location. The result that in­
creasing distance from the central agglomeration region 
(Paris) has an important negative impact on location sug­
gests that our theory cf the "next best location" for cer­
tain activities may well have some relevance.
2Since capital subsidies are the main regional incentive 
in many S.C. countries one could perhaps expect that more 
capital-intensive processes may have been located in d.a.s 
than might otherwise have been the case. However if the 
relationship between capital intensity and skill require 
ments is not strong (e.g. electronics) it is consecuent’y 
not to be expected that this will result in increased demand
azi.
only a passive role with regard to qualitative aspects of 
regional development (and function-specific decentralisa­
tion or deglomeration policies may consequently be more 
effective in this respect).
The above interpretation is not intended to pre­
sent any hard and fast theory —  moreover it seems high­
ly plausible that for particularly labour-intensive 
process firms will actively seek out low-cost locations1
—  but it does suggest that there may be a broad range 
of activities in which corporate strategy is more likely 
to prevail than specific locational advantages and with 
regard to the location of which there may exist a certain 
amount of discretion.
Some of these points are brought out by two stu­
dies on the location of plants in electronics and light 
engineering sectors in France.
A study of the location of electronics passive 
components establishments created in France between 1954— 
1970 revealed that out of a total of 5 3 plants, 32 were 
located in areas with no or only a low level of subsidy,
and only 12 were located in development areas with high 
2subsidy levels .
Moreover, with regard to skill requirements, another 
study of the impact of several large new plants (elec­
tronics and light engineering) in two cities in the West
(from_previous page)
for high skill levels in development areas.
however,as Holland(1976) has pointed out, these are anyway
more likely to be found in the l.d.cis than ¿1 the Idr's of the
2 E CCf. Hansen(197 4), p. 55. Moreover, large enterprises
appeared to be more reluctant to locate in development
areas than smaller ones.
l'il
of France revealed that the high level of demand for un­
skilled labour1 created by the new plants had actually 
lowered the average level of skills in both areas.
On a somewhat broader scale, the degree of func­
tional division of labour between regions can be assessed 
from the following set of figures relating to France.
Recalling the high degree of external ownership 
observed for the provinces in this country (see back) 
and the dominating role played by firms based in the 
Paris region, one would expect to observe, on the basis 
of our outlined hypothesis, substantial qualitative dif­
ferences in the structure of the labour market as between 
these two areas. One might also expect differences to be 
more marked (i) for the peripheral development areas. —  
that is as distance from Paris increases and (ii) for
regions where employment in externally owned enterprises
2is particularly high .
In the first table we have considered eleven re­
gions which have been divided up into three broad cate­
gories, that is; central agglomerated regions, regions 
which are partly classified as development areas, and 
regions in the West and South West which are totally clas­
sified as development areas3.
1Cf. Hansen(1974), pp. 61-62. In one case unskilled em­
ployment constituted 71.5% of total employment compared 
to 48.7% in existing enterprises.
2Although lack of data as to which sectors have high le­
vels of external ownership in which regions implies that 
we shall not be able to make any more than general re­
marks on this question.
3See Chapter 9 for definitions and levels of subsidy 
available.
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Employment within each sector1 is divided up into 
high-level (management & technical) functions and low- 
level functions (unskilled labour), and the relative 
shares are given for each region and sector.
Looking down the columns, if our aforementioned 
hypothesis is broadly correct, one would expect to see a 
relative decline in high-level functions and an increase 
in low-level functions as between these three broad cate­
gories .
The results" show striking functional differences in 
employment structure which are most marked for the Paris 
region. Rhone-Alpes does not however appear to fare con­
sistently better than the remaining nine regions except 
marginally in manufacturing industry and most notably in 
chemicals and automobiles.
In other words only the Paris region, which is by 
far the major source of extra-regional investment, shows 
such considerable command over high-level functions in 
all sectors considered. As such, this result should not 
be surprising.
To summarise for the six sectors considered, the 
main results are as follows. In general, for all manufac­
turing sectors (excluding automobiles), whilst in the 
Paris region high-level functions occupy a much more im­
portant position than low-level functions (30%—42% of em­
ployment as against l0%-20%) the situation is almost ex­
actly the opposite in the provinces.
However, the essential differences in employment 
structure vary somewhat between sectors.
Manufacturing industries
Whilst unskilled labour accounts for only one in five 
jobs in this sector in the Paris region, it constitutes
1The sectors chosen are those in which employment growth 
rates were highest over the period 1967-74, and for which 
decentralisation from the Paris region has been particu­
larly marked. See Ch. 9.
l a r
around one in three jobs, or more, in the provinces. Dif­
ferences in high-level function employment shares are even 
more marked. Whereas this accounts for 30% of manufacturing 
employment in Paris, only around one in ten jobs fall into 
this category in the provinces. Moreover, on average, in 
the provinces a lower proportion of high-level functions 
are composed of senior management and technical staff 
(around one third), than in the Paris region (around one 
half). Given the size and composition of management, pro­
fessional and technical staff in the provinces, it would 
seem that these functions are by and large limited to 
the every day running of establishments rather than to 
higher level functions such as strategic planning, pro­
cess and product development and basic R & D.
Business services
Only high-level functions are examined for this sector 
since differences in lower level functions are not as 
clear-cut as for example in manufacturing industry. Whereas 
these functions account for 38% of employment in Paris 
and 26% in Rhone-Alpes, in the development areas the share 
typically varies between 18% and 24% (in Limousin almost 
30%). However, absolute size is also important and in this 
respect it is notable that Paris accounts for 41% of to­
tal employment in this sector. On the other hand, in Li­
mousin, where the proportion of high-level functions is 
relatively high, this region accounts for only .68% of 
total business service employment as against 1.14% of to­
tal industrial employment and 1.4% of national population.
Mechanical engineering
In both mechanical engineering and chemicals, for each 
of the 11 regions, the share of employment in high-level
1  2. é.
functions is higher, and that in low-level functions lo­
wer than the for manufacturing industry as a whole.
Regional differences are however very marked. Whilst 
almost one in three jobs in the Paris region are in high- 
level functions, the average in the development areas is 
less than one in six, and in Rhone-Alpes, one in five.
Again, whereas unskilled jobs constitute 13.4% of 
employment in Paris, there are wide differences in the 
provinces, with employment in this category generally 
ranging between 18% and 28%1. Since this sector is rela­
tively large, such-differences are probably due to com­
position effects, however it is notable that differences 
in high-level functions are much less marked (14% to 17% 
in the D.A.s).
Electronics and electrical engineering
For such a highly research-intensive sector, it is not 
surprising given our earlier discussion, that by and 
large, functional differences in employment should be more 
notable than elsewhere.
Whereas in the Paris region over 40% of employ­
ment is in high-level functions and less than 15% composed
of unskilled labour, the situation is almost exactly the
2reverse elsewhere .
in Limousin the figure is 10.5%. A further 60% of employ­
ment is in the category of skilled and semi-skilled wor­
kers which is 10% or more than in any other region. The 
result is probably largely due to craftsmanship require­
ments in more traditional specialisations for which this 
region is well-known.
2 It is interesting to speculate whether the relatively high share of 
high-level functions in Rhone-Alpes and Aquitaine is due to the pre­
sence of very large centres in these regicns. It is not merely by 
chance that in 1974 all three foreign-owned plants in Aquitaine were 
situated in Bordeaux, or that five out of six such plants in Rhone- 
Alpes were situated in Lyons, whereas foreign plants in other sectors 
in these regions showed more dispersed locational patterns (D.A.T.A.R., 
1974).
2 z ?
Moreover, the fast rate of expansion in this sec­
tor combined with a high degree of external ownership 
and proliferation of branch plants suggest that the re­
sultant spatial and functional division of labour forms 
part of a precise corporate strategy, and that the re­
sultant functional patterns are hardly to be explained 
by regional differences in the structure of indigenous 
enterprises1.
In this respect it is interesting to note that 
the regions where employment in this sector grew fastest
after 1967 (i.e. Bretagne and Poitou-Charentes where
2employment more than doubled between 1967-7 4 ), and where 
the share of foreign direct investment is greatest, i.e.3Loire, Auvergne and Bretagne / were also those with the high­
est shares of unskilled labour (50-60%).
Automobiles
The proportion of unskilled labour to total employment 
in this sector is very high for all regions considered 
(40% to 60%). It is notable however, that in Bretagne and 
especially Bsse Normandie where several major decentrali­
sations have taken place, the proportion of unskilled la­
bour is at the top end of the scale, around 60%.
However, regional differences in the share of 
high-level functions are more marked, and the differences 
are such as to suggest that little decentralisation of con­
nected high-level functions has presumably taken place 
(again, notably in the area of Bsse Normandie and Bretagne).
1In the provinces, foreign-owned plants alone accounted for
2 9.3% of employment in this sector. Moreover the level of 
foreign penetration was higher here than for any other in­
dustrial sector. Ibid.
2See Chapter 5.
3 Enplcyment in foreign-owned plants of over 200 enployees accounted 
for respectively 53%, 87% and 42% of elec. engin. employment in these re­
gions (DftlAR, 1974, p. 43).
Z Z 8 .
Chemicals
This sector, which is again typically research inten­
sive, exhibits substantial regional differences in func­
tional structure, albeit to a lesser extent than in elec­
tronics .
Although in the Paris region the proportion of un­
skilled labour is even lower than in the electrical sec­
tor (10%) , whilst the share of high-level functions is 
very similar (41%), in the development areas, the ratio 
of high to low level functions is generally more balanced.
However, there remain some rather significant dif­
ferences in the share of unskilled labour as between the 
development areas. On this point, it is again notable 
that the three regions which have amongst the highest 
shares of unskilled labour (i.e. Bretagne, 37% and Poitou- 
Charentes, 30%, Loire 27%), are also those which expe­
rienced the fastest growth in employment over the period 
1967-741.
In other words it would appear that the growth in 
investment and employment that occurred in previous periods 
in the development areas (in chemicals, electronics and 
electrical eng. and automobiles) was to a large extent cha­
racterised by the delegation of lower-level functions to 
these regions.
This together with the dominating position of the
Employment increased by more than a third in these re­
gions over the given period. See Chapter 5.
X Z  9.
Paris region with respect to high-level functions in manu­
facturing industry in general, are the main empirical fin­
dings of this section, and go a long way in supporting our 
previously outlined hypothesis.
Given the scarcity of data, it has not been possible 
however, to separate out a number of factors which may have 
influenced the general pattern. The relative Importance 
of factors such as distance from agglomerated regions, 
the size and diversity of sectors within any region, and 
the level of external ownership, to name but a few, have at 
most been only partially taken into account1. Any further 
analysis of these points would however have been rather 
tentative.
At this point of the analysis, however, the re­
sults would seem to indicate (i) that firms establishing 
branch plants undertake only limited delegation of high- 
«
level functions, (ii) that these are largely centred in 
c.a.r.'s and that (iii) any differences in the functional 
demands of new plants in areas outside c.a.r.'s are mar­
ginal and not necessarily related to the distance of the 
region frcm the c.a.r., (iv) the functional demands made 
by new branch plants in the d.a. ' s may be of a lower average
^For example the relative importance of the level of exter­
nal ownership and distance from c.a.r.'s on the functional 
division of labour is not entirely clear, but may suggest 
that the farmer is af greater importance; Bsse Normandie with by far 
the highest level of external ownership (71.5%), in spite of close 
proximity to the Paris region, records the lowest or second lowest share 
of high-level functions in every sector considered. Limousin on the 
other hand, with the lowest level of external ownership (29.5%), fares 
substantially better in most cases (for figures see INSEE(1976)p.6).
- X?>o ~
Table 2.
The share of the Paris region in overall employment by employment 
category in 197 4.
Employment category Share of Paris region as %
of total for category
Senior engineers and professional
technical staff with applied skills in
management, planning, information^mathe-
matics and economics and social sciences 66.9
Other senior engineers and technical staff 48.2
Senior administrative staff 43.1
Senior professional staff in banking finance
and insurance 52.8
Employment in the legal and literary pro­
fessions 56.2
Teaching and research staff in higher education 48.2 
Doctors, dentists, pharmacists, vet. sur­
geons 3 8.7
Computer analysts and programmers 54.7
Senior professional and technical staff in 
publicity 77.6
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 17.6
All employment 27.8
Population 19.2
Source: derived from INSEE serie D, no. 51, mars 1977, and 
Basic Statistics of the Community, 197 5-7 6.
1 3  1.
level than those of indigenous enterprises —  at least this is 
suggested in several cases where the influx of externally owned 
plants has been relatively high^.
Our second table is aimed at complementing the previous dis­
cussion by describing absolute rather than relative differences 
in the functional structure of employment.
Rather than considering particular sectors, we have chosen to 
give an overall breakdown'of high-level functions for the Paris 
region. The dominant position of this area becanes immediately 
obvious; over one half of senior management, technical and re­
search jobs are concentrated in Paris. Furthermore such con­
centration of high-level functions is by no means limited to 
the industrial sector; the same situation applies to banking and 
insurance institutions, the legal profession, higher education 
and even the medical profession.
Whereas in Paris the national share of high-level functions 
is almost double its share of the active population, in all other 
regions, including Rhone-Alpes, the share is lower, often consider­
ably, than that of regional working population.
A final point we should consider is whether there are any sig­
nificant functional differences within manufacturing sectors be­
tween establishments of different size. Relevant figures are given 
in the following table.
^The structure of functional demands may also depend on establish­
ment size , and we shall shortly consider whether this factor 
has any relevant explanatory power.
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Table 3 .
Employment structure by function, sector and establishment 
size, for France (1978).
Sector /no. employees 11-49 50-199 200-499 500+
/functional MPT/unsk MPT/unsk MPT/unsk MPT/unsk
level
Mechanical engineering 18.1/21.1 18.0/23.3 20.1/25.5 20.1/26.7
Elee. & elee, enginee­
ring 27.2/22.0 24.1/30.9 22.3/42.2 27.4/37.0
Autanobiles 18.0/31.9 13.1/39.6 12.0/50.4 11.5/50.2
Chemicals 29.3 /26.6 28.3/22.4 27.3/18.9 26.3/14.5
Source : INSEE, serie D, no. 72, 1980.
key; MPT = management, professional staff and senior technicians 
unsk = unskilled workers and labourers.
2-33.
Only in the automobile sector is there any 
clear decline in the proportion of high-level functions as 
establishment size increases .However the proportion of un­
skilled labour in the workforce shows a clear tendency 
to increase with plant size in three of the sectors con­
sidered: mechanical engineering, electronics and automo­
biles. In the chemicals sector the situation is clearly 
the reverse and the smallest establishments employ pro­
portionally about twice as much unskilled labour as the 
largest ones.
Overall, and ccmpared to the first table, this 
would seem to suggest that, for the sectors considered, 
the relatively high proportion of high-level functions in 
the Paris region and the correspondingly low share in the 
development areas ( and conversely for low-level functions), 
cannot reasonably be explained by firm-size structure in 
the vast majority of cases. Rather, these figures are con­
sistent with our earlier hypothesis that functional diffe­
rences as between regions are more likely to find an expla­
nation in the deliberate strategy of firms based in the 
Paris region (or abroad) to maintain central control over 
high-level functions.
We shall now turn to consider the precise Implica­
tions of the above findings regarding the development po­
tential of the less developed regions.
5.4. The_r^ional_implicati°ns of_the_spatial and sectoral 
distribution_of research and development activities.
In a fundamental sense the ability of a region 
to achieve self-sustained and continuous growth will depend 
on the capacity of firms established there to adjust to 
market demand and technological change. This argument is 
especially applicable to certain fast-growing or research­
intensive activities, where competitive advantage goes to 
those firms which are most willing to innovate, and where 
"the distance between the front runner and those who are 
equipped to move forward only at normal speeds of technical 
advance is glaringly apparent."^
Very often the sizeable basic burden imposed by
R & D costs implies that such activities may more readily
2be carried out by larger industrial enterprises. Moreover 
the state, which in many Western European countries has 
for seme time been financing up to two-thirds or more of 
industrial R & D^, in important science-based industries,
^Shonfield(1965), p. 375, see also pp. 59-60.
2 Although our previous table might seen to present a less concentrated 
impression of high-level functions (which include R & D ejipl.), it 
should be noted that the figures referred to establishments rather 
than firms or enterprises. The five biggest canpanies in Belgium and 
the Netherlands in 1970 accounted far 30% and 65% respectively of to­
tal industrial R & D in these countries (CECD 1978 ,p. 172). Far the 
Netherlands, detailed figures show that firms with less than 200 em­
ployees accounted far little ever 4% af industrial R & D expenditures 
(ibid., p. 169).
^Shonfield (1965), p. 372. R & D expenditure, and in particular state 
aid to R & D in general is concentrated in a few key sectors. The pre­
sent plans by the Frerch goverrment to nationalise large sections cf 
industry would far example give state control of 93% of R & D in areo- 
nautics 60% in electronics, 62% in chemicals and 29% in pharmaceuti­
cals, which together account far 53% af total industrial R & D ex­
penditure (Le Monde, 22 July 1981).
may have explicitly encouraged such developments; as one 
author has put it, "many of the beneficiaries are likely 
to be precisely the big well-established firms, with a 
proven reputation for the execution of research or develop­
ment programmes and the quality of staff to do the job well."1
However,the evidence suggests that the less developed
peripheral regions may largely miss out irt this process; in
the first place due to a notable absence of large sized firms
in R & D intensive -sectors, and in the second place due to
the tendency of firms which do undertake R & D, to locate
2research establishments in the central areas .
Moreover the existence of a large pool of scientific 
personnel together with the high propensity to locate cor­
porate headquarters in such central areas, continues to en­
sure that these, rather than peripheral regions will continue 
to attract the bulk of new R & D activity.
As a result, firms in peripheral regions may be at 
a severe disadvantage with respect to cost or ease of access 
to new technology. Furthermore given the high propensity of 
corporate branch-plants in peripheral areas to undertake 
fairly standardised activities based on transferred mature 
technology, there may be very low technological spin-off 
effects on supplier firms in these areas.
I^bid. One particular case cited is that of the postwar defence indus­
tries, pp. 372-3. See also ch. 9 vis France. As Shanfield also points cut, 
the allocation of state R & D funds to large private enterprises is often 
aimed at maintaining the pace of technological advance in key sectors, 
which face strong foreign can petition; see discussion pp. 374-76 vis 
canpaters.
2One study of the regional distribution of R & D employment in.the UK came 
to the conclusion that "the group and detached R & D centres of manu­
facturing industry account for sane 20,000 jobs in the South East, 3,500 
in Central and Southern England and 4,000 in development regions",E.C. 
(1977) Regional Policy Series no. 3, p. 120. The evidence with respect to
XZé>.
Indeed there would seem to be evidence to suggest 
that technological impediments place severe constraints on 
the growth of small firms in peripheral regions, which is 
reflected in their lower rates of innovation as compared to 
similar sized firms in central areas1.
Defining the term innovation as the commercial ap­
plication of new technology, we may, in the first instance, 
distinguish between innovation relating to production pro­
cesses and final products. We may then turn to consider the 
specific bottlenecks that may be faced by independent firms 
in peripheral regions concerning the development of each.
With regard to product innovation, it is often hard
to see how any really substantial modifications in the final
2product can take place without sane level of applied R & D . 
Moreover, it is also possible that product innovation will 
necessitate major changes in the production process.
Imitation is always possible however and this may be 
especially beneficial where cost advantages (e.g. labour) are 
obtainable. Furthermore, techniques which require small
(ctd. fran previous page) M.N.E. branch plants and subsidia­
ries suggests that most basic and applied R & D takes place 
outside the peripheral regions, often abroad in the heme base. 
DATAR(197 4), p. 61, Business International(1974), p.165.
^cf. IIM(1980), p. 12. Studies relating to W. Germany and the 
UK.
2 The autanobile industry is a good example where the cost of developing 
new models has risen substantially over recent years. Furthermore the pro­
gressive shortening of the average lifetime of products in high-techno­
logy sectors, implies that product de/elopnent may necessitate continuous 
and growing levels of R & D. See Shonfield (1965), p. 375, with regard to 
data processing equipnent.
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additions to capital are likely to be taken up more quick­
ly than those requiring heavy investment^.
The ability to apply new techniques to production 
processes may also imply R & D outlay, and may furthermore, 
as we have seen, be fundamentally integrated into the 
wider process of product development. However, to a large 
extent, changes in production process may simply be attri­
butable to the purchase of up to date machinery and equip­
ment, thereby circumventing the need for in-house R & D.
In part the problems experienced in these respects 
by firms in peripheral areas may be traced to the somewhat
more generalised problem of lack of management expertise in 
2smaller firms . At another level, however, the cost and
availability of finance to undertake innovation may present
serious problems for small firms, and especially those in
peripheral areas.
Whilst U.K. evidence would seem to suggest that external
finance is less catunon for small firms than for large3 ,
small firms have only limited access to the capital market,
and the most common form of loan finance for smaller firms
is often bank overdrafts. Moreover, where small firms are
able to obtain external finance, the cost to them will in-
4evitabiy be higher than the cost to a large firm .
^Cf. Thwaites(197 8), p. 452.
2Cf. IIMU980), p. 9.
^Bannock(1976), p. 66.
4 Ibid. The reason is quite simple; a given project wrcr. a given prcce- 
bility cf success will present a different risk to a lending institution 
depending on whether it is undertaken by a snail or a large firm; the 
collateral and ability cf absorbing losses could generally be expected to 
be lower in the fanner than in the latter.
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Concerning cammerciai interest rates, there is also 
evidence to suggest that the cost of obtaining bank credit may 
also vary in a spatial context. In Italy, canmercial rates 
were found to vary from 15.3% in Northern Italy to 17.3% in 
the mainland South1. Similar differences would also appear 
to exist between the South East and peripheral regions of 
the UK2.
Lastly, in spite of evidence to suggest that smaller 
firms may be more efficient in their use of R & D resources3, 
it remains that smaller firms have only limited access to 
R & D facilities.
Although seme countries have shown recognition of 
the need to fill the innovation gap in small-scale enter­
prises by adopting policies to stimulate industrial R & D 
capacity, there are certain basic problems. According to one 
survey of R & D stimulation policies .in the Irish Republic, 
neither in the foreign sector (owing to the fact that firms 
concentrate on the production phase) nor in the indigenous
sector (owing to their small size) could any adequately de-
4veloped R & D capacity be said to exist . It was therefore
1SVLMIZ 1980, p. 65.
2Cf. Twaites 1978, p. 451.
3Twaites(1973), p. 449. In the sense that large firms have 
to spend more per invention and per significant invention 
than does the small enterprise.
4 OECD (1973) . Policies for the stirulation of industrial innovation, Vol. 
II-2, p. 95. This is reflected in the fact that (i) the ratio of grcss 
exp. on R & D/GNP in Ireland «as practically the lowest in the CECD area, 
arri (ii) R & D efforts of enterprises were essentially centred in a few 
units (ibid., p. 83).
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concluded that in general, the economy seemed unable to take
advantage of government efforts in this field.
This seems to suggest that under such circumstances
policy may be more effectively applied to the integration
of new technologies and products rather than to the basic
1research process .
It should however be stated that the Irish Republic,
which is at present in the forefront of developing policies
2to promote innovation in small firms , does in fact use 
both approaches to innovation policy.
In the first place, the Industrial Development Autho­
rity makes available grants of one-third towards the cost 
of work within a firm of investigating and refining proposals 
leading to a new product, new investment or R & D. These are
^See also Ewers and Wettmann(1980)t p.176.
2In theirish case defined as firms with up to 50 employees, 
and, in 1979, with fixed assets cf less than £400,000.
Although France and Italy both spend considerable amounts 
cn subsidising industrial R & D, there has been a notable 
lack of developing policies for small-medium sized firms or 
integrating such policies into the framework of regional 
planning and development, In France, the greater share of 
R & D grants go to large firms in key sectors —  the aircraft industry 
alone accounted far 60% of all French public R & D financing in 1976 
(see also ch, 9). In Italy the 1977 law (no. 675) far the coordination 
of industrial policy —  mainly aimed at rationalisation and including 
granting and lending of investment funds and R & D support —  never really 
got off the ground due to various factors including a change in govern­
ment in 1978.
Of the major EC ecananies, cnly W. Germany appears to have developed 
more ccmmercially oriented R & D policies, and shifting "from funding 
big projects by big companies to funding snaller and median sized enter­
prises and users." Franko(1980), p. 29.
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also available to medium/large scale firms1.
Secondly, through the Institute for Industrial Re­
search and Standards (IIRS), a wide range of technical ad-
2visory services are made available , and the institute pro­
vides valuable technological support to industrial firms 
wishing to expand or introduce radical changes.
The IIRS has also been instrumental in promoting 
new ventures. It has helped inventors by financing patenting 
and licensing costs,, providing scientific and technical 
laboratory facilities, as well as searching for appropriate 
firms to undertake commercialisation^.
Furthermore, the IIRS has gradually expanded towards 
developing new technology applicable at all stages of the
1IDA(1979) , Industrial Plan 1978-82. In 1977 the IDA backed 
research in 160 R & D projects and for 22 investments in re­
search facilities, with associated investment totalling 
£3.1m. In 1979 225 projects were financed with a total invest­
ment of £6.4m. Over 4/5 of grant aid went to R & D projects 
rather than permanent research and development establishments 
(IDA Annual Report 1979) .
2Including: technical information, cost reduction, quality 
improvement, standards, specialist technical testing. Fur­
thermore, these services are provided on a next to free basis. 
The IIRS accounted for around 20% of total government R & D 
expenditure, in the mid-1970s, and its importance should 
not therefore be underestimated.
^Results of OECD questionnaire; see OECD(1978), p. 90.
2-M
production process , and is thus in some sense substituting 
for applied R & D deficiencies in the private sector.
Finally, several recent initiatives aimed at deve­
loping the growth and innovation potential of small firms 
include {i) financial support for "first time enterpreneurs", 
including equity and guarantees for bank borrowing for wor­
king capital, (ii) a project identification programme
which provides a "bank" of product possibilities to be 
availed of by Irish firms —  notably regarding product op­
portunities based on the requirements of new industries 
(thereby increasing the spin-off effects of new firms on 
indigenous enterprises), and (iii) a major programme of 
small advance factory clusters, over a wide range of urban 
and small-town sites.
In part, the success of these policies, especially 
in regard to the development of new and small-sized firms 
can be judged from the rapid employment gains made by small 
firms, particularly over recent years. Out of a projected 
34,470 grant-aided jobs in 197 2,- 4,703 came from existing 
domestic small firms and a further 1,415 from newly esta­
blished domestic small firms. Moreover, small firms accounted
1 The conclusions of a recent OECD report suggest that this 
approach may be particularly relevant for Ireland and other 
developing regions ofthe EC; "... with the international 
diffusion of advanced technology it is obvious that the 
standard international scale may be too large for the domes­
tic market in a particularly developing country ... Under 
these circumstances it appears reasonable to encourage en­
terprises to investigate ways of optimising operations 
other than by simply increasing scale economies. There have 
already been sane premising results in reducing optimum efficient 
size of plant by changing the technology (e.g. electronics), ...(which)
... promise many possibilities for decentralisation and scale reduc­
tion." OECD(1981), see concluding remarks.
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. for almost one third of projected job potential in domestic 
industry1.
In conclusion the discussion of this section suggests 
that appropriate state or regional bodies may play a vital 
role in Improving the capacity of indigenous industry in 
development areas to innovate and absorb technological 
progress.
The necessity for such action has been demonstrated 
by outlining the particular deficiencies characterising firms 
in these areas, notably (i) scarcity of high-level functions
(ii) poor employment performance and high rates of firm 
turnover, (iii) the low propensity of externally-owned branch- 
plants to promote local linkages,(iv) the scarcity of adequate 
supplier-firm capacity arising frcm bottlenecks relating 
essentially to lack of risk capital, and organisational and 
management deficiencies.
5.5. The business service sector as a bottleneck to innovative 
capacity._
A related issue which we shall briefly touch upon 
concerns the capacity of firms in perfcheral areas to acquire 
professional management and technical advice, and the level 
of provision of these services in such areas.
From our previous comments on France it is already 
clear that such services tend to be largely concentrated in 
central agglomerated areas and that in peripheral areas the 
level of provision is relatively low.
1IDA Annual Report 197 9. However, these figures may be 
somewhat over-optimistic - see chapter 8.
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A wider level of generality is provided by the re­
sults of other studies, which emphasise the lack of availa­
bility of a wide range of business services in peripheral 
areas and the lack of recourse to such services by local 
firms\ This problem is compounded by at least two factors. 
Firstly, the tertiary sector, although expanding rapidly 
in many countries, is not generally susceptible to easy 
dispersal and in the case of rural peripheries tends to 
be centred in larger urban areas. Hence, firms in low-den- 
sity rural areas may experience certain distance and infor­
mation costs.
Secondly, branch plants in peripheral regions are
2generally limited in their use of business services ?
those which are called for tend to be internalised within
the corporation, and derive from head office locations,
that is, primarily, outside the peripheral regions in
3question .
As a result, branch plants in general do little
to stimulate development of the local business service sec­
tor. Moreover, in regions where the greater part of indus­
trial activity is controlled by such establishments, this 
sector may have became so restricted as to place serious 
constraints on the development potential of indigenous firms.
The answer to these problems lies partly in ex­
panding the use made of business services by locally-based
^Cf. Ewers and Wetrmann, pp. 171 and 177. Cf. IIM(19 30),p .9.
2Cf. Twaites(1978), p. 453,
3Marshall (197 9) , p. 544 and Table 12.
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firms, whose recourse to which is often markedly low espe­
cially with respect to market research, product develop­
ment and financial services1.
A more tangible solution however, is to improve 
accessibility to such services in the form of regionally 
based advisory networks, very much along the lines dis­
cussed in our previous section. This would, at the same 
time increase the awareness on the part of local entre­
preneurs of the need to integrate these skills into the 
development strategy of the firm.
In general, the purpose of the discussion in 
these sections has been to outline the shortcomings and 
deficiencies in industrial structure characteristic of 
many of the peripheral regions in Europe. Specifically,.- 
we have distinguished between aspects relating to indi­
genous firm growth on the one hand and the impact of ex­
terna lly-owned plants on the other.
Although we have brought attention to certain 
deficiencies regarding the qualitative and linkage effects 
of branch plants, the main problem in this respect lies 
somewhat deeper. In short, corporate strategy and the 
integrated nature of such undertakings ensures, from the 
outset, that local spill-over effects will be reduced to a 
minimum. In conclusion, a more profitable approach to de­
velopment planning might involve specific policies, delivered
1Cf. Marshall(1979), p. 556, cf. IIM, pp, 9-11.
very close to the firm, to enable existing enterprises 
to make better use of resources and adapt more quickly 
to technological change. Such policies, aimed particularly 
at small and medium sized enterprises, where bottle­
necks to firm development are most apparent, would do 
much to improve the overall competitiveness and growth 
potential of this sector.
The question of indigenous firm competitiveness 
leads us to the broader issue of considering the overall 
competitive framework within which local firms in peri­
pheral areas operate, and which in turn may place funda­
mental restrictions on the growth and development poten­
tial of such firms. This is the subject of our next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6.
In this chapter we shall consider two general circum­
stances under which the ability of peripheral firms to effec­
tively compete with other, often larger enterprises based 
outside these regions may, in a variety of respects be under­
mined by factors very largely outside their control.
Specifically we shall consider (i) the regional 
consequences of merger and takeover activity, and (li) 
in the light of rising levels of concentration in a large 
number of sectors, and, increasing -recourse to the international 
division of productive processes, the ability of peri­
pheral firms to compete in both Intermediate and final 
stages of production. Consideration of the last point(s) 
will entail an examination of the growth strategy of 
large-sized firms in these sectors.
As we have seen, many development areas in the 
E.C. are characterised by high levels of external owner­
ship. It is generally more difficult however to obtain 
data on the growth of this process over time1. The only 
such study that the present author is aware of relates
2to the Northern development area in the UX between 1963-7 3 .
Between these two dates, employment in externally-owned
plants in manufacturing industry increased from 54.1% to
7 9.3% of local employment. Closer examination of the
^Moreover what there is often relates to foreign direct 
investment (see on) . The growth of foreign-owned establishments 
has also been quite hicn at EC country level —  for example in Bel­
gium betvjeer. 1968-75 these establishments increased their share of 
national manufacturing enplciraent from 18% to 33% and turnover frcm 
33% to 44%, cf. Franko(1380), p. 37 table 13.
Cf. iter shall (1979), table 1. Figures taken iron the establishment- 
based data bank, University cf Nevcastle-u pen—Tyne.
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figures reveals that this was due as much to a decline 
in the number of indigenous establishments as to an in­
crease in those under external ownership. By 1973 the 
number of indigenous plants had fallen by almost one 
third^. What proportion of this decline was attributable 
to change of ownership (i,e. acquisition by externally-
based firms) is not known exactly, but there are reasons
2to believe it may have been sireable .
On the face of it, there may be no reason to 
assume that the transfer of ownership by itself would 
necessarily result in any harmful effects on local in­
dustry —  indeed it may even be accompanied by rationali­
sation which could bring longer term benefits.
However, given the importance of acquisition ac­
tivity in many EC countries, it is worth considering in 
more detail, (ij the regional implications of such acti­
vity and, if these are significant, (ii) the underlying 
explanations (at both interregional and international levels). 
Firstly a strong tendency towards spatial and sectoral con­
centration emerges from several country studies on this 
subject.
As one recent British study on acquisition acti­
vity noted, "the South-East daninance of extrarregional 
acquisitions represents a strong metropolitanisation trend 
in the pattern of take-overs —  in other words a transfer
“^Between 1963-73 the number of indigenous establishments 
fell frctn 310 to 207 and the number of externally-owned 
establishments increased from 338 to 569. Ibid.
2Leigh & North(1978) counted 6 firm acquisitions in the Northern region 
over 1973/74. It is therefore not inconceivable, if acquisitions had 
proceeded at a similar rate in 1963-73, that up to 30 firms and a larger 
number of plants could have changed hands over the period considered 
above.
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of the ownership and control of provincial firms to the 
South-East.
In the case of West Germany, the number of mer­
gers rose steadily over the 1970s —  from 168 in 1969 to
2305 in 1969-71, and to 558 in 1978 . Around three quarters 
of these were of a horizontal nature3. Moreover, the rise 
in merger activity became increasingly associated with 
a few large corporations taking over a greater number of
4
medium sized firms. . Given that corporation headquarters
in W.Germany tend to be centred in the main agglomerations^,
the metropolitan/peripheral dichotomy may well be as
marked as in the 3ritish case.
Whether, or to what extent this process can be said 
to be characteristic of the l.d.r.'s in general, and what 
might be the precise competitive implications for firms 
at the periphery, are unfortunately matters which can only 
be indirectly evaluated. On this point one may note, however, 
that typically, the number of medium to large sized firms 
in high-growth sectors Csuch as electronics, chemicals etc.)
located in peripheral regions, even when these areas are quite
large (e.g. S.Italy, see back for figures)., is often very
small. Recalling furthermore the typically high levels cf
 ^Leigh & North(1978), p. 236. The South-East region accounted for arcund 
one half of all interregional acquisitions (see table 4 ibid.), i.e.
119 out of 245 between 1973/4.
2Bundeskartellant, Mcncpoikcnmissicn 1973. Several points, regarding 
these figures should be noted; firstly the coverage is only fully 
canplete after 1973, secondly after this cate the implementation cf a 
size threshold cf immunity fron controls resulted in sharp increase ir. 
the acquisition cf smaller ccmpanies, thirdly the greater part cf mer­
gers in the 197Cs have been cf the "eccnanic" rather than the "legal" 
type e.g. via share-asrchasing.
33undeskartellsmt 1979.
 ^Ibid. See also, Leigh & Ncrth(1973) , pp. 236-37 * vis UK data.
^EC(1981), p. 42 et sec.
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external ownership found in these sectors, it seems clear 
that competition from locally-owned firms may, in many cases, 
be very limited.
However, with regard to acquired firms, the di­
rect implications of increasing acquisition activity on 
the part of large metropolitan-based corporations are 
more tangible, and well documented. Returning to the 
aforementioned UK study, the main findings can be summarised 
as follows:
(i) A high proportion of takeovers by firms based 
in theSouth East were made by large corporations 
operating at national and international levels 
with interests in several product markets;
(ii) Acquisition was invariably followed by a shift 
of high-level decision making functions to the 
parent organisation, that is outside the re­
gion and notably to the South-East1. In 27% 
of cases the degree of management control left 
(i.e. at the level of routine production and
purchasing functions) in effect relegated to
2acquired firm to branch plant status ;
(iii) Acquisition was followed by plant closure in
33% of cases3 . Furthermore in 64% of these ca-
____________ ses, closure was accompanied by the expansion of
^For similar comments on foreign takeovers in France see 
DATAR(1974), p. 64.
2Even where a "high degree” of managerial responsibility 
remained, decisions regarding capital expenditures were 
typically limited to very small sums.
3Although to be fair, in a further 44% of cases output was 
subsequently increased (would this have occurred anyway?), 
the rather low levels of subsequent investment and employ­
ment gains, do not seem to support the somewhat optimistic 
view taken by the aforementioned authors on this question.
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production elsewhere in the company, in many in­
stances with machinery and key operatives being 
moved to expanding sites. Although rationalisation 
may have been the motive, it seems clear from 
these figures that the development potential of 
acquired firms is not highly regarded by acquiring 
firms, and in any event, comes second to overall 
corporate strategy;
(iv) Around 18%-of sample acquisitions resulted in a 
marked change of material linkage patterns. No 
quantitative figures are made available, hence 
this may or may not, be a significant figure. 
However, in 85% of cases service linkages were 
severed and tranferred to the suppliers of the 
acquiring group, or internalised within the corpo­
ration. It is suggested that this may have led to 
a decline in the demand for business and production 
services in the peripheral regions and to a corres­
ponding increase in the South-East.
One final point of interest is that there were mar­
ked differences in closure and expansion rates depending 
on whether the takeover was of a conglomerate (diversifi­
cation) type, backward integrated or horizontal (in the 
same market). Subsequent expansion was more often the case 
in the first two types whilst closure was more inclined 
to follow horizontal acquisitions.
Whilst horizontal takeovers may partly be due to 
a desire on the part of acquiring firms to expand output
by a relatively inexpensive and quick method1, there is 
a fair degree of presumption that the more common rationale 
may have been to eliminate competitors in similar markets.
In the UK study mentioned above we are not told what prop­
ortion of acquisitions considered were of the horizontal type. 
Whilst circumstances obviously differ somewhat as between 
countries, it may be noted by way of an example, that in the 
case of W. Germany around three-quaters of all mergers between 
1973 and 1978 were of the horizontal type, which suggests 
that if any competitive distortions can be said to arise from 
this process, in quantitative terms, they may well be impor­
tant. In particular, the observed tendency for acquiring 
firms (in W.Germany and the U.K.) to be very large, and in 
general larger than'acquired or non-acquiring firms(W.Germany)
might seem to place in some doubt the alternative hypothesis
2of persuit of scale economies at the firm level.
The discussion thus far leaves us in little doubt
Interestingly, the recourse to acquisition for this pur­
pose may in fact have been stimulated by restrictive 
controls on plant location in central areas (see Hamilton, 
1978, pp. 164-5.
2 See discussion in Mueller(1980),pp. 160-161;Bundeskartell- 
amt,197 9.
It should be pointed out, however, that we are not de­
nying the existence of such economies which may be espe­
cially important in science-based industries (Snonfield 
1965). In the view of the present author, the importance 
of such economies at the firm level should not how­
ever be exaggerated —  although several studies point to 
their existence (cf. Pelkmans 1981)to some decree and at some 
level, (i) there is little evidence regarding the precise 
magnitude of their effect vis. costs, (ii) some such "eco­
nomies", notably with regard to the acquisition of capital 
seem to offer dubious, if any, resource savings to so­
ciety in general, and may anyway be a consequence of im­
perfect capital markets (see back), (iii) other benefits, 
such as "access to markets", may be "double-edged" in the 
sense that lower costs or increased profits may be just 
as much due to market dominance as to real savings such as 
reduced distribution costs or internal economies (see espe­
cially Scherer et al 197 5 for a ranking of economies in­
ternal to multiplant firms) . At the plant level,hcwever, mere 
evidence exists to suggest the existence of scale economies 
for a wide range of industries(Townroe & Roberts, 1981).
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as to the negative effects of takeover activity in pe­
ripheral areas. Many of these effects are of a direct na­
ture, however it cannot be ruled out that the corporate 
strategies of larger firms with respect to horizontal 
takeovers may be intended to increase market dominance 
at both sectoral and spatial levels with further, indirect 
negative effects on peripheral firms.
This possibility would therefore seem to merit 
further discussion. We should then consider;
(i) general explanations for merger/takeover activity, 
and ,
(ii) proceed to outline some of the main tendencies and 
effects of such activity on concentration and the develop­
ment of market power/dominance.
6 . 2 . In g e n e r a l ,  e x p l a n a t i o n s  r e l e v a n t  f o r  c u r  p r e s e n t  p u r p o s e s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  grow th  o f  m e r g e r / t a k e o v e r  a c t i v i t y  can  l a r g ­
e l y  be s p l i t  i n t o ;  s l o w  market  grow th  ( o r ' d e f e n s i v e '>  argum­
e n t s ,  and e x p a n d in g  m arket  (o r  ’ o f f e n s i v e )  a r g u m e n t s .1
The first argument has to do with the product- 
cycle. Product markets may grow quickly at first as the 
product is introduced. As the product matures and imita­
tion is possible competitors join the market, eliminating 
the quasi-monopoly position cf the initiating firm, redu­
cing profits and, eventually, creating surplus capacity. 
Firms may then be forced to liquidate, merge or implement 
cartel agreements. Acquisition of rival firms may be one 
answer, especially since this enables the acquiring firm 
to increase its market share without creating additional
* That  i s ,  a b s t r a c t i n g  from a number o f  o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  e x p l ­
a n a t i o n s  -  e g .  t h e  ' i n e f f i c i e n t '  f i r m  b e i n g  t a k e n  o v e r  by 
t h e  ' e f f i c i e n t '  f i r m ;  a s s e t - s t r i p o i n g  e t c .  The above  d i s c u s s ­
i o n  c o n s i d e r s  o n l y  tw o ,  v e r y  b rea d  l i n e s  o f  argu m en t .
2- £■<*.
capacity. By this means it may subsequently prove easier 
to eliminate excess capacity and improve profitability.
Alternatively firms may consider it preferable to 
look around for other ways to expand, that is, by acqui­
sition or internal growth into more promising lines of 
production. Diversified mergers for these reasons,, as has 
been noted, often take place "between large and slow gro­
wing firms and smaller rapidly growing ... firms which 
are in the first stages of the product cycle"1.
Hence diversification may be a determinant factor 
in the ability of a firm to continue to grow, or even to 
survive. Moreover, as we have noted, there may be a sub­
stantial premium on size in this process. As one study 
remarked, "in this sense concentration is not merely 
seIf-reinforcing; it is inherent in the asymptotic pattern 
of market growth for individual products. Unless new 
firms and new products come along ... concentration (will)
increase both within markets and within the economic sys-
2tem as a whole" .
6.3. in the second case, whilst one might not typically
expect to observe a tendency towards horizontal takeovers
in expanding markets, a number of arguments have been put
forward to suggest that market shares of large firms in
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures will remain
stable, even under conditions of fast market growth. These
arguments may be important in the context of the present dis-
1Cf. Jacquemin and de Jong(1977), p. 88. This, by the way 
supports,our earlier comments on the Leigh & North study 
regarding the overriding importance of corporate strategy 
in the acquisition and assimilation process.
2Bannock(1976), p. 63.
cussion because they imply that additional capacity may 
be pre-empted by existing firms, with little possibility 
of entry by new firms to fill the expanding market.
One approach emphasises the tendency of techno­
logical leads to perpetuate themselves. In other words, 
a breakthrough in a new product may prove to be only 
the beginning of an extended process of innovation —  the 
leading firm may then maintain its lead simply by keeping 
one step ahead of actual or potential competitors“. The 
"imitation" lag, In certain R & D intensive sectors may 
therefore be long enough to permit this type of market 
lead to continue, without leading firms having to resort 
to other measures to maintain market shares.
However, a number of other tactics may be used 
to create barriers to entry where size and ccst advan­
tages, rather than technological innovations, are the 
outstanding feature of the market. Firstly, in a static 
framework economies of scale may present an important bar­
rier where the minimum-efficient scale of production con­
stitutes an important share of total market demand. Where 
an optimum size firm represents a "non-insignificant" frac­
tion of pre-entry output, post-entry profits in the in­
dustry may depend on the extent to which existing firms 
are willing to contract production in response to entry.
The more they do so, the smaller will be the fail in price. 
If aggregate market demand is static it is net inconceivable
^Shonfielc(1965), p. 60. One case described in this text 
concerns the plastics industry in which Germany and sub­
sequently the United States maintained substantial leads 
"in the production and export of certain plastics, in 
spite of the fact that there was no secret about the under­
lying technology required for their manufacture." Ibid.
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that price, in the short term, will be pushed down be­
low average costs for both existing firms and new entrants. 
In other words excess capacity may result.
Secondly, absolute cost advantages, such that ave­
rage costs of existing firm(s) are everywhere below those 
of potential competitors, may derive from a number of 
sources; better production techniques, exclusive owner­
ship of sources of supply or of a distribution network, 
significant liquid funds, better spatial distribution of 
activities1. Resulting cost advantages to leading firms 
arising from such market imperfections may effectively 
limit the entry, or performance, of new firms for longer 
or shorter periods.
Thirdly, monopolists, or oligopolists by concer­
ted action, may establish limit-pricing policies to ef-
2fectively prevent entry of new firms to the market . The 
two central assumptions of this theory are that (i) the 
product is homogeneous and (ii) potential entrants fore­
see their available market share as that portion of the
market demand curve which is not satisfied by existing 
firms. Furthermore, it shculd be clear that use of such 
strategies becomes more likely to occur to the extent that 
other types of barrier(see above) do not exist to prevent 
entry in the first place. In other words, the 'barrier to 
entry' in this context arises primarily from the size of the★minimum-efficient scale of production itself.
The basic argument is summarised in the figure below;
^Jaquemin and de Jong (1977), pp. 119-20. Furthermore, as 
these authors point out, "because of imperfections of the 
European capital market, industries which require large 
initial amounts of capital are especially well protected 
against entry." Ibid.
2Sylos-Labini(1957), Bain(1956), Modgliani(1958). The lat­
ter article is essentially a review and synthesis of the 
two earlier works. * The present case is therefore anal­
ytically similar to the first case presented,but presupposes 
that firms will attempt to avoid the possibility of excess 
capacity developing along the lines mentioned above.
mftD"'*' A*
Pm and represent the profit maximising price and out­
put under unconstrained monopoly? The "limit" or entry 
preventing price is that price which may be maintained 
without attracting entry of new firms (in our example, 
even if these firms' are equally efficient) . The limit 
price, pj_ is set so that the corresponding marginal 
demand curve, D" D" , is everywhere below the long-run 
average cost function. Under these conditions, entry will 
obviously not be profitable.
In general, the excess over competitive price 
which the oligopolists may subsequently command will tend 
to increase with the importance of economies of scale 
and decrease with market size and the elasticity of de­
mand ^ .
The assumption that new entrants will restrict
themselves to supplying the non-satisfied portion of de-
2mand, has however been criticised as being unrealistic . 
On the other hand, as a first approximation, this ana­
lysis may not seem so unrealistic. In the short term it 
may prove easier to penetrate untapped outlets than to 
compete directly with those of established suppliers 
(especially if the latter have well proven distribution
^Modigliani(1958), p. 220.
2Jacquemin and de Jong (1977), p. 127.
* In which case the marginal demand curve facing a new 
entrant is represented by D ’D'.
IS*.
and maintenance networks with security of supply) . 
Secondly, in the case where new entrants do compete di­
rectly with established firm(s), market price may, under 
conditions of static market growth, fall to such an ex­
tent as to make the initial investment unprofitable*.
In a dynamic context in which demand is increa­
sing it has however been argued that monopolies or oli­
gopolies will tend to persist, for the reason that, if 
market growth is foreseen, "it will always pay existing 
firms to pre-empt the market by establishing new plants
before the time when it would first pay new firms to 
„ 1enter" .
The model developed by Lipsey and Eaton essen­
tially relates to growing spatial markets. It differs 
fran earlier, spaceless models, in the sense that, whilst 
in the latter the potential for pure profits arises where 
the ratio of minimum efficient scale to market demand is 
large (and subsequently disappears as the market grows), 
in the spatial model, the potential for natural monopoly 
is undiminished even where the market grows large enough 
to be served by several plants.
Briefly, the argument can be summarised as follows. 
Initially we assume that a given firm, A, serves a market 
of given density by a plant located in the centre of the 
market (ax). If, at seme subsequent point in time (time
Eaton and Lipsey (1979). For earlier works on excess - 
capacity as a barrier to entry see Pashigian(1968), Need- 
ham(1971), Wenders(1971) and Esposito and Esposito(1974).
* Of course, the possibility exists that if a new entrant 
can expect to be more efficient at all levels of output 
there may, even under these circumstances, be some incen­
tive to push out the original producer.
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T2) demand (market density) increases, and is foreseen
to increase, competition among potential new entrants
will ensure that new plant will be established (at
such that the present value of the new plant(s) will
be zero^. Intertanporal excess-capacity will therefore
arise due to the fact that "new capital is established
in the market before the increase in density that jus-
2tifies its existence" .
However, and this is the main point of the ar­
gument, it can be 'shown that it will be in A's own 
interest to block entry to the market at some time 
before it will be profitable for new firms to enter.
We assume that firm A is initially supplying 
the market in Tq with a plant at point a^ in the figure 
below. At seme time in the future (T2), market density 
is expected to increase, which is sufficient to ensure 
that at time T^, new firm(s) would establish plants in 
their individual profit-maximising locations (say b^,b ) 
in each of the intervals (-1:0) and (0:1). Although, 
considered by themselves, the new plants have the same
-1 (-2/3) 0 (2/3) +1
|----- 1-------H--- *--- h— ----1-------1a b a b a2 1 1 2 3
value to A as they would to a new entrant, if A does 
not pre-empt and new firms enter at T , sales and 
profits fron plant a^ will fall abruptly after this point.
^i.e. the present value of profits earned post-market ex­
pansion will just offset the losses incurred pre-market 
expansion.
Eaton and Lipsey(1979), p. 152.2
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Moreover, A would choose different locations from those 
of new entrants. Whilst new entrants would attempt to 
crowd out their competitor at a^ (for the reasons ana­
lysed by Hotelling, 1929), firm A would locate the new 
plants at a^ and a^ so that each plant would serve one 
third of the market. Firm A would therefore have the 
added advantage of firstly, placing the three plants in 
their joint profit-maximising locations and secondly, 
charging the joint profit-maximising price when it owns 
all three plants. As such it will pay firm A to esta­
blish the new plants just prior to . Essentially, the 
monopoly pre-enption result can therefore be seen to de­
rive fran "the difference between the profitability of 
the market when three plants are owned by A, and two of 
the plants are owned by new entrants"1.
The order of magnitude of this advantage will
obviously depend on the size of the gains to be had from
joint profit-maxlmisation with regard to both location
and prices. Under some circumstances it may even pay the
firm to build the plant and leave it idle if this deters 
2entry . Similarly, if only a few suitable sites were 
available, the monopolist could acquire them and eventually 
use one or more as a base for when the market subsequently 
expanded3. Further extension of the basic argument may 
thus lead us to speculate as to whether there may be more 
than a casual link between market dominance and (firm)
^Eaton and Lipsey(1979), p. 153. The argument can also be 
extended to cover interior segments of the linear market, 
two-dimensional space, and a market growing in length hol­
ding the density of customers constant. See ibid.
2Ibid., p. 156.
3Ibid. p. 157. This situation is not specifically allcwed for in 
the model itself, where factor supplies are evenly distributed over ' 
the whole area.
1~ é I
acquisition activity in growing markets. Under such circumstances the 
the acquisition of smaller firms serving only local markets but with ready 
scope for expansion may prove easier and less costly than 
establishing new plants in a given area —  apart from 
the further advantage of eliminating potential competi­
tors . One might also apply this line of reasoning to 
markets which expand in length or spatial coverage (e.g. 
via integration and the reduction of tariff barriers etc.).
It is notable for example, that in the North and East 
of France, the most common form of foreign participation
by neighbouring countries has been through outright acqui-
2sition or share purchasing of existing firms . In other 
words the "frontier" effect of inteyaticr. may have been marked 
more by acquisition than by the establishment of new plants.
A last point; the above model essentially concerns 
markets for homogeneous products*. However, even where pro­
duct differentiation exists, one may find that earlier sta­
ges of production are subject tc important scale economies
Eaton and Lipsey did not extend their argument this far, 
and were right not to do so. Their mccel assumes that 
all new capacity is met by new plants. In the "real world" 
where some alternative capacity may already be in exis­
tence (e.g. (i) monopolistic pricing may provide an um­
brella for smaller less efficient firms, (ii) the effect 
of transport costs may reduce optimum plant scale below 
that optimal to production alone), to the choice between 
installing new plant or supplying the whole area from the 
original plant, may also be added the alternative of ac­
quiring existing capacity and expanding it.
2DATAR(1974), p. 25. Other particular examples along these 
lines may be cited; for example the foreign acquisition 
of a number of major Italian firms in the electric domes­
tic appliance sector. Benettti et al (197 5), p. 56. Franko 
(1976), p. 157.
* Although the above arguments may in seme cases apply to differentiated 
product markets to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the degree 
of substitutability between alternatives.
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(e.g. base chemicals). In this case, the pre-emption of 
. vertically integrated productive capacity may also help 
to maintain the market power of leading firms with re­
gard to final products1.
6.3.1. In conclusion, there is no shortage of arguments,
2and supporting empirical evidence , to suggest that mar­
ket shares of leading firms in monopolistic or oligo­
polistic market structures will tend to remain fairly 
stable,or increase, even under conditions of fast market 
growth. This argument applies both to high-technology 
products where there are significant firm size advantages 
and to relatively standardised product markets, where, 
although scale-advantages may be of initial importance, 
pre-emption (i.e. plant "reproduction") may enable leading 
firms to maintain stable market shares, even where market 
size has increased sufficiently to allow for several "op­
timum" sized plants.
One corollary could be that expanding demand in 
peripheral areas may be more likely to be met by existing 
firms within oligopolistic structures, than by growing
An example of these tactics being the location in Southern 
Italy of a large vegetable freezing complex (by Unilever) 
"with the effect of pre-enpting competition on the Italian 
market by local enterprises" (Benetti et al, 1975, p. 83).
2See especially, E.C.2nd Competition Report 1972, sec. 187
" 3rd Competition Report 197 3, pp. 122-4,
and sec. 159 E.C.6th Competition Report 1976, sec. 293
E.C.9th Competition Report, 1979, sec 221 a).
The argument is given greater generality by the observation 
that, at the EC country level, market structures for indi­
vidual products "are generally oligopolistic and frequently 
almost monopolistic", E.C. 6th Comp. Report, p. 157.
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locally based firms with considerably less market power
• The ability of leading firms to establish capacity as 
every opportunity is unfolded, and even before, may Drove 
the surest way of eliminating potential competition within 
growing markets.
6.4. Having discussed some of the causes and consequen­
ces of merger/takeover activity and the development of 
oligopolistic market structures, we shall follow up by 
considering the resulting effects in terms of conduct and 
performance. Specifically, we shall examine the advantages 
of size, and the relevant characteristics of large-sized 
firms in oligopolistic markets. The relevance with regard 
to regional development may be seen in terms of (i) 
resulting competitive structures and (ii) factors deter­
mining the location of direct investment by leading firms.
As one review of European industrial organisation
pointed out, "within each of the national European'states,
there has been a spectacular increase in the number of
mergers, undertaken disproportionately frequently by large 
2companies" . Indeed, takeover may have been "one cf the
Ironically, regional development policies may have even 
accelerated this process. For most foreign direct invest­
ments in the Mezzogiorno, state subsidies have typically 
covered over 50% cf outlays fci initial investment and 
plant extensions (3enetti et al 197 5, p.97). Doubtless 
many of these companies would have located there anyway 
(3usiness International,1974, pp.89,90). When interviewed, 
seme even expressed embarrassment at the level cf subsi­
dies they were able to obtain compared to local firms (ibid. 
p. 89). Furthermore, the promotion of joint-ventures (via 
INSUD, the financial branch of EFIM), has greatly facili­
tated the installation of foreign MNEs under particularly 
favourable terms. Once started the foreign company has the 
right to acquire outright the subsidiary from INSUD, and 
in the case of insolvancy, losses are not infrequently borne 
^by the state (3enetti et al, pp. 34-36).
Cf. Jacquemin and de Jong (1977), p. 71.
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most frequent inodes of increasing concentration in Europe"1.
Although merger/takeover activity is not by itself
2a sufficient condition for increasing concentration , it 
can be assumed that there is more than a casual link be­
tween the two. We should then consider whether, in the EC, 
over the recent period of the 1970s, there have been any 
corresponding developments in relevant national and in­
ternational operations and firm concentration levels.
In the first place it should be noted that a num­
ber of problems arise in measuring concentration levels. 
Definition of the geographical market may be difficult 
where national markets have become more or less closed- 
off through, for example, non-tariff barriers, product 
differentiation, or by concerted action of leading firms 
(e.g. cartel agreements). Definition of the product mar­
ket may also bring problems especially due to the exis­
tence of multiplant corporations which may be classified 
in a number of industries. To the extent that such compa­
nies cross both national and sectoral boundaries, often 
undetected, "nationally based sectoral concentration ra­
tios (will) therefore seriously underestimate real econo- 
„3mac power .
Notwithstanding these caveats, the 3rd Report on 
Competition Policy, bringing together some forty-six com­
parable national reports on the development of concentra­
tion between 1962-196 9, came to the conclusion that concen- 
tration(C4) ratios in 1969 were substantially higher in
1Cf.Jacquemin and de Jong(1977),p. 71.
2Since the latter depends also cn (i) the number of new 
firms entering the market,(ii) therelative size and number 
of firms affected by such activity, and (iii' growth and their 
relative closure rates by firm size .
3Ibid. p. 51.
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virtually all industries considered than in 1S621. By 
196 9, in 39% of cases, the four largest firms accounted 
for 50% or more of the relevant markets. Moreover the 
fastest rates of increase in concentration were to be 
found in markets where concentration was already high.
Similar studies have been carried out for the
2period 196 9-74 with the conclusion that, for this more 
recent period, "concentration is fairly stable"^. Food 
distribution, brewing and household electrical appliances 
have however proved to be notable exceptions and, in some 
sectors, concentration has increased sharply in many coun­
tries. On balance however the Commission is perhaps being4rather guarded in its comments . This is understandable 
considering that there were notable gaps in some of these 
figures and that the period covered was particularly short. 
Also to be taken into account is the fact that, in certain 
industries and countries concentration does not increase 
"simply because it is already at a very high level"^.
Taking a broader view, one sees clearly that the 
importance of the largest companies in the EC has increased 
substantially since the mid-1960s —  a period which also 
corresponded to the start of a generalised and very sub-
10p.cit., pp. 122-4.
^6th Compet. Report EC 1976. The years 1969-70, 1972 and 
1973-74 are compared. Unfortunately figures relating to 
a number of countries and years are often missing for many 
sectors, and this makes comparison somewhat difficult.
^Ibid.,p. 76.
4Elsewnere it states that one of the major features of the 
past 10 years has been that, in the markets considered,
"the number of firms operating has shown a steady and stri­
king fall." 9th Compet. Report, p. 142.
^Ibid.,p. 157. Recent studies have pointed to the very high 
market shares of leading firms in the European market in 
such sectors as food, plastics and domestic appliances, 
at the level of specific products. 10th Comp. Report, pp. 
181-187.
stantial merger wave in western Europe1.
Whereas the largest 50 companies controlled 15.4% 
of manufacturing output in the EC in 1960 and 1965, this 
share had risen to 20.3% by 1970 and 24.5% by 1976^. The 
top 100 companies in 1976 accounted for around 29% of EC 
manufacturing employment and for over 31% of output3.
As we have seen, although for the earlier period 
from the mid-1960s, there is a strong relationship between 
rising concentration and merger activity (the former gene-
4rally being attributed to the latter ), the situation af­
ter the mid-1970s is less clear.
Mergers, takeovers and joint-ventures, all appear 
to have remained fairly stable from 1973-79 both in terms 
of the number of operations and firms involved and, apart 
from notable increases around 1975, no discernable overall 
trend is apparent5.
Share-purchasing has however shown a steady growth 
over this period, such that by 1979 share-purchases accoun­
ted for 80% of all operations*reccrded in the E.C^
Unfortunately, separate breakdowns within manufac­
turing industry are not available. However, in terms of 
the total number of operations (national and internatio­
nal) undertaken between firms in this sector there does 
appear to have been a sharp increase in the last few years. 
From 1,414 in 1975 and 1,496 in 1977, the total number of
* Comprising, share-purchase, joint-ventures, national mergers/takeovers.
^■National mergers and takeovers increased from 131 in 1961 to 
around double this figure after 1965,settling down to 138 
(EC 9) in 1973. They increased sharply again in 1974-75 
(to 231 in the latter year) and have averaged between 136- 
146 per annum in subsequent years. Source: EC Commission, 
various memoranda and Canpetition Reports.
^Locksley and Ward(1979) , table 4.
3Ibid., table 3. Interrelationships between what appear to be indepen­
dent firms, such as joint ventures, financial links and formal or in­
formal agreements, are not always easily identifiable, and it is pro­
bable that the exclusion of a number of such linkages may have resulted 
in an understatement of concentration in the above figures, ibid., pp. 
96-97 and 97 ff.
4 5Ibid. p. 96. EC Canpetition Reports, various years.
EC Ccrrp. Report 1980. In 1979, there were 1,824 national share—purchases 
involving 3,793 firms, and 518 international share purchases involving
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operations rose to 1,592 in 1978 and 2,098 in 19791.
Whether this represents a new and significant upward
trend in acquisition activity is not yet clear. What does
seem clear is that for one reason or another, (minority)
share purchasing has become the most widespread method of
2gaining footholds within or between industrial sectors .
Certainly, it is clear that the largest industrial 
firms have over recent years increased their share of EC 
employment and output to rather sizeable levels, overall3and within particular industrial sectors .
This observation qualifies our next section which 
looks into the advantages and characteristics of large 
firm-size, and the possible associations of market power 
and conduct with corporate size and market structure. The 
discussion will of necessity be brief, and we shall mere­
ly attempt to highlight the main, relevant points.
5- In general, as to aspects of corporate size which
may have important implications for competition, we may 
distinguish (i) vertical integration and the relationship 
between final good and supplying industries, (ii) market 
power and monopolistic leverage within and between product 
markets, (iii) spatial pricing and spatial competition.
We shall consider these in turn.
(i) Vertical integration and_defensive_concentration
A number of ways in which the emergence of large com­
panies in particular markets could stimulate further con- 
fctd. from ""last page) 1,124 firms~
1Derived from: EC Comp. Report 1979, table 6 and EC Comp. 
Report 1980, table 6.
^For reasons stated previously, it is quite possible that the 
"independent" share-purchase by two or more subsidiaries 
in a third firm —  which could amount to a takeover,where 
the subsidiaries are owned by the same company —  could go 
largely overlooked in the EC share-purchase figures.
 ^As a broad ocnparison with our earlier figures we may note that in 
the United States (1970) , the top 100 manufacturing canpanies accoun­
ted for one third of net output and one naif of industrial assets, cf. 
Holland(1976), ch. 5, p. 139.
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centration were outlined in the Bolton Report1.
In the first place, the concentration of purcha­
sing power in the hands of a few major companies, by
increasing their bargaining leverage, may stimulate de-
2fensive concentration in supplying industries . It is of 
course possible that the initial impetus will come from 
the supplying industries themselves, which could stimu­
late further concentration in the production of final pro­
ducts. In both cases, the competitive repercussions may 
be particularly negative for small firms3.
Secondly, through vertical integration, large com­
panies or groups of companies, may establish substantial
4barriers to reduce actual or potential competition . The 
subsequent exclusion of competitors from sources of sup­
ply or retail outlets owned by the corporation may be one 
such strategy. This may be achieved either by ordering 
subsidiaries at earlier stages of production to stop sup­
plying to other independent firms^, or by various types 
of "price-squeezing" involving differential pricing of 
intermediate products towards independent processors and 
final consumers^. In the latter case the ownership of sales
1Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms, HMSO 1971, ch.7.
2For examples vis food retailing and baking in the UK, see 
Bannock, 1976, appendix 2.
3For example, "once the supplying industry is concentrated, 
the supplying firms will have no incentive to charge small 
firm customers the same (low) prices as they charge large 
buyers, so that small firms may have to pay higher prices 
than are justified by the costs of supplying small orders 
and will thus be at a disadvantage". Bannock,19 76, p. 62.
4Although, frar. the point of view of the firm, vertical integration may 
derive essentially frcm uncertainty regarding input availability or the 
costs thereof.
^E.g., EC Ccrrmissicn v/s American Comercial Solvents Corporation(C.S.C.), 
1972.
^See Jacquemin and de Jong (1977) , pp. 64-66. As a result, "a firm 
considering entry in such a vertically integrated market would have 
to set up operations in two stag as at the same time, which raises ca­
pital requirements and increases risk", ibid., p. 66.
2organisations or control over distribution outlets may 
eliminate any subsequent possibility of arbitrage.
(ii) Monopolistic leverage
This concept, closely connected with standard ana­
lysis of industrial concentration, attempts to explain 
how a firm with a dominant position in one market may ex­
tend its position through diversification into other mar­
kets. Two well-known devices for these purposes are cross­
subsidisation and tying arrangements1.
By cross-subsidisation a firm may use "funds from
one geographical or product market, from one stage of
production or even from its cash reserves to subsidize
2other areas of its operation" . On the one hand this stra­
tegy may be used to "squeeze" a non-vertically integrated 
firm in the manner previously outlined; on the other, cross­
subsidisation may be used directly to establish a dominant 
position in a new product or geographical market. In the 
latter case, the success of this device depends on (i) the 
existence of monopoly power/profits in the original mar­
ket, and (ii) the possibility of being able to maintain its 
new monopoly position once established (this point has been 
discussed previously).
By means of tying arrangements, the purchase of a 
final product entails the use or purchase (normally at re­
gular intervals) of another "tied" product. In this case, 
the producer may extend the dominant position with respect 
to the final product to eliminate competition or erect bar-
3riers to entry into the market for the tied product . At 
the minimum, such an arrangement will probably give the 
producer a certain amount of discretion with regard to 
pricing of the tied product.
*See ibid., pp. 88-90. 2Ibid., p. 89
3For further discussion, see ibid., pp. 89-90.
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However, the danger of tying arrangements being 
used to effectively block entry for competitors, is more 
serious and is given specific recognition in Article 86 
of the Treaty of Rome which forbids the abuse of dominant 
positions, mentioning tying practices as an example.
At a wider level, Vaitsos(1980) has argued that in­
put integration now constitutes a key factor of the world 
economy. As such, "resource packaging", particularly by 
MNEs, may extend to a very broad range of fields, inclu­
ding: "machinery markets, technology licensing, certain 
consulting services, finance involved in suppliers' cre­
dit etc."1. Moreover, the overall economic power achieved 
by these enterprises through input tying, may turn out to 
be greater than the sum of the market power obtainable in 
each input market.
Lastly, by:itself, the ability of firms to go multinational 
and benefit from the international division of activities, 
direct access to markets, and lower labour costs, may en­
able them to gain a competitive advantage unavailable to 
smaller firms2.
In relation to the preceding argument, we should 
perhaps stress that, although size alone is not a suffi­
cient condition for competitive success, the mechanism.of 
oligopolistic competition may tend to increase rather than 
close interregional disparities in firm development3. 
Although a number of aspects of this process have already 
been considered, we have only touched superficially on 
spatial aspects relating to market power and competition.
^Seers & Vaitsos(1980), p. 29.
2As the 10th EC Competition Report noted with respect to the 
French consumer electronics industry, "The largest firms which are 
in a position to establish assembly lines in the Far East and to 
negotiate the purchase of (pre-asserfcled) ccnpanents frcm Japan, are 
best placed to cope ... with the wave of inports frcm outside Europe 
... However, it has also led to an increase in concentration as 
smaller carpetitors face higher production aosts because their goods, 
which are entirely hone-produced, are being driven off the market." 
Ibid., pp. 185-6.
3See Holland(1976), pp. 144-5.
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For example, in the context of centre/periphery rela­
tions, one might expect that firms at the periphery would 
in some sense be protected by factors relating to trans­
port costs or small market size from direct competition 
with trading firms based in central areas. We shall now 
turn to consider such possibilities.
(iii) Spatial grice competition
Recalling our previous discussion on limit-pricing, 
or price-elimination strategies, Modigliani(1958) has ar­
gued that, in a spatial context, transportation costs may 
well render such tactics unprofitable1. This outcome rests, 
however, on the assumption of uniform f.o.b. pricing, 
such that, if a firm has to give a discount to capture a 
far-off market, the same price reduction will necessari­
ly apply to all markets.
On the other hand, another study has shown that 
monopolistic profit-maximisation in a spatial context is 
achieved "by setting non-uniform discriminatory deli­
vered prices involving freight absorption to the benefit
2of more distant buyers" . Hence, unless freight absorption 
is actually prohibited, Modigliani's assumption would not 
appear to be realistic under the market structure consi­
dered. In general, where a firm is in a monopoly position 
in a given geographical market, freight-absorption will 
enable "more distant markets to be supplied, output to be 
raised and profits to be expanded"3. If such action is 
prohibited, the monopolist may react by restricting its 
territory and refusing to supply more distant demand , or 
where there are a few leading firms, attempt to institu­
tionalise price alignment by means of base-point pricing.
1Op.cit., pp. 224-5. Phlips(1976), EC Competition
Studies, "Spatial pricing and 
competition",p.54. See also pp.31-2.
3Ibid. , p. 23. 4Ibid. p. 26.
Under the basing point system, all prices are 
delivered prices and are equal to the predetermined base- 
point price plus costs of carriage, even where the sel­
ler's factory is not located at the basing point itself.
On the face of it, this system might seem likely 
to benefit peripheral producers who may align their pri­
ces to those of the basing point (plus carriage there­
from) . However, the question must be seen in a somewhat 
wider context.
Firstly, base-point pricing will tend to enduce 
a process of geographic concentration of buyers around 
the basing point of the dominant centre of production.
This may be especially relevant in the case of basic or 
intermediate products with the result that firms using 
these products in further stages of production may effec­
tively be constrained to locate near the basing point for 
the basic product1.
Hence, although the system is generally recognised
2to be fairly restricted in its application (e.g. coal and
3steel ), there may be a certain cumulative effect on other 
areas of activity.
Secondly, in the case where a new firm in a peri­
pheral location does attempt to follow an independent pri­
cing policy (and thereby extend the possible range of its 
market), "the predatory establishment of a special area 
price or of a basing point in that region would quickly dis-
4courage it" . Conceptually such action might amount to the
1For an example of how this may occur, see Phlips, op. 
cit., pp. 52-3.2Typically to oligopolistic situations with price leader­
ship, where transport costs are important, or where price 
cutting may have particularly unfavourable consequences 
(e.g. where fixed costs are high in proportion to total 
costs). As such base-point pricing has the advantage of 
"making tacit price agreements possible where explicit agree­
ments are prohibited", ibid., p. 16.
3See Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty. 4Ibid., p. 49.
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same process of freight absorption by the market leader as 
analysed in our previous example.
In conclusion, where a firm has a dominant position 
which it exploits in a central area, freight-absorption 
may, to a large extent, allow price-elimination policies 
to be pursued even in peripheral markets. In other cir­
cumstances, the setting of a basing point near a growing 
peripheral market may have essentially the same effect. 
Under the latter system, one further effect is likely to 
be the concentration of linked activities around the base 
point of the basic product, even if production costs with 
regard to the latter are lower elsewhere. In general,by 
what amounts to tacit price-fixing1, the system is well 
adaptable to safeguarding the interests of dominant centres 
of production.
Following from these arguments, we must reject the 
idea that markets at the periphery are in some sense pro­
tected from direct competition or oligopolistic mar­
ket pre-emption from the centre. Indeed, the growth of 
markets and improvement of transport structures in these
areas in the past two decades may even have served to has-
2ten this process .
1Ibid., p. 53.
2For example, with respect to S. Italy after the 1960s, R. 
Wade (in Seers et al, 1979, p. 201) has outlined how the 
abovementioned factors led to a "commercial invasion" from 
the North and a sharp decline in employment in traditional 
manufacturing sectors.
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Structure,_conduct_and_performance.
In the following sections we shall discuss further 
the development of the large-sized firm, its place in Euro­
pean industrial production, its contribution to the expan­
sion of European trade and its relevance for the economic 
development of Europe's less developed regions.
We have already raised a number of questions regar­
ding the competitive and investment linkage effects of such 
enterprises and pointed to their growing significance in 
terms of production and investment. Within the context of 
recent developments in international trade and production 
and the process of European integration, it remains to exa­
mine what effects these changes are likely to have on the 
framework of productive activities in the l.d.r.s and their 
scope for development.
As we have seen, the largest European enterprises
have come to play a very important role, overall and in a
number of sectors in particular1. Some of the many factors
2determining their growth have already been discussed .
There is little doubt however, that this trend will con­
tinue; already in the early 1960s, Shonfield(1965) had 
noted "that there is an increasingly important range of 
industrial activity, dependent on research and development 
of the wide-ranging type characteristic of industries in 
the most dynamic sectors of modern technology, which requires 
the support of firms which have grown beyond a very sub-
3stantial size."
XSee Jacquemin and de Jong(1977), p. 98 et seq. "a sectoral 
classification shows that these big enterprises are in the 
same few industries; steel, chemicals, electronic equipment, 
vehicles, food and petroleum".
2 And include, scale economies in production and R & D, econo­
mies of internalisation, cost and access to finance, diver­
sification, and development & extension of market power.
30p. cit., p. 374.
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Furthermore various studies of such large sized enter­
prises suggest that, in general, "the larger the firm the
greater its degree of product diversification1 and the wider
2its geographical dispersion" . In other words multinational 
production can in some sense be seen as an important, if 
not essential step in the growth and development of the 
large diversified firm. It is not by chance that "fewer than 
five of the continental European companies on the Fortune 
magazine's "200" list have no foreign manufacturing acti­
vity"3.
Moreover, in recent years the trend has been towards 
higher degrees of multinationality; in a survey of 403 of 
the world's largest industrial enterprises, Dunning (1981) 
found that between 1972-77,257 had increased sales of their 
overseas affiliates as a proportion of the total group sales.
In 103 cases this proportion had remained unchanged, and in 
only 4 3 cases had the degree of multinationality of produc-
4tion actually declined .
With regard to performance, the figures are somewhat 
more difficult to interpret. In terms of rate of growth of 
sales (1972-77), both for the EC and USA, sales growth in
1Jacquemin and de Jong have also suggested that there may 
be a trend towards greater diversification amongst the lar­
gest European enterprises, both through external and inter­
nal growth. However, they also point out that the results 
may depend heavily on the methods used, hence one must be 
careful in drawing conclusions; op. cit.,pp. 105-107.
2Jacquemin and de Jong(l977), p. 114. See also, op. cit., pp. 
105-113.
3Cf. ibid.. For the 50 largest European industrial companies 
in 1980, domestic employment in the home country averaged 
only 36% of total employment (around 6 million employees), which 
suggests that the degree of international production in these 
companies is indeed substantial. (Figures derived from "Vi­
sion", July/August 1981, p. 21. These figures relate to 
29 of the top 50 companies, since not all, including some of 
the largest, gave breakdowns of domestic/total employment.)
4Op. cit., table 6.21. The results were divided up by industry according 
to research intensity. No essential differences emerged between these 
sectors taken as a whole, however, a nurrber of sectors stand out where 
more than 75% of saitple firms achieved higher levels of multinationality
z??.
nrms where the degree of multinationality^of production 
exceeded 52.5%, was higher and substantially so than in 
any of the six lower categories . With regard to the rate 
return on sales, a distinct improvement is seen in EC 
firms after the degree of multinationality exceeds 22.5%3.
In the USA, rates of return were uniformly higher4, and 
only one group stood out —— that where the degree of multi- 
nationality fell between 42.5%-52.5%, and where the average 
rate of return came to 10.7%.
One problem in interpreting the above figures is that 
the composition effects of nationality and sector may pre­
sent a bias in one direction or another. However, at the 
level of individual industries, the findings are broadly 
similar^. In general, therefore, -the evidence would seem 
to suggest that the advantages of international production 
do indeed show up in the performance of firms undertaking 
such activities —  both in terms of sales growth and in terms 
of profitability. This fact is without doubt important in 
understanding the widespread move towards international pro-
duction that occurred over the period considered(mid-1970s). 
(ctd. from previous page) over this period —  they include 
electronics and electrical appliances, industrial and farm 
equipment, motor vehicles(inc. components), building materials, 
and textiles, apparel, leather goods.
l e , o v e r s e a s  p r o d u c t i o n  as % t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n .
^Dunning(1981), table 5.7 Taking 1972 = 100, the 1977 index for the USA 
is 289.1 as against an average (unweighted) cf 186.4 for icwer levels 
cf multinational!ty of production. For the EC, the corresponding figures 
are 253.6 as against 198.0.
3Ibid., table 5.4 The highest rates of return (3.5%) were found in the 
categories 32.5-42.5% and over 52.5%. Belcw 22.5% rates cf return were 
either near zero cr negative.
4Between 2.5% and 5.4%, apart from the case cited.
5Ibid., tables 5.4 and 5.7. With regard to the rate cf grtwth of sales 
the acvantace of multinational!ty shews up,(i) for high research inten­
sity activities where the degree of ntuitinaticnality is sieve 52.5%;(ii) 
for medium r.i. activities from 42.5%-52.5% aad (iii) for lew r.i. ac­
tivities abcve 42.5%.
With recarc to the rate cf return cn sales, tnis advantage is in clear 
evidence only for high r.i. activities, tor firms where tne decree or 
multinaticnality exceeds 32.5%. Hcwever, sales crowtn may ce a setter in­
dicator given that .'-NEs typically maxixise after-tax funds available to
2- ?"S
What, then, are the major advantages to be found in the 
multinational dimension? One characteristic of MNEs is the 
transnational mobility and control of resources. "It has 
the capacity to secure full and reliable information on 
investment opportunities beyond national borders ; and it has 
the power to exploit differences between countries, in terms 
of availability and cost of labour, raw materials, capital 
and credit, as well as in terms of regulations, legal insti­
tutions ... At the limit the multinational firm produces 
where the labour cost is lowest, borrows where the cost of
capital is least, sells where the prices are highest and is
X 1taxed where the fiscal burden is lightest" .
Furthermore, the corporate internalisation of production 
and exchange may have far-reaching consequences for the coun­
tries or regions involved in the spread of such activities.
Specifically, the possibilities for income remission through
2transfer pricing between related parties, the corporate 
and spatial concentration of headquarters and high-level 
functions, and functional differences in the international anc 
interregional division of labour, imply important spatial ef­
fects with regard to income distribution, technical capacity 
and dependence for growth3.
The advantages of size are particularly noticeable with 
respect to the location of activities and in relation to 
the development of market power.
With regard to the former, the state has often taken up 
a leading role in the competitive bidding for the siting of
(ctd. from previous"page) th'e""firm rather than after-tax 
global profits (see especially, Vaitsos(1974), pp. 117-8).
1Jacquemin and de Jong(l977), p. 109.
*See especially, Vaitsos(1974), chapter 6.
^Vaitsos(1974) chapter 6 and Seers and Vaitsos(1980),pp. 30-31. 
3Vaitsos(1974), p. 118.
internationally mobile plants on home territory. For ex­
ample, Seers and Vaitsos(1980), cite the case of three EC 
countries trying to outbid each other and entering into di­
rect negotiations with the Ford Motor Co., for the siting of 
a major new plant. Even between regions of the same country, 
competitive bidding can be quite fierce —  the recent attempts 
of various development agencies, local authorities, govern­
ment departments to persuade Nissan to locate in one or another 
DA in the UK is a case in point. Even Nissan appears to be 
getting fed up with this internal haggling and may eventually 
move elsewhere1. Needless to say, the parties likely to 
gain most in this process are the MNEs themselves.
In general, in spite of the fact that specific guide­
lines for state aids (compatible with the various EEC Trea­
ties) have been outlined by the EC Commission, both with
2respect to particular industries and in general , national 
governments have often remained somewhat impervious to the
3rules and obligations in question .
However, the locational strategies of MNS's relate not 
only to the various stages of production. In particular, es­
pecially where product differentiation, national tastes, or 
distributive capacity are important, physical presence in a 
market may be essential and serve as a basis for simple re­
sale operations. For example, in 1970, just over half of
*See The Guardian, 18 August 1981.
For a review see EC 8th Competition Report, pp. 125-27 and 
10th Competition Report, pp. 111-14.
3In 1980 the Commission took the step of writing to all Mem­
ber States to remind them of their obligations especially vis 
Article 83(3) of the Treaty(O.J. 252, 30.9.1980). The Com­
mission further remarked that, m  several cases, "the extent 
of the tendency towards non-notification would appear to in­
dicate the possible existence of a general decision not to 
respect the provisions in question". EC 10th Compt. Rep. point 
162.
zso.
United States MNE exports to majority-owned affiliates in 
the EC were for resale purposes without further processing1.
This observation leads us to consider some of the more 
obvious implications for competition. Whilst on the one hand 
the entry of new foreign firms through f.d.i. or resale
'/ \Voperations (i.e. exports) may have the effect of breaking
up local oligopolistic/monopolistic structures and restric-
2ting the market power of local leading firms , there is also 
the possibility that the same operations may merely extend 
abroad the dominant positions occupied at home.
In this respect, two comments of the EC Commission on 
recent trends in the development of concentration and com­
petition are worth noting3;
i) a tendency towards the internationalization of firms, 
markets, products and consumer habits at Community 
level; the same transnational firms are coming more 
and more to occupy the same places in the same product 
markets in more than one Member State; and,
ii) the development of a new form of oligopolistic specia­
lization at transnational level in which elements of 
competition are closely bound up with elements of 
technical or commercial cooperation.and-quasi-monopo- 
listic rigidity.
The effects on competition may be felt both with respect to 
trade and f.d.i. In the first place, once there is market 
power abroad as well as on the home market a firm or group 
of firms may take advantage of their position by raising the
4industrial price of the product .
In general, as Caves(1974) has pointed out, "the disci-
1Seers and Vaitsos(1980), p. 32.
2See especially, Jacquemin{1981), pp. 4-8.
3EC, 9th Compt. Report, pp. 142-43.4In this sense exports may increase overall profitability with export 
profits being eventually higher than darestic profits. As a result, as 
Jacquemin(1981, pp. 10-11) has pointed out, whilst the benefit to the 
monopolist is less than the oost to the international ccimiinity, from 
the national point of view there may be a gain, and hence, the likeli­
hood that governments may even encourage such activities.
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plining force of trade flows is probably less when product 
differentiation is present, but it is in just those circum­
stances the multinational firm becomes a mere prominent ac­
tor"1.
With respect to f.d.i., internalisation of the produc­
tive process may lead to greater overall economic power in 
the manner described in previous sections. In product mar­
kets, it may also represent a step towards the extension 
of market power beyond heme boundaries. In particular,
" the decision to establish a subsidiary in a national mar­
ket ... is clearly-a rivalrous or independent move. Even if 
the parent was previously exporting to the market, local
production facilities make it a more effective rival and a
2greater threat to otner sellers" . One result may be to en­
courage defensive mergers on the part of national firms3.
Although not exhaustive, the above arguments may give 
some explanation of the trend observed by the EC Commission, 
towards the increasing presence of MNEs in individual product 
and national markets.
10p. cit. , p. 26. 
2Caves(1974), p. 25. 
3Ibid., p . 26.
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7.2 Having discussed some of the locational and competitive
aspects of the MNE, we shall now turn to consider some
of the more direct implications for the less-developed re­
gions of the EC regarding location and industrial linkages 
of branch plants and subsidiaries.
Once again, and due to the nature of the MNEs themselves, 
many of the developments underlying the geographical spread 
of subsidiaries must be seen in an international context. 
However in this context, neither trade theory nor gravity 
models in location theory would appear to provide any adequate 
explanation for the impressive surge in subsidiaries and f.d.i 
by continental MNE's since around the mid-1960's.1
As Franko(1976) has pointed out, it was more to be ex­
pected that the large proportion of European plants with 
capacities of around half that of their USA counterparts 
in the 1950s would make way for larger and more specialised 
units. "In sum, it was increases in international trade —
rather than in intra-regional investment —  that were con.- 
2templatec". As it turned out, "it was indeed in some of the 
industries in which the minimum economic scale of produc­
tion is said to be greatest, that continental European enter­
prises were establishing the largest number of manufactu-
3ring subsidiaries in the EEC" .
In other cases, such as electrical appliances and motor 
vehicles, at least in the early years, developments were* 4characterized more by growth in intra-EC trade than by the
iSee Franko (1976) esp. p. 135, R. Burmanjer, EUI, Dept. 
Economics Workshop paper 1931. Note: for the 1970s the EC 
Commission no longer gives figures for unilateral "cr.e pa­
rent" subsidiaries. However, figures on the development
of penetration of MNEs in manufacturing industries in EC 
countries give strong support to the hypothesis that this 
trend has continued well into the 1970s (see on) .
2Cf. Franko(1976), p. 140.
3Ibid., p. 141.
4Cf. Meyer (1978) ,p. 180.
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spread of manufacturing subsidiaries. Also noticeable in 
these sectors, however, was a growing tendency towards the 
relocation of activities among EC countries1. With respect 
to household appliances, in particular, the "common market" 
effect was also characterised by a fair amount of strategic 
"pre-emption" by market leaders at the EC level2.
Resulting from takeovers and the spread of(MNE) f.d.i., 
it is probable that at least part of the intra-industry 
trade in this sector can be attributed, in the first place 
to plant specialisation and product concentration, and in 
the second place to intra-firm trade.
Moreover, with the growth in MNEs and the internationa­
lisation of production in general, it is probable that 
this outcome is also typical for a fairly wide range of 
industrial sectors.
Supporting evidence for this theory is given by a re­
cent study of exports from foreign-owned establishments in 
France (1976) 3, where it is shewn that such establishments have a particu­
larly high propensity to export back to their home country.
In fact, for most EC countries (with the exception of the 
UK) , the home country proved to be the single most important 
destination for exports from French-based subsidiaries.
For example, the share of output exported by MNE sub­
sidiaries* located in France ranged from 8.1% to 19% —  on 
average around three quarters of which being to EC or other 
W. European countries. Most notably, for W. Germany and Bel­
gium/Luxembourg respectively, 8.4% and 4.6% of output from
1Cf. Franko (1976) , p. 156.
2From the late 60s to early 70s two examples are of note: 
firstly the acquisition of Ignis(Italy) by Philips and, 
secondly, the proposed acquisition of Zanussi(Italy) by AEG 
which was prevented by the German Cartel Office "out of 
fear that AEG would then have had control over much of the 
cheap Italian imports that were holding down prices in the 
German market". Cf. Franko(1976) , p. 157.
3INSEE, Economie et Statistique, June 1980, pp. 9-27.
*Belgium/Luxembourg(16.2%), Netherlands(8.1%), W. Germany 
(19.0%), Italy (13.1%), UK (13.7%).
X S l^
French located subsidiaries was destined for the country 
of origin .
As such these figures would seem to reflect a "frontier" 
integration effect arising from the relocation of oertain activities 
to lower cost locations; and being stronger for countries which are 
geographical ly closest and between vaiich labour-cost differences may 
be most marked. Hence for France, NNEs based in W. Germany and Belgium/ 
Luxerrbourg take most advantage of these possibilities whilst UK and Ita­
lian MiEs do so to a lesser extent and have a lesser interest in so 
doing. When M^Es frcm the UK and Italy locate in France, market con­
siderations are probably of overriding importance. Whilst this may also 
be the case for W. German and Belgian MMEs, the attrativeness of loca­
ting oertain activities in nearby, lcwsr-cost locations is clearly more 
pronounced.
On the other hand the evidence is that U< firms are not entirely out 
of this process. As a low-cost export base, the Irish Republic appears 
to be more attractive, and not only for UK firms. In 1974 for exarrple, 
newly established UK subsidiaries based in the Irish Republic exported
21% of total sales back to the UK (around 77% of which in the form of
1 § sales to affiliates) . Subsidiaries frcn the E.C. as a vfcole, exported
over 16% of total sales back to the EC. and a similar proportion of sales
to the UK3*. Cn average, exports of foreign-cwned enterprises accounted
for over 86% of their total sales.
§§In some sense, therefore, the locational advantages or 
the regions at the European periphery , in spite of their
*For Italian subsidiaries the figure was 2% and for the 
Netherlands 1.5%. Figures derived from ibid., table 8.
**Sales to affiliates of EEC(7) subsidiaries, averaging a 
somewhat lower share of total exports, i.e. 2 9%.
^Figures derived from McAleese(1977), tables 4.3, 4.7 and 
4.9.
2Vis. Italy, see Business International, p. 17 et sec. The 
survey concludes that, "most companies invest in the Mezzc- 
giorno either to supply the major Northern Italian markets 
or to establish an advantageous export base." This is con­
firmed by Benetti at al (1975), who estimates that 80% of 
foreign-cwned plants in the South use it predominantly as 
a base for export to the cents/north or abroad.
§ less Ireland and the U.K.
§§ including tax incentives, regional policy, etc..
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distance from central markets, make them an attractive 
"springboard" for direct exports or intra-firm transactions 
for companies which have the capacity to undertake production 
on an international scale.
Whether such developments are entirely beneficial to 
the l.d.r.s themselves in a medium/long term framework, 
or whether they are in fact preferable to any alternative 
strategies for regional development, is of course an im­
portant question. It is also one that should be considered 
before looking more closely into the locational strategies 
of multinational corporations. Much effort has been spent 
on attempting to answer the controversy of whether the loca­
tion decisions of MNEs on the whole help to strengthen or 
weaken the agglomeration forces in the spatial structure 
of industrial development (Yannopoulos and Dunning, 1976, 
Holland 1976, Blackboum 19 78 , O'Farrell 1980). However, 
even if it is possible to provide unambiguous answers, there 
remains the question of which of the two outcomes is to be 
preferred. In other words ars assessment of the locational 
patterns of MNE subsidiaries cannot be divorced from an 
assessment of the benefits or otherwise from the impact of 
such plants on their local environment.
We have already discussed at length some of the problems 
and drawbacks associated with this type of "dependent" de­
velopment. Recalling these arguments would however lead us 
to conclude that at a spatial level qualitative rather than 
quantitative considerations are probably more important as 
concerns the aims of regional development at the periphery. 
Hence, any quantitative analysis of MNE plant location must 
necessarily be plagued with caveats as to the exact medium/ 
long term benefits of the operations in question. Neverthe­
less, given the extent of such operations in the EC, it is
&(a
important to analyse some of the main spatial developments.
7.2.1. The_level_of_MNE_genetration_
In general, the share of industrial activity accounted 
for by firms under foreign control has increased to quite 
sizeable proportions for most EC countries over the course 
of the past two decades. In France, for example, foreign 
establishments increased their share of industrial turnover 
from 8% in 1960 to around 26% in 19731. In Belgium this
2share increased from 33% to 44% from 1968 to 1975 alone . 
Although in France", around 42% of this total was accounted 
for by US affiliates, the evidence suggests a shift towards 
investments originating from the EC3.
For most countries the level of penetration varies some­
what between industrial sectors. The following table gives 
a breakdown of the degree of foreign penetration in W. Ger­
many, France and Italy for the industrial sectors where 
foreign penetration was highest.
Share represented by enterprises with foreign participa­
tion for several industrial sectors.
W. Germany France Italy
Sector I % II % III'%
Manufâc.
ind. 25.1 21.0 21.3
Food &
bev. 19.3 _ n.a. 21.6
Chemicals' 43.5 38.3 23.1
Mech. engin. 25.3 22.1 24.8
(elec. eng.
& elec.) - 34. S*
I = share of_gross output where;foreign participation above 20^ ,1972.II _ » . . i. . . . 50%,1973.
Ill = sanple of 828 conpanies. Capital held by non-residents as a percen­
tage of the total capital of the large ccnparJ.es (1973) .
*Inc. rubber and plastics **inc. electronics +enployment figures(1973)
Source: CECD(1977) Penetration of WEs in manufacturing industry in 
_______menfeer countries, pp. 15, 49, 71.
■'’Seers & Vaitsos(1980), pp. 164-65. Franko 1980.
3Seers & Vaitsos(1980), table 9.10. The proportion of EC direct invest­
ment to total f.d.i. in France increased threefold between 1966-1971. cont.
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No detailed figures are available for Ireland, however, 
some of the trends observed in other countries are also in 
evidence here, particularly with respect to electronics and 
electrical engineering1. This sector is particularly im­
portant and has been well at the forefront in terms of 
employment gains for many of the EC peripheral regions in 
France, Italy, Ireland and Scotland {see chapter 5). More­
over, the role of MNEs has been particularly notable even
in regions where the degree of foreign penetration has
2otherwise been very low .
7.2.2. MNE_location.
From the evidence available it is not entirely clear 
whether, on the whole, MNEs tend to prefer central loca­
tions to development areas, to a greater or lesser extent 
than comparable domestic enterprises.
Evidence for the UK and Ireland would seem to suggest 
that foreign firms are marginally more inclined to locate 
in D.A.s than domestic firms3. On the other hand, Black- 
bourn(l9 78^  has concluded that, in general, "an examination 
of the actual locations selected by MNEs in North America 
and W. Europe suggests that MNEs do contribute to regional
(ctd. from previous page) (DATAR, 1974,p.126). In terms 
of investment, EC firms have been more important than US 
firms since 19 62.'
1 At present the electronics sector alone employs around 14,000 persons 
in Ireland, almost all of which is attributable to the influx of new 
overseas firms in the past six years. In 1979 alone grants were awar­
ded to overseas new projects involving around 7,000 new jobs. I.D.A.
2The degree of penetration (majority-owned affiliates of over 200 em­
ployees, 1973) in this sector is particularly notable in many of the 
French DAs; between 20 and 291 in Aquitaine, Bsse Normandie, Bretacne, 
Limousin and (electronics only) around 90% in Auvergne and Languedoc. 
DATAR, 1974, ch. 2.
3Vis UK, see Howard(HMSO 1968). Between 1960-65 , 44% of interregional 
moves originating from the UK went to Development Areas. The figure for 
movements originating from abroad was 54%.Vis Ireland, see O'Farrell (1980). Between 1960-73, 58.9% of M4E branch 
plants set up in Ireland were located in DAs compared with 48.9% of the 
branches of Irish rrultiplant firms.
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disequilibria in many countries"1. Some countries appeared
to be attracted by 'core regions' to a greater extent than
others, however this may also have been due to factors such
as type of investment/sector and proximity to the investing
country (see on). For example, as O'Farrell in the Irish
study pointed out, "results indicate that the number of plants
2per town by town size group is independent of region" . 
Similar results were found for Italy, where over 70% of 
employment in foreign-owned plants in the South was located 
in the regions attached to the agglomerations of Rome and 
Naples .
Although, then, there are certain problems involved in 
correctly interpreting such global figures, in another sense, 
the orders of magnitude by themselves stand out. In France 
(1971), for example, over 34% of total employment by firms 
with foreign participation was located in the Paris region, 
whilst this region accounted for less than 24% of total in­
dustrial employment. However the figures suggested that this 
'core region' was equally attractive to most major inves-
4tors, in contrast to Blackbourn's findings .
Particularly interesting for France, was the propensity 
of foreign investors to locate in regions near or adjacent 
to the home country. Hence, whilst the largest US plants 
(outside Paris) were spread fairly evenly over the whole ter­
^p.cit., p. 125. The figures used relate mainly to the late 
60s.2Op.cit., p. 148. "Hence locational discrimination by indus­
trial investors in Ireland —  both indigenous and foreign
—  is much greater with respect to town size than region."
3Benetti et al(l975), p. 44,i.e. Lazio (Cassa zone only) and 
Campania.
4 Derived from DATAR(1974), table 6. Similar proportions were 
observed for investments originating from W.Germany, Nether­
lands, USA and UK —  only Belgium/Luxembourg showed a more 
dispersed pattern with 14% of employment located in the 
Paris region.
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ritory, plants originating from Belgian, Luxembourg or 
Dutch companies tended to be concentrated in the northern 
part of France; those of W. German origin towards the N.East, 
and for UK plants around the North and N.West1.
For some regions the level of foreign penetration has 
been quite high (up to 90%) in fast growing high-technology 
sectors such as electronics. In certain cases, regions as 
a whole have become very dependent on foreign capital. This 
is particularly noticeable in Alsace, where between 1953-70 
around one half of new jobs came from foreign establishments, 
most of which originating from W. Germany .
Even in the peripheral regions of the South West, where 
foreign penetration was typically low around 1970, there 
have been some notable inflows of foreign investment in 
more recent years. In Aquitaine employment in existing fo- 
reign-owned establishments more than doubled between 196 9 
and 1975, and in Midi-Pyr£n€es between 1967-72 over 50% of 
new jobs and around 26% of aided investment were accounted 
for by the foreign sector3.
In general however the impact of foreign direct invest­
ment on the local economic environment has left much to be 
desired. In addition to some of the points previously raised 
on this subject, we may briefly list some of the conclusions 
of the DATAR study for France:
1Ibid., table 8 and map 4. For Belgium/Lux. and the Nether­
lands 63% and 40% of employment in foreign subsidiaries 
was located in Nord, Picardie, Champagne and Hte Normandie; 
for the UK 58% of employment was located in Nord, Picar­
die, Loire, Normandie; for W. Germany 6 4% was located in 
Champagne, Lorraine and Alsace.
2Ibid., p. 52.
3Ibid., pp. 52, 63.
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i) Qualifications; for example in the Nord region
it is noted that "even the most recent implantations 
which are for the most part in fast-growing sec­
tors (automobiles, chemicals, electronics) mainly 
concern jobs in production lines or assembly. Quali­
fied jobs only concern management and maintenance" . 
Similar reflections are made for Aquitaine and 
Poitou-Charentes. In general, female workers are 
estimated to account for around 30% of the average 
workforce.
ii) Wages and salaries; in general these are rarely be­
low the regional average and, normally, for equiva­
lent skill levels, are about 5 to 7% higher. In 
part this may be due to the need2to attract local 
labour from-existing enterprises .
iii) Linkages; in gene^al^inp\its account for less than 
10% of branch plant requirements. This is in part
due to the organisational structure within which these 
plants operate, and in part due to the type of acti­
vity. However, it is notable that in many cases, long- 
established foreign plants tend to have purchasing 
policies not unsimilar to equivalent French enter­
prises. As a general observation, the volume of sub­
contracting delegated to local firms is in most cases 
very limited .
t ± _ a.rid_MNE s _
We shall briefly consider what are the factors influen­
cing the location decisions of MNEs and how they perceive 
or are influenced by regional development policies.
The evidence on this subject is very limited and, in 
general, open to a fairly broad level of interpretation.
The previously mentioned Business International Survey 
of foreign investments in Southern Italy, for example, came 
to the conclusion that "incentives are rarely, if ever, the
^Ibid., p. 54. 
^Ibid., p. 55
3Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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decisive factor in choosing to locate in one country rather 
than another"1.
Evidence for the UK would generally seem to support 
2this argument . From the Italian survey, it would appear
that the importance of incentives is largely in guiding
investment to the South, "once the basic decision has been
3made to invest in Italy" . As such, regional incentives 
may serve to offset most of the perceived or real additio­
nal costs of operating in a more distant location (e.g. 
viz transport costs, training costs, infrastructure etc.).
One point of note was that the 10-year tax concession 
on company income (including grants) and profits was gene­
rally rated of equal or greater importance than invest­
ment grants and loans; even though in most cases the latter 
financed over 50% (and often over 75%) of the investments4for which detailed information was provided .
It is also possible that the delay involved in the 
disbursement of grant funds5 substantially reduced their 
perceived or effective value, especially in relation to 
other incentives which appeared to be more or less automa­
tic in their operation.
In general, the value of tax incentives will be greater 
the higher the level of profitability of the enterprise.
From our earlier remarks on the performance of firms by 
degree of multinationality we may deduce that MNEs may be 
marginally more responsive to such concessions than domestic 
firms. This influence will obviously depend on country and
10p. cit., p. 90.
2Cf. Holland(1976), pp. 152-53.
3B.I. (1974), p. 33.
^Ibid., p. 30 et seq.
5Ibid., p. 84, often between 1 1/2 to 2 years, although this 
situation seems to have subsequently improved (see Yuill,
1980, p. 154).
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sector of investment,however, if we note for example that 
the average rate of return on US manufacturing investment 
in Ireland between 1974-79* came to 29.4% (and for the EC 
as a whole 15.5%), the case is given somewhat greater 
generality. In particular the Irish figures must be seen 
in the light of an array of tax incentives including (i) 
export-profits tax relief(at 100% for 15 years; this has 
now been replaced by 10% corporation tax); (ii) no restric­
tions on repatriation of capital and profits; (iii) double 
taxation agreements with all major industrial countries.
Although rebates on social charges were also mentioned 
by many firms as being important in the location decision, 
as Holland (1976) has suggested, their importance is likely 
to be less in relation to MNEs as compared with domestic 
firms. Where labour costs are a very important factor MNEs 
will probably prefer an l.d.c. location to a l.d.r. even 
if labour subsidies are available. Domestic multiplant 
companies which do not have access to very low-cost labour 
abroad are therefore more likely to be influenced by re­
gional subsidies to wage costs, especially for the location 
of more labour-intensive processes.
Whilst labour subsidies may induce the MNE to locate 
its relatively labour-intensive processes in peripheral 
regions of the EC, the case is not at all clear. Labour aval 
ability or other factors may be more important - as we have 
seen, France and Ireland for example, have experienced this? 
ncmer.cn without recourse to labour subsidies. Indeed, it 
may be the case that, for MNEs at least, too much attention 
nas been placed in the past on the question of whether capi 
tal or labour subsidies are better suited to attract employ 
mer.t and labour-intensive operations to the l.d.r.s. A more 
^US Department of Commerce.
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pragmatic approach based on an analysis of corporate stra­
tegy and planning would probably give more accurate and 
realistic conclusions.
In a general way, grants, loans, labour subsidies and 
tax concessions may all be internalised within the struc­
ture of the multinational corporation. As such, the surplus 
from regional incentives derived from one sector of activity 
can easily be transferred to other operations or investment 
elsewhere1. If this is the case then MNEs may pay more at­
tention to the overall value of subsidies (in which as we 
have seen, tax benefits play an important role), rather than 
in the particular weighting of capital/labour subsidies.
If labour costs are really important then l.d.c.s locations 
will anyway be preferred, and it makes little economic 
sense to provide a blanket labour subsidy (normally at 
very high costs, see chs.8&9)to attract a handful of labour- 
intensive operations that might have been better located 
elsewhere.
Lastly, if, as several studies have revealed, market 
opportunities are a far more important consideration in 
MNE location decisions than regional incentives, it is worth 
pondering on whether the very high levels of subsidy opera-
a r ating in many peripheral areas/not unduly high, and possibly 
reflect a certain amount of outbidding by the countries in­
volved?
It is debatable whether, in general, sufficient 
importance has been attached to the way incentives work 
and are oerceived and the way they could be improvec. Cer­
tainly, however, the efforts of the EC Coirmission to coor­
dinate incentives and impose ceilings are a step m  tne right 
direction to avoid outbidding and safeguard competition.
See Holland(1976), for evidence.
 ^ For further discussion, see chapters 8 and 9.
27.3. European integration (Customs Union) and industrial 
development —  theory and practice
As a point of departure, one way of understanding the 
differential effect of a Customs Union on developments in 
productive capacity and organisation, is to take as an 
example the differences in the impact of free-trade in 
industrial goods and agricultural products. Whilst free 
trade has been generally welcomed in the former it has been 
rigorously avoided in the latter, and the C.A.P. is cer­
tainly no exception.
This fact should not however be surprising. Free trade 
in agricultural products where goods are more or less stan­
dardised and markets are highly competitive, would inevita­
bly lead to low or falling agricultural prices.
Even more so, since prior to the implementation of the
C.A.P. various levels of protectionism and large differences 
in support prices were to be found in all member states.
Hence even with a common external tariff, competition 
within the community was likely to be strong, implying 
significant structural adaptation.
As it happened, the initial set of prices agreed on by 
the Six was eventually undermined when first the Franc was 
devalued in 196 9 and later the same year, the DM was reva­
lued.
The problem occurred because common prices were set in 
terms of the unit of account (=1? U.S.), so that when
a member state changed the par value of its currency, it 
automatically changed irs domestic agricultural prices, civer. 
unchanged dollar prices. The solution was a system of com­
pensatory taxes and subsidies. 3y 1978, the result was that 
prices for agricultural products within the C.A.P. varied 
by as much as 60% (in terms of nominal exchange rates) be­
tween member states of the EC1.
^"The Agricultural Situation in che Community 1978", EC Com­
mission.
zIt should however be emphasised that this state of 
affairs was not forseen in the Treaty of Rome, where it 
appears that by and large, the same rules relating to free 
competition(one market) in industry(esp. arts. 9,12) were 
also intended to govern agricultural markets (arts.38-47, 
especially, art.38(2), art. 44(2), art.45(2)).
In the case of manufactured goods the impact of trade 
led integration was quite different. Basically, the ex­
pectations1 were that free trade would lead to inter-industry 
specialisation —  industries situated where costs of pro­
duction were lowest would expand, and where costs were high­
est whole industries might face the prospect of elimination.
Regional imbal-ance could result since a disproportio­
nate share of adjustment would be inflicted upon countries 
or regions at a lower stage of development.
As it happened, the outcome was somewhat different. In­
stead of countries specialising in different industries, 
and the composition of their exports to other EC members
becoming increasingly different, the opposite occurred and
“ 2their exports became increasingly alike . Trade creation in 
the E.C. was therefore largely of the intra-industry type.3
Once again, the explanation is not surprising given the 
nature of production and market conditions for differentia­
ted manufactured goods.
Given increasing returns to scale and length of produc­
tion runs, for individual products, firms in an industry 
will tend to specialise in a narrower range of types or models.
In the Canadian case, for example, Lermer(i97 3) has shown 
how adjustment to free-trace is characterised by rationalisa­
tion, and a shift from using plants to produce a large varie­
ty of goods, to a few or even a single good. As a result,
^Viner J."The Customs Union Issue", 1950, ch. 4. See also 
Belassa B. "Tariff reductions and trade in manufactures among 
the industrial countries", A.E.R. June 1966,pp. 466-73.
^Mever, F.V.(1978), p. 180.
3For examole I.I.T. as a percentage of total intra-EEC trade 
rose from 53% in 1959 to 65% in 1967. See Grubel & Lloyd(1975) 
70.9% of the increase in total trade over this period took 
the form of an increase in intra 2-cigit industry trade,?.135.
exports cam be produced with greater scale economies and 
lines that are no longer produced may simply be imported.
Moreover, the high cost of entering the market for 
technologically advanced products makes it impossible for 
firms to do so over the whole product range.
Since the market life of such products relative to 
their R & D stage tends to be short, firms will be eager 
to recoup their initial outlay as soon as possible. Under 
such circumstances firms may prefer freer access to inter­
national markets to protection of the home market.
The reason for- this is that they are operating under a 
time constraint and will be anxious to reach large markets 
before the product moves into later stages of the product 
cycle1.
In this way the creation of a free trade area or cus­
toms union, by providing access to wider markets will tend 
to promote specialisation within industries and the growth 
of intra-industry trade. The scope for such specialisation 
obviously varies somewhat from industry to industry. How­
ever, as we have seen, it was especially from activities 
where such scope existed that came the main growth of intra- 
EEC trade2.
Whether increased specialisation would have occurred in 
the absence of a customs union is an interesting question. 
Certainly the reduction of tariff barriers helped to speed 
up the process, however it can be argued that I.I.T. specia­
lisation was already increasing before this period. As we 
have seen, the growing importance of technological factors, 
by itself, would have implied greater specialisation in the 
production process. On the other hand it is clear that such 
developments would have been frustrated had international 
trade not become freer, since market size is yet another im­
portant factor in the incentive to specialise.
1Shonfield(1965), p. 60.
2F.V. Meyer, p. 180. Mainly machinery, transport equipment, 
chemicals and "one quarter of the trade in consumer goods".
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Comparing the share of I.l.T. in the expansion of the 
trade among the EEC countries, with the corresponding share 
in the expansion of their total trade with non—member coun­
tries , does, however, tend to give support to our hypothe­
sis that trade liberalisation did in fact speed up the pro­
cess of intra-industry specialisation.
We shall now consider in more depth the regional signi­
ficance of the preceding discussion. As we have noted, "in- 
tra industry specialisation results in the retention of more 
industries than under inter-industry specialisation" .
Following from this analysis one could argue that "regional 
development strategy should permit ail countries to have 
each of the prestigious and basic industries ... with the 
important difference that each country will produce only 
a relatively small number of products of each 'industry
On the other hand, joining two economies at rather dif­
ferent stages of development could just as well result in 
a reduction in the total number of products available at 
equilibrium/whilst under autarky, trade restrictions may pre­
vent direct competition between essentially similar pro­
ducts, if more goods enter when free- trade is established, 
price competition could lower the prices of competiting 
"higher-quality" goods down to a point at which similar "low- 
quality" goods would no longer be preferred. As Jacquemin 
(1981, p. 14) has concluded, "the still very limited theore­
tical perspectives suggest that there are potential gains 
from trade in terms of product variety, but that these gains 
are not at all automatic."
However, the regional implications of increasing specia­
lisation become more worrying when we consider the type of 
firm and market conditions which typically prevail under 
these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . _________
1Grubel & Lloyd(1975),p. 135. 70.9% as against 60% respectively 
for the period 195 9-6 7.
2Ibid., p. 131.
3in this sense, specialisation v.cuid be based on "ccrrparative advantage 
that mav be traced to cultural 2nd historic reasons , ibid., p. 14 /.
See <±l.*7 of Ibid., for full analysis of this point.
2. 9i.
Since in some industries R & D is a bar to entry due to 
the effort and know-how involved, and because R 4 D itself is 
an expensive process, firms may tend to concentrate on the 
technological subdivision of activities rather than try to 
cover the whole field of possibilities.
A large-sized firm however, has certain advantages in this 
respect. Firstly it is more able to undertake the fixed costs 
(and risks) involved in R & D activities.
Secondly, it may circumvent the process by which 
R & D efforts might imply a narrowing of its product range
—  there are several ways of doing this; (i) production can 
be rationalised by using a higher proportion of standardised 
components, hence more effort can be spent on the final pro­
duct, (ii) it may buy in the rest of its former range from 
other firms at home or abroad1, so that it may still continue 
to supply the market with the whole range, (iii) similar to
(ii), a firm may locate some of the more established produc­
tion lines (where price competition becomes increasingly im­
portant) , in developing countries where labour costs are 
lower and tax and transfer-pricing advantages are to be had.
Such tasks are hardly within the scope of small-sized 
firms. Whatever the explanation, it is certainly a fact that 
exporting has become increasingly dominated by large sized 
firms in most industrial countries*
For example, in the UK(between 1971-1974), it has been
estimated that less than 4% of all exporting enterprises (i.e.
2933) accounted for over four-fifths of UK exports .
In France in 1974, 300 enterprises accounted for two-thirds
of French exports, 120 for half and 65 for 40%3.
Also, the largest exporters were in most cases multina­
tionals. In the UK, only S of 244 firms with an export turn-4over above £ 10m. in 1974, had no overseas investment links .
The problems that such concentration may present for
regional development have been extensively considered in pre-
1F.V. Meyer, p. 42.
2Ibid., pp. 30-32. 92 enterprises accounted for exactly half 
totax exports. * 3^  eSp# Viz export concentration in Italy;
3ihid a 31 Banco di Rana, Review of Economic Conditions ini B i a . ,  p .  j i .   ^ F e b .  i 9 8 Q >  f f .
Ibid., p. 33.
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vious chapters and by S. Eolland(l976). Apart from doubts 
we have already expressed as to whether trades dominated 
by such large firms may be conducted under conditions resem­
bling p.c., there are further reasons to doubt whether the 
l.d.r.s will in general benefit from this process.
By going multinational rather than multiregional, firms 
may obtain labour at a fraction of the wage level existing 
in even the lowest cost locations in the EC1. Moreover, 
they may also obtain tax advantages and government aids on 
a scale unobtainable even in the most favourable regional 
locations in Europe.- In other words, when such enterprises 
do relocate they may well prefer an l.d.c. location to an l.d.r.
location inside the Community. Even when new production is 
from E.C. based plants, proximity to central management or 
research staff is often an overriding factor. Hence, central 
locations, at least where skill requirements are high, tend to be preferred. 
On the other hand, "multinational companies are in a
weak position to claim that they cannot afford to locate
2major initiatives in Development Areas" , especially since 
most of them already have substantial experience of dispersed 
multi-plant management and the organisation of "global trans­
port on what amounts to a pipe-line basis"3.
Even so, it is not beyond the scope of such firms to 
threaten to invest outside the country when pressured by
national disincentive policies to locate in a development
4area .
Although a discussion of ceglcmeration policies is main­
ly reserved for later, it should by now be clear why several
writers (and indeed governments) advocate a type of 'Programme
Contracts' system where leading firms are supposed to submit 
their major investment programmes for negotiation between the 
firm and Ministry concerned3. 
ibid., p. 152 2Ibid.
ibid. 4Itid., p. 153. The case in question
relates to I.3.M.
3Ibid., p. 255. See Chapter 3 viz. Italy and deglcmeraticn policies.
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Also desirable would be some 
attempt to limit the amount of direct and indirect subsi­
dies that national governments in the EC are able to offer 
to attract f.d.i. to their respective development areas.
This is necessary if all (equivalent) regions are to compete 
on an equal footing.
The analysis of the preceding pages, although by no 
means exhaustive, has hopefully served to bring out some 
of the main regional implications of the European integra­
tion process. We have seen how standard theory predicted a 
growing geographical concentration of economic activities 
and a large degree 'of industrial structural change.
In the latter case the theory was a little off the 
mark and whole industries did not in fact disappear as was 
once suggested. However the growing concentration of economic 
activity in the hands of a limited number of enterprises —
which may almost certainly have been speeded up by the in­
tegration process —  can also be seen to have brought with 
it new problems and regional implications. The task for re­
gional policy is to make these new elements fit in with the 
overall goal of regional balance.
The precise question of fitting policy instruments to 
particular problems is a matter that we shall discuss at 
length in following chapters.
3 ® 7 .
CONCLUSIONS
In the course of our previous chapters we have ob­
served firstly, how the trend towards economic polarisa­
tion may be largely self-reinforcing and, secondly, how 
it may be accentuated by the process of integration and 
the establishment of a Customs Union.
Whilst the answer of regional policy makers in the 
60s and 70s was generally to induce existing firms to 
move out to development areas, the situation in the 1980s 
is likely to be vastly different and substantially more 
complex.
Specifically the important changes in organisational 
structure that have often arisen, both within and between 
regions of the same country, lead us to the conclusion 
that regional policy and development theory must now be 
viewed in an entirely new framework.
Much more attention must now be paid to the develop­
ment of locally based enterprises and the impediments to 
growth which they face.
Furthermore, the growing importance of the largest Euro­
pean enterprises coupled with the functional sub-division 
of activities at a spatial level can be seen to have far- 
reaching consequences for the productive and innovative 
capacity of the peripheral regions. Specifically the effects 
can be seen in terms of:
(i) the functional division of labour at a spatial level
(ii) the centralisation of headquarter and R & D functions
(iii) the unequal distribution of production and technolo­
gical capacity
(iv) the unequal distribution of economic surplus
(v) the growing contrast between small and large scale
enterprises
(vi) the implications for competition —  the recourse to 
takeovers in expanding markets.
Whilst 'dependent' development may be better than no dev­
elopment at all, the real question should be,'what are the 
alternatives, and are they better?1. In this sense perhaps 
the main danger to be avoided is that of the less developed 
regions being simply reduced to standardised, lower echelons 
of economic activity whilst the potential of indigenous firms 
is overlooked. These and other related questions will be dealt 
with in some detail in the chapters which follow.
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P A R T  I V
CHAPTER^
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
8.1* §trategies_for_regional_harmonisation
Up to this point we have reviewed a number of approaches, 
each explaining some aspect of regional economic development.
It is worthwhile now, to briefly recall these arguments as they 
have considerable bearing on the attempt to assess policies aimed 
at improving regional performance.
The determinants of regional growth of output (and thereby 
regional productivity, income and employment), can be viewed from 
both supply and demand sides, and it is possible to combine these 
two approaches.
On the supply side, the resource endowment approach1 would 
stress the importance of sectoral structure, the level of infra­
structure provision and agglomeration effects. Whilst, in prin­
ciple, the resource endowment of a particular area can be con­
sidered as determining its production possibilities or potential
output, "it is not so much the total resource endowment, but
2rather a set of "bottle-neck" factors which determines the pro­
ductive capacity and limits the development or income potential."
As such, the relative resource equipment per worker will 
determine the potential output, and if the existing productive 
capacity is fully utilised, actual output as well. Optimal use 
of resource capacity will however depend on its combination with 
specialised and substitutable private factors of production. Whether 
this is the case will depend on the particular benefit-cost ratio,
*For a review of this approach in English, see; working paper by
D. Biehl, in Report of the Study Group on the role of Public Fi­
nance in European Integration, European Commission, 1977, vol. II, 
esp. pp. 69-79.
2The costs of eliminating these factors and the benefits arising 
therefrom may vary considerably; "... in general it is more expen­
sive —- in terms of resource costs —  to compensate a region for 
the non-existence of these bottle-neck factors, or to replace fully 
utilised bottle-neck factors, and furthermore the possibilities 
for substitution become more limited as their location is more fixed, 
as their production capacity is higher, and as they are in more 
specialised industries", ibid., p. 69.
namely the relation between productivity and the real wage rate 
or the "efficiency-wage".
The "relative competitiveness" approach outlined above can
furthermore be combined with the demand oriented export-led growth
approach1. On this line of reasoning, the potential product of
a region will depend also on its proximity to high income areas:
the lower (under given real-wage differences) are the costs for
a peripheral region to participate in interregional trade with
central high income regions, the more competitive it will be in
2the markets of the central regions .
From our formal (demand oriented) growth model developed 
earlier we may add the following observations; firstly, whilst 
the "efficiency-wage” may be important together with distance and 
communications costs in determining the equilibrium level of re­
gional output, it is fundamentally structural factors (notably 
the income elasticity of demand for exports) which are responsible 
for changes in the rate of growth of output. The resource endow­
ment approach is however complementary here, since it stresses 
the importance of other structural factors (notably infrastruct­
ure and agglomeration effects) which may seriously limit develop­
ment potential.
Secondly, the dynamic effects of growth should not be over­
looked; competitive advantages tend to perpetuate themselves —  
the positive externalities of agglomerated centres, access to 
wide markets and a high level of infrastructure provision in cen­
tral areas, all imply that such areas will be greatly favoured under 
the resource endowment approach. Moreover, in a dynamic setting, 
where the growth rate of productivity is a positive function of 
the growth of output, differences in regional productivity and 
output growth rates are likely to persist leading to regional di-
1See also D. Biehl, ibid., p. 79.
2In this sense a region's economic or market potential can be v i e w e d  
as being determined by the relative proximity of that region to the markets 
of other regions. It is notable that a recent study of econctnic potential of 
the E.C. regions shews that the gap in relative accessibility between the nest 
central and peripheral regions widened frcm the sixties to the mid-70s. See 
European Ccrmission,"The Regions of Europe", 1981, pp. 60-61.
vergence in "efficiency wages" and per capita incomes. Hence to 
view the regional problem in terms of regional wage rates being 
out of line with productivity is something of an oversimplific­
ation since either relative wages (or wage subsidies) may have 
to decrease (increase) permanently to restore competitive equil­
ibrium. It can then be seen that efforts to improve the struct­
ure of regional exports and production,as well as the eliminat­
ion of supply-side bottlenecks, are necessary for any long-term 
improvement in regional competitiveness and growth.
At this point it is useful to differentiate between public 
policies relating to general infrastructure and those relating to 
productive* investments1;
i) infrastructure: in general it is often very difficult to 
arrive at any objective estimate of regional differences in the 
level of infrastructure provision —  especially since, in any 
case, such an assessment would need to take into account the par­
ticular needs of specific regions. In practice, a large part of 
public expenditure in this area has tended to be undertaken on 
primarily social considerations —  namely the attainment of rea­
sonable regional equality in the provision of public services and 
utilities. As such the overall redistributive effect of public
3expenditure on infrastructure tends to be neutral , except in the
*That is those activities directly related to the production process
*With regard to bottle-neck factors not specifically related to infrastructure, 
see ch. 5.
2Significantly, the Carmission study, "the Regions of Europe" 1st periodic re­
port, 1981, also mentioned this unfortunate statistical gap (section 1.8).
The report however note that in respect to education and training in­
frastructures, "training opportunities appear to be inadequate in the peri­
pheral and rural regions in respect of scientific and technical education at 
both second level and post-school stages", ibid., p. 115.
S^ee MacDougal Report vol. II, esp. ch. vis France.
case where special instruments are adopted or where there is a 
decided political will (expressed in institutional form) to 
the contrary (e.g. Italy, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno).
Very often such programmes are concentrated on specific pro­
blems or objectives, for example, the improvement of communicat­
ions (S.W. France, Ireland, S.Italy), improving water supply
(S.Italy), the redevelopment of former industrial sites (U.K.),
2the provision of (advance) industrial estates (U.K., Ireland) .
Infrastructure investment can therefore be viewed as in 
the first place, providing a common base of amenities and ser­
vices (e.g. accessibility, education) at a spatial level, and 
in the second place, as improving certain shortcomings '(e.g. 
water supply, pollution) or bottlenecks to further development 
(e.g. industrial or tourist infrastructure). There is often a 
fine and sometimes indistinct borderline between infrastructure 
investments for "social" and "productive" consumption (e.g. water 
and energy supply) —  and some would argue that in most cases 
there is a great deal of overlap.
Given that a large if not the major part of government in­
frastructure expenditure falls under the former category it is 
also important to ensure its full and efficient utilisation. As 
one author has remarked, "The chief benefit of a well conceived 
regional policy is to secure in the long-run a more efficient em­
ployment of all forms of national capital taken together —  inclu­
ding of course social capital —  than would result from an entre­
preneur's conventional profit-and-loss approach to the problem3of investment." The argument here is that apart from the first 
round income effect of a productive investment, there is also a 
"capacity" effect —  that is, the effect of the additional invest­
ment on the degree to which existing productive capacity is used. 
Hence, whilst the return to an investment project may appear low 
in the first instance, it may "yet turn out to be an efficient use
g., the 'Gemeinschaftsaufgabe', for the improvement of regional 
structure in w. Germany (ibid., p. 100).2 See E.C., "The Regional Development Programme" 1979, ch. 4.
3 Shonfield (1965), p. 183.
1
of capital once the calculation takes in the additional return 
accruing from the venture to other investments indirectly af­
fected, both private and public."1
ii) productive_investments: the above comments were in­
tended to make clear the nature of the relationship between pu­
blic policy and private enterprise as concerns regional develop­
ment. Italy is perhaps one of the E.C. countries where this 
relationship has been made most explicit. With a relatively high 
share of productive investment in the state-holding sector, the 
Italian authorities were quick to seize the opportunity of com­
bining public, infrastructure and productive investment pro­
jects, especially in the context of designated industrial areas2or tfrowth-points' . This was facilitated by, amongst other things, 
the obligation imposed on state-holding enterprises to locate 
a certain proportion of their investment in the south.
Whatever the shortcomings of this approach (see ch. 5.3.), 
it is doubtful whether, in particular, given the high degree of 
coordination required at various levels, development could have
3been achieved at such pace if left only to market forces .
Italy is however a major exception in the European context 
in its use of state enterprise to pursue the objectives of re­
gional development. More generally, and in all countries of the
E.C. investment incentives and less commonly, disincentive policies 
form the cornerstone of regional policy.
Investment incentives —  which grew substantially in coverage 
and real value in most countries from the 196 0s on —  are aimed
at attracting firms (industry or services) to locate productive
4investment in problem regions. In some countries such incentives 
are combined with disincentive (or deglomeration) policies in 
congested areas, with the aim of increasing the supply of poten-
^honfield, 1965,p. 278. ^or a good review of public infrastructure policy 
in S.Italy seepodbielski, 1978, esp. chs. 3 and 5.
S^imilar arguirents are put forward by Shonfield(1965), pp. 184-5 in his assess­
ment of the achievements of the state-cwned (oil and natural, gas) corporation,
ENI, in the 50s and early 60s.
F^rance, U.K., Italy and the Netherlands. Such policies have in general had de­
creasing success since around the mid-1970s and have increasingly care up against 
severe criticism, particularly with respect to their sanetimes negative effects on 
ti>e development of inner urban centres. They are discussed separately in section
8.3.s *
tially divertible (or mobile) investment to the development areas.
As one author has noted,
"By the start of the 1970s, the regional-incentive armoury 
was well stocked in almost every Community country, the incen­
tives on offer ranging from capital grants to interest-subsidised 
loans, from accelerated depreciation allowances to direct tax 
concessions, from employment premia to rent subsidies, from con­
cessions on electricity prices to labour training aids, and from 
removal-cost assistance to transport subsidies.
Conceptually, these subsidies can be viewed as compensating 
producers for a variety of costs encountered in moving to or 
setting up in a development area. Their effectiveness will there­
fore depend on whether they are of sufficient size to compensate
2for such costs. At least" two types of cost can be distinguished ; 
i) transport and communications costs associated with poor access­
ibility to major supplies or major markets; ii) additional train­
ing costs due to lower quality labour force often found in under­
developed regions, which because of collective bargaining at a 
national level,may not be reflected in regional wage differentials.
As such, one can then distinguish between the break-even sub­
sidy (which just compensates for regional cost differentials) and 
the required subsidy which furthermore compensates for an approp­
riate degree of risk involved in setting-up in an unknown location, 
and a degree of uncertainty with respect to receipt or continuat­
ion of the subsidy.
Furthermore, the required subsidy level should be compared wit 
the effective rather than the nominal subsidy value; that is, 
the net present value of the subsidy taking into account eligible 
items, tax treatment and delays in payment (see on, section 8.4.).
In the following sections we shall confine ourselves to dis­
cussing only the major regional instruments in the three countries 
considered (France, Italy, Ireland). Thus we include for example 
aspects of state-intervention only where these are particularly 
relevant. Any further detailed discussion would be somewhat super­
fluous given the large amount of recent literature on this sub-
1Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980), p. 14.
2See Yannopoulos & Dunning (1976).
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Finally we given an international comparison of the effect­
ive value and expenditure on the main incentives, and consider 
the various advantages/disadvantages of each measure in the way 
it operates.
8•2 • Euro£ean_CommunitY_2£inci£les_of_coordination_of_re2ional 
aid_schemes
•yIn December 1978 the Commission communicated to Member States 
the principles it would apply henceforth to regional aid systems 
already in force or to be established in the regions3 of the 
Community. These principles were to run for a period of three 
years and are now due to be revised (although it is unlikely 
that any of the main points mentioned below will be changed sig­
nificantly) .
In the first place,one of the Commission's main concerns was 
that aids granted to certain regions should not distort competit­
ion or hamper the proper functioning of the single market.
In this respect national measures have been coordinated by 
setting ceiling limits (measured in 'net grant equivalent') on 
regional aid intensity. Compared to previous arrangements, the 
provisions are broadened by the inclusion of the alternative 
ceiling related to job creation, and new measurement techniques 
for certain types of aid previously regarded as non-transparent.
The categories established are as follows:
- Greenland no upper limits
“ Mezzogiorno , Ireland 75% of initial investment
N.Ireland, Berlin(West) costs oj 13,000 EUA per job created
thereby
- France:West and S.West, 30% of initial investment costs or 5,500 
Massif Central, Cor- EUA per job
sica
Italy:designated areas 
in the Centre/North
1See for exairple, Yuill, Allen, Hull(1980); Vanhove & Klassen(1980); Allen, K. 
(1979); Commission of the European Cannuru-ties, "Regional Policy Series , esp. 
no. 15.
2O.J. L31 of 3.2.1979 for full text. In practice the designated development 
areas under national legislation. T ’or investments exceeding 3m. EUA not more 
than a further 25% of initial investment costs or 4,500 EUA per job can be paid 
by way of other aiHc and must be spaced over 5 years. Source: E.C. 8th (ctd.)
O.K.: assisted areas u w
with the exception 
of "Intermediate Areas"
- West of Denmark and 25% of initial investment costs or 4,500
the Zonenrandgebiet EUA per job
border region in W.
Germany
- other Community regions 20% of initial investment costs or
(i.e. more central 3,500 EUA per job
and industrial regions)
A second princip e of coordination is that aids should ult­
imately contribute tc competitiveness such that firms may cont­
inue to function profitably in the longer term without aid.
In this respect, the Commission has 
consistently expressed its general opposition to the granting of 
aid which is not conditional on initial investment or the creat­
ion of jobs, but is linked to a firm's production and constitutes 
operating aid1.
A final important point concerns Community guidelines towards 
sectoral aids in certain crisis industries (shipbuilding, textiles, 
manmade fibres, steel). Whilst the Commission has accepted the 
justification for aids to enable orderly adjustment to market 
conditions, it has also recognized the need to avoid an undesir­
able increase of national interventions in these sectors..
Specifically,"since it is a common feature of the industries 
concerned that capacity is excessive, aids should not be given
to investment projects which would result in capacity being in- 
2creased" . In a number of cases, this criterion has been applied 
not only to sectoral, but also to regional aids.
In conclusion, "the combined effect of the (alternative) cei­
ling related to job creation, the common ceiling for the less- 
developed regions, the new techniques of measurement and the freeze 
on operating aids ensures that all regional aids are now subject 
to control"3,
f  ) Carpetition Report. Note: aids paid for the transfer of an establishment 
are assessed on the value of capital equipment (or workers) transferred, or by 
limitation of aid to the actual costs involved.
^.C. 10th Carpetition Report, point 164 .An exanple here is the UK Regional De­
velopment Grant which is granted automatically for any investment (including the 
renewal of capital goods). The UK Govt, has undertaken to amend it. Another 
is Irish supplementary depreciation allowance of 20% for (also replacement) plant 
and machinery - it was withdrawn, subject to Cannission objection, in 1981.
^.C. 8th Carp. Rep.,1978. 3Ibid., point 154.
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3.3. THE MAJOR INCENTIVES AND PUBLIC POLICY - A REVIEW
8.3.1. FRANCE
(i) General_back2^ound
The problems of regional development only became an 
important national issue after 1967 —  a year which corres­
ponded to the publication of J.F. Gravier's "Paris et le 
désert français". This book, which greatly aroused public interest, 
drew attention to the disparities which existed between Paris 
and the regions of the South and West, and outlined the 
problems and effects of'excessive centralisation in the 
Paris region. In the immediate post-war period, Paris gained 
a disproportionate share of new industrial development. On 
average around one in three new jobs in industry were located 
in the Paris region between 1949 and 1954. Furthermore there 
was a substantial net inflow of firms to this region over 
the same period .
In 1950- the first steps towards a "plan national d' 
aménagement du territoire" were outlined in a document pro­
duced by the Minister of Reconstruction and Housing. One of 
the main elements of the plan was to decentralise industrial 
employment from the Paris region, concentrating particularly 
on newer, fast-growth industries such as automobiles and elec­
tronics .
In order to help implement these plans, the "Fonds 
National d 'Aménagement du Territoire" (FNAT) was set up in 
1950. Basically the fund was used to finance the creation of 
a number of industrial estates and provide corresponding infra 
structure works.
^Allen & M a  clennan ( 1970) , p.1'52, table 6.1.
On the other hand, there were no effective legal 
powers, at that time, to enforce expansion outside the Paris 
region. Only in 1955 were official restrictions placed on 
industrial expansion in Paris.
It was not until 1953 that the National Planning 
Commission began to play a role in regional development policy. 
In a sense, however, these first efforts were somewhat limited 
and the Second Plan (1954-57) was dominated by the problem
of dealing with the short-term consequences of the 1952-59
recession. Supplementary financial benefits were given to 
firms expanding in certain problem areas (zones critiques) 
which were heavily dependent on industries that faced secular 
or cyclical decline in demand (mainly wool, textiles and 
leather).
The Third Plan (1957-61) was in fact the first to 
specify regional development as one of its general objectives. 
The plan called for a more balanced distribution of popul­
ation, industry and incomes, and outlined a number of arguments
for limiting the growth of Paris.
1955 saw the announcement by the government of a 
package of financial aids to firms establishing outside 
Paris. This represented the first serious state commitment to 
aiding regional development and laid the basis for regional 
incentive policy for the years to come. A special interde­
partmental committee was set up to deal with the funds made 
available (Fonds de Développement Economique et Social —
F.D.E.S.). Furthermore, the F.D.E.S. acquired considerable con­
trol over publically financed investment —  at the national 
level it replaced the Modernization and Equipment Fund which 
had financed the investment projects in the First Plan (1946- 
52),.and the interministerial Investment Committee which had 
supervised the spending of available public investment funds 
since 1948.
The 1955 legislation introduced a special investment 
grant (amounting to a maximum of 20% of capital costs) avail­
able to firms establishing or expanding in certain "critical 
areas". By 1956 26 such areas had been delineated. They were 
widely scattered over the whole country although most of 
them were in the South and West. As regards size the areas 
were somewhat limited —  in most cases grouping several com­
munes, and in some cases, even single towns. Apart from in­
vestment grants,other financial aids were made available —  
these included subsidised loans, tax concessions (transfer 
tax on buildings, and local taxes), manpower training and mobility 
grants. These aids were only available to firms decentralizing 
outside the Paris region, whether or not they located in one 
of the existent areas. The logic of these aids was to somehow 
conpensate firms for the risk and cost involved in the decen­
tralisation process.
Finally, to deal with the credit problems faced, in 
particular, by small and medium-sized firms1, the Sociétés de 
Développement Régionale (S.D.R.) were set up in 1955. These 
companies had the function of acquiring shares in firms located 
in depressed or under-developed regions. In addition the S.D.R. 
could also provide medium term loans or underwrite long term 
borrowing by firms.
Briefly, the Fourth and Fifth plans continued to define 
and expand the basis of regional development policy which had 
been laid in the 1950s. The major elements of the Fourth Plan 
(1962-65) included a more explicit definition about the strategy 
of regional development planning. In particular, it chose a 
selective approach. The policy implication was that, to be 
fully effective, expenditure on general infrastructure should
1See Allen & Maclennan, p. 164 for further discussion of this point.
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be concentrated on a limited number of well chosen locations 
or growth-poles. This would encourage large firms to decen­
tralise to such centres, and a secondary or "spill-over" effect 
would be felt in the surrounding areas by inducing the develop­
ment of secondary poles through inter-industry and service 
linkages.
Secondly, and complementary to the abovementioned aims, 
the plan for the first time included a régionalisation of the 
public investment programmes in the national plan.
In the Fifth Plan, the policy of selectivity was 
defined more precisely-with the designation of eight growth- 
poles (métropoles d'équilibré) to act as counter-weights to 
the growth and importance of the Paris region. As has already 
been observed1, the acceptance of the principle of industrial 
concentration implied large scale and long term migration for 
sparsely populated regions such as those in the South-West and 
West of France.
On the other hand the Plan contained a rather signif­
icant concession towards the West of France in the form of 
a target to create 145,000 jobs in industry (i.e. around 35% 
of the projected increase) between 1966-70. The aim was to 
avoid an increase in regional disparities and provide a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits from growth. However, 
it was also in some sense a stop-gap measure in recognition of 
the fact that industrial employment had remained stable or 
shown only below average growth in the West and South-West over 
the period 1959-62.
To conclude this section it is worthwhile to say a 
few words about the distribution of regional policy expenditure 
and public expenditure in the period up to 1966.
10p. cit., p. 104.
2>x :l
Firstly, considering grants and loans awarded over the 
period 1955-66, the most noticeable feature is the rather wide- 
ranging regional coverage of financial assistance. Many regions 
of the Paris basin gained considerably, especially Centre and 
Picardie. So too did the Nord region, Lorraine in the East and 
Rhône-Alps in the South-east. As one author has cofnménted, "up 
to 1966, the effect of financial aid has been to underpin 
industrial expansion in regions whose economies were reason­
ably healthy and latterly to encourage some substantial ... 
industrialisation in the three western regions (mainly Brittany 
and Loire)"1. By 1966 the degree of selectivity in regional 
grants and loans had reached such proportions that 50% of aid 
was channelled "to around one fifth of the number of assisted
firms located in what is effectively the Brittany peninsula
2and four city regions outside it".
Certainly, it was not until the mid-60s, that both 
the geographical coverage and value of incentives was raised 
sufficiently to attract decentralising firms to the more re­
mote areas of the South-west and Massif Central. Before’ this 
occurred, it is notable that between 1950-62, "60% of the jobs 
created by decentralising firms were in the regions of the 
Paris basin and the contiguous regions of Burgundy and Lower 
Normandy".3
Considering that net migration from the South West 
amounted to 65,000, the number of jobs created by decentralis-
1K. Allen & M.C. Maclennan, p. 246.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 243.
ation over the period, 10,500, was of relatively minor importance.
The Massif Central was in a similar position. In other words it
would seem that interregional migration was still being heavily 
relied upon to achieve overall regional balance.
Although régionalisation of the budget was still incom­
plete by 1965, the figures available1 suggest that the redis­
tributive power of public capital expenditure was certainly 
not significant. On the basis of expenditure per head both
the South-West and the Massif Central were below average for
almost every major component of public expenditure. Neither
did the loans to local authorities from the various funds and
2institutions present a much better figure . A more rigorous 
analysis of public expenditure in France in 1970-73 comes to3similar conclusions . In particular "given that régionalisation 
of the capital expenditure budget does not take into account 
'major projects' which in many cases are carried out in the 
Paris region ... it is highly likely that the ... regional 
allocation of central government infrastructure expenditure 
and grants has zero redistributive impact."
The above discussion raises the question of whether 
public capital expenditure can be considered to play a major 
role in promoting employment growth in the more backward 
regions, particularly the South West anà the Massif Central.
1?rojet de loi de finances 1967 vol. Ill, appendix. See also 
Prud'homme(1974), p. 48.
2To be fair the F.I.A.T. (Fonds d' intervention pour l'aménagement du terri 
infrastructure grants were more favourably distributed. How­
ever with a total annual budget of around Ff. 175m. the overall 
picture could not have been changed considerably.
^MacDougall Report 1977, Vol. II, pp. 49, 50.
3 > ^ .
(ii) ¿nfrastructure_and_urban_develogment policy
At the outset it is worth noting that there is a very 
strong link in France between national economic planning, 
urban policy and infrastructure policy. We shall, however, 
limit our discussion to the major points.
a) urban development. French urban planning was at an 
early stage (see back) concerned with the need to provide ur­
ban centres capable of counteracting the influence and at­
traction of Paris and acting as focal points for the reloc­
ation of manufacturing and tertiary activities. Eight cities, 
or groups of cities, were designated in 1964 as "growth poles", 
termed'Métropoles d 'équilibre', on a range of criteria in­
cluding size and central-place1 status. Such towns were to 
benefit from special efforts and appropriations for infra­
structure under the 5th Plan.
One point of criticism was that large areas were not cover- 
•ed by this policy —  notably Clermont-Ferrand (Massif Central), 
Dijon (Burgundy), and Rennes (Brittany) were excluded.
In a sense a partial retreat from the aims of this policy 
was made in 1965 (and embodied in the 6th Plan), when it 
v;as realised that urgent steps should be taken to accommodate 
the foreseen growth of the Paris agglomeration. The plan was 
to create five new towns at a distance of around 20km from 
Paris. Whilst firms relocating from the Paris central area to 
the new towns would not receive regional incentives, the 
development of such towns was in fact a major commitment of 
the 6th Plan, and furthermore closely linked to deglomeration 
policy approval system (Agrément) which operated in the City 
of Paris. Recently however, the new towns have experienced in­
creasing difficulty in achieving employment targets, with the 
result that "new towns in the Paris region and agglomerations 
in the provinces are now to some extent in competition for 
jobs moving out of the centre of the Paris agglomeration
*On the basis of nine functional regions and eight other centres.
2Allen (1979), p. 189.
3*f.
In 1967 another goal appeared —  presumably in a further 
attempt to balance the growth of Paris —  to promote certain 
medium-sized cities within a 100-200km radius of the capital. 
This policy became more generalised in 1970 with a policy 
for medium-sized towns (villes moyennes)1, which was aimed at 
increasing the ability of the métropoles to transmit growth 
to their surrounding areas. It is worth noting that preoccup­
ation concerning the ability of such growth poles to achieve 
balanced spatial development, began to increase over the 70s,
particularly in view of the very divergent spatial demographic2trends .
More recently, French spatial planning has seen a further 
movement towards dispersion in the form of a various aids for3rural renewal (rénovation rurale) and a policy towards smaller
1Such towns qualified for the maximum rate of regional invest­
ment grant (P.D.R.) and preferential treatment regarding cen­
tral government expenditure on infrastructure.
^or example, whilst population growth in the six major cities after 
Paris (all métropoles) varied from 5%-l4% between 1968-75, over the same 
period the population of rural ccnrnunes remained virtually static. Non­
urbanized and non-industrial rural ccmnunes (Z.P.I.U.) continued to 
shew an average annual rate of population decline, constant since 1954, 
of around (-) .8%.
Source; Données Sociales, 1978, INSEE, p. 11.
3This comes under several of the 25 "Priority action programmes" (P.A.P. ) 
in the 7th Plan. The state's contribution to regional p.a.p.s has however 
varied considerably between regions. Between 1976-80 ccmnitments (in mil­
lion, 1975 FFr.) amounted to 17.2 in Corsica, 13.1 in Limousin, 60.7 in 
Auvergne, 41.3 in Midi-Pyrénées (that is seme of the least developed rural 
areas) and varied between 72.8 to 615.0 in the non-development areas (Paris 
723.6). Rural development would therefore seem to be outranked by other 
(urban) priorities. For figures see E.C. Regional Development Progrannies
—  France 1976-1980, 1978.
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(rural) urban centres (contrats de pays)1, and their surround­
ings.
As concerns Paris, the attempt to restrict the growth of
the capital through decentralisation has been gradually watered
down and qualified in a number of respects. In the early 70s
2the D.A.T.A.R. pointed to the need to maintain the importance 
and position of Paris as an international centre. This view 
found its expression in a softening of decentralisation meas­
ures towards projects with international or high-skill func­
tions in industry or services. As a result only "activités ba­
nales" or relatively low—skilled projects were effectively pres­
surised to move outside Paris or the new towns, to the provin-
3ces .
As regards urban growth French policy has therefore several, 
even conflicting goals; i) promoting Paris as an international 
centre, ii) promoting the new towns in Paris and elsewhere;
iii) promoting eight equilibrium metropoles; iv) promoting 
certain medium-sized towns; v) promoting rural urban centres 
"A policy of promoting everyone is of course no policy at all."4
From what can be gathered from new developments in French 
regional policy (see on), it seems clear that i) towns with over
100,000 inhabitants will in general receive less favourable
T^he "politique des pe ti tes villes et de leurs pays", was developed in 1974/5 
in addition to the "plans d' aménagement ruraux" (P.A.R.) introduced in 
1967 which had seen only limited application. For a critical discussion 
see Audouin (1977), p. 211 et seq.
2Pélégation á 1 'Aménaganent du Territoire et a 1'Action Régionale. The DATAR, 
which is directly under the authority of the Prime Minister, is the cen­
tral body responsible for the execution of French regional policy. It has 
three hroad areas of influence, i) to coordinate and influence investment 
decisions by ministries and local authorities, in accordance with the aims 
of regional planning, ii) to undertake studies of regional infrastructure 
requirements. It has a strong influence on planning in major urban areas 
and rural renewal areas, iii) it controls a special regional fund(F.I.A.T.) which, although it accounts for only around 1% of public investment ex­
penditure, is often useful for 'strategic' projects and provides a certain 
leverage in interministerial negotiations.
3See Allen (1979) ,pp. 188-191.
4P r u d 'homme (1974), p. 43.
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treatment than in the past, ii) greater efforts are to made 
to encourage administrative, service and research establish­
ments to decentralise (the tax on expanding industrial esta­
blishments in the Paris area is however to be suppressed)1,
iii) stress is likely to be placed more heavily on rural de­
velopment.
Hopefully, the various goals of French spatial planning 
will therefore become more consistent with .one another, and, 
by being more specific, achieve a greater degree of effective­
ness and impact on local priority situations.
(iii) Frençh_regional_incentive_DOliÇYi '
Following recent proposals by the D.A.T.A.R. on the re­
form of regional incentives, and in view of the fact that 
legislation covering the present aids expires on 31 December
1981, it is obviously difficult to provide an overall and cur­
rent view of the French incentive package.
We shall therefore subdivide the present section into two 
parts: (a) regional incentives from 1976-81, and (b) an out­
line of the proposed measures for reform.
a) T^e regional development aid system can be
divided into two categories and six measures.
The first category is composed of aids relating to the 
creation of employment in industry or services in certain struct 
urally disadvantaged regions. These aids are complemented by 
certain fiscal advantages. The second category concerns the 
industrial adaptation fund (Fonds Spécial d'Adaptation Indus­
trielle, F.S.A.I.), created in 1978 with the aim of helping 
industrial conversion in certain areas affected by particularly 
severe sectoral crises (e.g. steel, shipbuilding).
1See Le Monde, 1 December 1981.
Izê
-The re5 ional_development_grant (prime de développement ré­
gional, P.D.R. ). The P.D.R. constitutes the major regional 
incentive in France and accounts for around 45% of annual re­
gional incentive spending. It is a project related capital 
grant which varies in intensity depending on the area concer­
ned and whether the project is an extension or a new start 
(see map)1. The minimum required fixed capital investment nor­
mally varies from Ffr. 300,000 (and 10 new jobs) for new pro­
jects in localities of under 50,000 persons to Ffr. 800,000 
(and 30 new jobs) in localities above this size. Extension pro­
jects are in general treated more strictly in terms of minimum 
job requirements. In areas where only large projects are eli­
gible the minimum investment required is Ffr. 10m (100 new 
jobs), and extension projects are ineligible.
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Again, localities in upland and rural areas and Corsica 
have somewhat more favourable minimum investment and job re­
quirements (although the minimum requirement does not fall 
below Ffr. 300,000 or 6 new jobs).
Investment and job targets must be realised within three 
years, and, if not achieved, any part of the award already 
made may be required to be repaid ("claw-back”) to the grant­
ing authorities1.
Conditions of eligibility stipulate that projects must 
not be tied by the nature of their activity to any specific 
location. Furthermore; state-owned industry directly adminis­
tered by the state is not eligible. Although service-sector 
projects are eligible under the P.D.R., such projects are 
generally covered by the schemes mentioned below.
- Service activities_grant_(prime de localisation d'ac­
tivités tertiaires, P.L.Â.T.J.
This aid covers service sector projects which involve 
job creation, extension or transfer from the Paris region. 
Thirty new jobs must be created, or twenty in the case where 
the registered offices of the company transfer or set-up in a 
development area. In the case of an extension new jobs must 
represent at least a 50% increase in "tertiary" personnel, or 
100 new jobs (whichever is the lower) where a new service func­
tion is created or relocated from the Paris region.
The grant is available throughout the country with the ex­
ception of the Paris Basin Award levels are Ffr. 20,000 per 
job in areas where the P.D.R. is available and Ffr. 10,000 
elsewhere. There are no.investment conditions.
■^The fact that claw-back in any one year has amounted to as 
much as 10% of the total value of grants awarded in the 
same year, must certainly have caused a number of firms 
to hesitate before applying for the aid in question.
2 For example, Orléans, Blois, Chartres, Rouen are excluded.
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- £ssearch_activities 2ran"t (prime de localisation d'acti­
vités de recherche, P.L.Â.R.y
Similar to above; however, there is no general spatial 
differentiation in award levels. Ten new jobs must be created, 
which should in general represent at least a 30% increase 
in the case of extention projects. Although there are no spec­
ific investment conditions attached, the award (Ffr. 25,000 
per job created) may not exceed a maximum of 15% of investment 
for investments of less than Ffr 10m, and a maximum of 25% 
of investment for larger projects, or projects situated in 
certain designated towns ("pôles de recherche").
- decentralisation_grant_(indemnité de décentralisation)
This aid is awarded to industrial firms in partial reim­
bursement of costs incurred in transferring all or part of
2their production from the Paris region. 500m of industrial 
floorspace must be vacated and the award covers 90% of costs 
of dismantlement and 60% of transport costs. Normally awards 
should not exceed Ffr. 500,000.
- special aid to_rural_areas_(aide spéciale rurale)
This is a general small-project scheme available in most 
"cantons" in designated rural areas. The aid applies to both 
industrial and service projects as well as 'artisanal' trades, 
tourism and hotels. For new projects the award varies from 
Ffr. 20,000 per job for the first ten jobs, Ffr. 15,000 per 
job for the next ten, and Ffr. 8,000 for a final ten. No aid 
is given above the thirtieth job. For extension projects, 
initial enterprise size is taken into account and the rate of 
award is calculated at the marginal rate as above. There are 
no investment conditions.
In addition to the aide spéciale rurale, there are several 
other incentive schemes for small-scale artisan firms. These 
include: decentralisation allowances for small sub—contractors
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who move out of the Paris region; aid for the creation of 
artisan firms in rural areas (max. 30% of investment in the 
Massif Central and 16% elsewhere); special assistance for ex­
tension projects in the Massif Central (min. Ffr. 150,000 and
3 new jobs) with rates of award equal to those under the P.D.R. 
In a sense the above small-project schemes are intended to 
fill some of the gaps created by the relatively tough minimum 
requirements set under the P.D.R. It is difficult to under­
stand why this approach was taken rather than the alternative 
of incorporating them into the original P.D.R. scheme.
- f seal incentives. The local-business-tax concession ('ex­
onération de la taxe professionnelle) is the second major 
regional incentive (after the P.D.R.) accounting for, very 
roughly, 25% of incentive spending (in terms of revenue for­
gone) . The local business tax is an annual tax assessed accord­
ing to the theoretical rental value of fiscal assets as well 
as some proportion of the annual wage bill, the tax rate being 
set independently by each département and each commune within 
a département.
The concession, which is made at the discretion of either 
the département or commune, may be up to 100% of tax liability 
for a period of up to five years.
The aid is reserved for new projects, extensions and, under 
certain circumstances, reorganisation projects. Although ser­
vice sector projects are largely eligible, the vast majority 
of concessions have been limited to manufacturing industry.
Eligibility conditions are fairly complex. In general, how­
ever, regarding spatial coverage, tertiary activities are elig­
ible over most of the country apart from the Paris Basin, job 
requirements being similar to those under the aforementioned 
service industry schemes.
Industrial projects are eligible over a somewhat less, but 
still fairly wide area. Job requirements vary from a minimum of 
10 new jobs in localities of under 15,000 persons to 30 new
3 5 Z
jobs above this size. In mountain and rural areas and Corsica 
the minimum job requirements are 6 and 15 jobs respectively, 
depending on size of locality. Extension projects must, in 
general, provide at least a 20% increase over initial employ­
ment.
In practice there are a number of problems with this aid.
In the first place, "the variation in local-business-tax
rates is such that a location offering no concession may, in 
the long run, be more attractive than one in which a concess­
ion is available."1 Secondly, inso far as the aid leads to 
higher taxable profits the firm concerned will also bear a 
higher corporation tax burden, which may substantially reduce 
the effective value of the concession.
As a result the aid is often very difficult to value from
the point of view of the firm, which must consequently limit 
its effectiveness.
- special depreciation allowance_(amortissement exception­
nel)
This is a project related incentive enabling firms to write 
down, in addition to ordinary depreciation, 25% of the value 
of their new buildinçs in the first year. Eligibility conditions 
are similar to above; one notable difference however is that 
tourist and hotel projects do not qualify for this aid. The 
area covered by the scheme is limited to development areas in 
the West and South West only.
Results
From 1976 to 1980 (inclusive) the main results of the maj-
2or abovementioned aids can be listed as follows :
1Yuill, Allen and Hull(l980), p. 77.
2 Source:D.A.T.A.R.
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i) the P.D.R. aided the creation of 198,400 jobs and was 
associated with investments totalling some Ffr. 27,500m;
ii) the P.L.A.T. and P.L.A.R. were granted for 216 tert­
iary and research projects, associated with the creation of 
12,600 jobs;
iii) special aid to rural areas, was attributed to 3,852 
projects, creating some 14,300 jobs;
iv) the F.S.A.I. intervened in 150 projects entailing a 
total investment of Ffr. 8.2 billion, and providing 22,600 
new jobs. Aid was granted in the order of Ffr. 2,300m. (of 
which Ffr. 1,200m. in .subsidies).
In total from 1976-80, 248,000 new jobs were subsidized, 
entailing investments of over Ffr. 36 billion, and at an in­
centive cost of around Ffr. 4.5 billion over these five years.
b) proposals for reform_of re2 ional_development_aids. As 
recognized by the D.A.T.A.R., a number of problems have aris­
en, or have become evident, in the French aid system. Aid 
ceilings in terms of grant levels per job created have not 
been revised since 1976 which has greatly affected their val­
ue • furthermore, the system has become overly complex which 
impedes its effectiveness; lastly, the system is too admin­
istratively centralised which has not allowed sufficient 
account to be taken of local situations and requirements.
The D.A.T.A.R. has therefore proposed the following lines 
for reform, based around a large degree of decentralisation 
of decision-making powers with respect to the granting of sub­
sidies, and the designation of eligible areas.
The proposals entail replacing the present scheme by two
measures, differentiated according to project type.
1) Prime d'aménagement du_territoire, P.A.T. (to replace 
the P.D.R., P.L.A.T. and P.L.À.R.)
This is intended to be a project related aid similar to
the P.D.R. The maximum rate will be Ffr. 50,000 per job creat­
ed up to a limit of 25% of initial investment costs. Regions
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qualifying partially or totally for this aid will be able to 
establish variable aid levels within the eligible zones. Hence 
spatial priorities may be established locally and a greater 
degree of selectivity should thereby be achieved.
Furthermore, the aid may, at the request of the benefic­
iary, be converted into a rebate on interest charges. This 
possibility, previously unavailable under earlier schemes, 
has been included in view of the requests of numerous region­
al authorities and enterprises. Great use is likely to be 
made of this alternative in view of the fact that henceforth, 
regional public authorities are to be allowed to participate 
directly in the activities of the "S.D.R." and the "sociétés 
de financement interrégionales" as well as the "Sociétés 
d'économie mixte" —  that is, in general, the major regional 
bodies which provide local project finance. Previously, the 
regional authorities could only guarantee loans from these 
bodies ;
2) prime régionale à l'emglçi.
This aid will be available in designated areas with the 
exception of towns of over 100,000 inhabitants. The maximum 
rate will be Ffr. 20,000 per job created up until the 30th 
job in the same establishment. This ceiling is raised to 
Ffr. 40,000 in designated mountain and rural areas. Again, 
regional administrations will be able to vary the intensity 
of the aid as between locations according to local priorit­
ies. This aid is not cumulable with the P.A.T.
Although the exact spatial conditions of eligibility 
for these aids still has to be determined in consultation 
with the regions, the population covered will certainly not 
exceed 38% of the national total (i.e. the actual level), and 
in all probability will be substantially less. In general, 
the larger agglomerations will be excluded from these aids, 
the reason being that,generally, in such locations the employ­
ment situation reflects essentially national phenomena rather 
than specific regional difficulties.
Whilst most procedures will effectively be decentralised, 
four types of specific intervention (P.A.T.) will be made at 
the national level, namely:
(i) aids to employment creation in areas affected by in­
dustrial restructuring, where employment losses have 
been severe (e.g. Lorraine)
ii) aids for certain projects in areas suffering from tem­
porary employment setbacks, and which are situated out­
side the designated areas
iii) service sector projects eligible for the P.A.T.
iv) large-sized investment projects (above Ffr. 25m) or 
projects established by large-sized firms or foreign- 
-owned enterprises with an annual turnover above Ffr. 
500m • The aim here is to avoid excessive competition 
between regions for such projects and to achieve a 
greater degree of control over M.N.E. and large pro­
ject location.
In addition, (national) loan facilities will be made 
available for projects falling into the above four 
categories.
other aids: The two fiscal incentives mentioned, above will be 
retained and harmonised with the new aid system, to 
ensure that Community aid ceilings are respected.
Comments: Although further details concerning eligibility 
conditions for these aids are not yet available, it seems 
clear that they will be considerably less complex and specific 
than under the previous system, based as they are on the need to 
provide a greater degree of discrimination in favour of small/ 
medium scale projects and rural locations.
It is difficult to foresee hew the regions will react in pract­
ice to the new system. Although aid levels may be varied within 
designated areas it remains to be seen whether the regions 
will actually use the discretion at their disposal. Intra- 
regional political pressures and the desire not to be left cut 
may,in practice,lead to maximum rates being made available 
over a large proportion of the designated area.
Another interesting aspect is the greatly increased scope 
for regional authorities to participate in the funding of 
investment projects. Again, this seems certain to lead to im­
provements in project financing especially for firms in the 
small/medium size range.
On the whole it would seem that two types of area in parti­
cular are to be favoured: i) industrial reconversion areas, and 
ii) less developed areas. The general aim seems to be one of 
"dispersed development' and as such constitutes a refutal of 
"growth-pole" concepts and the ability of such centres to 
'spread' development to their hinterlands.
-  -
8.3.2. ITALY
General_back2round
Some_basic_figures_^: Southern Italy as % Italy
population(19.3m) 
GDP
35.5%
24.0%
Southern Italy as % E.C.
population 
active population 
unemployment
7.8%
5.9%
18.0%
Disparities in levels of economic development between Northern 
and Southern Italy are no new phenomenon. From the period 
after Unification in 1861, when substantially lower (Piemon- 
tese) external tariffs were imposed on what was then a very 
protected Southern economy, until the first real efforts to 
promote industrial development in the late 1950s, the history 
of the Mezzogiorno has been one of uninterrupted decline . 
Southern industry suffered a severe setback between 1880 and 
1901; between 1901-193 6 Southern industrial employment de­
clined by about 10% whilst there was a corresponding increase 
of around 50% in the North3.
By 1950, the pressure of population growth had made itself 
felt through acute poverty in the agricultural sector, charac­
terised by the "pulverisation" of small holdings and much 
fragmentation.
The first attempts at closing the North/South gap were 
largely unsuccessful, and represented little more than a stop­
g a p  measure to prevent mass migration from the land and ri­
sing unemployment. Between 1950-53, the newly created state fund 
for the South, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, concentrated its
^Figures for 1977; European Commission, Regional Development Pro 
gramme, Mezzogiorno 1977-80, 1980. As the study points out, the 
population of the Mezzogiorno is therefore actually larger than 
that of five Member States, ie Netherlands, Belgium,Ireland, 
Denmark and Luxembourg.
2A somewhat fuller account is given by Bull(1978).
^Allen & MacLennan(1970).
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efforts almost exclusively on agriculture and basic infra­
structure1. Although it was hoped that investments in public 
works and infrastructure would help stimulate Southern in­
dustry, it soon became clear that much of the original in­
vestment in the South was largely to the benefit of industry
2in the Centre/North .
In 1957 the main lines of an industrialisation policy for 
the South were laid, which included, (i) the introduction of 
investment incentives (profits tax exemptions, investment 
grants and soft loans) to induce firms to the South. These 
incentives were however highly selective and aimed at attract­
ing large-scale projects to designated areas; (ii) the 
start of an industrial growth area policy, aimed especially 
at stimulating external economies; (iii) the decision to use 
the state-holding sector to promote Southern development.
During the period 1958-69 its industrial investments accounted 
for some 34% of the Southern total3.
In 1965 the Cassa's funds were enlarged and the pattern 
of their use reflects the change in the emphasis of develop­
ment policies. From 1950-65, 55% of expenditure went to agri­
culture, 33% to infrastructure and only 12% to industry. From 
1965-70 industry obtained 48%, agriculture 17% and infrastruct-
4ure about maintained its share . Industrial incentives, how­
ever, remained largely selective.
Since 1971, there have been a number of changes. In the 
first place, growth-centre policy has been slowly abandoned
—  from a policy of "dispersed concentration" to smaller 
centres (or nuclei) until 1976, to one of "diffused” develop­
ment in aid of depressed and internal areas in the more recent 
period ._________________________________________
10f the Cassa's allocation for this period of around LIT. 570m, approximately 
77% went to agriculture and the retainer to infrastructure. Moreover, efforts 
in the agricultural sector (acccrpanied by three reform laws and expropriat­
ion of land frcm large landowners)were based around farming units of five 
hectares or less which presented little hope for long term viability.
2The multiplier (Centre/North) for investment in the South was estimated to 
be 0.39 in the early 1950s, Martellaro(l965).
3Podbielski(l978). 4Bull(l978).
5See Ronzani (1978), pp. 136-9 for further details.
Secondly, the role of state—enterprise has been increased 
substantially. From 1957 to 1971, the state—holding sector was 
required to locate at least 60% of its new and 40% of its 
total investment in the South. After 1971 these percentages 
were raised to 8 0% and 60% respectively*. Furthermore, public 
authorities and companies with state participation were re­
quired to place at least 30% of their supply contracts with 
firms located in the South.
Thirdly, incentives have become more generous and less 
selective. Greater emphasis is now laid on aids for small/ 
medium sized enterprises1. The very substantial decline in the
number of Southern enterprises operating in this size group 
2from 1961-71 , and the correspondingly close association at 
the regional level with movements in manufacturing employment3 
must surely explain the increasing preoccupation with this is­
sue.
A related point is that from the late 1960s onwards, 
wage-bargaining increasingly took place at a national level, 
in contrast to the previous period. To outweigh this effect, 
and as part of the overall strategy to increase employment in 
the South, a rebate system on social security contributions was 
introduced in 1968. In 1976 the concession was extended to 
cover the full amount of social security liabilities (which 
averaged around 27% of wage costs) for (net additional) labour 
hired after that date.
- The role of state industry in regional development.
Before turning to consider the actual results of this 
particular approach to development policy it is worthwhile to
4briefly consider the underlying rationale for state involvement .
*To be achieved by 1980. However, the somewhat higher 1971 targets were not in 
practice achieved.
1One example here is the Società Finanziaria Meridionale(FIME) created in 
1971, which provides credit and various types of technical assistance, in 
particular to medium-sized autonomous enterprises.
^Banco di Rana, May 1973. 3Bull (1978).
4The following discussion relies heavily on A.Shonfield(l965), p. 178 et seq., 
which still rerains probably the best and most detailed account of the origins 
of state involvement in the Italian econany.
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The Italian state holding sector is composed of a number 
of holding groups (IRI, ENI, EGAM, EFIM), of which the Istit- 
uto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), established in 
1933, is the largest and most important1.
The IRI, it should be noted, is a "semi-public corporat­
ion". In a financial sense the state's substantial contribution 
to the group can be seen as a means of increasing the return 
on capital available for distribution to IRI’s private invest­
ors. Without such intervention it is doubtful whether the IRI 
could have obtained the large amounts of mon6v required for 
investment from the ordinary capital market.
"The final outcome would then have been that the group 
would have invested less in those of its enterprises 
which the stock market would have regarded as hazardous, 
either because they were old and in need of expensive _ 
reconversion or because they were too new to be trusted."
The sheer size and diversity of the group provides another 
advantage —  the possibility of setting off profits in one 
sector against losses in other —  which together with the 
backing and assurance of the state, have made the IRI a safe 
vehicle for investment.
Commercial stability is helped by the coexistence of"com­
plementary" sectors e.g. shipbuilding and shipping, which may 
lend mutual support by placing orders during slack periods. 
Moreover, the importance of certain base industries (e.g. 
steel, cement) in determining the efficiency and performance 
of other sectors of the Italian economy, has placed a high 
premium on competitivity; at an early stage investment in mo­
dern plant and managerial stress on high standards of technic­
al efficiency were deliberately used to hold down prices and 
improve product quality in strategic base sectors3.
Apart from some of the more obvious advantages of size (and 
diversity); for example, the ability to cope with projects in
*In 1963 the IRI employed 278,500 persons in some 120 companies, 
and by 1977 524,000 persons.2Shonfield(1965), p. 189. In practice, a large part of IRI's operations 
fall into one of these two categories.
3Ibid.
1 48.
high-technology sectors subject to risk, investments which 
necessarily take place over a relatively long time-scale, or 
projects which require coordination with other sectors or in­
frastructure works, there were certain other advantages in 
the field of management and worker training. Such advantages 
appeared through the availability of a 'large and varied com­
plex of technical cadres' able to exploit new investment 
opportunities, and the ability to implement in-house training 
and retraining facilities1.
Given the somewhat paradoxical capacity of the state-hold- 
ing sector to combine political and social obligations and 
objectives with shrewd business decision-making, state industry 
seemed well-placed to provide the necessary impetus to in­
dustrial development in the South. Pressure was certainly there 
for it to do so; in 1960, employment‘in state enterprise in 
the Mezzogiorno accounted for less than 18% of total state-sec- 
tor employment. Moreover, Southern employment in industry at 
this time accounted for a mere 16.5% of total employment, as 
against 33.5% in the Centre/North, and the imbalance in the
labour market was reflected in an annual average rate of mi-
2gration from the South of around 223,000 persons .
State enterprise responded by locating an increasing share 
of investment (and employment) in the South, noticeable from 
around the late 60s3. The relevant data for this period are gi­
ven in the Table below.
From Table 1 it is evident that the 1971 targets set for the
share of new and overall investment to be located in the South 
have never in fact been met. In terms of total investment, the 
share going to the Mezzogiorno reached its peak in 1972 and 
has since fallen continuously, in both relative and absolute 
(nominal) terms, whilst, overall, investment in the state holding
1Ibid., p. 189 & 187."It is worth remarking that IRI, with ENI, 
are the only businesses in Italy which have engaged in any 
serious work of retraining workers. They are also the pioneers 
in management training." Ibid.
^Figures from Podbielski(1978), tables 20,22.
3Employment in state enterprise increased from around 60th. units 
from 1960-65 to 85.6th. in 1969.
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TABLE 1 : INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE STATE-HOLDING SECTOR 
IN ITALY (Mezzogiorno and Centre/North).
(billion lire, current prices)
• invCidinLiMi.
1969 1972 1975 1978 1
Mezzogiorno/rest Italy- 338.1/592.7 1,139/941.1 1,145/1,941 1,136/2,76
Total Mezzog. 
as % Italy 36.3% 54.8% 37.1% 29.1%
Industry**:
Mezzogiorno/rest Italy 224.2/267.4 828:8/446.2 : 683.9/851.7 516.3/1,048
as % Italy 45.6% 65.0% 44.5% 33.0%2
Major sectors : Mezzogiorno 
-----------  as % Italy _
steel, metallurgy etc. 56.0 84.3 57.6 24.1
mech. eng. 49.4 52.1 40.0 32.4
of which electronics - (46.7) (52.3) (32.7)
oil & refining 38.2 19.5 21.3 37.5
petrochanicals & other 
chemical products 69.0 78.4 71.8 70.5
Major sectors : Mezzogia 
------------- as % total
steel, metallurgy etc.
n
5P
23.6 32.3 31.5 34.0
mech. eng. & electronics 24.8 30.3 32.7 33.0
oil & refining 13.1 11.9 11.0 17.5
petrochemicals & other 
chemical products 45.1 52.6 55.0 50.8
Total employment: 85,600 I4t),400 183,700 191,000
Mezzogiorno as % total: 20.5% 24.0% 26.0% 27.6%
Source: Derived from Ministero delle Partecipazioni Statali, Relazione Prò-
grammatica, vol. 1, Rane 1980.
1 '^ Estirreted percentages for 1979, 35.8% (total) and 41.7% (Manf.), from
different source, vis. SVIMEZ, Rapporto 1980 sull1 Economia, p. 117. Planned 
investment 1981, 45.8% (total) arid 56.4% (manf.), Ministero Partecip. Stat._ 
op. cit., p. 45.
^Excluding foreign investment but including non-localisable investment.
**Excluding construction and food.
^^Frcrc 1978 on, excluding workers operating abroad in oil & refining.
sector has increased considerably. In terms of employment, 
the relative capital-intensity of projects located in the 
Mezzogiorno is reflected in the fact that employment shares 
consistently remained considerably lower than investment shares, 
before and throughout the 1970s1.
Between 1971-74 over four fifths of state investment in the 
steel and chemical sectors was located in the Mezzogiorno; this 
represented on average more than half of overall and three quar­
ters of industrial state investment in the Mezzogiorno.
In terms of additional employment, the effects of this in­
vestment surge were minimal —  only around 25,000 new jobs 
were created in steel and 6,000 in chemicals from 1970-75 at
the cost of an average annual level of investment in these
2sectors of around £ 350 million (current prices ) between 
1971-74.
The events leading up to the restructuring of base industry 
in Italy and its relocation towards the South, have already 
been described in chapter 5, and there is little to suggest 
that such investments were in general the outcome of a deter­
mined attempt to promote regional development. Rather, the de­
cision to invest in the South was frequently taken on the basis 
of specific sectorial and locational considerations, in which 
the receipt of various investment subsidies (conditional on a 
southern location) presumably played an important role.
Lastly, state-enterprise has in general shown a high degree 
of selectivity as between the various southernjsgions. In 1978 
around 70% of state industrial employment (excluding construct­
ion) was located in just two regions, Campania (ie the Naples 
region, with 45%) and Puglia (25%). Campania accounted for 81% 
of (Southern) state employment in mechanical engineering and 
45% in electronics, whilst Puglia accounted for 60% employment
:As one author has noted:"Investment per enployed was not only systematically 
higher in the south than in the whole of Italy but this difference increas­
ed progressively over the years." Podbielski (1978).
2Min. delle Part.Stat. - Relazione Prograirmatica,l980, p.63. The enployment 
figures refer to net (sectoral) rather than gross job creation. Estimates 
of investment cost per job in the early 70s suggest that to create a job
in chemicals or steel requires on average Lire 55.4million as against L.
5.6m. in  irrfnct-rn/ and L. 6.4.m. in engineering", A. Th^rmes in :_____
IkZ.
in iron and steel1.
- Infrastructure policy.
There are at present two organisations responsible for 
the administration of special assistance for the development 
of Southern Italy.
(a) The "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno", which concerns itself with 
the administration of subsidies to industry, the management
of the fund for subsidised credit to Southern industry, the 
implementation of special projects and industrial infrastruct­
ure works, and the provision of assistance through the medium 
of institutions and financing companies;
(b) the Governments of the southern regions, which are resp­
onsible for all intervention provided for by Article 117 of 
the constitution (particularly as regards agriculture, craft 
trades, public works), and also regional development projects
to be carried out on the basis of ad hoc financing as part of
2special assistance .
Expenditure of the Cassa from 1976-79 on credit and capital 
subventions and under the various forms of special assistance 
is given in Table 2 below.
A detailed breakdown of investment incentives is given 
in the following section. As concerns overall capital expend­
iture on infrastructure, it is to be noted that this increased 
very considerably as from 1974. From 1960 to 1967 average an­
nual expenditure amounted to around Lit. 116 billion. This 
figure rose to Lit. 250 billion between 1968-73, Lit. 866 billion 
in 1974, Lit. 1,240 billion between 1975-77 and Lit. 1,560 
billion in 19793. In real terms infrastructure spending by the 
Cassa more or less levelled off after the mid-1970s, with more 
emphasis being placed on (the completion of) special projects.
1Min. delle Ppc. Stat., op. cit., p. 75. These three major sec­
tors account for 68% of state industrial employment in South­
ern Italy.
2E.C."The Regional Development Programmes", 1979, p. 144.
3Current prices, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1977, Appendice stati- 
stica, Table 113, p.187. Figures for 1979, Bilancio 1979, p. 34.
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TABLE 2 : EXPENDITURE BY THE CASSA PER IL MEZZOGIORNO 1976-79
(billion lire, 1975 
1976 1977
prices)
1978 1979
Industry : 
capital expenditure 318 319 319 326
Infrastructure:
- industrial areas & nu 
clei 108 118 136 107
- workers housing 6 10 12 8
Incentives: ^
- investment grants 204/(241) 191/(268) 171/(270) 211 /(377)
- interest subsidies (209) (202) (306) (274)
Special Projects
(capital expenditure) 207 237 318 295
Regional activities
(capital expenditure) 679 709 560 423
- agriculture 189 195 140 94
- tourism 28 37 23 23
- aqueducts & drab- 
age 182 179 163 111
- roads and communic­
ations 134 148 99 92
- areas of particular 
depression 105 99 79 51
- hospitals 15 29 35 27
- others 26 22 21 25
other credit intervent­
ions :
- agriculture (33) (38) (17) (9)
- tourism (32) (35) (34) (33)
TOTAL: 1,204 1,266 1,197 1,044
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1977, 1978, 1979, Rome 
(current prices) not included in total.
*The increase over 1978 is mainly due to the speeding up of 
payment procedures (op. cit. , 1979 p. 34).
The Cassa, it must be stressed, undertakes the implement­
ation or financing of infrastructure works over and above 
normal state activities in this area. This particular organ­
izational form was established in the 1950s to by-pass the 
normal channels of ministerial autority, since "this was con­
sidered to be the only way in which the co-ordination required 
for regional planning was capable of being secured" . Under 
current proposals for reform, the responsibility for a large 
part of the Cassa's present activities will eventually be 
fully entrusted to regional levels of government.
In the past the Cassa has been criticised for tending to
substitute for,rather than complement,the normal intervention 2of ministries . This is perhaps unavoidable given that it 
is difficult to tell what would have otherwise been the ex­
tent of state infrastructure activity, and given that some 
expenditure categories of necessity overlap (e.g. hospitals, 
roads). A very large proportion of capital expenditure (see 
Table 2) is, however, directly related to productive invest­
ments .
As concerns industrial infrastructure, the Cassa under­
takes or finances such works as the preparation of industrial 
land, the connection of industrial sites to energy sources, 
water supply and sewage, and the improvement of road and rail 
connections. The criteria governing such operations ensure that 
they are both necessary and closely linked with industrial in­
stallations, and furthermore, that their cost is proportional 
to the importance and value (also in terms of employment) of 
the industrial investments in question3.
General infrastructure provision in industrial areas and 
nuclei (there were some 46 of these in 1979) covers a wide 
range of activities including, general urban improvement works,
^Shonfield (1965), p. 197.
2Ronzani (1979) , p. 137.
3E.C. Regional Development Programme, Mezzogiorno 1977-80,
1980, p. 61.
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water supply and sewage, electrification, roads and rail links 
and ports.
Special Projects, introduced in 1971, were intended as 
general infrastructure schemes, developed on an interregional 
and inter-sectoral basis and designed to . meet specific develop­
ment or environmental objectives1. The vagueness surrounding 
their initiation and implementation means that their definition, 
in practice, is necessarily determined by what they actually
do rather than what they might be doing. Several major fields
2of intervention may be singled out ; the depollution of the 
Gulf of Naples, water supply works, irrigation works, inter­
regional road works, urban, industrial, tourist and more general 
infrastructure works. Certain projects relate to coordinated 
activities for specific development areas; for example, Pro­
ject no. 2 for South-East Sicily comprises a wide variety of 
coordinated interventions in many sectors, ranging from port 
facilities, tourist development, industrial infrastructure and 
agricultural structures. In general, however, the projects 
are designed to eliminate major bottl£necks to further develop­
ment, requiring substantial investment over an extended period, 
and necessitating a planned approach to project development 
including an assessment of both the costs and benefits of the 
works involved.
Finally, it should be remarked upon that Cassa expendit­
ure directly related to agricultural infrastructures and in­
centives has constituted an ever diminishing share of total 
Cassa expenditure —  from over 55% in the 1950s, around 17% in 
the late 1960s to under 15% in the 1970s —  and reflects the 
turnabout in development policy discussed earlier.
This reversal was perhaps somewhat surprising and excess­
ive in view of the importance of Southern agriculture in both
*For a good survey, see Podbielski (1978), ch. 5.
2See, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio 1979, Section II.
the Southern and national economy1. Lack of concern with the
agricultural sector had also, by the late 1970s led to some
very serious anomalies in the distribution of E.C. aid under
2the EAGGF Guidance section . Some hasty changes were made in 
1978 in an attempt to comply with Community agricultural di­
rectives and available resources were increased substantially 
for the period 1979-823.
The general connection between infrastructure provision 
and incentive policy in the Italian case is quite clear. As 
one E.C. study remarked, ’by now "the South is well equipped 
with infrastructures in certain sectors: chiefly motorways 
but also, to a lesser extent, harbours and airports. This 
wealth of fixed capital is at present under-utilized in re­
lation to its potential capacity and could therefore cope 
with a much higher volume of use that at present."4 The foll­
owing section will examine the incentive policies which should 
aim at obtaining maximum use from such investments.
- The main incentives.
There are four main industrial incentives currently 
available for projects located in the Mezzogiorno. They in­
clude capital grants, soft loans, social security concessions, 
and fiscal concessions. The details are as follows:
This incentive, only available in the 
Mezzogiorno (see map), is more or less automatic in its 
operation, being available for a wide range of industrial
1Accounting for around 17% of regional product and 27% of employment and 
over 40% of gross marketable production. ISTAT and E.C. data for mid-1970s.
2Given the corplete lack of any régionalisation of assistance the ccnnu.tment 
(1964-74) for EEC assistance to projects in the Mezzogiorno amounted to
only 32% of the total allocated to Italy. Moreover, actual expenditure amoun­
ted to only 15.4% of ocrrmitments, hence the Mezzogiorno actually received 
in the course of 11 years, seme 19m. u.a. or approximately Lit. 13 billion. 
See E.C. Regional Development Prograxme-Mezzogiomo, 1980, p. 22/3.
3Ibid., p. 369. 4Ibid., p. 20.
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activities1 (including local resource based activities, which 
is in contrast to the French system). The level of the grant 
varies according to location and project size. Capital grants 
(covering the construction, re-opening or expansion of in­
dustrial installations) are calculated on the basis of a stan­
dard scale proportional to the cost of fixed eligible invest­
ments —  ranging from a maximum grant of 40% for an invest­
ment quota of up to Lit. 2,000m. to a minimum grant
of 15% for an investment quota in excess of Lit. 15,000m. The 
grant is supplemented by one-fifth if the project is in a 
priority sector , and by a further one-fifth if it is located
1Petroleum, base chemicals and synthetic fibre production (where 
capacity seems excessive) are at present "suspended" from 
eligibility.
Around 30 are distinguished, mainly in high-growth and advan­
ced technology sectors.
2
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in one of the (designated) particularly depressed areas (i.e. 
max. = 56%). For projects in the largest size category, elig­
ibility is decided by the CIPE (Interministerial Committee for 
Economic Planning), rather than the Minister for the South 
as is usually the case.
There are no particular employment conditions attached 
to this aid, and it is also worth noting that the number of 
cases where aid has been suspended is very low (around 3%).
soft_loans. Loans at favourable rates of interest are 
granted through the "special credit institutes" (SCI) and 
various banks specialising in medium and long term credit.
Since the procedure and conditions of award are determined 
by law it actually makes no difference which of the above bo­
dies is approached.
Application procedure is similar to that for the capital 
grant -and in practice both applications are considered to­
gether. The SCI examine the financial viability of the pro­
ject and the application is then passed on to the Cassa which 
examines its eligibility, technical feasibility and further 
requirements such as infrastructure provision. Finally, the 
Ministry for the South checks conformity with national, re­
gional and other territorial planning.
With respect to financing, the Cassa awards the interest 
subsidy from a special National Fund for Concessionary Credit 
to Industry. Some 65% of the resources of this fund are held 
over for the Mezzogiorno1.
The concessionary interest rate on these loans is set at
70% below the reference "market rate". The loans may cover up
2to 40% if project costs and are only available to projects of
1Such schemes also operate in the insufficiently developed zones 
of the Centre and North but at less favourable rates of award. 
They are not considered here.
Land purchase, land preparation and "technically necessary 
stocks", are eligible items under soft loans whilst they are 
not eligible for capital grants.
2
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less than Lit. 15 billion1 (in the case of extensions, in­
cluding existing plant).
The maximum duration of the loan is 15 years for setting 
up projects and 10 years for other projects.
It is worth noting that under the two abovementioned 
schemes whilst, in general, projects are expected to be 30%
“own-finaneed", for small projects in priority sectors and 
locations, up to 96% of project costs may eventually be covered 
by a combination of grants and loans.
ii§£§l_.£°S£§§§i2!l§* Tax concessions are available in the 
Mezzogiorno, taking the form of rebates or exemptions on com­
pany profits. Companies in Italy currently have to pay two 
direct profit taxes, i) the ILOR, a tax of 14.7% on all types 
of income including profits, and ii) IRPEG, a specific com­
pany profit tax of 25%.
Two concessions relate to the ILOR; the first involves 
full tax exemption for 10 years for all profits arising from
eligible industrial projects located in the Mezzogiorno and
2in the aided areas of the Centre/North ; the second is an ex­
emption of up to 70% of profits made anywhere in Italy but 
reinvested in (SCI-financed) projects in the South.
The third concession is restricted to new enterprises 
with headquarters also established in the Mezzogiorno. It takes 
the form of a rebate of 50% of IRPEG tax liabities, for 10 
years starting from the time profits first arise (as with the 
ILOR concession).
Application for these awards is straightforward (through 
the tax authorities) and the award follows automatically 
through the tax system.
No figures are available on the cost of this particular
incentive.
1This ceiling is due to be in c r e a s e d  in line with inflation and 
projects over this size are also to become eligible for (non— 
-concessionary) loans after the first Lit. 15 billion.
2In these areas only small/medium sized firms are eligible.
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This subsidy is relatively 
automatic in its functionining and at present consists of a 
full..rebate on social security liabilities for all labour hired 
(after 1 July 1976) in excess of the employment level at that 
date. The concession which is non-project related and only 
available in the Mezzogiorno is due to expire in 1986. Pre­
vious schemes (see "background") expired in 1980. The cost of 
this particular aid is worth noting; in 1975 alone rebates 
in the order of Lit. 701 billion were handed out, representing 
around one half of all expenditure on regional incentives —  
the rest accounted for by investment grants and interest sub­
sidies .
Results: Table 3 below gives the relevant information concern­
ing capital grants awarded, and associated investment and 
employment in the Mezzogiorno for the 1970s. Although the 
figures only relate to capital grants, as we have seen, a pro­
ject qualifying for this will in most cases also benefit frcm the
remaining incentives outliied above. Hence, whilst the job 
creation figures in Table 3 are probably a very close approx­
imation to the overall level of new employment aided by the 
main incentives, the actual level of subsidy (as well as the 
level of associated investment1) is certainly much higher than 
the above figures would suggest.
Overall the figures suggest a higher and fairly sustained 
effort in terms of expenditure after 1971. In terms of assoc­
iated employment, however, there would appear to be little, 
if any, corresponding improvement. Of note is the substantial 
decline in the amount of awards and associated employment in 
1979.
Table 4 gives the regional breakdown of aided employment 
associated with investment subsidies from 1950 to 1979. The 
figures are subdivided into two areas, i) Southern Italy, and
^This occurs because of the wider coverage of soft loans as com­
pared to grants.
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TABLE 3: VALUE OF CAPITAL GRANTS, ASSOCIATED INVESTMENT AND 
JOBS AIDED IN THE MEZZOGIORNO OVER THE 1970s
Capital grants / value of grants
awarded1 
(billion lire)
year current prices
/ associated / jobs forecas 
investment2 ('OOOs) 
(billion lire)
current prices
1970 53.4 377 69.7
1971 61.7 393 98.1
1972 134.3 884 103.3
1973 207.0 1,170 80.9
1974 363.6 2,020 69.6
1975 296.9 1,272 79.6
1976 337.4 1,253 n. av.
1977 334. 9. 1,454 60.8
1978 622.8 2,196 65.8
1979 449.2 1,618 36.5
Total 1970-79 
approx. = 700,000joW.
Note : The figures above relate to awards. Since there is al­
ways a lag between awards made and payment or invest­
ment, the above figures may not coincide with grants 
paid, investment realised or jobs created over the pe­
riod considered.
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Bilancio, Appendice stati­
stica, Relazione, various years.
1The figures are not comparable with the previous table since 
they concern authorized awards rather than actual payments:in 
any one year (Table 40c), 1977, op. cit., and table 24, Rela­
zione 1978/9.
2To 1977, Table 40b, 1977, op. cit., for 1978/9 Table 24, Re­
lazione .
3To 1975 App. stat. Table 17, from 1977 on, Relazione, various, 
table 24. No figures traceable for 1976.
.ii) the regions of the centre which are also covered by the 
main regional incentives. For the Southern regions we compare 
the share of jobs aided with a standardisation measure, that 
is, the regional share of southern population. This has not 
been possible for the Centre regions, as we have no knowledge 
of the actual population covered in these partially classi­
fied areas1.
Taking firstly into consideration the South it is to be 
noted that four of the eight regions have consistently main­
tained a level of job "creation" roughly proportional to their 
size (i.e. Campania, Puglia,- Basilicata, Sardegna).
In contrast, the two southernmost regions, Calabria and 
Sicilia have consistently maintained a level of aided job 
"creation" at roughly one half of this level.
The northernmost region, Abruzzi, has on the other hand 
consistently maintained a substantially higher level of job 
"creation" relative to its size; a tendency which appears to 
have strengthened in the past few years.
Perhaps one of the most remarkable findings, however, is 
that the classified areas of the centre regions (Toscana, 
Marche, Lazio) accounting for less than 7% of the Mezzogiorno 
have accounted for such a large proportion of overall aided 
employment creation —  16.1% from 1950-75 and 18.6% from 1977- 
79.
On reflection however, it is not particularly surprising, 
especially given that over 60% of aided jobs have come from 
new establishments rather than extension projects, that a 
policy which provides the same level of subsidy in more de- 
veloped Central regions as in less developed peripheral re­
gions should be more effective and attract more projects in 
the former than in the latter. There would seem to be a good
1 There is a certain ambiguity here since the term "Mezzogiorno" gener­
ally refers, in normal usage, only to the regions of the South listed 
above. The area of activity of the Cassa does not otherwise conform to 
any statistical or administrative unit.2In 1970, for example, G.D.P. per head in Lazio was 11% above the national 
average whilst Calabria had a level of GDP per head of seme 52% of the nat­
ional average. E.C. Basic statistics 1975-76.
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TABLE 4 : EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATED WITH INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES
AWARDED BY REGION, 1950-1975 and 1977-1979(inclusive)
Region 1950-75 1977-1979 1977-1979 population 
as % South 
(1979)
jobs aided as 
% sub total for 
South
jobs fore­
cast
jobs fore­
cast as % 
sub total 
for South
Mezzogiorno1
Toscana(Elba)) 215 (
Marche ) 16.1% of 5,986 ( 18.6% of
Lazio ) total 24,152 ( total
South (sub tota1) :
Abruzzi 8.5% 24,176 18.2% 6%
Molise 1.1% 4,639 3.5% 1.7%
Campania 35.4% 40,322 30.4% .27%
Puglia 23.6% 26,371 19.9% 19%
Basilicata 2.9% 3,895 3 % 3%
Calabria 4.0% 8,347 6.3% 10%
Sicilia 13.4% 17,287 13. 0% 25%
Sardegna 11.0% 7,753 5.8% 8%
100 % total» 163,143 = 100 % 100%
As defined by the area of activity of the Cassa per il Mezzo­
giorno, which includes only some parts of Toscana, Marche and 
Lazio.
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, 1975 tav. 20, 1977/8/9, 
tav. 24.
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case for increasing the spatial selectivity of the main incent­
ives in favour of the more peripheral regions where presumably 
the negative influence of locational factors (e.g. distance 
costs) is more hard-felt than elsewhere.
In conclusion, the approach to regional development policy 
in Italy is probably the most comprehensive of any country in 
the European Community. In particular, the role given to state- 
-holding enterprise stands out as a unique experiment in re­
gional planning —  even if its results still need to be assessed 
with a good degree of caution. The establishment of a develop­
ment agency (the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) with substantial 
funds and direct responsibility for industrial and strategic 
infrastructures, is another unique and successful feature of 
Italian policy. Finally, the extent to which industrial infra­
structure needs are assessed and provided for in combination 
with the award of investment incentives (as we have seen, this 
forms part of the application process), is an important feat­
ure which is notably lacking in many other countries.
8.3.3. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
§§£]S2£2H2^*
The Republic of Ireland represents a unique 
case in the Community insofar as for aid purposes, the entire 
national territory qualifies for aid under the E.R.D.F. Al­
though there are indeed significant regional differences 
within Ireland (see Chs. 1 and 2) many of the fundamental 
economic difficulties facing the country are national rather 
than regional in character. Indeed, in terms of the level of 
economic development, GDP per head in Ireland is less than 
one half of the Community average.
Out of a present population of almost 3.2 million, some 
201 of the workforce is still employed in agriculture. The 
very substantial rate of population growth over the 1970s 
(around 1 1/2% per annum) combined with the effects of select­
ive migration over the 1950s and early 1960s, have resulted 
in an extremely skewed population structure and a high de­
pendency ratio —  around one half of the Irish population is 
now below 25 years of age.
In budgetary terms the relatively small tax-yielding po­
pulation base and the needs of providing adequate basic infra­
structure over a sparsely populated area, together with ef­
forts of promoting industrial development have placed a severe 
burden on public finance and the balance of payments*.
Problems of industrial adaptation have added to the task.
In 1966 the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) and in
1973 the accession of Ireland to the EEC and Customs Union,
olaced manv traditional industries which had been built up unde
2tarirr orotection, on a very precarious rooting .
Adaptation has required a substantial increase in product­
ive investment -- in 1960 the investment ratio was only 14%,
T^he Exchequer ' s borrowing recuirsnent nac reacned 14% or QiP cv 1980, and 
the balance of payments deficit 10% or QiP in 19/9.
2"The orccess of adaptation casbined with the effects of recession and in­
flation resulted in almost 43,G00'qualified'redundancies in the three years 
to 1976 and a steeo rise in the unemployment rate", E.C. Regional Develop­
ment Procramme - Ireland, 1977-80, 1378, p. 67.
but had risen to 24% by 1976, reaching 27% in 1977. Official 
sources estimated that a figure of nearer 31% would be required 
to generate the additional employment necessary to compensate 
for redundancies caused by structural adaptation and growth 
of the working population1.
Whilst the development of industrial policy in Ireland 
can therefore be seen in a primarily national context, there 
is nevertheless a certain level of discrimination in favour 
of the least industrialised and less developed areas. A brief 
account is given below.
In 1969, the introduction of the Industrial Development 
Act produced most of the significant changes which are still 
at the basis of present policy: In particular the Industrial 
Development Authority (IDA), which had been formed in 1950, 
was reconstituted as an autonomous state-sponsored organisation 
with the major responsibility for investment grant awards and 
the promotion of industrial development. The two major in­
centives at this time were i) 100% tax relief on export pro­
fits from manufacturing activities for a 15 year period (and 
partial relief for a further five years), and ii) capital grants
with a 10 to 15 percentage point differential as between De- 
2signated and Non-Designated Areas; not available for new pro­
jects (until recently) in the Dublin area. In practice the 
level of discrimination in favour of the less developed areas 
has been fairly high. This arises firstly from the differen­
tial element in the regional grant and secondly from the plan­
ning stragegy of the IDA itself, in favour of such areas.
In terms of physical planning and infrastructure policy, 
it is notable that the swing towards growth-area policy in
1Ibid. , pp. 20 and 63. <*
2An area in the West and South West covering 57.7% of the nat­
ional territory and one third of the total population.
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the late 6 0s (similar to both France and Italy) was never in 
fact implemented. Moreover, from 1972 onwards, the Government 
has continued to follow a policy of dispersed development.
Physical planning in Ireland, no doubt because of the 
nature of the problems at hand, tends to be undertaken at 
national rather than regional level. Nevertheless there are 
quite important regional implications, and the aim is to se­
cure a balanced development of all parts of the country.
Stated objectives include; a major road development plan 
for the 1980s, the creation of additional port facilities in 
Cork and Dublin, the improvement of the telephone service and 
facilities for telex and data transmission, and the form- 
ulation of a comprehensive energy policy .
A final point to note is that infrastructure provision 
and industrial planning and development tend to be closely 
linked, partly due to the close contact between the IDA and 
local authorities, and partly due to the fact that the prov­
ision of government sponsored new and "advance" factories is 
largely the responsibility of the IDA.
T^he Buchanan Report in 1968, identified nine medium-sized towns sufficiently 
removed from Dublin to act as counterweights to the growth of the capital. For 
a fuller discussion see H. O'Neill,"The case for concentration , Irish Bank­
ing Review, Sept. 1973. An important factor is to be borne in mina is the 
extremely weak urban base in Ireland —  in 1971, apart frcro Dublin, only 
seven towns had a population exceeding 20,000, and only a further nine tcwns 
had a population exceeding 10,000. As the abovementioned author carmen ted,
"One finds it difficult to believe that they (the Government and the IDA) 
are seriously suggesting that we live in the cities and ccranute to the 
countryside to work." Ibid., p. 20.
^.C., ibid., annex 4.
1 S'?.
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Incentives administered by the IDA fall under several 
headings. Between 1973-77 almost three-quarters of total ex­
penditure (of around £ 77 million per annum) was accounted 
for by the new-industry and major-expansion programme, whilst 
a further one-fifth was attributable to the re-equipment 
and modernisation programme1. A third programme which has 
seen increasing use in the past few years relates to new 
and existing small firms. These schemes will be considered 
in more detail presently. Other schemes, although of relat­
ively small significance in terms of expenditure, are prim­
arily of "strategic" importance and include: (i) the promotion 
of joint-ventures between Irish and overseas companies, (ii) 
grants towards the current costs of R & D projects, negotiable 
up to a maximum of 50% of such costs or h 50,000 per project, 
whichever is the less (in-house project "feasibility" studies 
are also eligible for grants up to a maximum of 1/3 of 
costs), (iii) the service-industries programme which assists 
firms providing services which were previously imported, or 
which are able to secure business outside Ireland whilst pro­
viding employment within the country (mainly involving engin­
eering and architectural consultancy and computer software);
(iv) the Enterprise Development Programme (started in 1978) 
designed to assist first time entrepreneurs with suitable ex­
perience to establish their own manufacturing businesses; (v) 
under the Industrial Development act (1969) , the IDA is also 
empowered to offer interest rebates, loan guarantees and take 
equity in firms —  these powers have been used extensively as 
from around 1977, and in 1980, total tax based lending repre-
2sented around 17% of total direct funding of industrial policy .
1Yuill et all (1980), p. 120.2Irish Business, August 1981.
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- ¿DA capital grants
(i) New industry_and_major_expansions programme. Under this 
scheme, non-repayable grants are available towards the cost 
of fixed assets, defined as site, site development,buildings, 
new machinery and most equipment. Grants are negotiable up 
to the following legal limits:
- in Designated Areas, 60% of eligible costs
- in non-Designated Areas, 4 5% of eligible costs.
The basic-level of these grants is 40% and 25% respect­
ively. An additional "top-up" of up to 20% may be negotiated 
if additional criteria- are met, including, high-skilled job 
content, high degree of local linkage, high growth potential, 
and technological and scientific content.
Eligibility conditions state that the investment must be 
of a reasonably permanent nature and employment must be either 
created or maintained. Until recently most investments faced 
explicit "aid-per-job" limits.
(ii) Re-Eguipment^modernisation_of existing^industries 
programme. Under this scheme grants are made available towards 
the cost of modernisation of plant and machinery in existing 
firms. The grants are payable up to a maximum of 3 5% of elig­
ible costs in Designated areas and 25% elsewhere.
There are no specific employment conditions, but employ­
ment levels are at least expected to be maintained. Lastly, 
re-equipment grants may not exceed B 85 0,000 except with go­
vernment approval.
The above grants may be supplemented by other eligible 
forms of IDA assistance but only up to the administrative max­
ima already noted.
(iii) Small industries_granti Similar in operation to the 
new industries programme, and available to both new and exist­
ing small firms, with up to 50 employees and fixed assets of
b 400,000. Maximum rates of award are 60% in, Designated areas 
and 45% elsewhere.
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Fi£cal_incentives
In 1978 a new scheme was announced to replace the exist­
ing system of export-profits relief. From 1 January 1981 until 
31 December 2000, Corporation Profits Tax for all manufacturing 
industry is reduced to a new flat rate of 10%. Even so, the 
100% export-profit-tax-relief scheme (outlined earlier) con­
tinues to remain of interest, not least because it will con­
tinue to remain available until 1990 for companies already 
in receipt of it.
Main results
The main (official) results for the 1970s can be summar­
ised as follows1:
- planned investment by IDA grant-aided firms came to
b 2.677 million from 1970-1980. Grants totalling £ 831 million 
were committed to these projects;
- Job approvals associated with this investment amounted
to 192,380 (net of known cancellations), of which 99,000 or
251% were in domestic firms .
One of the problems involved in interpreting these fi­
gures is that there has been little systematic verification 
made by the IDA to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the 
job creation targets of firms in receipt of IDA assistance 
have actually been met; or, if such targets have indeed been 
met, whether they have in fact been maintained over a certain 
period of time.
Table 5 gives a breakdown of the relevant figures for 
1979, a year in which figures were also available on the ac­
tual level of grant-aided job creation (column 4). Of parti­
cular note in Table 5 is the relative success of IDA policies
1IDA, Annual Report 1979.
2Job approvals in small firms (mainly domestic) increased sig­
nificantly as a proportion of the total —  from 9% of total 
approvals in 1970-1 to some 8,240 jobs or nearly 25% of total 
approvals in 1979.
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TABLE 5 : REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF IDA GRANT COMMITMENTS, JOB 
APPROVALS AND JOB CREATION IN 1979 1
1. 2. 3. 4 . 5.
■Manufacturing IDA grant Job approvals Grant aided Actual
employment Jan. aaimitments 1979 jobs change
REGION 1978 in 1979 filled . Jan. 1978-
(£ m) in 1979 Jan. 1979
Donegal** 6,100 3.6 820 500 290
North West *a 4,400 6.1 1,208 420 200
jaWest 13,700 10.5 1,935 1,140 1,100
Mid-West* 17,950 37.6 4 ,978 1,350 1,590
South-West 36,000 28.4 4 ,644 1,680 1,420
j*South-East 25,850 22.6 3,929 2,750 1,360
East 96,500 84.3 13,185 5,270 -1,470
North-East : 17,000 12.6 2,183 1,290 700
Midlands * 12,150 10.8 1,588 1,780 890
TOTALS 229,650 3bm 216.4 34,470 16,240 6,080
1979: Grants commitment per job 
approved = h 6,280^.
Grants commitment as % 
planned investment^ = 43.2%.
Designated Area 
* Part of region in Designated Area
^Source: derived from IDA, Annual Report 1979, p. 25-27, and 
IDA, Industrial Plan 1978-82, p.46.
2Gross job creation in 1979 came to 23,590.
3Grant coramitmeftt per job approved varied from h 2,964 in do­
mestic small industry to h 7,063 in new overseas industry.
^Planned investment associated with IDA grant commitments to­
talled h 501m. in 1979.
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in the least developed and sparsely populated regions along 
the West Coast (Donegal, North-West, West), where new job 
creation in 1979 represented between 8.36% and 9.5% of 1978 
employment levels (Ireland = 7%).
The number of jobs "created" in this year (16,240) must 
however be seen against a level of job approvals of some
18,000 in 1976, 24,000 in 1977 and 30,000 in 1978. Even allow­
ing for reasonable lags between investment and job creation1, 
the figures for 1979 would appear rather low.
As the IDA themselves admit "under the New Industry pro­
gramme some 60% of the expected jobs on average are transla­
ted into actual jobs in five years"
However, since grant payment takes place in stages (short­
ly after bills are submitted to the IDA), one would expect 
investment, job creation and grant payment to bear a fairly 
close relationship.
Nevertheless, it would appear that for the period 1970-78, 
whilst job creation ran proportional to grant payment for 
foreign-owned companies in Ireland, for domestic companies 
"only 14% of approved jobs exist (in 1981) while 45% of approved3grants were paid" . Consequently, the true "grant-cost per 
job created" in domestic industry may be considerably higher 
than Table 5 would suggest, and an independent survey has
4estimated a figure of around h 15,700 .
Whilst it is true that where projects do not commence, no 
grant is paid, it should be taken into account that a large 
part of the award may often be versed towards site develop­
ment, buildings and installation of machinery, before any 
significant employment creation actually takes place.
1In France the maximum "lag" permitted is 3 years, in Ireland 
over 5 years.
^IDA, Industrial Plan 1978-82.
3Irish Business, August 1981 - Summary of report commissioned 
by the National Economic and Social Council (unpublished).
4Ibid.
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In some respects the important drive by the IDA over 
the 1970s to attract foreign manufacturing companies to locate 
in Ireland, is worth considering in more detail.
In 1980 foreign companies employed around 80,000' 
workers in manufacturing or some 34% of the total workforce. 
Between 1970 and 1978, however, out of a total of some 77,000 
IDA job approvals (net of cancellations), only 28,900 jobs 
(i.e. 38%) were actually in existence by 1981. Around 60% of
the job gap is estimated to be due to companies never reaching
job targets, and a further 40% due to companies reaching tar­
gets and not sustaining them1.
In general, whilst representing a substantial share 
of manufacturing employment and exports (around 75% in 1980), 
foreign firms have done little to promote local production
linkages. Moreover the internalised nature of their activities
2generally serves to exclude this possibility from the start . 
In 1976 84% of components and other supplies purchased by 
foreign firms were imported. Length of stay tends to make 
little difference —  companies with plants in production in 
Ireland for over 10 years purchased only 2% more of their 
supplies domestically than recently established firms3.
Ibid. Overall, 38,500 new jobs have been created by foreign 
companies since 1973, but net job creation has been consider­
ably lower given that there have also been some 17,000 re­
dundancies in this sector since that date.
2See discussion of this issue in part III.
3Ibid.
8.3.4. Deglomeration_golicies
Within the present European Community, there are some 
four countries which operate restrictive regional policy meas 
ures. There are generally two major objectives involved in 
these various approaches. The first is to reduce congestion 
(or internalise congestion costs) in the main agglomerations 
by placing certain restrictions (taxes) on the development 
of new industrial/service sector activities. The second and 
related aim, is often to provide a complement to regional 
incentive policies by increasing the volume of "mobile" in­
vestment which is constrained to move out of the congested 
or central areas (the “carrot and stick" effect).
The normal procedure is that a firm wishing to commence 
a new or extension project (i.e. leading to an increase in 
surface area) must in the first instance apply for a permit 
and/or pay a tax. Where only the permit system operates (i.e. 
UK) and a refusal is legally binding, the alternative is 
then either to abandon the project or to locate it elsewhere.
A brief description of controls operating in the late 
1970s is given below:
France ; The two instruments which exist here apply 
only to the Paris region. The first, termed the "Agrément", 
is a surface area based permit system, such that once a firm 
exceeds a given level of floor-space in a controlled area, 
all further extensions become subject to permit approval. The 
fiscal side of the system comprises a congestion different­
iated tax ("Redevance") on all new industrial and office 
floor space in the Paris region (apart from zero-rated peri­
pheral areas of this region). The "Redevance" is paid irres­
pective of the need to obtain an "Agrément", although clearly 
if an "Agrément" is not obtained, the project cannot proceed.
The procedure for award of a permit generally tends to 
avoid direct refusal and subsequent risk of abandonment. The 
individual bargaining process which often ensues, tries to 
ensure that "some projects will be relocated in return for 
others being approved, which provides new employment both in
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Paris and the provinces"1.
Decisions (and bargaining) on the "Agrément" are arrived
at by considering the individual merits of the case in quest-
2ion. Two main criteria are involved :
(i) the mobility potential of the new project. This is 
seen to depend on, firstly, the size of the project; second­
ly, the size of the applicant firm, which is indicative of 
the capacity of the firm to relocate the new project or some 
other part of its operations outside the Paris region.
(ii)The second criterion relates to the so-called "nobility" 
of the project. Generally speaking, projects involving high- 
-level national or international functions have been con­
sidered justified in having a central location on two counts; 
in the first place they enhance the role of Paris as a centre 
for national and international headquarter functions; in the 
second place, they are considered to be less mobile " given 
the lack of suitable high-quality labour outside Paris and >3the unwillingness of this type of labour to move out of Paris" . 
The circularity of this last argument is surely self-evident.
On the other hand, "non-noble" activities with a high 
proportion of low-skilled labour are considered more mobile 
since suitable labour could easily be found in the provinc­
es .
Moreover, this process of functional selectivity has 
been further strenghtened via the bargaining procedure ment­
ioned above - in practice, new projects involving "noble"
activities may be aoproved in return for the relocation of
' 4new or existing "non-noble" activities (activitees banales}
The system described above has been subject to increa­
sing criticism over the past few years'* not least because of
1Allen (1978) , p. 192.
2See ibid., p. 189.
3Ibid., p. 188.  ^ E.C. "Deglomeration policies in the Eur­
opean Community-a comparative study". Regional Policy Series 
No 18, 1981, p.180.
5 Although it has been in operation in more or less the form 
described since around I960-
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its high degree of functional selectivity. This is especially 
brought out in the findings of one study which suggested.." a 
strong link between procedural features of the Agrement and 
the problems of small firms, the decline of low-skilled occ­
upational groups and, at least until the mid-sixties, a str­
icter treatment of the manufacturing sector."^ Ironically, 
whilst smaller firms are in theory less mobile, they are also 
less able to reach a "bargained" solution, which is reflected
in correspondingly higher refusal rates for applications from
2smaller firms.
At present, a substantial degree of change in the operat­
ion of both the Agrement and Redevance seems imminent.
The principle changes proposed include:3 i)"softening" 
of the Agrement, ii) suppression of the Redevance vis indus­
trial projects, iii)increases in the Redevance tax with res­
pect to offices and research laboratories.(to Fr 1,300 m 2).
The industrial tax had remained fixed at between FFr 25 to 
FFr 150 per square metre since 1971, and by 1981 represented
4probably less than 5% of construction costs.
Furthermore, central administration is now being 
actively encouraged to think in terms of decentralisation; 
this has been achieved by prohibiting further expansion of 
civil service establishments in the Paris region and requir­
ing all ministries to present plans for decentralisation.^
In conclusion, considering the very substantial qual­
itative regional differences in employment structure noted 
in Chapter 5, revised French deglomeration policy seems fin­
ally set to match regional problems with adequate policies, 
and marks an important change from a system which effectively 
set workers to the provinces whilst maintaining the main ce­
ntres of decision making in Paris.
1 ibid p.181 2 ibid table 43 3 Le Monde, Dec.1st, 1981
4 ibid ^It is notable that public establishments are also
liable to pay the Redevance; in 1980 around one half of the 
FFr 105 million tax revenue came from this source.
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ITALY
Italian deglomeration policy works on a sim­
ilar two-tier basis. In the first place under the 1971 
Mezzogiorno law, " quoted companies with equity capital 
of more than Lire 5 billion must inform the Ministry for 
the Budget and Economic Planning of their investment plans.
In addition, any expansion of plant in excess of Lire 7 bil­
lion must be communicated to the Ministry."^ If the Ital­
ian authorities do not give a reply within three months of 
submission, the investment plans are allowed to be carried 
out. Investments realised in spite of a negative decision 
become subject to a tax equal to 25% of the cost of the inv­
estment .2
The "Authorisation" requirement applies to the whole 
of Italy and, furthermore, all public companies require auth­
orisation.
Where authorisation is required firms must apply to the 
Ministry of Budget and National Economic Planning. This body 
will then submit a report on the project to the CIPE3 which 
is responsible for the final decision.
In practice there are a number of problems with this 
system. In the first place, given the wide spatial coverage 
of this control it is often difficult for local authorities, 
when planning permission is requested, to determine whether 
or not an Authorisation is also required. In particular it 
may be much more difficult to check whether exemption limits 
are surpassed when factors such as firm size, investment cost 
must be assessed, than under a system which sets floor-space 
control limits.
Trans. Ronzani (1979), p. 143
2 This is notably in contrast to the French system where, as we have seen, the tax must be paid whether or not a permit is given.
3 Carni-tato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica.
In granting the Authorisation factors which in practice tend to be taken 
into account include; employment aspects and labour availability, phys­
ical congestion, environmental implications. See Allen(1979) p. 199.
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This problem is of less importance in the South however, 
since projects in receipt of regional incentives will autom­
atically pass through the CIPE or Ministry for the South, which 
check conformity with Authorisation controls. In practice, for 
large projects the CIPE will decide upon Authorisation and in­
centive awards simulaneously.
At this point it is worth outlining the initial intention 
behind the Authorisation system. In the first place the aim was 
to provide a source of information on investment plans and give 
the authorities scope for initiating a "planned bargaining" pro­
cedure between the state and individual firms. In exchange for 
locating in a state-preferred area (ie the South), the author­
ities would negotiate an appropriate "package" of infrastructure 
provision and investment incentives. In 1976 however, changes 
introduced in the incentive system for the South removed the dis­
cretionary element in the granting of awards for large projects, 
therby putting an effective end to the implementation of "bargai­
ning" procedures.
Given the administrative problems outlined above, the 
lack of explicit area delineation or the establishment of any 
sectoral priorities, it is perhaps not too surprising that the 
Authorisation has never really developed into a major instrum­
ent of Italian regional policy.1 Wheras initially, the project 
tax was meant to constitute the "stick" in planned bargaining
agreements,administrative problems reflected in an overall ref-
2usal rate of a mere 2.7% have effectively diffused even this as­
pect of locational control. It is by now no means clear whether 
the policy as a whole can function either as a relocation inst­
rument ( for which it was intended), or as a decongestion in­
strument (for which it is clearly not suited). In contrast the 
French system appears to be able to combine both of these policy 
objectives.
1 See Ronzani (1979) p.143.
2 E.C. "Deglomeration policies in the European Community",
1981, p.211.
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Comparative analysis
As one comparative study of E.C. deglomeration 
policies points out\ " it is important to note that no' 
country has based its control policy solely on a tax scheme, 
and that in none of the countries has the tax component played 
a dominant role or effectively contributed to the attainment 
of regional policy (as opposed to agglomerational) objectives".
Surely the new guidelines for French disincentive 
policy form a notable exception, and indeed there is no reason 
why a well-defined policy(tax) aimed at balancing 'social1 and 
'private* costs in congested areas should not operate independ­
ently as an effective tool of regional policy. The only expl­
anation why this has not been done up to now is either, firstly 
tha:t governments do not really believe in negative externalities, 
or, secondly, that they are afraid of possible inflationary con­
sequences. Neither argument is particularly convincing.
One clear advantage of tax penalties is that the choice 
of whether or not to locate in a congested area is ultimately 
determined by the firm itself,taking into account perceived 
gains. Furthermore, if tax revenues are used to provide incen­
tives in less developed or problem regions, the tax paying 
firm which chooses to locate in a congested area is in no posit­
ion to claim that production costs have been unduly increased, 
given that alternative low-cost locations have been made avail­
able.
Whilst tax penalties/incentives may be seen as 
cost neutral, and by taking into account 'social' costs achieve 
greater welfare gains, the reasoning behind permit systems is 
less clear. Moreover, it is probable that under adverse economic 
conditions, the indisciminate use of permit systems would lead 
to as many projects being abondoned as relocating, and evidence 
would suggest2that the current recession has led to relaxation 
of permit systems to the point where they may be said to have 
ceased to exist.
E.C. op.cit. p.211 2 ibid p.184.
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Section 8.4. A comparison of the value of incentives and
total national expenditure on regional policy.
The purpose of this section is to put the relev- 
ent figures given in the previous tables on a comparative basis 
and provide a set of reference data on which to make a somewhat 
preliminary assessment of the various policies.
The following table provides a comparison of the 
effective subsidy values of incentives in the top priority reg­
ions of the respective member states. The values are expressed 
in terms of standard valuation measures, that is, in relation 
to initial capital costs, annual capital costs and value added. 
The general method for obtaining these results was outlined in 
the introduction to this chapter and will not be repeated here. 
Suffice it to note that the transition to annual capital costs 
requires certain assumptions to be made regarding asset lives 
and capital cost mix, and the transition to value added requires 
further assumptions on the capital-labour ratio. Hence, the values 
given below may in reality vary somewhat from project to project1
The figures are taken from the European Regional 
Policy Project, and in general refer to the maximum combined 
value of incentives available in 1975. A point to note is that 
capital grants invariably form the most important element of 
the incentive 'package', and range in value from 2.7% of value 
added in Luxembourg to 8.9% in Italy. In terms of spatial diff­
erentiation within countries the degree of net advantage bes­
towed on l.d.r.'s varies significantly from case to case. In
In fact several aids are not included in table 6 due to 
various problems of estimation; these include i) export 
profit tax relief in Ireland, ii) social security concess­
ions in Italy, iii) local business tax concessions in France.
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Table 6
Effective subsidies as a percentage of various denominators -
region in each country. EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SLsSIDi:
COUNTRY
MAIN PROBLEM 
REGION
INCENTIVE
COMBINATIONS
INITIAL
CAPITAL
COSTS
ANNUAL
CAPITAL
COSTS
VALUE
ADDED
Belgium Development Zones CG+IS+AD 11.3 10.1 3.3
Denmark Special Develop­ment Regions 'CS+IG 15.4 13.8 5.2
France Award Zone 1 RDG+SDA 13.5 12.2 3.7
Germany Zonenrandgebi et IA+IG+SDA 18.2 15.5 5.3
Ireland Designated Areas IDA grant + IA 34.7 32.1 10.0
Italy Mez2ogiomo CG+NSL 46.3 41.7 12.1
Luxembourg CG+TC 7.8 7.1 2.7
Netherlands Development Areas IPR+AD 15.9 13.7 4.9
United
Kingdom
■Special Develop­
ment Areas RDG+IB.G 21.5 21.7 ■4.8
Incentive keys:
Belgium: capital grant (CG); interest subsidy (IS); accelerated depreciation (AO) 
Denmark: company soft loan (CSi); investment grant (IG)
France: regional development grant (RDG)-; special depreciation allowance (STA.)
Germany: investment allowance (IA); investment grant (IG)-; special deprecia- 
tioa- allowance (SDA)
•Ireland: Industrial Development Authority (IDA) grant; investment allowance (IA) 
Italy: capital grant (CG); national soft loan (NSL)
Luxembourg: capital grant (CG); tax concession (TC)
Netherlands: investment premium (IPR); accelerated depreciation (AD)
United Kingdom: regional development grant (RDG); interest relief grant (IRG)
Source : K. Allen,"Regional incentives in the E.C? Berlin 19 78,
Italy there is a substantial relative advantage to be gained 
from an l.d.r. location {ie. Mezzogiorno); in terms of value 
added a difference between sane 11.0% for a priority (medium 
-size) location in the South, around 2.3% in a depressed area 
of the centre-north, and 1.6% elsewhere.1 In France, spatial 
differentiation is less marked with only a one percentage
1 Allen (1978), op.cit. p.152
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point difference (in terms of value added) between each of 
the three award zones. Ireland is an intermediate case with 
a fairly reasonable degree of preference towards the desig­
nated areas - as a proportion of value added the maximum 
level of subsidy may reach 10% in these areas, 6.9% in the 
non-designated areas and 5% in Dublin.
At the Community level one finds a degree of 
net advantage in the order of some 5 percentage points (va­
lue added), between peripheral and more central areas. A 
notable exception here is the South-West of France where 
the effective subsidy value, even at its maximum, is well 
below that in some of the more developed central areas.
Table 7 gives a breakdown of the main financial 
incentives by country for 1974. The figures are taken from 
a working paper of the European Commission (1976), and con­
cern direct aids only - that is, excluding infrastructure 
aids, sectoral aids and various minor incentives. Unfort­
unately they are not comparable with a more up to date set 
of figures published by the Commission in 1979.1
Table 7. Direct regional aids in the EEC countries, 1974
Typ« Belgium Denmark Germany France Ireland Italy _uxem- Nether- United E£C 
fcxclud- bourg lands King­
ing West dom
Berlin^
24.9Capital subventions 
Interest allowance & aid in 
loans at reduced rates 63.2
Employment premiums & social 
security concessions —
Fiscal exemptions 8.5
Aid for purchase of industrial 
land & buildings 1.8
Cost of state guarantees granted 
for security of loans 1.8
Total 100.0
Million UA 116.7
S o f C D ?  ' 0.28
36.2
47.8
6.1
" 9.9
100.0 
8.7 ! 
0.04
6S.8 55.1
0.4§
42.5 22.4
5  13 3
*4.0
2.4
100.0
15.2 51.8
34.2 34.9 07.7} 11.9 38.6
63.6 45.8
§. 8.0
(30.6) 30.8 
-  12.7
9.6 4.6 - 15.0 5.8 2.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
435.8 124.0 114.2 1J4S.8 4.3
0.14 0.06 2.15 0.96 0.25
0.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 
21.1 1,037.7 3.015.8 
0.05 0.68 0.33*
Source: EEC Working paper, 1976.
* The GDP of West Berlin is included
E . C . , 1 9 7 9 , "L es  r e n i m e s  d ' a i d e  r e g i o n a l e  d a n s  l a  C .E .
A *  I n t r o d u c e d  s i n c e  1974 (w h e re  known) 
i n  v a l u e  o r  e l i c i n a t è d  (w h e re  known) 
i n  v a l u e ( w h e r e  k n o w n ) .  F o r  Denmark t h e  f i n u r e  f o r  
1977 i s  some 3 0 m .u . a .  ( E . C . , o p . c i t . l 9 7 9 )
(-)*■ s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e d u c e d  
- s u b s e q u e n t l y  i n c r e a s e d
E.C., "The regional development programmes", 1979,p.250,table 4. 
These figures do not cover fiscal concessions or labour subsidies 
and are not disaggregated by incentive type.
Table 7 has been revised as far as 
possible regarding the incentives on offer. The general 
tendency has been towards more comprehensive coverage con­
cerning aid-type, although whether this has actually led 
to any significant increase in overall spending on region­
al incentives is difficult to tell for the present.
The main incentives would appear to be 
capital grants, fiscal concessions and 'soft' loans. This 
last incentive appears to have gained increasing popular­
ity in several countries since the mid-1970's. Labour sub­
sidies, however defined, are really only of major import­
ance in Italy, where as we have seen, the present scheme 
is due to expire in_1986.
As a proportion of GDP, expenditure on 
direct regional aids varies considerably from country to 
country, with the relatively highest shares of spending 
being undertaken in Ireland, Italy and the U.K.. It should 
be emphasised however that this difference has not so much 
to do with the spatial coverage of such aids as with aid 
intensity —  in most countries the population covered by 
designated development areas was fairly similar at between 
27% to 36% of the total. In Belgium and the U.K. the fig­
ures were 42% and 45% respectively, and in the Netherlands 
17% ]
Table 8 gives figures on the number of jobs 
(created or maintained) associated with direct regional 
aids for 1974. Expenditure figures from the previous table 
are also given for comparison, and the member states are 
placed in descending order of total incentive expenditure.
It should be noted that job creation figures are 
in all cases associated with capital grants or loans only. 
This arises from the fact that other incentives tend to 
supplement the basic regional grant leaving the job creation
1 Figures for 1978, Yuill,Allen and Hull (1980),p .216.
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Table 8 . Direct regional aids and associated
employment, 1974 .
Country : Expenditure »million U.A. New employment
Italy 1,148.8 d 69,600 b
U.K.
w.Germany • 
France
1,037.7
435.8
124.0
15,600 a
105,502 (new) , 
148, 175 (maintained)
43,128 b
Belgium 116.7 23,525
Ireland 114.2 16,333 b
Netherlands 2 1. i approx 6, 500
Denmark 8.7 n.av.
Luxembourg 4.3 200300
= 3,015.8 mi.u.a. = 280,500 approx.
Source : see table 7. For Ireland see, IDA Annual Rep.1977
a) including jobs maintained - figures for "selective 
financial assistance" (loans) only.
b) capital grants only, c) annual average over per­
iod 1967-77.
d) this figure includes interest rebates on loans 
made in the centre/north, whilst the employment 
figures relate to the South only. The difference 
involved is probably around 50 m.u.a.
Note : Whilst expenditure figures relate to actual spen­
ding in the given year, the employment figures 
relate to expected employment resulting from awards 
made in that year.
figures essentially unchanged. Where fiscal concessions 
operate with a somewhat broader spatial coverage, (eg. 
France,Italy) there are unfortunately no figures avail­
able on associated employment creation.
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The above points are important when comparing 
incentive cost and job creation. For example, around one 
half of total expenditure in Italy went towards social 
security concessions, and in the U.K. around 40% (early 
1970's) went towards the Regional Employment Premium.
Wheras the former scheme covered additional employment 
units only, the U.K. subsidy covered all employment units 
in manufacturing industry, and as such constituted an op­
erating aid not linked to new employment creation. Whilst 
the U.K. employment figures in table 8 are in any case 
substantially underrepresented(see footnote), the Italian 
figures are probably low to the extent that no specific 
account is taken of new employment directly attributable 
to the social security concession.
A more general consideration, and one we have 
already pointed to in a number of instances concerns the 
difference between declared job creation and realised 
new employment. The degree to which grant payment is lin­
ked to job realisation varies somewhat from case to case, 
and some countries are stricter than others in controlling 
the extent to which job targets are actually met. As a 
result, actual job creation, as we have noted in several cases, 
often tends to be below declared job targets. The exact 
extent of this difference is not known in many cases, but 
as we have seen for Ireland;such discrepancies may well 
be considerable —  with the general effect of raising 
aid cost per job created.
Finally, the term 'job creation' is in 
itself somewhat misleading. Quite clearly a certain prop­
ortion of aided projects could be expected to proceed 
anyway, although perhaps in a somewhat reduced form. In 
other cases regional aids may influence location rather 
than the actual decision of whether to invest or not.On 
the other hand regional employment creation may be higher
to the extent that inter-industry linkages create demand 
for locally produced inputs, and to the extent that the 
initial increase in regional income is enhanced through 
the multiplier effect.
In a fundamental sense the employment impact 
of regional aids will depend on whether or not they are 
considered as 'windfall' gains and, conversely, to what 
extent they enter into the firm's location and investment 
decision making. We shall now turn to consider this asp­
ect in more detail. The following chapter will take up 
the problem of determining the actual level of employm­
ent creation directly attributable to regional incentives.
8.5. Summary ; some preliminary considerations on the 
effectiveness of the various instruments.
Before making any detailed comments about sp­
ecific instruments to which we shall proceed shortly, it 
is worthwhile to provide some background to the economics 
of investment and employment subsidies.
In the first place we should make clear the 
distinction between non-spatially differentiated national 
subsidies, and those which have a clear element of net 
regional preference. Essentially, for national subsidies 
there are two effects to consider —  firstly, the 'income' 
effect on profit-maximising output, investment and empl­
oyment, and secondly, the 'substitution' or relative pr­
ice effect on the optimal capital/labour ratio.
At the regional level there is a third factor 
to consider; the displacement effect, or the extent to 
which investment that would have taken place elsewhere 
is diverted to a favoured location.
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Inve£tment_subs id ie s.
Much confusion has arisen in the past con­
cerning the possible labour displacement effects of inv­
estment subsidies, and is generally the result of view­
ing such incentives solely in terms of relative factor 
prices.
However, whilst an investment subsidy will cer­
tainly affect relative factor prices for (additional1)
investment and therefore to some extent the resulting
2capital/labour ratio, the final outcome in terms of empl­
oyment will clearly also depend on the ’income’ effect, 
or the extent to which output is higher than would other­
wise have been the case.
As one author has remarked : " the essence of 
a subsidy to investment is not primarily to induce sub­
stitution along a given production frontier, but to make 
profitable projects that were previously just below the 
margin of profitability" 3
Conventional analysis of this subject typically 
assumes that investment subsidies cover all investment 
units and not just marginal ones (eg.Thirlwall,op.cit.). 
As a result the final outcome, that is whether more or 
less labour is hired, will clearly depend on the rel­
ative stregths of the 'substitution' and 'income' eff­
ects, and, ex ante, there is no way of telling whether 
more or less labour will be employed. The essential diff­
erence between the two approaches arises due to the fact 
that wheras a subsidy on additional investment may leave
Ihis is a distinction we make throughout the following analy­
sis, unless otherwise stated. In ether words, all aids are 
assumed to apply to new investment only (inc. extensions) 
rather than straight replacement investment.
It is woz'h noting that this will occur only in the case 
where alternative techniques are available.
3 Thirlwal], (H.M.S.O. 1976), p.100.
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the initial structure intact^- a subsidy covering replacem­
ent investment may well affect the existing productive str­
ucture with indeterminate effects on the initial level of 
employment.
Taking account of the abovementioned consid­
erations, we may note that a regionally differentiated 
investment subsidy may result in an increase in the level 
of regional employment ;
i) to the extent that otherwise non-profitable projects 
which would not have gone ahead are implemented,
ii) to the extent that profitable projects which would 
have gone ahead anyway are not induced to employ a 
lower level of additional labour than would otherwise 
have been the case.
iii) to the extent that (profitable) projects which would 
otherwise have located elsewhere are induced to move 
to the designated development areas.
Conversely, an investment subsidy will result in a lower 
level of new regional employment ;
i) to the extent that profitable projects which would have 
gone ahead anyway or would have located in a develop­
ment region, are induced to employ a lower level of 
additional labour due to the substitution of capital 
for labour (net of any 'income' effects) in the final 
production process.
The (net) employment effect of a regional investment sub­
sidy will, at a national level, depend on the final out­
come of the respective 'income'and’substitution' effects, 
which will in turn be positively affected to the extent 
that new projects are induced (domestic or foreign) or 
planned projects are expanded.
 ^ In fact, there may be two opposite and indirect effects on the lev­
el of existing output and employment. In the first place, where new 
investment is canplsnentary there may be positive effects on the 
level of existing capacity utilisation. Secondly, where new activ­
ities in sane sense substitute for existing production or inputs 
there may be a negative or displacement effect on existing capacity.
A final point which should be emphasised at this stage is 
that, at a regional level, the more important employment 
effects shouLd be expected to arise more from the diversion 
of 'profitable1 projects from elsewhere, than from the encou­
ragement of otherwise non-profitable ventures.1 To achieve 
this it is clear that regional subsidies should be made as 
spatially selective as possible; if the intention is to 
attract profitable projects to l.d.r.ls, then there is lit­
tle point in subsidising projects which would have located 
in an .l.d.r. anyway, or diverting profitable projects from 
one development area to another. Clearly,the liklihood of 
either of these outcomes will increase as the proportion 
of designated development area becomes larger. At the limit, 
a policy which subsidises everyone everywhere will have 
little influence over industrial location.
Re£ional_factor subsidiejs and marke^structure^
Whether or not market structure may influence 
the operation and effectiveness of a factor subsidy is a 
question we shall now turn to consider. Specifically, there 
may be good reasons to believe that the net effect on out­
put will in general be greater under competitive conditions 
than under monopoly. The intuitive interpretation is that 
whilst under monopoly, price and marginal revenue decline 
as output increases, under competitive conditions price and 
marginal revenue can be assumed to be invariable given that 
the increase in output is small in relation to total market 
demand. The outcome is illustrated graphically below.
'Non-profitability' as such is, of course a very complex 
concept to define ex ante. In the first place as mention­
ed previously, it may result from relative locational 
disadvantage of one kind or another. In the second place, 
profitability may also depend on the investment decisions 
of other firms; as such the decision of one firm to inv­
est in a l.d.r. may improve the profitability of other 
projects in the same area ('capacity' effect).
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Figure 1 presents the long-run cost and revenue funct­
ions facing two firms, one a monopolist and the other under 
competitive market conditions.
The average-cost curves are long-run in the sense that 
bothe capital and labour are assumed to be flexible,and high­
er levels of output may be achieved using the optimum combin­
ation of both inputs.
For the purposes of analysis, all costs are assumed to 
be variable costs and the factor subsidy is assumed to repres­
ent a fixed proportion of marginal costs1. Neither of these 
assumptions appears to be particularly unrealistic given the 
long run nature of the analysis and the character of the aids 
to regional development in question.
That is i) where factor costs remain unchanged; a fixed 
subsidy per factor unit employed, and ii) where factor 
costs rise with output; a factor subsidy proportional 
to unit factor costs.
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The effect of this type of aid is to move the marginal cost 
curve, MC, downwards to the extent depicted by M C ' in fig 1.
The new (subsidised) level of marginal cost is only available 
however for additional capacity; which,for the monopolist inv­
olves all levels of output above qm , and for the competitive
£firm all levels of output above q --  these being the initial
profit maximising positions under the respective market condit­
ions .
Given the above observations it is clear that aver­
age cost will decline only for additional levels of output; that 
is, to LAC' for the monopolist and LAC" for the competitive firm.
The new profit maximising levels of output become
m 1q for the monopolist, and, under the assumption that price in
c c 'the competitive market remains unchanged (at p ), q for the
competitive firm.
In figure l.this results in a higher absolute and
proportional increase In output for the competitive firm. It also
results in super normal profits being achieved at the post-subsidy
c 'level of output q
The reader who is not yet convinced of the certainty
of this result is invited to consider the situation where ARm
represents the marginal rather than the average revenue curve
facing the monopolist^. In this case it can be seen that the
post-subsidy level of monopoly output would lie midway between 
c c 1q and q . However, the cost of the subsidy (being proportional 
to marginal costs) would come to somewhat less than one half of 
the subsiy paid to the competitive firm, due to the fact that 
marginalcosts are rising over the levels of output considered.
inIn this case MC intersects with MR‘at the level of out- 
. c put q .
In the-case of the competitive firm it should finally 
be noted that the availability of a subsidy which operates at 
the margin is of major interest only where the firm was prev­
iously earning normal or super-normal profits. Where the firm 
was originally making a loss, it is unlikely that a subsidy on 
additional capacity would lower LAC" sufficiently for the firm 
to at least 'break even'. An operating subsidy on all units of 
output would be much more likely to have this effect - that is, 
to prop up enterprises which would otherwise have no long-term 
viability.
Figure 2. presents a similar analysis for a typical 
firm under oligopoly. Under oligopolistic market conditions the 
reactions of other large firms producing similar products, to 
changes in price and output must also be taken into account.
The general assumption in the "kinked demand curve" 
model (fig.2) is that whilst competitors will generally follow 
a price cut, they will tend not to follow a price increased 
This situation results in a discontinuity in the marginal rev­
enue curve facing the producer (aaD) such that relatively small
»
shifts in the long-run marginal cost curve (MC to MC ) . are un­
likely to result in the firm changing either price or output.
The main conclusion to be drawn from the above anal­
ysis is that market structure is indeed an important element to 
be considered when assessing the potential output (and employ­
ment) effects of industrial and regional subsidies.
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The argument being that where one of a small group of firms 
raises its price, other firms will be content to allow their 
volume of sales to subsequently increase without adjusting 
price.
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Note : After Laidler (1974). dad represents the demand
curve facing the oligopolist where other firms do not react 
to a change in price or output of the firm in question.
DAD represents the demand curve where other firms are expected 
to adjust prices in the same direction. The availability of 
a factor subsidy does not affect equilibrium output q, or 
price p.
In particular, the analysis lends support to the gener­
al case (see introduction) for making subsidies in principle 
conditional upon net addition to capacity. Subsidies to oper­
ating costs, whilst increasing profitability, do virtually 
nothing that could not be achieved by subsidies which operate 
at the margin.
In order to avoid the possibility of capital / labour 
substitution, it may be further desirable to link the subsidy 
in some way to net additions to the workforce. An example here 
is the new regional development grant in France with a value 
of up to FFr. 50,000 per new job created, restricted to a ceil­
ing of 25% of investment costs.
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Labour_subsidies".
When used, labour subsidies in the European Comm­
unity are, for reasons already mentioned, applicable only to 
additional units hired. It is nevertheless worthwhile to spend 
a few words at this point on considering the logic behind 
'blanket' labour subsidies such as the Regional Employment 
Premium in the U.K.. Such considerations are not without inter­
est given the great claims which were made at the outset and 
the expectation that R.E.P. would operate in an equivalent 
manner to a regional'devaluation'.
In the first place, reference to our previous 
discussion would bring us to conclude that insofar as it con­
stituted an operating aid, R.E.P. may have had just as much 
effect in propping up unprofitable firms as in encouraging prof­
itable expansion of output. As such it is perhaps not surpris­
ing that its eventual withdrawal caused much complaint from 
firms which had been in receipt of it for sane years.
Secondly, the assumed equivalence of a regional 
devaluation and perpetual wage subsidy is itself open to ques­
tion1-, as is the somewhat more fundamental assertion that a 
wage subsidy, by increasing the level of exports may serve to 
raise regional growth rates. On the latter point, even if we 
admit that a wage subsidy may permanently lower regional ex­
port prices and hence raise the absolute level of exports, this
is by no means a sufficient condition for the regional growth
2rate to be raised permanently.
In the first place, because a devaluation also imposes the 
penalty of higher import prices, and hence provides an added 
incentive to improve efficiency in the import-competing sector. 
In the second place due to the fact that when a wage subsidy 
is mainly or largely used to increase profits, the expansionary 
effect on output and employment is correspondingly reduced (see 
annex ch3) .
2 Specifically, it would require either, the rate of growth of 
exports to be some function of the level of export prices, or 
regional growth to be some function of the absolute level' of 
exports —  neither of which assuptions has any theoretical base. 
See Thirlwall (HMSO,1976), p.103, and annex to growth model der­
ived earlier.
A third set of considerations concerns the actual 
effectiveness of the R.E.P. in question. In the first instance, 
as Kaldor (1970) pointed out, the level of subvention would 
have to be very substantial in order to improve the competit­
ive position of the depressed areas; a 6% reduction in labour 
costs would allow only about a 2% reduction in the level of 
regional export prices, given that a large proportion of the 
total cost of regional output consists of value added by firms 
located in other regions.
In the second place, from what can be gathered on 
the actual use to which R.E.P. was put, industrial enquiry 
results suggest1 that around 40% went towards higher profits, 
50% towards lowering prices and sales promotion, and 10% tow­
ards higher wages. Over one half of firms questioned stated 
that R.E.P. had resulted in their undertaking more investment 
in development area plants than would otherwise have been the 
case. At the limit however, it is of course possible that a 
labour subsidy on existing productive capacity may result in 
the greater part of additional investment (arising from higher 
profits) being located in new or existing plants elsewhere (Ho­
lland 1976). In the third place, the observed employment impact 
of R.E.P. has not been convincing. At the outset one of the 
main objectivss of the policy ( apart from attracting labour 
intensive activities to the problem regions) was to improve 
competitivity in local enterprises, and help prevent closures 
and redundancies in traditional sectors (eg. textiles) by giv­
ing these firms time to adjust to changing market conditions 
and production techniques.
However, from what can be gathered from the results 
of various studies covering the period 1967 (when R.E.P.was in­
troduced) until 1971, the impact on new employment creation 
has been extremely limited.
1 Moore and Rhodes (HMSO 1976) p.213. Out of some 300 develop­
ment area firms approached, only around one third(mostly the 
larger ones) had made a"formal and concious decision as to how 
R.E.P. was to be used" (ibid.). For the sample of firms as a
whole, R.E.P. receipts were found to be as high as the equival­
ent of 21% of pre-tax profits (ibid.).
In particular, the survey sample mentioned earlier revealed 
that 39% of firms (119 out of 291 replies) questioned felt 
that employment had not been affected in any way by R.E.P.
Only 56 firms (representing however 27% of sample employment) 
stated that closures/redundancies had been avoided due to 
the R.E.P. , with job saving representing some 13% of total 
employment in these firms(op.cit.p.214/5).
The above survey results must however be seen in the 
light of more recent studies covering the same period (1967-71). 
MacKay and Thomson (1979)- for example,-found little evidence 
after allowing for the influence of firm movement^and industrial 
structure, of improved indigenous firm performance in the five 
years after the introduction of R.E.P.. Moreover, a disaggreg­
ated analysis of their results shows that in two of the assisted 
areas which experienced signs of improvement, less than one half 
of local manufacturing firms received R.E.P., whilst in three
out of four regions where R.E.P. was paid to nearly all firms
2indigenous firm performance declined.
A final argument in support of labour subsidies is that 
they may"redress the possible labour-saving bias in factor prop-
3 'ortions introduced by capital subsidies". The argument that a 
subsidy to wage costs will lead to the use of more labour inten­
sive techniques is however dependent on the assumption that there 
exists plenty of room for variation in the production process and 
a high elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. 
Where lack of alternative technologies places limitations on the 
available choice of factor mix, small reductions in the price of 
labour are unlikely to result in changes in the capital-labour 
ratio. Support for this view is given by the findings of one
That is, new firms which established in these areas frcm 1960 onwards.
2 MacKay and Thomson (1979) ,p.252. These findings would seem to contradict 
the results of a similar and earlier study (where firm movement was not sep­
arately considered), which suggested that R.E.P. may have been responsible 
for seme 20,000 additional jobs in the D.A.'s fran 1968-71; Moore and Rhodes,
E.J. vol 83,1973'. Whilst R.E.P. may well have had sane effect in diverting 
firms to the problem regions, it is hcwever significant that the major share 
of expenditure on R.E.P. went to firms already operating in these areas (Ash­
croft, 1978).
3 Thirlwall, (HMSO,1976).
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report.^which drew attention to the fact that no evidence could 
be found to suggest that R.E.P. had led to labour/capital sub­
stitution on any significant scale. Similarly, the argument that 
the simultaneous use of labour subsidies is necessary to compen­
sate for the capital bias of investment subsidies, found little 
support insofar as evidence did not show that the latter had in­
duced firms to employ more capital intensive techniques than mi­
ght otherwise have been the case (ibid.).
Whilst the above analysis has largely centred around 
the Regional Employment Premium which applied to all and not 
just additional labour units, there is unfortunately little to 
be gained from further consideration of marginal labour subsidies. 
In particular, the latter may raise additional problems of ineq- 
uity for firms which do not receive it ; the main point being 
that whilst capital grants, loan finance etc. are potentially 
available to all eligible firms wishing to expand, a marginal 
labour subsidy (which becomes the equivalent of a 'blanket' sub­
sidy for new firms) gives a 'competitive' edge over existing firms 
which, at the limit, short of making workers redundant to take on 
others, will not be able to compete on equal terms.3
In conclusion it can be said that the cost of R.E.P. —  
amounting to up to 41% of total expenditure on regional incentives
—  would appear particularly high in view of it's somewhat limited 
impact on new employment creation. Whilst the R.E.P. was probably 
useful in terms of reducing or postponing closures/redundancies in 
labour intensive 'traditional' sectors, it should be asked whether 
a short-term sectoral strategy (eg. textiles) would not have been 
more cost-effective in this respect.
 ^Moore and Rhodes (HMSO,1976),p.218.
2 ibid. They do not however go on to point out the precise nature of the prob- 
lens involved, which in the view of the present author are such as to pranpt
severe doubts regarding their desirability at any level.
3 eg Italy. Inthe Italian case,however,these effects were perhaps minimal inso 
far as many smaller scale enterprises effectively avoided such contributions
in the first place. In more modem sectors there vould anyway have been few
direct competitors in the local market (see Part 3).
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Selectlvity_and Jjidustrial subsidies
A few words should finally be said about whether 
industry specific (or variable rate) subsidies are likely to be 
more effective in promoting regional development than non-selec- 
tive subsidies. Two separate considerations relating to demand 
and supply aspects are worth noting.
Firstly, in the sense that a shift towards produc­
tion of goods with high growth prospects and a high income elas­
ticity of demand is essential to improve a lagging region's gr­
owth rate1 it may clearly be desirable to single out such indus­
tries for particular encouragement.2
Secondly, In order to improve secondary linkage 
effects on local supplier firms, it may further be desirable to 
single out activities which, for particular regions would be lik­
ely to have especially favourable matrix multipliers. Oiie obvious 
advantage would be that of avoiding the situation where firms may 
be attracted to certain regions by high levels of subsidy at the 
expense of other problem regions where surplus capacity may exist 
in relevent supplier industries.
In general, the main practical difficulty with this 
approach is that whilst input-output analysis may tell us some­
thing about the location of industrial inputs on average, at the 
margin and for new firms such results can only be considered a 
rough guidline. In particular, as we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, 
industrial linkage patterns are often determined by firm structure 
and the functional position of a production unit within the cor­
porate whole. The importance of ensuring that new firms in depres­
sed areas do not create more direct and indirect activity, else­
where, has however led one author (Thirlwall,1976), to suggest 
that subsidies should be offered on the condition that the indus­
tries concerned bought a certain proportion of their inputs from 
specific regional suppliers.
1 See growth model outlined earlier and introduction to this 
chapter.
2 Not solely in terms of financial incentives; external econom­
ies such as the availability of research facilities or skilled 
labour force may be equally important.
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Some „concluding remark^ on_the_var_ious_incentives.
In this section we shall conclude by outlining some of the adv­
antages and disadvantages of the major regional incentives to 
be found in the countries considered.
Investment grants
As we have seen, these tend to be the single most im­
portant regional incentive in most E.C. countries.
A grant system has the advantage of being simple to 
operate, easily differentiable at sectoral or spatial level and 
transparent at the level of the receiving firm.
A substantial element of discrimination can be achieved 
with investment grants"; in the first place they may be item rel­
ated to cover only directly productive investment expenditure; 
in the second place they may be made available only for truly 
'mobile' production processes (eg.France) to encourage firm mov­
ement, or may be directed towards industries using natural res­
ources (eg.Italy) to encourage local processing.
Neverthe'les's problems may arise particularly where such 
assistance is largely automatic in character insofar as grants 
may be given to firms which would anyway have located in a dev­
elopment region1.
An even greater problem however is that quite substant­
ial levels of assistance may be given to projects which create 
very few jobs, and, as we have seen minimum job requirements 
vary considerably from country to country. Whilst this problem 
can to some extent be avoided by setting alternative ceilings 
on aid per job created, there is the additional question of wh­
ether and to what degree awards should be phased to coincide 
with job creation targets. Since many firms clearly exaggerate 
potential job creation figures when applying for an award, there 
is obviously a case for linking aid payment to actual job creat­
ion or making stated targets legally binding (ie. subject to re­
payment) . In this respect, whilst the French system (up to 1982) 
was probably too strict (max. 3yr time-lag allowed), the Irish 
system, as we have noted appears to have attatched too little
cf. Klassen(1980),vis.West Central Scotland Plan.
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importance to this problem (only around 60% of job creation is 
expected within 5yrs.).
Certainly some distinction needs to be made bet­
ween new-start and extension projects1; from a study of the empl­
oyment build-up in over 200 newly established factories in the 
U.K. Northern region between 194 6-70 (MOORE & RHODES,1976), it 
was found that nearly three-quaters of eventual employment could 
be expected within three years, building up to a 'mature' work­
force after a total of some eight years. In the case of extension 
projects employment build-up was generally much faster.
'Soft*loans
There is an obvious and close relationship between 
investment grants and preferential loans. The grant equivalent 
of soft loans is simple to estimate and in some countries loans 
are offered as an alternative to grants.
Awards are generally administered through public or 
private credit instituions, and this may have two advantages; 
firstly, the award will typically be subject to the normal ev­
aluation procedures of the institutions concerned; secondly, 
accessibility is generally good and request procedures are fair­
ly simple.
These factors may be particularly important for 
small-scale projects where access to private credit with the 
minimum of administrative delay may be of overriding importance. 
Wheras capital grants are paid when the investment is completed, 
or in stages, soft loan systems have the obvious advantage of 
improving access to investment finance at the time it is needed.
In addition, soft loans may be made flexible and 
discriminatory as in the case of grants by means of, variable 
interest rate concessions, interest or repayment-free periods, 
or variable loan duration.
Problems may however arise in controlling and coor­
dinating award and payment through intermediary agencies,and
Lack of distinction between new and extention projects in the 
(old) French system, may have been responsible for the disprop­
ortionate share of extension projects in the total of aided inv 
estment (see Ch.9).
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there is a clear dichotomy of interests between at the same 
time making financial assistance as selective and discretion­
ary as possible, and maintaining a fair degree of decentral­
isation and simplicity in the process of loan application and 
award.
Fiscal concessions
In general, tax concessions (eg. accelerated depre­
ciation allowances, profit-tax concessions), insofar as they 
relate to profits have the advantage of inspiring efficiency. 
Moreover since the level of aid is directly related to a firmte 
viability, waste of public funds is avoided.
However in practice there may be a number of drawbacks. 
In the first place such awards are not investment specific and 
do not operate at the margin, and in practice eligible profits 
may arise just as easily from the exploitation of a monopoly 
position as from the extension of capacity or improvement in eff­
iciency. Secondly, where firm mobility is low such concessions 
may take on the form of a "windfall1 gain to firms already oper­
ating in the designated regions rather than a direct inducement 
for profitable projects to locate in such areas. This is howev­
er a more general problem with all non-marginal subsidies.
Thirdly, tax concessions do not provide quick liquid­
ity advantages in the way of soft-loans or capital grants; more­
over it may be some years before a new plant becomes fully oper­
ational and profits first arise.
Fourthly, whilst tax concessions may well be useful in 
increasing the effective value of other incentives (insofar as 
these give rise to higher taxable profits), on the other hand 
the net advantage afforded by such concessions may be substant­
ially reduced by either national tax concessions or accelerated 
depreciation allowances. The latter case is quite interesting 
as an example of the UK tax system shows; in the UK 100% first 
year allowances are generally available for many types of capit­
al i n v e s t m e n t ,and companies may effectively set the full cost of 
plant and equipment against profits earned in the year they were
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bought - thus achieving a very substantial reduction in the cost 
an investment ( that is for companies which are actually lia­
ble to pay tax). Although tax relief may be rolled forward, many 
companies may find themselves in the position of having to wait 
some considerable time before taxable profits rise to a level 
where a claim can be made. It is consequently not too difficult 
to imagine a situation where new companies in development areas
- even profitable ones - find that the financial advantage con­
ferred by regional investment grants is less than the fiscal 
advantage obtained by comparable but established firms elsewhere.
Finally, certain administrative and technical problems 
may arise in identifying and attributing eligible profits, espec­
ially in the case of multi-plant companies. One practical sugges­
tion to overcome this difficulty, has been that a firm's profits 
should be attributed to it's constituent plants in proportion to 
their share of total employment.1 This would have the effect of 
making profits-tax concessions non-factor-neutral (ie.positive
labour bias) for companies with plants located outside designat-
2ed development areas .
However even this solution leaves a lot to be desir­
ed, particularly in the case of M.N.E.'s operating in several 
European countries. Here, the ability to practice transfer pric­
ing between subsidiaries (see Ch.7) and offload sizeable prof­
its onto plants where profits-tax concessions are available,is 
clearly one potential means of bypassing national tax liabilit­
ies where these are highest - at the 'cost' of the less developed 
areas which forego revenue which might otherwise have been obt­
ained through these activities. At the limit, it could be argued 
that ,in this way, tax concessions at the periphery would serve 
just as much to maintain plants in more central locations, as to 
shift_ production processes to the less developed areas.
Labour subsidies
Many of the problems associated with labour subsidies 
have already been spelt out and will not be repeated here. 
Moreover/such subsidies are becoming increasingly rare (at the
Klassen (1980),p.328 2 ibid.
3 * 4
regional level) following the abolition of the Regional Employ­
ment Premium in the U.K.. In Italy, the concession on social 
security contributions is due to expire in 1986. Doubtless the 
very great expense involved with both of these subsidies must 
have been a deciding factor in their abolition/discontinuation. 
Some further observations on labour subsidies will be made in 
the chapter which follows.
Conclusions
Whilst there are obvious problems involved in drawing con­
clusions regarding countries employing somewhat different app­
roaches to the implementation of regional policy, a number of 
important observations can nevertheless be singled out.
1. A general tendency towards a more dispersed development 
approach is detectable in all three countries considered, and 
would appear to be largely explainable in terms of:
(i) slow or negligable 'spread' effect of regional growth cent­
res or 'poles' on their surrounding areas, probably compounded 
by,
(ii) the politically motivated desire not to be seen to favour 
certain depressed areas at the 'expense' of other, often more 
isolated areas.
(iii) changes in the structure of employment growth, now mainly 
observable in the service sector and tending to favour larger 
agglomerations over more sparsely populated areas.
2. Increasing recognition of the need to develop suitable polic­
ies to promote indigenous (small) firm expansion. In the past 
general aid schemes have often proved too inflexible (eg. vis 
minimum job or investment requirements) and insufficiently comp­
rehensive with respect to the needs of smaller firms. Doubtless 
one explanation for this trend lies in recognition of the fact 
that under present economic conditions it is no longer realistic 
to rely solely on firm movement to improve industrial structure 
in the development areas, and that the main impetus to growth
and adjustment now lies primarily with the indigenous firm sec­
tor.
3. Whilst the service sector now appears a much stronger can­
didate for incorporation into regional incentive schemes, in no 
country have such schemes achieved any substantial degree of 
success. Very often this occurs because regional aid schemes, 
which are primarily capital oriented, have little direct rel- 
evence to the service sector. Where 'tailor made' schemes exist, 
as in France, and are related to job creation, transfer and set­
ting up costs, the low level of take-up suggests the existence 
of strong barriers to service sector mobility. In the French 
case, this has led to renewed efforts to control tertiary expan­
sion in Paris and promote decentralisation.
4. Concerning regional incentives, we have drawn attention to 
the problem of controlling grant payment and job creation. Fail­
ure to make serious effort in this sphere is likely to lead to 
increasing, and justified, criticism that the cost of regional 
policy is proving to be out of all proportion to the number of 
jobs actually created.
5. We have also shown that to obtain maximum effect with mini­
mal competitive distortion, factor subsidies should preferably 
operate at the margin and be as spatially selective as possible. 
Under given circumstances sectoral discrimination may also be 
desirable.
6. Following from the above comments we may wish to make the 
analytical distinction between aids which are designed to enc­
ourage firm movement/relocation to development areas, and aids 
which are primarily aimed at improving the development poten­
tial of indigenous firms. Specifically, whilst the former tar­
get may call for a sectoral approach such as variable rate cap­
ital grants favouring high growth industries with strong regio- 
al linkages, the latter may require a somewhat broader range of 
instruments to help firms develop and improve products and prod­
uction processes, and to eliminate general bottlenecks to small 
firm development (see also Part 3) .
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Introduction to the analysis
Chapter 9
. 1 .
Whilst Chapter 3 gave detailed information on the num­
ber of jobs aided by regional incentives, there is clearly an 
important conceptual distinction to be made between the number 
of jobs aided and actual job 'creation' - that is, the number of 
new jobs or jobs maintained which are directly attributable to 
regional incentives of one type or another.
Clearly, to arrive a: such figures we roust of necessity 
make certain assumptions as to what would have happened in the 
absence of regional policy. In the following studies this is 
achieved by evaluating regional (industrial) performance after 
having allowed for the employment effects attributable to indus­
trial structure.
The technique adopted for this purpose involves the es­
timation of an 'expected' employment growth series for each emp­
loyment sector in each region - which quite simply describes the 
employment growth which could be expected over a given period if 
each of the regional industrial sectors grew at a rate similar 
to that for the nation as a whole. Subtracting this set of fig­
ures from actual employment chances over the same period gives 
us a view of regional employment performance in which the eff­
ects of industrial structure have been largely eliminated^. This 
residual or 'growth' component is generally taker, to reflect lo­
cation specific advantages/disadvantages in the widest sense.
 ^See annex 1.
r r c w i h  c f  e s p i s y : v e r x  ; a i s c i a t s  f i c u r e s ) , i s  e l v e r ,  'e y  t h e
Whilst regional financial incentives may be expected to 
play an important role in improving regional economic performa­
nce, there may in practice be a number of other factors involv­
ed - the level and quality of basic infrastructure, wage costs 
and productivity, transport costs, external economies and natu­
ral resource endowment, to name but a few. Basically there are 
two alternative methods for separating out such effects; the 
first method involves distinguishing between 'policy-off' and 
' policy^-on' periods, and extrapolating the residual trend from 
the former period into the latter. This approach however, assu­
mes that non policy related locational factors are of equal 'st­
rength* in both periods, and the validity of such an assumption 
clearly becomes more questionable as the number of years cover­
ed in the two periods becomes longer.
The second possible method is to subject the residual 
components themselves to econometric testing, taking account of 
other factors which may have affected location specific advant­
age. This is in fact the approach adopted in the present study 
and for two main reasons ; in the first place it is often very 
difficult to make a clear distinction between 'policy-off' and 
'policy-on' periods; in the second place, it is clearly desir­
able to know something about the relative importance of other 
locational factors, which may in turn have significant policy 
implications.
Finally, although every precaution has been taken to 
avoid them, it is perhaps just as well to bear in mind some of 
the criticisms and practical limitations of the so-called ' shi- 
ft-share' employment analysis.
In the first place the technique may fail to take acc­
ount of the multiplier effects on other sectors not included in 
the analysis. One method often used to achieve such estimates 
is to multiply the residual component by some estimate of the 
regional multiplier (from input-output analysis) to obtain the 
direct and indirect effects respectively.
In the second place, the validity of the results is
clearly dependent on the level of industrial disaggregation us­
ed and the degree of similarity within industrial groupings fr­
om one region to another. Important regional differences may 
for example appear between product ranges within any particular 
sector (eg.transport equipment - automobiles and components), 
or between firm-size distributions (although this is only impo­
rtant if there are important functional differences at this 
level,(see Chs. 5&9 vis Italy)).
Similar considerations may be made with respect to the 
time period covered and the choice of base years. In practice 
most studies of this kind tend to adopt a survey period of 5-7 
years and the same approach has been adopted here.
Finally, some of the abovementioned problems may become 
especially evident as the results are disaggregated for indivi­
dual sectors in individual regions. In certain cases industrial 
sectors may be particularly small, and at the regional level 
consist of no more than one or two local firms. For this reas­
on, and to facilitate assessment, both absolute and percentage 
figures are given wherever possible. The results pertaining to 
very small 'token' sectors must be assessed with care as they 
may derive as much from largely 'random' factors (eg. firm cl­
osure) as from 'real' factors determined by competitive and 
locational advantages. In most cases however, the overall reg­
ional results are not likely to be influenced to any great ext­
ent .
In conclusion, whilst the shift-share technique is 
not without its faults, and is probably far from ideal, it is 
certainly preferable in the present context to making no str­
uctural adjustments at all. Without such assumptions it is very 
difficult to see how any objective estimate of the relative 
employment performance of the regions could be arrived at.
As an introduction, sections 1.3 to 1.4 outline some of the 
past trends iniegional employ»«gitgrowth. in industry. These trends 
are then compared with developments in other employment sectors. 
Section 1.5 gives a background to the analysis and discusses some
1.2. FRANCE
cf the problems associated with defining the development areas. 
The detailed results and subsequent discussion are to be found 
in sections 1.6 to 1.9. Section 1.10 briefly compares the results 
with equivalent studies on 3ritish regional policy. In sections 
1.11 to 1.12, we summarise the results and present our general 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of French regional policy.
1.3. Broad trends in regional industrial employment.
To begin, it is useful to 
outline some of the main historical trends in regional indu­
strial employment. The periods of major interest are as foll­
ows ;
(i) 1954-62.1 Over this period, industrial employ­
ment in France increased by 6.2%. Whilst many of the regions 
in the centre and north progressed particularly well, for ex­
ample the Paris region 7.9%, Franche-Comté 12%, Bourgogne 9.3%, 
Bsse.Normandie 19.4%, Centre 13.7%, Hte.Normandie 15.2%, Pic­
ardie 19.9%, Champagne 9.3%, the same was not true of south­
west or Bretagne. Industrial employment remained more or less 
static in Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Limousin and Bretagne, 
fell by 4.1% in Languedoc and increased by only 2.6% in Auver­
gne. On the whole, the south and south-east fared reasonably 
well, with increases of 9.4% in RhÔne-Alpes and 3.8% in Prov­
ence .
(ii) 1962-68^ The increase in overall industrial 
employment slowed down over this period to 1.85%.
Declining employment levels were to be found in the Nord 
region -6.1%, and for the first time in Lorraine -4.1%, and 
the Paris region -5.3%, and employment in Alsace and Rhône- 
Alpes remained unchanged.
The redistribution of industrial employment away from 
the major industrial centres had clearly begun. The growth 
process was one of a slow "spread" effect outwards from the 
centre - thus, Normandie, Picardie and Centre all had relat­
ively high growth rates of between 11% and 24%. This process 
was especially notioable in the west, where growth rates in 
Loire and Poitou-Charentes were around 15%.
Growth rates in the south and south-west, however, remai­
ned relatively low compared to the aboveirentioned regions - 
between 3.7% and 5.4% (apart from Limousin 7.1%).
1 J.O. 1979 12th Jan. Table 16 p.19.
* Note ; these figures cover all industrial sectors(—construction and public 
works)Î and are not entirely comparable with our somewhat narrower 
definition of manufacturing employment (table 3).
L+OZ.
In conclusion, although there was some redistribution 
towards the development areas of the south-west, the effect 
was by no means substantial - in terms of jobs created in 
excess of the national average, no more than around 20,000 
( 2.5% of total industrial employment ), for the whole of 
Aquitaine, Midi-Pyr£n§|s, Limousin,Auvergne and Languedoc.
(iii) 1968-73. Over this period industrial
employment increased at an annual rate of 1.9%. In the reg­
ions of the centre,west and north, the process of employment 
spread continued. Normandie, Po itou-Charentes, Bretagne,Centre, 
Loire, Picardie, Franche-Comte and Bourgogne all having annual 
growth rates of between 3% and 5%.
On the other hand, in Paris, Lorraine and Nord, annual 
growth rates were, respectively, .7%, .2% and -.1%.
In the south-west, growth rates were slightly above the 
national average (2.1 to 2.5%), whilst Provence and Languedoc 
in the south experienced much lower rates of growth - 1.7% and 
1.0% respectively.
Overall, 1968-73 was a period of unprecedented growth in 
(salaried) manufacturing employment, which increased by 10.7% 
over these years(although if we measure from 1967 the increase 
is slightly less ie. 9.2% since employment fell in 1968). By 
the end of 1974 however, manufacturing employment had begun a 
steady decline.
(iv) 1974-77.^ - Manufacturing employment declined
at an annual rate of -1.3% in this period. The industrial reg­
ions were the first to feel the impact of the recession.Employ­
ment fell at annual rates of -1.6% in Picardie, -1.7% in Lorr­
aine, -1.9% in RhSne-Alpes , -2.0% in the Paris region and
-2.2% in the Nord region.
In the south and south-west, rates of decline were 
generally either similar or slightly better than the national 
average. On the other hand, the newly industrialised regions of 
the west and centre did considerably better, Loire and Poitou- 
Charentes even experiencing moderate increases in manufacturing 
employment.
1 INSEE. E & S N°119 Feb. 1930 p. 24
Uoti.
In 1977/78 the overall rate of decline increased 
to -1.8% per annum. In some regions the situation had reach­
ed grave proportions by 1978. Picardie, Hte.Normandie, Prov­
ence and Nord all experienced rates of decline of between - 
3.1% and -3.7%. Lorraine -5.1% suffered particularly badly. 
However, all regions of the south and south-west fared some­
what better than average.
Some regions even managed to make some progress in
1978 in spite of the general downward trend eg. Bretegne 2.4%, 
Loire .2%, Alsace .8%, Languedoc 1.9%.
In general it can be said that the crises affected 
most severly the older established industrial centres, whilst 
for a number of reasons the more recently industrialised reg­
ions seemed to have almost overcome the crisis. This could 
possibly be due to (i) a lower level of exposure to foreign 
competition, (ii) a higher share of new investment and new 
industries (regional policy in France may be termed "active" 
after 1968) as a result of regional policy, (iii) a lower 
share of declining industries or industries which are subject 
to severe cyclical effects.
Lastly, one should also bear in mind developments 
in other sectors of the economy - especially services and 
agricultural employment. We have concentrated on industrial 
employment in this section for the following reason, that in 
general, regional development policies are mainly aimed at 
promoting employment within the manufacturing sector. For 
example, in 1276 subsidies to the tertiary sector in France 
accounted for only 5% of all regional subsidies1. Hence, al­
though there is a growing tendecv in France, as elsewhere to 
promote employment in the sevices sector, for present purpo­
ses it is better to confine the analysis to manufacturing 
employment.
1 J.O. 1978 N°7 p.438.
As a general point, it should be borne in mind that 
movements in total employment may be very different from trend 
in the manufacturing sector. The fact that employment in serv­
ices grew at over twice the rate of manufacturing employment 
between 1968-75 (1.08% as against 2.25%)^ implied that those 
regions (mainly Paris and Provence) which had very high shares 
of services employment to start with would be at an advantage.
Indeed, the Paris region had one of the highest rates 
of growth of total employment (1.07% perannum) in spite of hav 
ing the fastest rate of decline in industrial employment(-.4 2% 
per annum).
In contrast', agricultural employment fell at an annual 
rate of -5.7% over this period. In several regions; Bretagne, 
Poitou-Charentes, Aquitaine, Limousin and Auvergne, total emp­
loyment actually fell due to the negative influence of a large 
agricultural sector (between 25%-35% of total employment), and 
in spite of positve rates of growth in both services and man­
ufacturing industries. In other words, these agricultural reg­
ions had severe structural disadvantages given the initial 
importance of this sector in total employment and its overall 
rate of decline.
The regional distribution of growth in manufacturing employ­
ment 1967-74.
The reasons for choosing these two dates should be 
fairly clear from our preceding discussion. Firstly, both 
1967 and 1974 correspond to similar points on the downswing 
of the business cycle, with correspondingly similar levels 
of pressure of demand. Total employment (measured at 31st 
December) fell by -.2% and -.6% and manufacturing employment
1 INSEE " Statistiques et indicateurs des regions françaises"
1979 p.16.
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fell by -2.0% and -0.8% in 1967 and 1974 respectively - 
all which arter extended periods of sustained growth.
Secondly, 196 3 corresponds to the start of what 
one could term "active" regional policy. Total spending 
on regional subsidies^- increased from Fr.55.1 m. in 1967 
to Fr.101.4m.m 1963 and Fr.195.4 m. in 1969. In real terms 
expenditure more or less levelled out in 1977 when spend­
ing increased from Fr.527 m. in the previous year, to aro­
und Fr.569 m.. In terms of associated employment, this av­
eraged over 40,000 jobs per year from 1969 to 1974, fell 
to around 34,000 in 1975 and 35,700 in 1976.1
From 196.1 to 1967 employment associated with reg- 
ional leans and grants averaged around 17,000 jobs per 
year. This earlier period of less intensive regional policy 
may be considered to have started between 1959/60. In fact, 
expenditure in 1959 (Fr.46m.) was slightly higher in real 
terms than in 1967.
Thirdly, the time span covered is reasonable (7vr) 
for this type of analysis. Since we are comparing the per­
formance of individual industries in the respective regions 
at two points in time, significant chances in the composit­
ion of these industries could render the two series of res­
ults incomparable.
The analysis itself is quite straightforward. For*each of the 21 regions, manufacturing employment in 1957 
was arranged into ten broadly similar groups. The overall 
national growth rate between 19 67 and 19 7 4 was then estimated 
for each industrial group. With these results it was then
1 EiS N°30 1975 table 1 p.14. * J.O. 19TS N°7 p.433/9
2 E&S N°S0 table 10 p.22. These figures relate to the Fonds
de d e v e lo ccerr .en t  e c o r o m ia u e  e t  s o c i a l  (FDSS) .
* Salaried employment only,measured as on Dec.3Ist.and excl­
uding construction and public works.INSEE D47 andD22.
possible to produce an "expected"growth series for each sec­
tor within each region by projecting employment levels accor­
ding to the national growth rate.
Clearly then, the expected growth rate for each region 
is simply the rate at which total manufacturing employment 
could be expected to increase given that each of the region^ 
industrial sectors grew at the national rate. By subtracting 
the expected employment series from the actual series, one 
obtains the residual growth series.
At this point it is perhaps worth considering this res­
idual component in more detail. In a sense the residual or . 
"growth" effect reflects the locational advantage/disadvantage 
of a region. Conceptually this must be due to cost factors of 
one kind or another - eg. transport costs, availability of fac­
tors or services, factor costs or regional subsidies. Further­
more the residual effect may be due to either, (i) a better 
than average performance of indigenous firms, (ii) an inflow 
of new firms. Both are directly influenced by regional devel­
opment incentives. Unfortunately we have no precise leads as 
to which of the two effects is most important. As far as the 
French case is concerned, we may however note on the basis of 
the distribution of regional subsidies, that in practice a rat­
her large proportion of such aids would appear to have been aw­
arded to expansion projects (approx.2/3) rather than new firms 
or decentralisations (J.0.1978,No 7).
A final point to be taken into consideration is that 
part of the residual effect may be due to employment multiplier 
effects or input-output relationships between industries within 
a particular region.^In other words the following analysis im­
plicitly assumes that each industry is independent when in fact 
interdependence may be quite high at the regional level.
LSee Dixon & Thirlwall 1975 ?. 175. This distinction is of less
importance however when we are mainly interested in the over­
all effects of regional policy, as is the case.
On the other hand, regional economies are typically high­
ly open, and it is therefore external demand rather than local 
demand which is normally of greatest importance. However,from 
an analytical point of view, the order of magnitude of the bias 
brought about by high levels of intra-regional inter-industry 
linkages is by no means clear; at the limit, if for example all 
motor-cars and all car components were produced in region A (or 
if all cars in A and all components in B), regional and nation­
al expected employment series would be the same for both indus­
tries, and the residuals would be equal to zero.^
1.5 The Development Areas.
Basically, we have termed aided regions those which 
were entitled to either an industrial development grant or 
an industrial adaptation grant (which were amalgamated in 
1972 to become the regional development grant). The geogra­
phical coverage of these grants remained more or less unch­
anged between 19 6 7-7 4, although the grant value was raised 
when the revised system was introduced in 19 72.
Generally speaking, these same regions were also able 
to benefit from soft loans from theF.D.E.S.. These loans, 
aimed mainly at large scale projects of particular regional 
importance, were of real significance only between 1967 and 
1970, and by 1976 had almost ceased altogether. The role of 
the F.D.E.S. as a source of regional credit was steadily tak­
en over by the "Sociétés de développement regional", (S.D.R.).
 ^ In this case, the shift-share analysis would overlook both 
regional policy and multiplier effects. To avoid this problem 
further disaggregation at the sub-regional level would be call­
ed for. It dees however represent a special case,which,as far 
as we can see,is not directly relevent in the present context.
These are private credit institutions which operate through­
out the country with the exception of the Paris region. Given 
their wide geographical coverage,however, it is hard to attrib­
ute any degree of regional discrimination to their interven- 
'tions.
The geographical coverage of investment grants 
and fiscal concessions (1967-72) is made clear from maps 1 & 2 
and table 1. Clearly, if one wished to include areas 3 and 4 
in the analysis as aided regions, the coverage would be extrem­
ely wide indeed. There is perhaps a case for including average 
assistance areas 3,since although these areas did not qualify 
for investment grants, they did qualify for a reduction in lo­
cal taxation (la Patente), which is by far the most important 
of the fiscal incentives. However, since the rate of local tax­
ation varies considerably by commune and departement it is not 
at all clear whether a locality where the concession is offeree 
is in fact at an advantage compared to one where it is not, if 
the tax is initially higher in the former. We have therefore 
chosen to exclude average assistance areas from our analysis 
since it is virtually impossible to asses their relative cost 
advantage.
A further reason for choosing a much tighter defin­
ition of aided areas is that detailed figures are available on 
jobs aided with respect to regional development grants and 
loans provided by the F.D.E.S.. As regards fiscal aids, these 
figures are only available from 1971, apart from which one alsc 
runs into problems of double counting with grant and loan 
assistance. From an analytical point of view, it will be inter­
esting to compare the results of our analysis with the offic­
ial job creation estimates.
For the purposes of our analysis we have therefore re­
defined the aided regions and classified them into three groups

as follows
GROUP 1 : Regions which are completely classed as aided ie.
eligable for the regional development grant.
Bretagne, Aquitaine, Midi-pyrenees, Poitou-Charentes,★Limousin, (Corsica).
GROUP 2 : Regions which are largely classified as aided.
Auvergne, Pays de la Loire, Bsse.Normandie, Languedoc
GROUP 3 : Regions which are in part classified as aided.
Nord, Lorraine.
In order to put the importance of regional aid into per­
spective, we have classified the twenty planning regions (apart 
from the Paris region) according to the total value of subsid­
ies awarded between 1960 and 1973. The incidence of regional 
subsidies is measured as the share of aided investment in total 
investment. In order of descending importance as regards the 
incidence of regional aid, we have Bretagne 44%, Limousin 37%, 
Poitou-Charentes 23%, Aquitaine 18%, Loire 17% and Midi-Pyrenee 
15%. Alternatively, we may compare the index of industrial 
employment with the regional subsidy index. In column 5 we have 
classified regions as very favoured, favoured or not favoured 
according to this criterion.
1.6. The results of the shift-share analysis.
Table 3 gives the overall results, with actual employment 
changes disaggregated into structural and residual components. 
The residual component is also given in absolute figures in 
the last column.
* 1Since Corsica is part of the Provence region for statistical
purposes, we have implicitly excluded it from the list of 
aided regions.
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TftBLE 2
Classification of regions according to total value of subsidies 
awarded betv»>een 1960-73. ( F . F r . m i l l i o n . )
Region 1960-73 % dist.
Ind.ercpl.^ " 
index 1967 incidence ^
Ind.enpl? 
% dist. D.A. status
Nord 381.4 13.5 10.2 10 f. 3
Pays de la Loire 365.6 12.9 4.2 17 v.f. 2
Bretagne 326.3 11.5 2.4 44 v.f. 1
Aquitaine 320.2 11.3 3.4
«
18 v.f. 1
Lorraine 305.5 10.8 6.0 7 v.f. 3
Midi-Pyr6n£es 191.4 6.7 2.8 15 v.f. 1
Poitou-Charentes 188.6 6.7 1.8 23 v.f. 1
Rhöne-Alpes 135.9 4.8 . 11.4 3 n.f. -
Limousin 93.2 3.3 1.1 37 v.f. 1
Languedoc-Roossillor 78.1 2.8 1.6 10 v.f. 2
Auvergne 70.2 2.5 2.3 9 2
Bourgogne 67.0 2.4 2.8 4.5 -
Ciarpagne 63.9 2.3 2.9 6 n.f. -
Bsse. Normandie 61.6 2.2 GOH 9.5 f. 2
Alsace 50.8 1.8 3.5 ’ 3.5 n.f.' -
Centre 46.4 1.6 3.6 4.5 n« r • -
Hte. Normandie 31.7 1.1 3.5 1 n.f. -
Prov./Cöted'Az/Corse 26.6 0.9 3.9 1 n.f. -
Picardie 17.5 0.6 3.8 1.5 n.f. -
Franche-Cor±<§ 13.7 0.5 2.8 2 n.f. -
2,835.6 lOC.O 100.0
i 2 3excluding construction averace annual aided investment vf = very favoured
annual investment(i562, '70, *71) f = favoured
Source: E&S M°SC 1976 pp.20,21. arc E^ 'SEE series D N°22 (table 5). ^  “ot i-avcurea
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One of the most striking features is the very substan­
tial shift of manufacturing employment out of the Paris region 
- according to our estimates this involved a net displacement 
of around 24 3,4 00 jobs. Whether this was due primarily to 
“push" _ factors at the centre (eg.congestion costs, factor 
shortages) or'bull" forces in other regions (eg.regional dev­
elopment grants) is more difficult to establish. However we 
may note that of these 243*,400 "tranferred" jobs, around 
136,000 or 54% went to non-classified regions (we exclude Rhone 
-Alpes). Table 4 gives a summary of the aggregated residuals 
for reference.
_ Table 4.
— — 2 1
Man.emp1.196S. Residuals T x ~C0
Non-Develcpment 
areas (less Paris
and Rhone-Alpes). 1,350,000 131,100 9.7
Development
Areas 1 & 2. 1,105,000 132,000 11.9
Clearly the D.AIs as defined above have only done 
marginally better than the non-D.A.'s in terms of -residuals 
and this result should be somewhat surprising.
Looking mere closely at the residuals in table 3, the 
situation becomes much clearer. The highest residuals (above 
12%) were to be found in these regions tc the west cf, anc 
including Poiccu-Charenres, Centre, Bourgogne ar.c Picardie.
In contrast, the D.A.'s cf the south-west ana scutn ail had 
residuals below 6.5 % ,two or whicr. being negative, and indic­
ating a relative locational disadvantage.
'■ï '
Lastly, it is worth asking whether the negative residuals of 
Nord and Lorraine can be partially ascribed to adverse multi­
plier effects resulting from a high share of declining ind­
ustries. Examination of the industrial breakdown of residuals 
for these two regions (table 5) suggests that if such effects 
existed they were probably limited to firms within the declin­
ing sectors(coal and steel)- which explains the high negative 
residuals for even declining industries.
The probable explanation however , is that severe locational 
disadvantages existed within these declining sectors, due for 
example to adverse changes in production or transport costs, • 
Concerning the question of whether structural factors 
are able to explain differences in regional employment growth 
rates, we may note that structural components for category 1 
D.A.' s were significantly below the national growth rate of 
manufacturing employment (unweighted mean of 5.1% as against 
7.4%), which is clear evidence of structural disadvantage in 
the south-west and Bretagne.
Finally, the very poor structural components in Nord, 
Lorraine and Languedoc appear to explain much of the actual 
performance of these regions.
Turning to table 5, we have the detailed results of 
residuals by region and manufacturing sector. All the ind­
ustrial sectors are covered except for construction and pub­
lic works (B.T.P.), oil refining and distribution, and prod-★
ucticn and distribution of electricity, gas and water 
none of which seemed to fit in with our somewhat narrower 
definition of manufacturing industries. Moreover it is high­
ly unlikely that these sectors would in fact qualify for 
regional development grants.
★ Excluding B.T .?. these sectors accounted for only 4.4% 
of industrial employment in 1957.
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components 
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in 
absolute 
figures, 
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Table 5 b.
Manufacturing 
employment 
residual 
ccmponents 
1967-74 
expressed 
as 
percentage 
changes.
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■ H^NorCentreBSNor • Burg 
.Nord ..Lorr 
Alsace 
F-C 
Jotre 
-Dret 
r-Cht&Aruit • 
M-P 
-J.ljn 
-Hhone. 
Auv 
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Industrial groupings.
Table 6
1967-74 Pep.empi,National growth rate. in 13C7(th.)
4.
5
1. Food and agro-industries.
Coal industry.
Mining and manufacture 
of construction materials 
and ceramics.
Glass industry.
3. Mining (ferrous) and steel 
industry.
Mining (non-ferrous) and 
metallurgy.
Transformation of metals.
Mechanical engineering.
Electronics and electric 
appliances.
Car industry.
Aero and naval construction 
and armaments.
3* Chemicals and rubber.
9. Textiles.
10. Clothing.
11. Leather.
12. Paper industry.
Printing industry.
13. Wood industry.
14. Plastics and other industries
2.82 % 521.3
-12.94 %
1.9 %
11.0 % 
18.1 %
33.08 %
2 1 . 8 6  %
14.65 %
-16.4 % 
-5.7 % 
■11.8  %
7.4 %
6.8 % 
4.1 %
13.8 %
424 .2
221Ì.9
402 .6 
666.0
371.8
525 .1
411.5
4 51.5 
30C .0
142.5
363 .5
235.6 
190 .1
In order that no sector would be particularly small 
in any region, we have had to group some industrial sectors 
together as is clear from table 5. On the other hand we have 
avoided .where oossible, agcrreqating sectors where growth rates 
showed appreciable differences. Hence for- example, textiles 
clothincr and leather are analysed searately. a full
breakdown of these groupings is given in table 5. In spite cf 
such aggregation, some sectors in a number of regions were par 
ticularly small, and where employment was below 2 ,0 0 0 this 
has been indicated in table 5 , since it seems clear that the 
corresponding residuals must be assessed with cautionJ-
.7 . Some further comments on the residual components.
A number of points may be made with respect to table
5. Firstly, the theory that regional policies should be more 
effective with regard to "mobile" or "footloose" industries, 
is given support in that the residual effects have been more 
pronounced in these sectors. Such footloose firms are gener­
ally considered to be more prevalent in groups 5 i 6 ,ie. elec­
tronics and mechanical engineering.2 The fact that residual 
components for these sectors are particularly high in the 
D.A.'s of Loire, Poitou-Charentes, Bretagne, Aquitaine and 
Midi-Pyrenees, suggests that regional policy has been part­
icularly successful in attracting mobile firms to these areas. 
On the other hand the results suggest the opposite for Langue­
doc and Auvergne, and are decidedly negative for Limousin.
The importance of these "mobile" manufacturing sectors 
in regional development can be seen by the fact that they are 
both "fast-growth" industries at the national level(table 5) — 
to maintain high growth rates in the D.A.'s it is clear that
the latter would have to attract firms in these sectors.
1 2See introduction. See "The Eeorcraics of Industrial Subsidies",
(1976,H.M.S.O.). Lever (1972), argues that the major determinant of wh­
ether plants are 'mobile' is if external econctnies are either relatively 
unimportant or may be easily found elsewhere. Unfortunately this may also 
mean that such plants have relatively lew levels cf industrial linkage, 
Thwaites (1978).
t-\20 ,
Secondly, it is clear that regional development
areas have been less successful in industrial group 7 --
the highest residuals were to be found in regions mainly sit­
uated in the north and north-east. A number of explanations 
may be put forward. Firstly, such industries may be less foot­
loose and as such subject to greater external and internal 
economies. Secondly, since this sector tends to be dominated 
by multinational enterprises, it is possible that French reg- 
onal policy has been unable to exert sufficient pressure on 
the location decisions of these firms. There would seem to be 
some justification for the second hypothesis1, (see Part 3) .
Thirdly, whilst some regions exhibited a clear loc­
ational advantage/disadvantage over the whole range of indust­
ries, other regions exhibited markedly varied performance as 
between industrial sectors. A rough measure of such differen­
ces can be found by estimating the (unweighted) coefficient
2of variation for the residuals of any region.
In the Paris region, the c.v. was relatively low, 
indicating that the decline of manufacturing employment was 
evenly distributed over all sectors - suggesting an overall 
locational disadvantage. In Nerd, the other "outflow" region, 
the c.v. was relatively high, suggesting that any locational 
disadvantage was confined to specific sectors.
On the other hand, Picardie, 3sse.Nomar.dia, Bourgogne, 
Loire and Poitou-Charentes all had low c.v.'s - that is an 
even distribution of manufacturing employment growth - which 
is as one would have expected given that these regions have 
benefitted more than others from the "spread" erects generated 
bv the outflow of manufacturing employment from the Paris reg­
ion.
Conversly, the relatively high c.v.'s for most of 
the develoomer.t areas are probably mainly due the mere effec­
tive impact of regional policies within certain industrial 
groupings.
7
 ^ See D.A.T.A.R. 1974. *” Note: sane sectors we re grouped together
for these estimates in order that they should be of roughly equal size.
 ^ tract near, scuare deviation (S.D.)) x ICONote : c.v. n
- • ■ a i  -
Finally, table 7 gives a breakdown of the residuals by 
industrial sector. For development areas 2 and 3, these are ad­
justed to approximate the residual component to the employment 
impact of regional policy. This is because only around one half 
of the area of these regions actually qualifies for the main 
regional incentives /^and the residuals have been reduced propor-
Table 7.tionally. 
Sector.
Metal working. 
Mech. engin. 
Electronics. 
Transp.& arm. 
Cbem. & rubber. 
Textiles. 
Clothing.
Leather.
Paper & print. 
Wood inds. 
Plastics & other.
Net residuals,10001s anpl. 
D.A.'s 1« O.A.'s 2 & 3.
- 1.0
9.5 
18.8 
- 0
1.5 
4.2
7.8 
-1.4
1.9
4.8
4.9
3.4 
4.6
6.5 
8.8 
2. 0
- 0.8
4.2
2. 6
4.1 
1.8
3.1
Net residuals as % of nation­
al enpl. growth in sector.
5.4 %
11.7 %
20.6 %
7.7 %
5.8 %
(-)15.4 %
23.4 %
68.3 %
29.3 %
The results largely support our hypothesis about firm 
mobility in electronics and mechanical engineering. This effect 
is particularly marked for D.A.'s 1. From our estimates, over 
15 % of new employment in the electronics sector v/as effectively 
diverted to these regions. In textiles and clothing there is 
evidence that regional policy helped significantly in slowing 
down the rate of employment decline in these sectors in the 
development areas (again D.A.'s 1 in particular).
Lastly, the impressive performance of category 1 D.A.'s in 
wood industries is probably associated more with the growth of 
indigenous firms than with the mobility of new enterprises )■ It 
is also likely that other factors relating to comparative adv­
antage and factor endowment explain some proportion of the res­
idual component for this sector.
 ^ Given that these industries tend to be natural resource based and hence 
region - specific.
1.8. The employment Impact of regional policy - 
1967-74.
In order to isolate the employment effects of regional 
policy from our previous analysis, a number of considerat­
ions are first of all necessary.
Comparing the "passive" and "active" policy periods, as 
we have defined them, entails making assumptions as to what 
would have happened in the absence of regional policy in both 
periods.
Table S compares regional employment performance over 
the two periods. .
Table 8.
Employment chances in manufacturing industry in the D.A.'s 
and non-D.A.'s 1962-68 and 1967-74.
1962-68: 1967-747
D.A.'s. non-D.A.' s.
% chance
T - -
% char.ce 
Pariregion.
i chance 
less Paris.
% change : 
D.A.'s 1. 
D.A.'s 2.
3.09%
3.54%
11.39%
D.A. 's 3. i  -5. 35%
-5.23%
5. 62%
D.A.'s. non-D.A.'s.
! 23.75%
i -2.34%
F r an ce = 1.85% France = 7.4%
1 J.O. N°1 1979 
(ind.erqpl. -B.T.P. ).
2 INSZZ - as table 3 
(note: as cn Dec.31).
* -  j .The figures rebate -c 
recions.
Emc 1 o vrr.en t
COCO) 1967. 1 , 9 7 2 .  4 3 , 2 7 3 . 1
D . A . ' s  ± S 2 .  l/j.05.5
„  „  „  3 3 6  6 . 9
N . D . A . 's  l e s s  P a r i s .  2 , 0 1 1 . 3
ent ire
The first thing one might ask is whether the fast rates 
of growth in D.A.'s 1 & 2 are due more to regional policy or 
simply to the decline of manufacturing employment in the Paris 
region. Although the later figures show that D.A.'s 1 & 2 ex­
perienced faster rates of growth than the N.D.A.'s as a whole, 
when we compare their performance with the N.D.A.'s - Paris, 
the results are less impressive.
In general, we find that the relative position of most 
areas has remained largely unchanged over the two periods in 
spite of the strengthening of regional policy.Two exceptions to 
this are, (i) Paris, where the relative rate of decline has 
increased considerably - possibly due to the'push' (disincentive)1- 
and 'puli' (incentive) effects of regional policy, (ii) D.A.'s 3, 
where the absolute rate of decline slowed down - although this 
could simply be due to the higher national growth rate over 
this period.
Finally we should note that the fastest growth rates 
for both periods are to be found in the group 2 D.A.'s - the 
most successful of which, Bsse.Normandie and Loire benefitted 
from both proximity to central areas and regional investment 
grants. There would thus seem to be a strong case for making 
regional policy more selective.
Since we have no figures for structural/residual growth 
components for 1962-68, at the limit we may note that if empl­
oyment in D.A.'s 1 & 2 had grown at the same rate as the N.D.A.' 
outside Paris (ie.5.62%), there would have been 19,000 fewer 
jobs created in D.A.'s 1, and 16,600 fewer in D.A.'s 2. In 
other words we may say that roughly 35,600 jobs in industry 
were created in the main development areas in excess of what 
would have been expected had these regions experienced the sane 
rate of growth as the[N.D.A.'s - Parisl
It should of course be recalled that one explanation for 
differences in employment growth rates (apart from regional pol­
icy) , is that industrial structure varies as between regions.
 ^ Taxes on factory and office space in the Paris region were introduced in 
1960, but remained lew until 1971.
2 Assuring that on average \ of D.A.2 employment is classified as such.
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The Influence of industrial structure has however been taken into 
account ror the period 1967-74 in our previous analysis, and on 
the basis or these figures we may make some more accurate est­
imates or the employment impact of regional policy.
Since official figures exist with respect to jobs aid­
ed by investment grants and loans, it will be interesting to 
compare these figures with our own estimates. Taking into account 
various lags in investment and job creation , we may estimate 
that over the period 1967-74 some 263,000 jobs were aided by
F.D.E.S. subsidies. Whether all or even most of these jobs would 
have been created in the absence of regional policy is of course 
another matter.
However, returning to our own estimates, we must examine 
■whether the residual growth component of the D.A.'s represents 
the least biased estimate of employment growth that may be 
directly attributed to regional policy,(the rest being attribu­
table to regional industrial structure! It is of course poss­
ible that seme of the residual component is due to other cau­
ses such as factor costs or availability.
This poses the problem of how to interpret the 
residuals for these regions, since they may only in part be 
due to the effects of regional policy. In fact, this critic­
ism may equally be applied to the rather wider question of 
equating the residual or "growth” components with regional 
policy impact.
In most studies to date, the general approach to
estimding the employment impact of regional policy has been
as follows. Firstly the residuals for a "policy-off" period
are estimated. These results are taken to represent the
underlying employment growth trend in the D.A.s relative to
the rest of the country. Next, the residuals for the "policy-
on" period in question are calculated. Finally, the trend
for the "policy-cff" period is applied to the "policy-on"
results,to obtain an estimate of the employment impact of
1regional policy .
t- oractice this type of analysis implicitly assumes 
that all other factors that may have affected location decisions 
remained unchanged over tr.e pclicy-on period. ; urtr.er^.cre,
1See, for example, Moore £ Rhodes(1973)
Mackav & Thomson(1979)
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these techniques are only justified when the individual in­
dustrial sectors considered are all fairly similar in com­
position and structure as between regions. In the case of 
Italy for example, as we shall see, this may represent a 
fairly difficult problem of interpretation.
In spite of these possible criticisms the abovementioned 
authors maintain that the shift-share approach provides a 
fairly accurate estimate of the impact of regional policy, and 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the overall results are 
generally fairly consistent —  all the D.A.s show positive 
differences between actual and expected employment series. 
Secondly, the divergence between actual and expected employ­
ment showed much less variability in non-manufacturing industries', 
and services. Lastly, and most important, studies on the 
movement of firms to D.A.s tend to confirm the validity of 
the shift-share estimates1, and the orders of magnitude con­
tained therein. Although shift-share methods tended to pro­
duce slightly higher policy estimates, this is rather to be 
expected given (i) part of the residual effect may be due to 
regional linkages and a subsequent regional multiplier effect,
(ii) firm movement studies do not cover the impact of 
regional incentives on indigenous firms.
1.8.1. For the purposes of the present analysis, hov'ever, 
there are a number of problems involved in adopting the 
same approach as the British shift-share studies. Firstly, 
the residuals for some of the D.A.s are actually negative.
This suggests the presence of certain locational disadvantages 
that are not taken account of. Secondly, it is not possible 
to clearly define policy-off and policy-on periods as in the 
U.K. studies. One would really have to go back as far as 
1955-62 at the very least. At that point it does not seem 
feasible or realistic to extrapolate a trend as far as 1967- 
1974. Thirdly, a large part of regional employment gain is 
clearly due to decentralisation from the Paris region. It seems 
likely therefore, that a certain proportion of these gains may 
be explained in terms of high wage and congestion costs in
^See Ashcroft & Taylor(l979)
Mackay & Thomson(19 79)
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P a r i s 1 t h a t  i s ,  f a c t o r s  u n r e l a t e d  t o  any form o f  r e g i o n a l  
p o l i c y .
The m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  way o f  p r o c e e d i n g  t h a t  s u g g e s t s  
i t s e l f  w ou ld  be t o  a p p l y  an e c o n o m e t r i c  model  t o  r e g i o n a l  
em p lo y m en t  c h a n g e s  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s  c o v e r ­
i n g  f a c t o r  c o s t s  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  and some o t h e r  m e a s u r e s  o f  
l o c a t i o n a l  " d e s i r a b i l i t y " .  C l e a r l y  i t  i s  b e t t e r  t o  u s e  t h e  
r e s i d u a l s  t h e m s e l v e s  as  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  s i n c e  t h i s  
e x c l u d e s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  on em ploym en t  
grcrw’t h .  The m odel  t e s t e d  was t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
EMPL = a + axWAGE + a2 UNEMPL + a-jTIME + a4URBAN 
+ a5R.P. + aglNFRA + a?DUMMY>
The same p o i n t  may be  made i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  U. K.  s t u d i e s  
w h e r e  London a p p e a r s  t o  h a v e  had much t h e  same e x p e r i e n c e  
as  P a r i s .  F u r t h e rm o re  i t  d o e s  n o t  seem r e a s o n a b l e  t o  f u l l y  
a t t r i b u t e  s u c h  l o s s e s  t o  t h e  im p a c t  o f  d i s i n c e n t i v e  p o l i c i e s .
where:
EMPL = Employment residuals for manufacturing industries£1967-74 (expressed as percentage changes )
WAGE = Average yearly income per person employed in manu­
facturing industry 1971
UNEMPL = An average of 1968 and 1973 regional unemployment2rates as a proxy for labour availability 
TIME = Distance of- main regional town or towns from Paris,
3measured as scheduled train time from Paris 196 8 .
This variable was included to examine the im­
portance of distance on firms moving out of the 
Paris region
URBAN = Level of urbanisation, measured as percentage of
population resident in a classified urban zone 
(Z.P.I.U.)4
RP = Expenditure on regional investment grants and loans
per person employed in manufacturing industry 1967-74 at 
1960 prices?
INFRA = An index of average expenditure per head on infra­
structure grants and direct central government 
capital expenditure over the period concerned^
DUMMY = Dummy variable. These were added for regions which
showed clear evidence of strong locational dis­
advantage from their residuals, namely, Paris, Li­
mousin, Nord (see Table 3).
See text for sources. Note manufacturing industries is here 
defined as groups 4 to 14 in Table 6.
LStatistiques et indicateurs des regions françaises. INSEE.
'Ibid. Note: the definition "population disponible à la recherche 
d'un emploi" (P.D.R.E.) was used.
Ibid. Ibid. Note Z.P.I.U.=zone de peuplement industrielle 
et urbain.
'ibid. and MacDougall Report 1977.
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Berors presenting the results, some general remarks on 
the model should be mace. Firstly, the model does not attempt 
to explain the overall pattern of manufacturing employment 
changes —  this would be much too great a task for such a 
simple model. Here we are only attempting to explain changes 
in employment that cannot be explained by industrial struct­
ure (since the structural effect is eliminated) and that are 
directly related to regional investment incentives. Hence 
we do not, for example, include sectors 1-3 in Table 5, since 
these groups would not normally qualify for such incentives.
As a consequence, this approach tends to exclude most of the 
less mobile, natural resource based industries, and is perhaps 
an advantage since the model would be quite unsuitable to explain 
_locational changes in such industries.
Concerning the independent variables, these are all 
related to factor costs or availability in one way or another.
The wage, unemployment and regional policy variables are clear 
cut examples of this and should need no further discussion.
The level of urbanisation and expenditure on infrastructure 
were included as general indicators of possible external econ­
omies and the overall level of desirability of a region from 
the point of'view of potential investors and management. There 
are however drawbacks with both cf these- indicators. In practice, 
the relationship between external economies and urbanisation 
may not be clear cut. It is quite possible that beycnc certain 
limits urbanisation has a negative effect upon external economies
1* These sectors include, construction, 
mining, food and agro-incustries ('-ntii 19/5) . In general, grant 
requests from firms whose activities are linked by their nature 
to a particular location, are not ta.<sn into consideration.
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for example, congestion costs, may lead to dis-economies of 
agglomeration, and firms may begin to move out of the congested 
centres. This might indeed be the case for the Paris region in 
particular. In order to partially avoid this problem, a rather 
broad indicator was chosen; that is, the overall level of 
urbanisation, rather than an alternative such as the propor­
tion of regional population in towns above x thousand inhabitants.
The possible objection to the infrastructure variable 
is that it does not actually measure the level or quality of 
overall infrastructure in any region. Furthermore the needs 
of some regions may be greater than others and may therefore 
require greater outlay to reach equivalent ' standards. On 
the other hand, it is not at all clear how the overall level 
of regional infrastructure could actually be measured compre­
hensively. However, it does not seem unreasonable to expect 
that a sustained effort in favour of certain regions over a 
seven year period should induce some employment effects in 
manufacturing industry, and it is on this basis that the 
variable has been included.
The variable TIME was included for a specific purpose.
Given the importance of industrial decentralisation from 
the Paris region, it seemed probable that distance from the 
original location might be a significant factor in explaining 
the spatial distribution of such moves, and therefore to some 
extent the overal regional pattern of employment growth. There 
are basically two reasons for expecting such spatial "inelas­
ticity", firstly, relocation involves costs and risk —  it is 
possible that these may both be positive functions of distance 
from the original location. This may particularly be the case 
where information costs about alternative locations are also 
a positive function of distance. Secondly, decentralisation
-from Paris may well involve loss of contact with suppliers 
of inputs and raw materials, and perhaps more important, loss 
of competitive edge in the important Paris market due to 
higher transport costs.
However, even if a significant coefficient is found 
for this variable, one should not immediately conclude that 
the abovementioned cost factors are entirely responsible.
It is perfectly possible that, when firms are constrained to 
decentralise from Paris, they do not undertake a detailed 
search for alternative locations but tend to choose the near­
est low-cost location -- in other words, they may act as 
profit-satisficers rather than profit-maximisers1.
Finally, dummy variables were added for regions 
which showed clear evidence of locational disadvantage in 
their manufacturing employment residuals. This took the 
value of one for Paris, Nord and Limousin, and zero for all 
other regions. In the case of Nord and Limousin, it seemed 
clear that in spite of rather high levels of expenditure on 
regional incentives these regions were either (i) unable to 
attract new industry, or (ii) suffering from a poorer than 
average industrial structure, and that in any case, the im­
pact of negative multiplier effects could be expected to be
2significant (Nord and Limousin had overall growth rates of 
-4.1 and 1.0% respectively over this period). In the case 
of Paris the dummy variable would be expected to pick up the 
effects of (i) disincentive policies, and (ii) cost push 
factors, such as congestion costs, that were not fully cover­
ed by the other variables.
1See for example P.M. Townroe(1972) R. Studies "Some behavour- 
ial considerations in the industrial location decision."
2 Whilst multiplier effects can generally be considered to be captured in the 
residual component of the analysis, what we are trying to do here is to expl­
ain these effects. Jtoreover, since the present analysis involves only manuf­
acturing sectors (4 - 14), it is clearly plausible that poor regional perform­
ance in other industrial sectors could have influenced output and employment 
growth in manufacturing.
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1.8.2.
_Hhe res_ults of the ^ estimated cross-section regression,_ 
(1967-74) are given below:
EMPL - 51.64 - 3.64 TIME*** - 2.02 WAGE** + 0.0121 RP* 
(0.79) (0.85) (0.006)
- 24 .24 DUMMY ***
(4.63)
R2 = .804 No. observations = 21
* significantly different 90% confidence level 
xx from zero at or above 95% " »
sat* " " 99%
Note: figures in brackets are standard errors.
The coefficients on URBAN and INFRA were found to be insig­
nificantly different from zero. The coefficient on UNEMPL 
had the wrong sign (negative) and was not significant. These
three variables were therefore omitted from the final equation.
Some of the limitations of the URBAN and INFRA variables 
have already been noted. However, we may add that in the case 
of INFRA, it was to say the least highly unexpected, that 
there pro^dto be no correlation whatsoever between public 
expenditure on infrastructure and expenditure -on regional 
financial incentives. One would perhaps have expected some 
coordination of these two instruments. Concerning the regional 
unemployment variable, we should perhaps note that similarly 
insignificant results for this variable were also found in a 
U.K. study about the impact of regional policy on the movement 
of industry within Great Britain1. This is an important find­
ing since it casts considerable doubt on the possibility of
1D. Maclennan &■ J. Parr (1979), chapter 2.
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regional dixferences in unemployment rates bringing about a 
redistribution of manufacturing employment. Either there is 
little influence of regional unemployment on regional wage 
rates, or firms do not place high importance on availability 
of labour1 (unless of course labour markets in central areas 
are particularly tight —  this did not appear to be the case 
over the period considered).
In conclusion we may state that differences in regional 
manufacturing residuals are largely^explctined" by (i) differ­
ences in regional wage rates, (ii) the effective distance 
of the region from Paris, (iii) unspecified negative location­
al factors (dummy variable), (iv) employment growth induced by regional policy.
To provide a rough comparison of the impact of 
regional policy expenditure and regional wage rates, we may 
note that the coefficient values suggest the following.
Firstly, to achieve a 1% increase in regional manufacturing 
employment2 would, on average, require a 3.41% fail in the 
regional wage rate. The value of this fall would amount to around
4 95 Fr per person employed per year? Secondly, to achieve an 
equivalent impact by means of regional investment, incentives 
would require an expenditure of Fr. 82.5 per person employed 
for the whole period.
As a result, or.® might be tempted to argue that labour
■“"Moreover, it is the spatial distribution of une~.ployrr.ent which 
is important. Unemployment which is concentrates m  a rew 
towns*would be much more effective in attracting industry 
than unemployment which is spread over a wide, perhaps rural, 
area.
2 ^Over a seven-year period. ~ 1971 prices. Pelative to average wage.
*In a simtle regression of UNEMPI on'WAGE, the UNEMPL coefficient 
was found to be insignificantly different from zero.
* *
At constant i960 prices.
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subsidies are likely to be far less cost effective than in­
vestment incentives. The validity of such an argument would 
however depend on the extent to which the WAGE variable 
accurately measures unit labour costs in manufacturing. It 
is possible that the variance of the latter is smaller than 
the variance of the WAGE variable in which case, the 
importance of regional wage differentials may have been under­
estimated. This may be the case if, for example, as is quite 
possible, part of the variance in the WAGE observations is 
explained by regional employment structure. A similar position 
would arise if, again, 'regional wage differentials were to 
some extent due to differences in regional labour productiv­
ity. To sum up, there is good reason to believe that if 
figures on regional u.L.C.s had been available, the results 
might have suggested the possibility of a more active role 
for labour subsidies. On the other hand, given the orders of 
magnitude mentioned above, it seems hardly likely that our 
conclusions as to the relative importance of investment in­
centives and labour subsidies would have been overturned.
Calculating the employment impact of regional policy 
from our estimated equation is fairly straightforward, given 
the overall level of expenditure on investment grants and loans.
Out of a total net residual of 235,400 jobs in regions in 
receipt of regional financial aids, the value of the estimated 
regression coefficient would suggest that some 103,900 jobs may 
reasonably be attributed to regional policy.
If we assume that on average, expenditure on regional 
policy was equally effective in development areas and non­
development areas1, we may estimate that the employment impact
*In practice, all regions apart from Paris qualified for 
some form of regional aid.
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in category 1-3 D.A.s amounted to some 84,180 jobs —  the 
rest going to the N.D.A.s.
It is interesting to compare these results with the 
alternative procedure of estimating regional policy impact —  
that is, summing the residuals themselves. This approach 
gives an estimate for the D.A.s of 90,900 jobs, which is 
quite close to our estimated figure of 84,180. The difference 
is possibly due to the somewhat arbitrary allocation of 
residuals in D.A.s 2 and_31.
In conclusion, the above results would seem to suggest 
that, on average, the residual component in our shift-share 
analysis gives a good approximation to the regional policy 
effect.
1.8.3. At this point it would be interesting to attempt a break­
down of the r.p. effect at the regional level. Clearly it 
is not feasible to hypothesize a strict linear relationship 
between expenditure on r.p. and employment creation at the 
level of individual regions. The approach adopted has therefore 
been to present the residuals themselves (adjusted for D.A.s
2 and 3) as reasonable proxies for the employment impact of 
regional policy. The results are presented below.
This problem arose since only approximately one half of the 
area in D.A.s 2 and 3 qualified for the main regional invest­
ment grant. We therefore attributed 50% of the residuals in 
these regions to the impact of regional policy(see back).
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Table 9: The employment impact of regional policy by region
Effectiveness of (a) (b)
pojj.cy
D.A.
Inpact as % 1967 
employment levels
Distributicr 
of total 
inpact
Iirpact as % 
1967 employ­
ment levels
Distribution 
of total 
inpact
R.P.
expenditure
index
HlOi
3rertagne 1 30 23.0 30 19.2 8.9
Bsse Norman­
die 2 30 9.8 30 8.3 2.7
Poitou-Chts 1 25 18.3 25 15.4 7.7
Pays de la 
Loire 2 20 18.5 20 15.5 14.1
MXERATE -
Lorraine 3 11 8.9 12 8.4 15.1
Midi-Pyre­
nees 1 7 7.9 12 11.0 11.8
Auvergne 2 6 3.3 7 3.0 2.8
Pquitaine 1 6 8.4 / 7.8 11.7
PCCR
N6rd 3 1 1.8 3 7.8 19.0
Languedoc 2 0 0 3 1.3 2.8
Limousin 1 0 0 6 2.2 3.4
ICQ lQO 160
total inpacr:(a) = 90,900; (b) = 112,350.
In particular one should be careful in interpreting the 
results for Nord, Limousin* and Languedoc. In the case of
The residual for Limousin was actually highly negative (-7.3%), 
but is here represented as zero on the assumption that we should 
eliminate the hypothesis of a negative regional policy impact 
at the level of the individual region.
Nord and Limousin, significant negative locational factors 
were clearly present, being allowed for by the dummy variable. 
On the other hand, a very low or near zero r.p. impact is 
theoretically possible in spite of quite high expenditure on 
investment incentives. This could occur if the region failed 
to attract new firms from other regions and most of the in­
vestment grants and loans went to firms already operating in 
the region, which would have invested anyway.
The above explanation would seem to be the only feasible 
one for the totally negative results obtained for Limousin. 
This region stands out as the only D.A. to register negative 
residuals in all of the major'growth' industries —  sectors 
in which one would expect regional policy to have been most 
active (see Table 5).
However, given the problem of interpreting negative re­
siduals, we have chosen to present two alternative estimates 
of regional policy impact. In Table 9 under the first hypo­
thesis, we give the net manufacturing residuals for sectors 
4-14. tinder the second hypothesis we sum only the positive 
residuals for these sectors —  this assumes that the r.p. 
effect cannot feasibly be negative for any sector within any 
region! It is notable that the two sets of figures do not 
vary greatly for most of the regions concerned, although, 
overall, the policy effect implied under hypothesis (b) would 
appear to be somewhat high. It seems more reasonable, there­
fore, to consider these figures as maximum policy impact 
estimates for any region.
1 Although it is of course possible that regional incentives could 
actually have served to divert firms (and jobs) frcm one development 
area to another.
The last column in Table 9 gives the distribution of 
regional financial aid for the development areas. It is inter­
esting to compare these figures with the distribution of policy 
impact. On average, regional policy in 3retagne, Basse Nor­
mandie and Poitou-Charentes appears more than twice as effect­
ive as the shares of r.p. spending would suggest.
On the other hand, for Nord, Languedoc and Limousin, r.p. 
appears to have been only half as effective as expenditure 
levels would suggest —  even on the most favourable assumptions 
(i.e. hypothesis (b)).^
It should of course be remembered that the residuals in­
clude the effects of regional wage differentials and the in­
fluence of distance from Paris. However, firstly, the wage 
factor, although highly^ significant was very weak. For example', 
in the case of Bretagne", lower wage rates could not reasonably 
account for more than 12% of the residual effect? For most 
other regions this effect would have been substantially less. 
Secondly, it is probable that the TIME variable also includes 
the indirect effects of regional policy. That is, (a) the 
extent to which total industrial movement from Paris to the 
provinces has been increased due to the pull-effects of 
regional investment incentives, and (b) the push-effects of 
regional dis-incentive policies in the Paris region.
For the abovementioned reasons, it seems reasonable to 
regard the estimates in Table 8 as largely representing the 
direct and indirect effects of regional policy.
In conclusion we may make the following observations.
(i) The estimated employment impact of regional grants and 
loans over the period 1967-74 comes to 103,900 jobs of which
It should be recalled that the use of a dumny variable for Nord and Lim­
ousin revealed the existence of strong locational disadvantage in these 
areas. Whilst it is of course possible that a positive regional policy 
effect oould have been largely 'crowded out1 by the former (eg.poor ind­
igenous performance), the fact that residual components in sectors where 
r.p. would seem to have been most effective in ether development areas (eg. 
mech.and elec.engin,chem.), were generally either lew or negative, would 
tend to suggest that this was not in fact the case.
Given the divergence of wages in Bretagne from the mean, and given the 
values of the other variables for Bretagne.
-84,180 may be attributed to the main development areas.
These figures compare with an official estimate of 263,000 
jobs aided over the same period.
Cleariv there is a fundamental difference between "jobs 
aided and "jobs created", since some proportion of these 
new aided jobs would certainly have been created anyway, 
in the absence of recicnal policy( around 61% according to 
our figures).
One would expect such "overlapping" or "wastage" to be lower 
in the case of new investment, where, at the margin, in­
vestment grants and loans may be very important in the 
decision to invest and in the choice cf where to locate.
In France, however, rather a high proportion of financial 
aid went to existing enterprises (around 2/3) and less than 
one third towards the creation of new enterprises.^
(ii) There appear to have been significant differences in the
impact of regional po —i.cy ss r’sjions. Around. o0%~
70% of the total policy impact occurred in the four western 
regions —  this is a very high figure considering that 
around one third of total expenditure on investment grants 
and loans went to these regions. If we consider that, overall 
the ratio of jobs created (r.p. effect) to jobs aided is 
around 1:2.6, then it is clear that for the West of France 
there is almost a one to one relationship between job aid
and job creation.
(iii) It seems probable that the "efficiency" of r.p. was 
related to the ability to attract new industry, one cf the 
main determinants of which being the effective distance cf 
the recion from Paris. This may explain why r.p. appeared
Journal Cfficiel (J.O.) ito.7 p.433. However, these figures largely 
accear to be in line with the general pattern of employment growth in 
France. As Prid'hcnnse has remarked on this subject, "The pic:
emerges is cuii from that based on massive decentralisations by
larger firms. Rather, what accounts ror tne increase m  mcustriai employm­
ent "is tvoicaliv the 100 employee firm that has gained another thirty enplo- 
vees." Hansen(1974) p.50. The camer.t however relates to the mid-late '60's.
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to be more effective in the West than in the South West 
and South which were effectively farther from the Paris 
region.
(iv) Surprisingly, expenditure on infra-structure proved to 
have no explanatory power in our estimated equation. This 
should not, however, be taken to mean that such expenditure 
is unimportant as for promoting regional development.
The result is more due to the fact that the distribution 
of infrastructure spending is largely unrelated to the 
aims of regional development policy. The fact that there 
was no correlation found between INFRA and R.P. supports 
this argument?- As a corrollary, it seems that a more active 
role might be sought for infrastructure policy.
(v) The main policy implication of the preceding analysis is 
that financial incentives should be made more selective.
For instance, the present ceiling on investment grants in 
the South West and South could be raised relative to the 
West, As a result, firms would have the financial induce­
ment to decentralise over greater distances. This, in turn 
would tend to raise the share of new firms moving to the 
South West and South, thereby increasing the efficiency
of r.p. in these regions.
(vi) Given that regional policy seems to have been mere effec­
tive in some sectors than in others (noteably electronics and 
mechanical engineering), there would seem to be a case for 
including some type of sectoral policy in the overall regional 
development "package". This could take the form of either,(i) 
differentiated financial incentives according to sector, or,
(ii) greater direct involvement,such as coordination of infra­
structure works or stricter location controls. In the following 
chapters, we shall discuss these alternatives in more depth.
In general the position of many of the less-ceveioped regions 
of the South-West looks bleak. In addition to raising the 
level of financial aid to investment it is probable that a
1 In fact, the influence of INFRA was prbably fairly neutral in the reg­
ression analysis given that regional differences in expenditure per head 
were generally very small.
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more concentrated effort on raising the overall level of infra­
structure is required, particularly in sane of the mere rural areas.
Unfortunately we have no information on the the spatial 
distribution of aided employment within regions. However, if 
the experience of Limousin is anything to go by, it is clear 
that largely rural areas lacking in urban infra-structure 
are not only unable to attract new firms but are moreover los­
ing employment in already existing enterprises.
Given the high incidence cf aided investment in 
Limousin,(table 2), one is led to the tentative conclusion that 
regional policy in these areas has been oriented more towards 
propping up existing firms than inducing the establishment of 
new firms. One is also led tc speculate as to whether the same 
is largely true of rural areas elsewhere in the south-west,and 
whether the impact,of regional policy in these regions has been 
mainly centred in the large urban areas. Certainly, the evidence 
is not convincing that the "spread" effects of economic growth 
will eventually reach even the most peripheral regions.Indeed 
our evidence would seem to show that large areas may be altog­
ether left out of the growth process. Certainly distance is an 
important factor, and it is clear “hat the regions to reap the 
most benefits from the decline of manufacturing employment in 
Paris are those which are geographically closest.
A comparison of French and British experiences.
Xt is interesting to compare cur results with those or similar 
studies on the impact of British regional policy. For example, 
MacKav and Thomson1 found that the direct policy effect in tne 
U.K. ever the period 1968-73 amounted tc 39,oCQ jees. -.¿_s rep­
resents an annual rate of job creation or ±¡,¿00 compares to 
French ficure o~ 14 ,840. -owever expenci-ure cn _egi^:.a— 
incentives was considerably higher in the U.K. - r l,i3/ m. 
between 1968-73 , compared to Jr. 2 , 36 3 m! between 1957-74 m  
France. On the face of it, Britisn regional pc.icy vcu_a »eem 
to be much less cost effective, however a number of factors
1 S.J.P.E. November 19 79 , pp. 245—'6.Figures adjusted for fitted time
* trend 1952-^ 3£ 179 m. at 1970 exchange rates.
-must be taken into account. Firstly manufacturing employment in 
the U.K. development areas increased steadily over this period 
in spite of the overall downward trend in total manufacturing 
employment, and this by itself is quite an acnievment. On the 
other hand 1967-74 corresponded to a period of unprecedented 
growth in manufacturing employment in France. In other words, 
the circumstances for achieving a redistribution of manufac­
turing employment were certainly much more favourable in France 
over this period.
Secondly, given that on the whole, a relatively high 
proportion of investment grants in France went towards the 
enlargement of existing enterprises , it would seem that U.K. 
regional policy was probably more successful in actually prom­
oting the movement'of firms to the D.A.’s.^
Thirdly, given the high level of expenditure on 
investment subsidies in the U. K*, it is quite possible that 
regional policy had a significant impact on the overall level 
of investment after 1963.§ In other words a case can be made 
for stating that British regional policy affected not only 
the distribution of employment (residual component), but also 
the level of employment (structural component). As the outcome 
of this, it is possible that the above figures may underestimate: 
the overall impact of British regional policy.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that in the pre­
ceding period, 1963-68, the estimated employment impact of
U.K. regional policy was more or less the same, whilst expend-
2iture was considerably lower (£ 288 m. at 1970/71 prices).
MacKay and Thomson op.cit. pp. 250-252. "It seems reasonable 
to claim that...alteration in the scale and direction of plant 
movement plays the major role in transforming industry by ind­
ustry performance."
2 Ibid. p. 246.
* Of the £1,187 m. spent cn regional aid, over 40% was accounted for by
the Regional Bnploynent Premium. Thus, investment incentives accounted
for around £700 m. which is still considerably higher than the French 
figure. See ibid. p.235.
§ The evidence on this point is not entirely conclusive,(LUND 1976). See 
annex 2 for further discussion.
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From 1974 onwards has been a period of almost continous 
decline in industrial employment. Furthermore differences in 
regional performance have widened.
By 1978 some regions were clearly over the worst, whilst in 
others employment was falling at a steady or increasing rate eg. 
Lorraine -5.1%, Hte.Normandie -3.5%, Nord -3.3%.* Already 
by 1976, it was clear that regional development subsidies 
were also being used to prop up employment elsewhere than in 
the major development areas. Out of a total of 35,700 jobs
aided in 1976 around 13,500 were attributable to the large,
industrial centres' of Lorraine, Nord, Alsace and Rhone-Alpes, 
whilst only 10,000 jobs were aided in the five group 1 D.A.'s. 
The situation in 1977 appears to have been similar.
A final point should be made, that the regions we have 
classified as having experienced a high regional policy impact 
(table 3), are also the regions which appear to have suffered
least from the current reccession. 3retagne and Loire, for ex­
ample actually experienced moderate growth rates in 1978 (2.4% 
and 0.8% respectively), whilst employment remained mere or less 
constant in Poitou-Charentes and fell only slightly in Bsse.Nor 
mandie. Although, in terms of jobs aided these regions have rem­
ained relatively favoured in recent years, it is probable that 
the high rate of injection of new industries up until 1974 also 
helped to contribute towards their better than average perform­
ance in the late 1970's. As MacKay and Thomson have pointed out, 
regions which receive such an injection oi new industries are 
likely to retain a substantial competitive advantage which con-
1.11.
The post 1974 period.
* Figures relate to 1978. E & S Feb.1980 N 119 p.24.
2 J.0. April 18th. 1978 p.439.
tinues to influence performance in later periods.1 3asically,
this advantage is attributable to an overall improvement in
capital vintage brought about mainly by the inflow of new firms2to the development areas. It is also possible that investment 
grants will speed up the rate at which existing firms will scrac 
old plant and machinery - although this will tend to improve 
capital vintage and competitive advantage,such a process may 
also be associated with some substitution of capital for labour 
and the short term, employment effects may be either positive or 
negative (see Ch.8).
In general, however, it is to be expected that the 
initial impact of regional policy would also lead to an improve­
ment in performance which should be more than transitory.
1.12. Concluding- comments on France.
In general we may conclude that French regional policy 
has been largely successful, both in absolute terms of jobs 
created and in comparison with regional policy elsewhere. On 
the other hand, the impact has varied greatly at the regional 
level. In particular there is some doubt as to whether French 
regional policy in its present form is capable of raising reg­
ional growth rates in some of the more isolated rural areas of 
the south-west.
It also remains to be seen whether regional policy has 
been equally successful under the more difficult economic con­
ditions of recent years. One may also ask whether it will con­
tinue to benefit mainly the less developed regions, or will —  
rather be aimed at maintaining employment levels in the estab­
lished industrial centres.
Furthermore, the argument for a wide coverage of regional 
policy which seemed justified for the pre-1962 period and poss­
ibly up until 1967, no longer seems valid given that a number 
of group 2 D.A.'s were the first to have benefitted from the de—  
cline of manufacturing employment in the Paris region, and wculc—  
possibly have done so even in the absence of regional policy.
Certainly, if regional policy is meant to promote the nan 
ufacturir.g base of the less developed regions, there is a case 
for making it more selective.
Op.cit. pp. 252-255.
2 This would also result in a higher residual component in 
terms of cur present analysis.
II.1.
A comparison of the effectiveness of regional policies 
between countries is a somewhat difficult and delicate matt­
er. Nevertheless it is possible to obtain some interacting 
results. A study similar to our previous section on France 
already exists with respect to Italy, and a few adjustments 
make the results readily comparable.
The Italian study in question^relates to the period 
1970-75. The four year period 1971-75, was one of relatively high 
spending on regional policy - at 1975 prices, lire 6,3 57 
billion, compared to lire 4,076 billion from 1966-70, and 
lire 3,103 billion from 1961-65.2
Overall, the growth rate of dependent manufacturing employment 
remained fairly stable when compared to the average for 
the earlier period 1561-70, but terminated after the rec­
ession in 1974/75.
Between 1970 and 1975 total manufacturing employment 
increased by 157,000 jobs. 82,300 of these jobs were located 
in the south - that is 52% of the total increase. However, 
this was the only major employment: sector apart from services 
to experience such good performance - total employment in 
the south actually fell over this period by 2,000'jobs.
Taking employment in manufacturing industry, the above- 
mentioned author obtained the following overall results (see 
table 1]. Clearly the® was a substantial amount of decentral­
isation - unrelated to regional incentives - away from the 
old-established centres of the north west, towards the more 
central regions {Marche and Lazio in particular). As rabla I 
shows, the structural components for the centre and south
A comparison with Italian regional policy.
M.D1 Antonio (1977).
S.V.I.M.S.2. (15"3) p.Si, ^assa excenciture.
M.D’Antoni jc.cit. p .1C4~. Excluding energy and construction.
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Table 1.
Region or 
area.
residual
component
structural
component
total change
North West - 126.7 43.2 - 83.5
North East 1.0 - 5.6 - 4.6
Centre 48.0 -16.0 32.0
South ; 77.7 -21.6 56.1
As % of 1971 Residual as %
empi.levels. 
9.3
of 1971 snplov-
Campania (26.6) ‘ 27.2 - 5.2
ment levels. 
(11.2)
Puglia (24.1) 24.6 - 4.4 12.9 (15.4)
Abruzzi (15.6) 14.0 - 2.5 18.8 (25.5)
Sardegna (7.7) 6.8 - 0.3 13.2 (15.6)
Molise (3.7) 3.8 - 0.8 35.8 (44.2)
Basilicata (2.8) 1.4 - 0.9 2.7 (15.1)
Sicilia (3.6) 1.3 - 5.2 -2-7 (2.5)
Calabria (1.7) -1.4 - 2.3 -9.1 (4.2)
Source ; M.D'Antonio (1977) p.1053.
ISTAT Annuario statistico italiano,1975 p.225.
 ^Figures in brackets relate to dependent employment only.
were both strongly negative, suggesting a weak industrial 
base especially when compared to the north west.
II.2. The effect of regional policy was not however spread 
evenly throughout the souths As a percentage of 1971 empl­
oyment levels, the residual effect was relatively low or 
negative for three of the southernmost regions - Basilicata,
We assume that the residual component will broadly correspond to the
employment impact of regional policy. This was certainly found to be
the case in our study on France r although in the French case it should 
be recalled that there were also found to be a number of other factors
which tended to pull in opposite directions.
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Calabria and Sicilia.
One should however assess some of these results with 
care. The fact that Calabria recorded a negative residual 
efrect Jnay not, however, imply that the impact of regional 
policy was totally negative. It rather suggests that other 
factors were involved that have not been taken into account 
in tne present survey. In particular, we know that in Calab­
ria, firm size is on average very small even by southern 
standards, with 53.6% of manufacturing employment belonging 
to units of less than ten employees in 1971.*
We also know that overall, employment in firms of this 
size actually fell between 1961-71. Clearly, comparing ind— 
ustrial sectors as between regions will tend to give biased 
results when the size structure of these sectors differs 
appreciably. As a consequence, the structural component for 
some southern regions may be unduly favourable given the 
poorer than average structure of production units. This would 
then result in an u n d e r e s t im a t e  of th e  impact cf regional 
policy when based on the residual component. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to see how one could compensate for this 
effect. As a rough approximation, we may note that between1 
1961-71, the small-scale manufacturing sector (less than ten 
employees), lost around 37 ,000 jobs. By and large, other sec-., 
tors in the south did not compare unfavourably with perfor­
mance in the centre-north ever this period. However, the small 
scale sector in the centre-north gained some 13,500 employees.
In other words, the firm-size disadvantage of the 
south may be estimated at around 43,200 jobs 2cver this period. 
If this disadvantage had remained unchanged over the period 
1973-7 5, cr.e micht have expected a loss of around 21, 500 jobs 
due to the size factor alone.
1 See S7IMZ3 (1973), pp.150,151.The corresponding figure for 
the south is 41.5%, and for the centre-ncrth 20.5%.
c 37, 000 +[l/3 x 13,50cj - this sector in the South being_one third 
the size of the same sector in the centre/north. The nature or tr.is 'dis­
advantage' is not intrinsically related to small firms per se, but merely
i x  ITSJ.3.CI.VS C02T-Cr?
Of STTJCV.
One might therefore consider this figure to represent the 
degree of overestimation of the structural component, and 
obtain a new policy impact estimate of some 59,3 00 jobs.
Following from the abovementioned argument, one might 
perhaps consider the figures in brackets in table 1 (relatinc 
to dependent employment only)^ as giving a more accurate imp­
ression of the impact of regional policy as between regions.
The reason for this is that taking only dependent employment 
clearly eliminates a number of very small craft or artisan 
enterprises ; that is, the small-scale sector which is relat­
ively numerous in the South and which, for many years, has 
suffered more or less continuous decline. Thus, the firm size 
problem in the analysis is oartially removed.
Comparing the two sets of figures in table 1, there 
are notable improvements in the residual components for Basil­
icata, Sicilia and Calabria —  three regions with very poor 
firm size structures. However, the results for Sicilia and Cal­
abria still remain well below average. As concerns Basilicata, 
although the employment impact of regional policy now appears 
rather impressive, it should be remembered that, in relation 
to overall changes in manufacturing employment, the impact rem­
ains relatively small. This is due to the high rate of employ­
ment loss in small-scale firms.
The point to be emphasised, is that the overall empl­
oyment position of many regions in the South has a considerable 
negative bias, not only because of a lack of growth industries, 
(vis.structural components), but also because of a dispropor­
tionate share of very-small-scale enterprises. Furthermore, 
the relative importance of these factors may be assumed to 
vary somewhat as between regions. Clearly, these are important 
elements to be taken into account where regional planning is 
concerned.
Table 2 gives the residual components for the most suc­
cessful manufacturing sectors in the south. In absolute terms, 
the mechanical engineering and electronics sector appears 
to have provided the highest number of job creations as a 
direct result of regional policy. This result is similar to
 ^Note: this is also the approach used in our study of regional 
policy in France.
-Table 2
Residual components for southern Italy 1970-75.
Sector. residual compon- as % of empi.in
ent,thousand jobs.relevant sector
in south(19 71).
Mechanical engineering
and electronics. 29.6 17.4
Transport equipment. 22.1 69. 1
Textiles,clothing,leather. 18.1 12.2
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals .8.6 18.0
Metallurgy. 9.1 27.7
Source ; M.D'Antonio (1977), p.1056.
SVIMEZ (1978), p.146.
our findings on French regional policy.
In relative terms (ie. as a % of 1971 employment levels), 
the effect is more marked in transport equipment and metall­
urgy. However, this is not surprising given that,(i) these 
sectors were both greatly under represented in the share of 
total manufacturing employment during the 1960's.^ (ii) inter­
vention in these sectors has largely been of the more direct 
type, as an integral part of national industrial policy and 
through the medium of existing state holding enterprises.
It should finally be noted that residuals for the remain­
ing three industrial sectors (food and tobacco, printing and 
other industrial products), were all negative. Once again, 
this may be due to a particular structural disadvantage rel­
ating to the south. We shall discuss in more depth the part­
icular productive structure of southern manufacturing sectors 
in a later section.
1 i e  S o u th  compared t o  th e  C e n t r e /N o r t h .  S ee  P o d b i e l s k i ,
(SVIMEZ 1978).
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To give some idea of the employment impact of state ent­
erprises at the sectoral level, Table 3 compares net employment 
changes overall and in state-holding enterprises for three 
employment sectors for which comparable figures are available.
Changes in dependent gnployment in southern Italy Table 3
by sector, and changes in employment in state enterprise.-------1
Sector. Residual ccmpon- Net change in emp- Residual as % Net charge in
ent ('COO empi.), loyment in South, of national state sector an-
( '000 empi.). growth rate. pi.in South0000),
Chemicals and
Parmaceuticals. 8.7 10.4 75.7% 6.1
Mechanical engin­
eering and electron. 30.1 34 .3 42.8 % 29.0
Transport equipment. 22 .6 24.2 135.3 % ----
Textiles,clothing, §
leather. 18.9 -4.4 (-)14.5 % 1.0
Metallurgy. 9.5 14.6 33.2% 24.6
(1)_________ (2)____________ (3) (4)
 ^ textiles only. Sources : M.D'Antonio (1977), Relazione Programma
tica, Ministero delle Partecipazioni 
Statali.
Note : The results of the shift-share analysis using dependent employment only, 
tend to confirm our hypothesis regarding firm size. Since this approach 
partially eliminates the snaller scale enterprises, the corresponding res­
idual ccrnponent is somewhat higher (85,800) than the figure for total empl­
oyment, (77,700).
These figures are most easily interpreted by comparing columns 
one and three, and columns two and four. If we assume that the 
residual component broadly corresponds to the regional policy 
effect, then column 3 represents the extent to which regional 
policy has "transferred" jobs to the South. A figure over 100 % 
implies that the rest of the country has actually experienced 
a net decline in employment in the sector considered.
A comparison of columns 2 and 4 gives an idea of the 
importance of state sector employment in the growth of e m p l o y m e n t  
in the South. In the case of Metallurgy, it is clear that the
-private sector must have lost around 10 ,000 jobs over this 
period. The state sector car. therefore be said to have contrib­
uted rullv to the growth of employment in metallurgy in the 
South. Another sector in which the state apoears to have olaved 
a dominant role is mechanical engineering and electronics.
. _ ________ _ - . - _  ---- In this respect it particularly
worrying tnat the private sector appears to have made only a 
minimal contribution to employment growth in these imoortant 
sectors. However, in the electronics industry in particular, 
there wouid seem to be some scope for even greater state invol­
vement. In terms of the proportion of state enterprise investment 
located in the South, electronics (37.5%) comes well behind a 
number or other major sectors such as chemicals (60%), mechan­
ical engineering (44.8%) and metallurgy (47.7%).
Furthermore, state enterprise employment in electronics 
is actually scheduled to fall by nearly 1,000 jobs by 1983, at 
least half of which will be lost in the Mezzogiorno.
Finally, around 4 2.6 % of all new investment by state- 
owned enterprises is planned to be located in the South between 
1979 and 1933. However, the rate of job creation is likely to 
be much reduced —  only around 3,700 new jobs were scheduled 
to be created in manufacturing in the South between 197 6 and 
1931. This compares with a figure cf '67 ,400“fcr the period 1970-75.
Although the growth industries at a national level ever 
the period 1970-75 car. easily be spotted —  electronics 19.8%, 
metallurgy 15 .4%,transport eq. 10.3%, chemicals & pharm. 9.11 —  the situa- 
ion is much different for the period 1975-79 . The only industrial 
sectors with growth rates of any significance ever this later 
oericd were, transport equipment 4.3%, metallurgy 4.6% and mach- 
ir.erv 2.5%? In this perspective, studies cr. regional policy up 
to 1975 must seem like past history. Clearly there is now very 
little ccssibilitv of repeating the substantial redistribution 
of industrial employment that occured up until 1974/75.
Furthermore, as we have seer., in the past such redistrib­
ution took place mainly, and in some cases almost entirelyimet­
allurgy and mech .engineer ing) tnrougn state-r.olc.ing enterprises.
 ^Provisional figures for 1379-31. Ministère celle Part.Stat.,?elazicni 19S0.
2 Oo.cit. 1973,p71. This figure dees not include 'Various man.",which is 
aggregated wiki "various services" in the earlier statistics. At a guess 
about "another 4,000 jobs could be added to this figure.
 ^ m, 3c ' ^ —* ire '-tensile di Statistics, 19S0 Nc. 4, p.308.
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The future for industrial employment in the South would there­
fore seem to depend critically on the role that the state is 
willing to play in the 1980's. It is therefore important to anal­
yse such recent developments, and this will be done in the chap­
ters that follow.
Table 4 gives a breakdown of investments receiv­
ing capital grants and a comparison with the policy impact 
by sector. As with the French survey, the actual policy im­
pact is generally lower (around one half) than the official 
job creation estimates.
Table 4.
Investments receiving capital grants and estimated regional 
impact.
Sector. regional pol- jobs subsid- capital per em-
Icy estimate. ised('6 9 - 7 S ) . ploved(million lire) .
Mech. engin. »electronics. 2 9 ,600
116 ,200 9 .5
Transport equipment. 2 7 ,100
Textiles/cloth./leather. 1 8 ,100 16 ,700 2 .9
Metallurgy. 9 ,100 2 9 ,300 6 0 .8
Chemicals a pharmae. a, fioo 2 6 ,800 5 2 .9
(Ftocd i tobacco). -  800* 39 ,800 1 2 .5
This result suggests that theri was probably a separate "southern 
factor' involved.One explanation is certainly the poorer than average 
size structure of this industry in the south.
Source; SVIME2 (1973), p.157 and M.O'Antonio op.cit. table 2.
The textiles sector is again an exception where the 
two figures broadly coincide.
The general interpretation of the above table is that 
around one half of the jobs subsidised would have been created 
anyway. This is somewhat better than the corresponding French 
figure of over 60 %.
In terms of capital per employee (investment per job 
created), chemicals and metallurgy are clearly much more cap­
ital intensive than the other sectors - the investment req­
uired to provide a job in these sectors being around six times 
the figure required for a job in mechanical engineering/elec­
tronics .
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Finally, table 5 gives the distribution of aided jobs 
and investment between new plants and the extension of exis­
ting enterprises.
Table 5.
Projects receiving cranes In the industrial sector,1969-
S/L 
14 .0
2S.5
Source ; Cassa per 11 Mezzcgiorno,Silancio 1975 .
1 9 7 5 . N initiatives Sr.slsvjier.t Investment
New clanta. 4,737 213,592 L.2,992 b.
Enlarce.Tier.ts. 4,562 135,910 L.3,467 b.
total = 349,3C2
Clearly, new plants were in general rr.ore labour int­
ensive, and as a whole constituted around two thirds of the 
total number of jobs aided. Hence it would seem that Italian 
policy was probably more successful in attracting new firms 
to the development areas than was the case in France where 
some two thirds of regional development grants went towards 
the extension of existing enterprises. However, in tne Italian 
case it is probable that many of these 'new1 firms were in
actual fact state enterprises.
Ill. - The role of the State and state-controlled enterprise in reg­
ional development.
Italy :
Italy is perhaps one of the only countries in 
Europe where state-owned enterprise has played such a consid­
erable role in attaining the overall goals of regional dev­
elopment policy. Italy's major state-holding enterprises were 
not however set up with this aim specifically in mind - the 
largest group, Iri, started its life in 1933 under Mussolini 
as part of a propping-up operation in the banking and indus­
trial sectors.
Under 1971 legislation, the state-holding sector was 
obliged to locate 80% of its new, and 60% of its total inv­
estment in the south. Although actual investment fell some­
what short of these targets, the impact was still consider- >
able - on average, between 1971-75, investment by state enter­
prises represented 37% of total investment in the south1-.
The state-holding sector in Italy essentially com­
prises two main companies, the Iri and the Eni, which in 1977
2employed some 524,000 and 103,000 persons respectively. Both 
companies have very wide ranging interests. The Iri for exampl 
has interests in Alitalia, Alfa-Romeo, broadcasting, most mot­
orways, banks, iron, steel, engineering, shipbuilding, elec­
tronics and public works. The Er.i group deals mainly in chem­
icals, textiles, energy and construction. Another smaller 
company,Efim, also has interests in the food and tobacco ind­
ustries, hotels and engineering.
1 SVIMEZ (1973), p.160.
2 The Economist, 30th.December 1973.
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From 1970 to 1975 employment in the industrial sec­
tor or state-holding enterprises in the south increased by 
almost 13,000 jobs per year. In the five years 1970-75, the 
net increase come to around 67 ,400 jobs.Given that over the 
same period manufacturing employment in the south rose by 
some 32,300 jobs, it is quite clear that the state sector 
played an important role in the growth of industrial inves­
tment and employment in southern Italy.*
France :
In France the only major industrial companies 
with over 50% state ownership are : (i) Renault (243,000
employees in 1977), (ii) Elf-Aquitaine (37,COO),and (iii) 
Electric!te de France (101,000). Of these only Renault is 
of major interest as far as manufacturing employment is con­
cerned. Of eight major Renault extensions outside the Paris 
region between 1960-74, only one was situated in a class 1 
D.A.(Bretagne), and only two in a class 2 D.A.(Loire). Three
were located in the Nord region (D.A. class 3) and two were
2located in Hte.Normandie (unclassified). Although there was 
clearly some effort to decentralise towards the west, the 
attempt appeared somewhat half-hearted, and the residual gro­
wth components for this sector in Loire and Bretacne (see 
table 5.) remained relatively low after 1967.
As in many other countries, regional development aid in 
France constitutes only a small part of total state aid to 
industry. In France, however, it is particularly difficult 
to fathom the orecise nature and extent of national aiu — 
until a law, removing administrative secrets was passed in 
July 1973, -here was little possibility of obtaining the 
relevant ficures.
* dependent xar/uf acturing employment rose by 109,500 jobs. Source: Him:
"della Part.Stat.1377, M.D'Ar.tonio, op.cit.
2 P.Durand (19"4), p.203
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From what can be gathered1, state aid to industry in 
France during the 1970s was very substantial. The aids fell 
mainly in the following categories: research and develop­
ment aid, export aids, regional development grants, fiscal 
aids, sectoral aids. Between 19 73 and 1976 total aid amount­
ed to Fr. 33,360 million or Fr. 8,340 per annum (around h 
725m). Expenditure on regional subsidies averaged about 
Fr. 450m per annum over this period, and therefore accounted 
for only 5.4% of total aid to industry.
Almost two thirds of this aid is centred in three indus­
trial sectors, the aircraft industry (36.6%), electronics 
and communications (15.1%), and shipbuilding (11.5%).
However, aid to investment was very low -- depending on 
the sector considered, it amounted to between 1% and 6% of 
total state aid. It is probable therefore, that regional 
investment aid accounted for a very large share of direct 
aid to investment. The other types of aid may in general be 
considered to have had a much smaller impact on new invest­
ment and employment. Very often these aidsvere aimed direct­
ly at improving the profitability or competitivity of large 
companies in key sectors. For example, "financial aid to 
research at Thomson is renewed yearly with a remarkable 
regularity and has tended to become an indispensable factor 
in maintaining the profitability of this enterprise."
R&D costs have, in certain cases, been financed at up 
to 90%, and in the case of export subsidies, these have 
sometimes reached a cumulative total of as much as 20%- 
30% of the agreed export price. —
In conclusion, there seems to be little evidence,for 
France, of direct state involvement in achieving the aims 
of regional development. Clearly the means at the disposal of 
the French government were nowhere near as powerful as those 
we have reviewed in the Italian case. It should however be 
recalled that the state has traditionally played a major role
^The report of H. Hannoun on state aid to industry, taken 
from supplementaux dossiers et documents du Monde(Le Monde) 
Jan. 1980, p. 151.
2 Ibid. p. 151.
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in the overall scheme of industrial growth in Italy, and it 
was onj.y one more step to apply these methods for the surocses 
of regional development. Clearly, if no such large scale state 
enterprises already exist, it is quite another matter to create 
them for these purposes. The alternative is an array of state- 
aids to existing private enterprises. A good example of this 
is found in the U.K. where, quite apart from specific regional 
aids, state-aid to industry amounted to some £ 2,822 m. over 
the period 1972-79 (by far the greatest part of which took 
place arter 1975 ). This compares with expenditure on regional 
grants and loans amounting to some £ 1,819m. over the same 
period.
In the Italian case one might also add to the cost of 
industrial policy the sizeable losses of the various state- 
controlled enterprises ever recent years.2
Certainly, it i_s becoming increasingly difficult to 
fathom the actual cost, of industrial policies in many E.C. 
member states. Furthermore, the dividing line between region­
al policies, sectoral policies and employment maintenance 
programmes is becoming
IV. Summarv and conclusions
Table 5 gives a comparison of the costs per job created 
in the three countries covered so far. By and large, expendit­
ure on regional policy has been made broadly comparable, and 
has been expressed in terms of sterling at values measured in, 
or equivalent to price levels around 1970-71. The job creation 
figures are taken from the aforementioned studies, and relate 
to estimated policv imoact ratr.er tnar. orri.ci.a_ rigures cn 
jobs aided. An  expenditure figures concern direct aids to
Table 6 .
An overall comparison of the impact of regional policies.§
Country oerioc covered estimated r.p. jobs per year cost oer year cost per
impacr.* £ million. job created.
France 1967-74 103,900 a 14,840 £25.6 d £1,725
U.K. 1968-73 89,600 b 17,900 £237.4 6 £13,260
Italy 1970-75 99,300 C 19,860 £550.0 f £27,694
* Direct effect only. Does not include multiplier effects on other
sectorsa) See text - residual component only.
b) Residual component + fitted time trend from policv-off period.
c) Residual component + correction for overestimate of growth 
component due to differences in firm size structure.
d) Current prices, e) Constant 1970-71 prices. f) Constant 1971
prices. (including expenditure on industrial infrastructure).
regional development (ie incentive spending).
Very substantial variations appear in the average cost 
per job createdwith France appearing to have the most cost 
effective policy.
However, regional policies in Britain and Italy 
are far more comprehensive than those operating in France.
Over the periods covered, these two countries were also empl­
oying labour subsidies which accounted for a very large
share of total incentive expenditure (41% in the U.K.and around 
249% in Italy). Clearly, as the national jcb creation target__
§
For sources see present text and Chapter 8 . For an alternat­
ive view of the cost of regional policy, see, E.C."The Reg­
ional Development Programmes",1979,p.242.
This is not to be confused with net Exchequer costs; for 
a discussion of transfer and resourse costs see Annex.
2 The cost of social security concessions in Italy came to 
Lire 225 billion in 1972, Lire 701 b. in 1975 and over 1,000 
billion in 1977, (Ronzani 1979)'.
-  < o - >  '
rises, so it becomes necessary to provide more ccmcrehensive 
policies, and this obviously entails a rise in the overall 
cosw a.*d — . * e average cost oer jco createc •
As we have  s e e n ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under w h ich  r e g i o n ­
a l  p o l i c y  had t o  o p e r a t e  w ere  v e r v  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h e  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  c o n s i d e r e d .  In F r a n c e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  e co n o m ic  c l i m a t e  
was v e r y  f a v o u r a b l e  and a tr e n d  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s i n g  i n d u s t r y  
away from  t h e  P a r i s  r e g i o n  had a l r e a d y  b eg u n .
In  B r i t a i n , m a n u fa c tu r in g  em ploym ent f e l l  a t  t h e  n a t i o n ­
a l  l e v e l  o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d .  T h is  r e s u l t e d  in  t h e r e  b e in g  r e l ­
a t i v e l y  l e s s  new m a n u fa c tu r in g  em ploym ent t o  a t t r a c t  t o  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  a r e a s .
In Italy, although emploper.: errewt:., rates at a natic
al level were generally zavcurable, ~ r*e oroblern of attract! ng
new inves tmer.t to the D . A . 1s was trera;:-y - - e a r - e -  ~ '"’I a *"1 *
France or Britain, arising mamly f (a; generally back-
ward industrial and commerc ial stru = ^ t (b) rising rel-
ative wag  ^S f  ^  ^  ^V1 0“ 'ndus— •— *• a
(d) distanee costs from the central kaüs. The aim of pro V
iding southem Italy with a series o f heavy basic industrie s
undoubted ly added greatly to the ev xpense-
Typirally, these industr les vere ’-'igrlv capital
ir.tens ive - investment per “r?.c" cv5s iz e inç in the region of
some £ 4 0,000? For a medium 3ize prO j — - -n a priority sector
and location ~rie eízac-ive valué oí eran t s, tax concessions
and leans could well be ever 4 C % c f ¿ni t i a_ capita_ costs,
or some £  ^f*"' ^ ^   ^ i 3 “^ >-s .V S C 3. S e *

Clearly it is difficult to make direct comparisons 
of the impact of regional policies where the surrounding circu­
mstances and policy aims themselves differ greatly from country 
to country. Whilst this would seem to have largely been the case 
in the present context, a number of general points in common 
would appear to be fairly clear.
1. In the first place, there would appear to be substantial 
difference between official figures on new jobs aided by reg­
ional incentives and actual job creation - the difference aris­
ing due to the fact that the incidence of regional aids on loc­
ation and investment decisions may vary substantially from inc­
entive to incentive and from country to country. Whilst the fi­
gures for Italy would suugest that around one half of new aided 
employment would probably have occured anyway, that is in the 
absence of regional incentives, the results for France would 
suggest a somewhat lower 'incidence'of around 40%. To some exte­
nt, this is to be expected given the much higher incentive val­
ues obtainable in Italy, and the major role played by state- 
holding enterprises in this country.
2. With respect to labour subsidies, the main criticisms 
raised in the previous chapter would appear to have been given 
some empirical confirmation. It is certainly the case for exam­
ple that labour subsidies in Italy and the U.K. have greatly 
increased the cost of regional policy in these countries relat­
ive to elsewhere. One may feel inclined to ask on the basis of 
table 7 whether such expenditure has really produced much bett­
er results.
3. Perhaps the most important conclusions to be drawn from 
our analysis concern the spatial effectiveness of regional inc­
entives. In particular our surveys on France and Italy have sh­
own that several regions appear to have benefitted little, or 
not at all from these policies ( Limousin,languedoc and Nord in 
France; Basilicata,Sicilia and Calabria in Italy). That most of
Conclusions
^ S’ 8 ir.
the abovementioned regions are also those with some of the gra­
vest economic and social problems in Europe is of even more co­
ncern. In order to improve the net financial advantage available 
to firms which may consider locating in more disadvantaged and 
less developed areas, it is clearly necessary to acieve a much 
higher level of spatial selectivity than is the case at present. 
Moreover, the degree of structural disadvantage in such areas 
(see tab.3 France,and tab.l Italy), would suggest a further 
need to develop specific policies to improve indigenous firm 
performance and adjustment potential. If, as we have suggested 
earlier, industrial investment is likely to much less 'mobile' 
over the 1980's than was the case for the 1970's, then policies 
must place correspondingly more emphasis on achieving a greater 
degree of 'self-help' and rely less on the movement of what are 
often mere production 'workbenches' to the less developed areas. 
In respect to the latter question, a higher degree of sectoral 
selectivity towards new enterprises locating in l.d.r.'s is pr­
obably desirable.
The case for development of such a 'two-tier' approach 
towards regional policy is given further backing by the obser­
vation that much of the new job creation in l.d.r.'s has come 
from what are essentially new industries to these regions (eg. 
mech./elec. engin. in France and transport equip.as well in It­
aly) , whilst in many cases more traditional consumer industries 
(wood,clothing,textiles,vis France) have fared less well in co­
mparison with other regions. As evidence from other studies 
would suggest, it cannot be taken for granted that the implan­
tation of new industries in less developed regions will necess­
arily produce significant and positive multiplier effects on 
the indiaenous firm sector. Indeed the outcome may be quite the
Ireverse.
On this point the concluding remarks of an Italian study on 
the induced employment effects of new industrial implantations 
(1961-71) in the South of Italy are worth quoting in full :
" La correlazione con l'indotto dei beni di consumo, che per tutto il Mezz­
ogiorno era nulla, nelle Area di sviluppo industriale diventa addirittura
negativa... Gli effetti distruttivi risultano di questa correlazione in
maniera evidente: ci si trova di fronte a questa contraddizione.. .che prop­
rio là nelle Area di sviluppo dove rreggiori sono gli investimenti produttivi
OS'?
Under the present depressed economic conditions 
of the 1980's, there will undoubtedly be a greater call for 
national policies at the micro level to deal with the growing 
problem of widespread unemployment. Certainly the regional 
implications of such policies will have to be assessed with 
care if the net advantage conferred on the less developed reg­
ions is not to be sunstantially reduced.
Moreover, one of the economic justifications for regional 
policy insofar as it relied upon the desirability of avoiding 
inflationary pressures set up in more central 'full-employment' 
regions is likely to come under increasing attack as unemploy­
ment rises in many of the old-established industrial centres. 
The precise reasoning behind a policy which may then appear to 
promote some regions at the 'expense' of others should there­
fore be made more explicit. In this respect a greater degree of 
spatial selectivity would seem to be called for, and the crit­
eria by which aided regions are defined should perhaps place 
as much emphasis on welfare considerations (see Chs.l&2) as on 
more traditional measures of structural disadvantage and unemp­
loyment.
cont/
e dove quirdi più dovrebbe aumentare la demanda e la produzione indotta di 
beni di consumo, viceversa si ha un declino più accentuato di questa indus­
tria . Gli investimenti autonomi che sono avvenuti.... quasi esclusivamente 
nel settore di beni strumentali hanno indotto attraverso l'incremento della 
demarca,anziché un aumento nella produzione di beni di consumo,un aumento 
di importazione dei prodotti del centro-nord che, trovandosi sul mercato 
concorrenziale in posizione di netto vantaggio... hanno provocato la crisi 
e quirdi l'uscita del mercato delle industrie locali preesistenti del sett­
ore dei beni di consumo".
Fran "Occupazione autonoma e occupazione indotta nell'industria meridionale" 
by F.Balsamo & G.Gribaudi, in Graziarli & Pugliese (1979) ,pp.338/9.
The technique used in this study is for example similar 
to that used by Moore and Rhodes (1973)^ It varies slightly 
from the standard shift-share approach where the regional ind­
ustrial weighting is continually adjusted - that is, the yearly 
estimates of the growth components are computed on the basis of 
regional weights in the preceding year.
In the present study, regional (expected) employment in 
1974 is calculated on the basis of industrial structure in 1967. 
In other words, constant regional weights are used. This method 
is analytically equivalent to the Moore and Rhodes approach, 
although the results obtained are in the form of overall figures 
instead of a year by year series as obtained by the abovemer?- ’ 
tioned authors.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the results ob­
tained using constant regional weights are likely to be slightly 
different from the standard shift-share approach. In particular, 
for industries growing consistently faster at the regional level 
than at the national level, the fact that the standardisation is 
not continuously adjusted will lead to an *underestimate' of the 
structural component (or expected level of employment), and an 
'overestimate'of the residual component. On the other hand,
for industries which have slower growth rates at the regional 
level than at the national level, for individual regions, the
residual component will be more negative than the results obt-
2ained by standard shift-share analysis.
However, the size of these discrepancies is likely to be 
very small, especially over such a short time period. Moreover, 
it is not clear whether, overall, or for any individual region 
the tendency will be to over or under-estimate the regional 
policy impact. All we car. say is that any such tendency will be 
of minimal importance for the purporses of our analysis.'3
B. Moore and J. Rhodes,"Evaluating the effects of British regional policy", 
S.J. 1973 vol.83,pp.87-101. See also Vanbove and Klasser. (1980), po.90-96.
2 It should however be noted that the contincus weighting system' may tend to 
underestimate the residual ccnpcrervt where the main regional policy impact 
is felt at the start of the study period and/or employment build-up occurs 
mainly in the early years. Her.ce it is possible for example that a negative 
residual ccula actually be produced for a sector, where, to all intents ana 
purposes, actual employment at the end of the study period is equivalent to 
expected employment (over the whole period) on the basis of national growth 
figures.
 ^In the special case where national employment growth is zero over the whole 
period, the two methods will in fact yield identical results.
Annex 2.
It is important to differentiate between expenditure on 
regional policy and the net costs to the government. One inter­
esting estimate of the latter has been made by Moore and Rhodes, 
(1974), for the British case, and the results are shown below. 
First of all, it is interesting to note that high levels of 
expenditure on regional policy can actually produce a net gain 
to the government. Line A gives the net expenditure on regional 
incentives. However, the cost to the exchequer is reduced due to 
higher tax receipts and lower social security payments as a res­
ult of the creation of some 220,000 jobs in the development areas 
over the period in questionT(see line B.).
The Exchequer implications of British regional policy,1963-70> 
annual averages, £ million at current prices.
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It is important to note that we are assuming that the regional 
policy estimate represents a net addition to total employment 
and not merely a redistribution of jobs to the development areas. 
In other words it is assumed that the government will restore 
the pressure of demand in the "fully-employed" areas where the 
jobs originated, and that the overall level of unemployment 
will therefore be lowered. As we shall see, this is by no means 
certain.
Obviously, the extent to which the government will 
need to restore the level of demand in the low-unemployment 
regions will depend on the extent to which inter-regional mig­
ration is reduced as a result of regional policy. The less mig­
ration is reduced the greater will be the required stimulus 
to maintain pressure of demand in the low-unemployment regions. 
As a result, overall levels of income and employment will be 
higher and so will the exchequer clawbacks. However, the final
estimates of the required budget deficit/surplus, do not appear
to be very sensitive to the migration estimates chosen.
In line C, it is assumed that the exchequer will receive 
further savings from the fact that reduced inter-regional mig­
ration will tend to reduce the need for public infra-structure 
and service expenditure.
Taking lines A,B and C together,the net gain to the gov­
ernment comes to between £28m.and £37m. per annum. In order to 
restore the pressure of demand in the "fully-employed" regions 
that have lost jobs as a result of regional policy, the govern­
ment must reduce taxes to the value of between £94m. and £96m..
It should be noted however, that this figure merely rep­
resents the transfer cost to the government, and not the resourse 
cost to the nation. For example, it does not take into account 
the extra income for firms and households generated by the reduc­
tion in tax rates.
A final point to be made is that on purely theoretical 
grounds, there is certainly a case to be made for Moore and 
Rhodes argument that the jobs attributable to regional policy 
always constitute a net increase in employment. This assumption 
is basically equivalent to saying that the high-unemployment 
regions have no weight in determining the national rate of infi-
Çt3 .
-ation. This type of result will obtain if, for example, wage 
inflation is determined in the low-unemployment regions and 
transmitted at the sectoral level to the high-unemployment reg­
ions, ( as outlined for example by Mackay and Hart,1975^). On 
the other hand, if the government uses the national unemployment 
rate to determine the target pressure of demand, as Moore and 
Rhodes actually concede, it is not clear that fcuere will be any 
call to restore the pressure of demand;. In this case, regional 
policy will only have achieved a diversion of jobs to the D.A.'s 
with no net employment gain at the national level. However it 
will have achieved a lowering in the overall rate of inflation 
since unemployment will have risen in the fully-employed regions 
with tight labour markets.
The general conclusion we have come to is that expenditure
on regional policy must not be assessed at face value. If cost-
2benefit studies are anything to go by (seeSchbfield 1976),then 
we have good support for the argument that regional policy in 
Britain produced a significant surplus during the 1960's.
It is quite clear therefore that the above remarks should 
be borne in mind , especially when assessing our expenditure 
figures in table 6.
1 " Wage inflation and the regional wage structure", in Contem­
porary issues in economics. Parkin and Nobay(eds.). 1975.
2 "Economic efficiency and regional policy in Britain",Urban 
studies, vol 13, 1976.
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CHAPTER 10. European Monetary Integration and the regions
Introduction
In this chapter we shall summarize some of the major reg­
ional implications of monetary union. Since such union im­
plies either permanently fixed exchange rates or a common 
currency, we. must first of all examine whether the inability
to alter exchange rates involves any real loss for certain
types of countries or regions.
Some of the questions we shall deal with in the course
of this chapter are, in a sense common to both customs unions
and monetary unions .- They mainly involve problems relating 
to destabilising factor mobility and regional competitive­
ness . However, where exchange rates are fixed, so are the 
terms on which a country engages in international trade and 
adjustment problems may prove more difficult. In particular 
we propose to outline the possible "costs" of maintaining 
fixed exchange rates, and examine the role of (intra-Com- 
munity) transfers in providing a solution.
One could argue that the costs of monetary union should 
be weighed against the benefits. In their enthusiasm to point 
out the benefits, some authors have been decidedly vague 
over the costs involved1. This type of analysis usually 
follows from the simple proposition that exchange rates are 
largely irrelevant2.
Although one would generally agree with the contention that 
monetary union is likely to bring some types of benefit (in 
the form of dispensing with non-productive activities such 
as exchanging Marks for Francs, reducing the volumes of 
money inventories of firms and banks, and removing the var­
iability of rates of return on capital investment) given the 
diversity and large number of factors to be considered, there
1e.g. Parkin M. (1972), p. 1142. "The gains could be enormous. 
There are no losses to be offset against them or again If the 
focus of attention in the transition is on the equalisation of 
inflation rates, the rest is detail.
2Ibid.
is no easy measure by which one can actually compare benefits 
with costs.
The above discussion of course begs the question of whether 
a policy trade-off is possible to compensate net losers in 
this process, or at least to create the necessary precondit­
ions for E.M.U. to be achieved. The budgetary implications 
are therefore examined, both with respect to the present state 
of affairs (EMS) and with a view to an increased role for 
public finance and budgetary transfers in facilitating the 
integration process. Finally, we shall attempt a brief re­
view of present funds and make an assessment of the scope and 
possibilities for their enlargement or adaptation.
1 0 .1 .1 .
In this section 10.1. we shall review some of the major 
early contributions to the "theory" of monetary integration. 
This involves examining the theory of optimum currency areas, 
the role of factor mobility, and the determination of in­
ternal regional balance under floating and fixed exchange 
rates.
The framework of analysis
What type of integration are we talking about? Following 
Corden’s1 analysis, we may distinguish two essential components 
of monetary integration. The first is exchange-rate union, 
this implies that exchange rates between members are perman­
ently fixed in relation to each other, but may vary, taken 
together, relative to non-union currencies. The second com­
ponent is capital-market integration that is the freedom of 
capital movements and remittances, and requires the harmonis­
ation of legal and fiscal arrangements with respect to in­
vestment and profits.
Hf.M. Corden, 1972.
A further distinction we must make in our analysis is 
between pseudo and complete exchange rate unions. In the for­
mer there is a formal commitment to maintain fixed exchange rates 
within the union but no common pool of foreign exchange re­
serves and the individual member states are free to determine 
their own money supply or credit policies -- in so far as this 
is possible or consistent with the aim of maintaining fixed 
exchange rates.
As an extension of the former arrangement ve could include the 
present E.M.F. proposals whereby deficit countries would ob­
tain short and medium term credit from a common fund. This 
would give countries more time to introduce restrictive mon­
etary and fiscal policies consistent with the prevailing ex­
change rate.
In a complete exchange-rate union we would have a com­
plete pooling of foreign exchange reserves. It is easy to 
see that such a move is only practical where a central mon­
etary authority is also set up. Unless this is done, deficit 
countries could engage in as much domestic credit expansion 
as they wished, which would be financed from the reserves of 
the surplus countries.
For this, agreement would have to be reached on economic 
policy coordination, or, ultimately, a Community central bank 
could be established which would have the sole right to create 
money within the union. The main difference between the two 
would be a certain element of finality involved in the latter 
solution.
From a conceptual point of view, this gives us essentially 
two possible methods of analysis of economic and monetary 
union within the European context. If we consider E.M.U. in 
its fullest sense —— one common money and one common bank —— 
we may then view the answers to resulting disequilibria in 
terms of effective regional policies, improving regional indus­
trial structures and exports, and social policies affecting 
the internal mobility of the labour force. Since no country
or region is individually constrained by exchange rate consider­
ations, it could conceivably be running a ''deficit" for much 
longer than would be possible if such constraints existed. In 
*
other words, we are arguing that the notion of transfers within 
such a union would be fundamentally different from repayable 
reserve transfers that would be entailed by mere fixity of 
exchange rates. In a sense the main question revolves around 
whether centrally determined policies can provide a good sub­
stitute for exchange rate adjustment and hence reduce the 
costs of monetary integration for the less developed regions.
10.1.2.
At this stage, however, it is worthwhile to examine the role 
of factor mobility and the concept of "optimum currency areas", 
as put forward by Mundell(1961). The idea that factor mobility 
could serve to reduce the disequilibria arising from a "free- 
trade area", had been set out a few years earlier (J.Meade 1956).
According to Mundell, an optimal currency area has the 
characteristics of high internal factor mobility and low ex­
ternal factor mobility. If the world could be divided into 
such regions then "each of these regions should have a separ­
ate currency which fluctuates relative to all other currencies" . 
Hence, it might be more advisable to establish currency areas 
within existing countries rather than getting a group of 
countries to form a currency area.
The central point in Mundell's analysis is that labour 
flows are seen as a substitute for parity changes and bring 
about the realignment of real wage levels due to changing de­
mand and supply conditions.
In the context of the E.C., however, there are some serious 
doubts as to whether such a process could in fact be envisaged. 
More fundamental still, it is even debatable whether such an 
equilibrating process is desirable due to the the "social" 
costs attached to labour mobility, particularly since this 
may be called for on a rather large scale.
iMundell(1961), p. 663.
One other consideration should perhaps be mentioned in 
this context. Although labour mobility within the union may 
be low, this might not be the case with regard to non-member 
countries. Cordon} for example, has argued that a large move­
ment of temporary workers from outside the Community might 
reduce the internal balance problem and the cost of fixing 
exchange rates. He assumes that "a country which deflates 
takes in fewer new migrants and sends some home, while the 
country that expands demand takes in more Of course,
the existence of an elastic supply of foreign workers in the 
expanding economy will_permit a lower rate of increase of 
the real wage —  this however is little comfort for the con­
tracting countries if they cannot avail themselves of the 
flexibility of sending home large numbers of unemployed mi­
grant workers. Furthermore, the supply of migrant workers to 
the expanding economy will tend to increase its rate of growth 
without any inflationary consequences. The competitive position 
of the region would improve and this could entail further de­
flation in the contracting economies.
If we assume limited labour mobility within the union then 
the possible consequences may be even more serious. If labour 
within the union is less mobile than labour outside the union 
(due for example to higher real wage differentials in the 
latter), the equilibrating movement of labour between member 
countries would be largely impeded.
Some further limitations of the "mobility” theory could 
perhaps be mentioned. Presley (1976) has suggested that the 
increased demand for factors in B, may not be sufficient to 
absorb the unemployed factors in A. This would occur if, for 
example, the declining industries in A were labour intensive 
whilst the expanding industries in B were capital intensive.
The net result may be a transfer of savings to B and persist­
ent labour unemployment in A, given wage inflexibility in the
latter.
1W. Corden (1972), p. 16.
Returning once more to the desirability of large-scale 
labour mobility, the declining areas may be faced with an 
additional and serious problem. In order to maintain a given 
standard of social services, regions would need to have 
higher central government transfers or a higher rate of 
local taxation. Recourse to the former may tend to increase 
the overall level of government spending. Increasing local 
taxation may have the undesired effect of increasing outward 
migration still further. On the other hand a decline in re­
gional social services would result in increasing spatial 
disparities in the quality of social infrastructure and the 
area would become less attractive for both workers and in­
dustrialists .
10.1.3. The role of factor mobility
From our preceding discussion it should be dear that fac­
tor mobility may be an important point to examine when con­
sidering the appropriateness of joining two or more coun­
tries in an economic and monetary union.
Under the simple classical theory of migration, labour 
would move from low-wage regions to high-wage regions, whilst 
capital would tend to move in the opposite direction. The 
situation we analysed in the previous section is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 1:
FIGURE 1
Region A Region B
An increase in demand for region 3's exports leads to an increase 
in the demand for labour in 3 (from to Dr ') and initially 
results in a higher real wage in 3. Assuming perfect labour 
mobility, labour will flow from A to B until a new equilibrium 
real wage, Wee' is reached in both regions. It is also clear 
that the new equilibrium will imply a higher level of invest­
ment in 3, and a lower level of investment in A, and that 
capital may flow from A to 31, in general leading to a net 
change in the overall location of economic activity.
____In Figure 2 we consider the case where region A suffers
:As Corden (1972), p. 32; has pointed out, the fall in regional 
export incomes may lead to less savings and so to less capital 
outflow. This may somewhat reduce the balance or payments ef­
fect due to changes in export demand conditions.
a decline in regional exports whilst there is an increase in
region B*. We shall now assume zero labour mobility between
A and B, the main aim being to analyse the role of capital
mobility. The demand for labour in 3 rises from D_ to Dr ’■L L
and this bids up the real wage to w'.
FIGURE 2
IC\ Region A \jJ, f Region B
The opposite occurs in region A and total employment falls to 
e' if real wages are flexible, downwards, or e 1' in the case of 
real wage downward rigidity. In the latter case and in the 
absence of migration, involuntary unemployment would become 
0— 0 * 1----- x IOC. On either assumption, a real-wage gap appears
Qe
between the two regions. There is now some incentive for new 
investment to flow towards region A, where the real wage is now 
relatively lower. Specifically, fix^ ns contemplating new invest­
ment in 3 would now consider relocation in region A —  this
would raise- the demand curve for labour in A and bid up the
2real wage rate until the regional wage-gap is eliminated .
T^his cculd be due to either ccrrpetiticn between the experts of A and 3, 
chances in tastes, or irerely a structural bias in A towards declining indus'tr
Of course, wage differentials could still arise due to skill level differ­
ences as between regional labour markets, especially if the l.d.r.'s at­
tracted lew-skilled labour intensive ir.vestrr.ent (see ch. 5) .
2
les.
In this case capital flows would be essentially equili­
brating. If we assumed limited labour mobility, then, in our 
example outlined in Figure 1, any resulting wage-gap not com­
pletely removed by migration from A to B, would eventually be 
eliminated via capital movements from A to B;
The worst fears of many economists opposed to E.M.U. would 
indeed be allayed if it could be shown that the real world 
operated in the manner described above. A casual glance at 
the net migration of capital and labour in the U.K. regions 
from 1966-1971 leaves us, however, in some doubts as to the 
validity of the classical theory of migration'*'. Only in Scot- 
la-nd- and- the North could be found net outflows of labour and 
net inflows of capital. Other regions could be classed as having 
either net outflows of capital and labour or net inflows of 
both.
How are we to explain such movements? A number of reasons 
could be put forward and we shall deal with these in turn.
(i) National wage bargaining
The tendency for wage contracts to be bargained for at a 
national level in most countries and sectors in the E.C. implies 
that within these countries, regional wage differentials are 
not likely to be very significant. This in turn implies a lower 
incentive for both outward labour migration and inward capital 
flows. Of course, labour and capital flows are also sensitive 
to regional unemployment rates, but evidence suggests that this 
alone could hardly provide the basis for an inter-regional 
equilibrating mechanism at least as far as capital movements 
are concerned. Furthermore, it is quite clear from our graphical 
example that if the real wage determined in the labour market 
in region B, is also applied to region A, unemployment in the 
latter will increase more than we have suggested. Since no real
^Armstrong & Taylor (1978), p. 61.
^or example in a major studv of the U.K. regions it was found that "the rel­
ative attractiveness of the D.A.'s (as measured by relative unemployment 
rates) had apparently no effect on the movement of industry to one D.A. ’s"; 
Ashcroft & Taylor 1979. See also 9.
*6
wage differential will appear, region A will suffer outflows 
of both labour and capital while the opposite will hold for 
region B. Only successful regional policies will reverse this 
tendency.
Amongst others, Pearce1 has argued that the adoption of a
common currency would destroy the "money illusion" that allows
2real-wage differences between national groups. Corden has 
also suggested that trade union integration could result as a 
by-product of economic and especially political and social 
integration. Empirical surveys have shown that indeed, wage 
differentials do tend to be narrower between the regions of 
monetarily integrated area^. As a case in point, Italy is a 
good example of trade union integration, since, after 1969 wage 
bargaining increasingly took place at a national rather than 
regional level —  this in spite of large and even growing 
regional disparities in unemployment (and underemployment)rates.
(ii) The expanding industry in B may be relatively capital 
intensive, and therefore overall, even if real wages were 
relatively lower in region A, there may result in less capital 
being available for investment in A.
(iii) Capital is generally assumed to be more mobile than 
labour, however this mobility should not be overestimated.
Capital mobility involves amongst other things, information 
costs and it is well known that most firms do not undertake4extensive searches when considering relocation . If forced to 
move (and the main factors here are often lack of space for ex­
pansion on site and other congestion costs), distance from the 
original site and the amenity level of the new location are 
often the main considerations^. Clearly then, regions on the 
periphery are often the last to be considered even though
1I.F. Pearce(1974), pp. 83-85. 2W.M. Corden(1972), p. 14.
Vaizey(1975), tables 1 and 2, pp. 107-108. The countries cov­
ered were Europe (7 countries), U.S. and Canada, and the fig­
ures related to 1972.4
Townroe 1972, Dixon & Thirlwall 1975 ch. 3.
5W. Molie 1977.
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real-wages may be lower there. As such it may be socially and 
economically justifiable to discourage investment in some 
areas and encourage it in others. Tax incentives and capital 
subsidies i.e. differentiated investment regulations could 
then be thought of as more rather than less optimal in the 
allocation of resources.
(iv) One further argument to explain "perverse" capital
flows to high-wage regions, is that the rate of return on 
capital is not only a function of wage costs. It may also be 
directly related to the scale of production. Hence, fast grow­
ing regions with scope for significant ecdnomies of scale 
may offer superior investment opportunities than less dynamic 
regions. This argument is of course more relevant when we 
take into account the high degree of openness of most regions 
within a country, and the high degree of dependence on a
relatively small number of exports. A high and buoyant demand
for a particular region's exports may therefore promote sub­
stantial capital inflows, in spite of the existence of high
real wages. The presence of scale economies would circumvent 
the process, according to classical theory, by which factor 
returns are depressed in the expanding region.
It should be clear, however, that the migration of labour 
to fast-growing regions may serve to magnify events as de­
scribed above. Labour migration implies a change in expend­
iture patterns from the regions of departure to those of ar­
rival. Through the effect of the multiplier this will lead 
to a decline in demand in the former and a rise in the latter, 
leading to further expansion in the already fast growing re­
gion. As Pearce1 (1974) has stated,
"... indeed it is easy to construct hypothetical cases 
where the migration of labour from a low wage area to a 
high wage area results in still higher wages where they
were already high and still lower wages where they were
1Pearce (1974), p. 95.
6already low. Nor does there seem- to be anything odd or 
unusual about such examples."
10.1.4. The role of exchange-rate flexibility
In this section we shall consider the policy problem of 
achieving internal and external balance under flexible exchange 
rates, and the nature of the "costs" involved when exchange 
rate flexibility is ruled out. Conceptually there is very 
little difference between countries where exchange rates are 
permanently fixed and regions within a country which maintains 
an exchange rate policy independently of its trading partners.
In the former, external deficits give rise to a fall in reserves . 
In the latter a fall in regional income may initially be off­
set by recourse to the national banking system, trade credit 
or short-term interfirm loans. In both cases if the deficit
It should be noted,however, that the B. of P. deficit may be 
largely self-correcting if the government is determined to run 
a balanced budget (see D. Currie 1976, Vane & Thomson 1979).
In this case, whether the private sector finance their excess 
expenditure by sales of securities or by running down bank 
deposits, the end result is a reduction in private sector net 
financial assets. A continuing balance of payments deficit 
will therefore lead to a continuing fall in private sector 
net wealth and a reduction in private sector expenditure —  
which will tend to improve the balance of payments.
To achieve internal objectives, the government may choose, 
for example, to tun a budc_^ t deficit, say, equivalent to the 
b. of p. deficit. The money supply would then remain constant 
with no change in private sector net wealth and therefore, 
private sector stock equilibrium. In this case the outflow 
of money to the foreign sector is exactly matched by the in­
flow of money to the government from the private sector.
The latter situation gives only quasi-equilibrium —  it 
is temporary in the sense that it can only continue as long 
as reserves are availble. The situation is in many respects 
amilar to that of the "regional case", where, for reasons out­
lined in the text above, a trade deficit may continue for re­
latively long periods.
persists, a contraction of credit in the country or region con­
cerned will occur, either due to the implementation of national 
policies to reduce absorption in the former case, or to the 
pressure on regional or national banks to maintain creditworth­
iness. In both cases unemployment occurs. Where factors are in­
sufficiently mobile between regions or countries there is a 
serious possibility of long-term inter-regional or inter-country 
divergence in unemployment rates, real incomes and growth.
Here we come to defining the "costs" for a particular 
country of maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Given the sit­
uation of internal balance at full-employment and external 
payments deficit, the appropriate policy would entail deval­
uation to achieve external balance together with some domestic 
reduction in absorption to maintain internal balance. As 
Corden1 puts it, "when the exchange rate instrument is ruled 
out, it is necessary for expenditure to be reduced more than 
in the optimal case, and excess unemployment will result. This 
excess unemployment, valued in some way, possibly by the loss 
of output it represents, is the cost of foregoing the exchange 
rate adjustment."
In particular, the growth constraints imposed by restrict­
ive domestic policies, may be higher for developing countries 
than for fully-employed mature economies. In the former case,
and with surplus factors, devaluation may be a least cost
2method of eliminating a balance of payments deficit . A further 
difficulty is that domestic credit restriction which has the
*W.M. Corden (1972), p. 10.
2Two major assunptions should be noted here. Firstly, real wages should be 
flexible downwards and there should be an elastic supply of labour. Hence 
the devaluation would be successful in that it wuld permanently lcwer export 
prices. Secondly, export demand elasticities should be sufficiently high.
In practice, a number of such "successful" devaluations have been recorded for 
various countries (see Robinson 1979), and we shall consider this possibility 
in more detail later. Furthermore under circumstances cannon to many develop­
ing countries, successful devaluation may actually be deflationary rather than 
inflationary (see on). The deflationary effects may to sane extent be offset 
by an inflow of foreign capital due to increased profitability in the tra­
ded goods sector (Cooper 1971).
effect of raising the interest rate may lead to capital inflows 
instead. The government would then find its hands tied; fiscal 
policy could not be effective in the short run, and 'Where there 
is high capital mobility, monetary policy cannot regulate in­
ternal balance either."1
In this case the optimal solution may consist of a combi­
nation of expenditure switchinq and reducinq policies. This 
2approach is basically a synthesis of the absorption and elast­
icities schools of thought, and it worthwhile considering at 
this point.-We shall once more assume the case of external im­
balance and a fall in foreign exchange reserves. Given that 
the country implements a successful absorption reducing policy, 
demand for importables will fall and there may also be some 
increase in exports. Clearly, excess demand for tradables 
may be eliminated if the cut in absorption is sufficient.
If, however, the prices of non-tradables are rigid down­
wards, the fall in demand will then lead not to price cuts, but
3to excess supply and eventually unemployment . Since there 
has been no relative price change there is no inducement for 
resources to move from non-tradables to tradables. Unemployment 
will occur and external balance will have been attained at the 
cost of internal balance.
To maintain internal balance a second policy instrument is 
called for. This can be attained by means of a switching policy 
which would raise the domestic price of tradables relative to 
the price of non-tradables. Resources would then be induced to 
move out of non-traded goods into the production of importables 
and exportables. The excess supply of non-tradables will be 
reduced whilst the supply of tradables will be increased, re­
ducting excess demand for tradables and improving the balance 
of payments. Furthermore, as concerns domestic demand, the rise
1Corden 1972, p. 31. ^Corden, 1977.
^See also R. Dornbush 1973 and M.V.N. Whitman, 1975, p. 503.
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in the relative price of tradables will shift the pattern of de­
mand towards non-tradables, reducing excess demand for the for­
mer and excess supply of the latter.
What has happened is that the initial cut in absorption, 
by itself, created excess supply of non-tradables whilst the 
expenditure switching policy eliminated it. Had the adjustment 
to externa 1 balance been entirely brought about by an expenditure 
reducing policy, it is clear that the reduction in domestic ab­
sorption would have had to have been greated (and unemployment 
higher) than if it had been accompanied by a policy of expendit­
ure switching, i.e. devaluation . By itself, an expenditure re­
ducing policy would create an excess supply of non-traded goods 
(given price inflexibility) and hence unemployment.
The above analysis was intended to emphasize the role of 
devaluation, and the fact that, if a country is constrained to 
using only expenditure reducing policies to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate, the resulting unemployment is likely to be sig­
nificantly higher than if a switching policy of devaluation had 
been used as well.
A final point to note is that in practice, devaluation often
2takes place from a position of disequilibrium in which domestic 
prices are rising relative to prices of export and import goods, 
and in this sense the most obvious method of rectifying the 
situation is by exchange-rate depreciation (Connolly & Taylor, 
1979). In a vast majority of countries considered in the above- 
mentioned study (27 countries, from 1959-70), devaluation was ac­
companied by contraction of the rate of growth of domestic credit, 
"and with one exception, all those that did, experienced an impro­
vement in the balance of payments "(ibid., p. 236).
Vor a monetarist model with non-traded goods see also H. Johnson (Sept.
1975), pp. 245-49.
2_r'cr a balance of payments model analysing devaluation fron a position of 
b.o.p. disequilibrium (applied to developing countries), see Cooper, 1971.
The change in the trade balance (in dcmestic currency) rnay actually be 
negative with deflationary effects on the devaluing country (ibid., p. 357).
10.1.5. The_monetarist_aggroach_to_the_balance_of_gayments
One important exception to the above, could be the case of 
relatively small, highly open economies, with a high ratio of 
tradable to non-tradable goods. In this situation a fall in 
the exchange-rate could lead to an immediate and profound in­
crease in the overall domestic price level. If trade unions 
are well aware of this impact on the cost of living it might 
not be possible to reduce the real wage rate, and the effect of 
the original devaluation will have been completely wiped out. 
However, the more open an economy the greater will be the ef­
fect of a devaluation on the domestic price level, and the more 
unlikely it becomes that trade unions will allow money illusion 
to persist. Hence, the more open an economy, the less feasible 
an independent exchange-rate policy becomes. According to this 
line of argument there would clearly be no loss for such a 
country in joining an exchange-rate union, since it could not 
ultimately influence either the price or profitability of its 
exports.
According to some authors, this line of reasoning is not 
only applicable to small, open economies, but it is much wider 
relevance. As such, "devaluation is only a substitute for dom­
estic credit contraction, operating by reducing the world value 
of a country's money supply"1. Any argument for devaluation is 
therefore as a means of avoiding the equivalent domestic mon­
etary contraction, and the case for preferring the former to
the latter "must rest on price and wage rigidity and money il-
2lusion of some kind" .
There are basically two objections to the usefulness of a 
devaluation. Firstly, a devaluation may initially create a bal­
ance of payments surplus, but this will ultimately lead to an 
increase in the money supply which will in turn increase the 
price level of the devaluing country, eventually restoring it to 
its original position, measured in foreign currency terms.
XH.G. Johnson (1977), p. 227.
2Ibid.
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S e c o n d ly ,  on t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  econom y i s  a p r i c e  t a k e r  
on w o r ld  m a r k e t s ,  t h e  o n l y  e f f e c t  o f  a d e v a l u a t i o n  i s  t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  home c u r r e n c y  p r i c e  o f  e x p o r t s  and im p o r t s  . T h is  l e a d s  t o  
h i g h e r  p r o f t s  and w ages  i n  t h e  e x p o r t i n g  s e c t o r ,  and w o r k e r s  i n  
o t h e r  s e c t o r s  a t t e m p t  t o  make up f o r  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  f a l l  i n  r e a l  
in com e (and c a t c h  up w i t h  e a r n i n g s  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  s e c t o r )  by  
c l a i m i n g  h i g h e r  w ages  . T h is  p r o c e s s  w i l l  e v e n t u a l l y  come t o  an 
end  when w ages  h a v e  r i s e n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  e x c e s s  or  
" w in d f a l l"  p r o f i t s  i n  t h e  e x p o r t  s e c t o r  and t h e  i n i t i a l  l o s s  o f  
r e a l  in com e a r i s i n g  from  h i g h e r  im p o r t  p r i c e s .  A t t h i s  p o i n t ,  
t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  w i l l  h a y e  i n c r e a s e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  h a v e  o f f s e t  
t h e  im p a c t  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  d e v a l u a t i o n .
H en ce , t h e  m o n eta ry  a p p ro a ch  a s s e r t s  t h a t  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  
c h a n g e s  i n  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  t e n d  t o  be  o f f s e t  by  c h a n g e s  i n  r e l a t ­
i v e  p r i c e  l e v e l s .
A number o f  c r i t i c i s m s  can  b e  l e v e l l e d  a t  t h i s  approach w i t h o u t  
h o w ev er ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  im p ly in g  t h a t  s u c h  t e n d e n c i e s  do n o t  i n  
f a c t  e x i s t .
In  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an e l a s t i c  s u p p ly  o f  
t r a i n e d  o r  t r a i n a b l e  la b o u r  may h a v e  a dam pening  e f f e c t  on wage  
i n c r e a s e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  g r o w in g  e x p o r t  s e c t o r s .  For e x ­
a m p le ,  t h i s  may w e l l  be t h e  c a s e  f o r  a number o f  a c t u a l  and p r o s ­
p e c t i v e  members o f  t h e  E . C . ,  many o f  w h ich  h a v e  i n  t h e  p a s t  su p ­
p l i e d  l a r g e  number o f  m ig r a n t  w o r k e rs  t o  o t h e r  W .European c o u n ­
t r i e s ,  and w h ich  c o n t i n u e  t o  h a v e  r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  g ro w th  r a t e s  
o f  w o r k in g  p o p u l a t i o n .
F u r th e r m o r e ,  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  do n o t  f u l l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  e x ­
trem e m o n e t a r i s t  h y p o t h e s i s .  For t h e  U . S .  f o r  e x a m p le ,  " e s t i m a t e s  
made i n  t h e  two r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  im p ly  t h a t  t h e  U . S .  can  e x p e c t  t o  
r e t a i n  f o r  some t im e  o v e r  h a l f  o f  a c h a n g e  i n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  e x ­
c h a n g e  r a t e  i n  t h e  form  o f  a r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  a d v a n ta g e  f o r  manu-
2
f a c t u r e d  e x p o r t s "  . A n o th er  s t u d y  c o n c l u d e s  t h a t  " th e  w e a k e s t  a s -
* i . e .  a d e v a l u a t i o n  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  p r i c e  o f  
exports. This however assumes th a t th e devalu ing country was in  an equilibrium  
p o s itio n  in  th e f i r s t  p la ce . O therwise we could use th e same argument to  ju s t ify  
d evalu ation  where le v e ls  o f in f la t io n  d iffe r e d  between tradin g p artn ers.
^Aukrust (1970) ^Von N. Whitman (1975), p. 522.
*4 1^
sumption of the (Scandinavian) theory is the hypothesis that 
higher export prices must eventually result in higher domestic 
prices"1. One of the explanations for this may be that domestic 
producers are, by contrast, price leaders on the home market.
If the acid test of a devaluation is whether it can bring 
about a permanent change in relative export prices, then a 
number of examples of effective devaluations are to be found;
Canada 1961-62, Spain 1959-60, Finland 1957-58, France 1957-592. 
Spain 1974-75 may well be another example (falling exchange rate 
and falling export prices). In these cases the transmission pro­
cess from export prices, to wholesale prices was incomplete, i.e. 
domestic (wholesale) prices were not determined by "world prices" 
of traded goods. "In other words, it has in the past been poss­
ible for a devaluation to bring about a permanent increase in 
either wages or profits in the exporting sector"^.
To be fair, one must admit that the results of the aforemen­
tioned study suggest that "parity changes have a larger and quicker 
effect on the rate of inflation than they used to have and a4smaller effect on 'real' variables" . This is especially the case 
for relatively small open economies, such as Belgium, the Nether­
lands and Finland. In some cases, however, it has been possible 
to achieve a semi-permanent relative price change (export prices 
and wholesale prices) by successive parity changes which keep one 
step ahead of the induced price changes^. However, the general 
point remains that very often® the final effect on wholesale 
prices is not as complete as would be suggested under the monetary 
approach . Although the results do point to the limitations of 
parity changes as regards Italy and the U.K., as other studies have 
shown the success of a devaluation will often depend crucially 
on the accompanying restriction or neutralization of growth in 
domestic credit (Connolly & Taylor 1979, Horne 1979).
1W. Robinson et al.(1979), p. 42. 2Ibid., p. 44.
3Ibid., p. 46. 4Ibid., p. 48
5Ibid_L, p. 45, especially U.K. & Ireland 1971-76.
^Excluding Belgium & Italy and possibly the U.K. (74-76). The 
Irish case is difficult to interpret clearly.
^See ibid., Table 4,p. 42. The period covered is 1963-76.
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10.1.6. Growth, technological change and the balance of payments.
One final question that has received surprisingly little 
consideration in the monetary union debate over exchange rates, 
concerns the rate of change of demand for exports and imports.
In other words, there is something more to maintaining balance 
of payments equilibrium than simply keeping the general level 
of prices in line with major trading partners. "Reference to 
market forces reminds us that in order to maintain balanced pay­
ments in the face of growth and technical change we require con­
tinuous change in relative prices"1. This point can be seen more 
clearly by considering1“ a simple two-country model. We assume 
thare is a- technological advance in country 1 which increases 
production, for given resources, in the commodity exported. Out­
put and incomes will go up in country 1 increasing the demand 
for imports, and (if-there is no change in country 2), there will 
be no-corresponding increase in demand for exports. "To put 
matters right, prices must rise in country 2 or fall in country
1. Alternatively, country 1 might devalue its currency, leaving
2money prices constant in both countries" .
Presley^ has shown that in a simple two country trading model 
where both countries have the same growth rates of GNP, inflat­
ion rates and trade ratios, a sufficient assumption to achieve 
divergent balance of payments positions, is that import in­
come and price elasticities differ significantly. Hence the coun­
try with the lower price elasticity and higher income elasticity 
of demand for imports will quickly experience a growing trade 
deficit, whilst the country in the reverse situation will ex­
perience a growing surplus of the same magnitude. And as Fleming 
has pointed out, the overall bias in such a situation may be 
deflationary since "the deficit rather than the surplus countries 
are likely to have to assume the greater part of the burden of 
removing the payments disequilibrium by adapting the level of 
demand"4.______________________________
1Pearce (1974), pp. 80-83. 2 Pearce, 1974, p. 81. Pearce's main 
complaint about adjustment via deflation under such circumstances 
was that the resulting unemployment problem would not be solved 
by factor mobility.
^Presley (1976), pp. 39-43.4j .m . Fleming(1971), p. 252.
The above model can obviously be generalised for several 
countries by introducing export elasticities as well1, but the 
general point remains that fixed exchange rates and a common 
rate of inflation leave many questions still unsettled, since 
in spite of maintaining an equal rate of inflation, differing 
responses to changing income and price levels could still 
place a country in disequilibrium with its partners.
For the moment we must turn to consider further the question 
2raised by Corden , of "whether centrally determined fiscal 
policies, and especially regional policies, provide some kind 
of substitute for exchange-rate adjustment, and so reduce the 
costs of monetary integration". We shall therefore consider 
the role of transfers in the context of a fixed exchange rate 
union, and their ability to alter the underlying real variables, 
in particular productivity trends and export performance .
10.1.7. An extension of the Fleming/Corden theory.
‘To a large extent the arguments of the abovementioned econ­
omists rested on the assumption that each country within a 
fixed exchange rate union had its own particular Phillips curve, 
the precise slope and position of which depended on structural 
and sociological forces within the labour market. Exchange rate 
flexibility would allow each country to select its own preferred 
position on such a curve, whilst monetary union would oblige all 
countries to accept a common rate of inflation, implying a 
higher level of unemployment for countries with less favourable 
Phillips curves.
This propostion has been given a geometric interpretation by 
De Grauwe^, who also considers how an alternative and more real­
istic approach, including expectations, alters the analysis and 
conclusions. The basic two country model is represented in Figure
3. The Phillips curve of country 1 is represented in the top right 
1See Presley(1976), pp. 93-97. ^Cordon(1972), p. 37.
^P. de Grauwe (1975) , pp. 634-646.
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quadrant and that of country 2 in the bottom right quadrant. In 
the top and bottom quadrants on the left-hand side, we have 
represented the relationship between wage (ft) and price (£) in­
flation. In De Grauwe's model, these are derived from a Cobb- 
Douglas production function under competetive equilibrium con­
ditions1 so that,
P = ft - â - $
where a is the share of labour in total product and £ is the aver­
age labour productivity.
With a constant labour share, £> = ft - The intercept is 
found by setting £> - 0, at which point ft =*- *^0. In other words, 
the intercept of the WI curves gives the rate of growth of labour 
productivity. Given a simple mark-up model, the WI curves are 
straight lines with slopes equal to one in absolute value.
The way we have drawn Figure 3-, the structurally weaker 
country 1 has a less fabourable Phillips curve and a lower rate 
of growth of productivity than country 2.
»
^ e  Grauwe does not give the proof, but see annex 1.
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At the outset, before monetary union, country 1 maintains an 
unemployment rate of U^ and a rate of inflation of P^. Country 
2 has an unemployment rate of Uj and an inflation rate of P2 . If 
these unemployment rates are maintained, it is clear that country
1 will have to devalue its currency. The equilibrium rate of 
depreciation of currency 1 in our example is represented by
S ® §1 P 2 ’
In the case where the two countries maintain fixed exchange 
rates, inflation rates in both countries should eventually con­
verge. This point of convergence is given as Pm in Figure 3. In 
our present case, a common inflation rate of Pm implies a diver­
gence in unemployment rates with country 1 moving up to U'x and
country 2 moving down to U'2* We are therefore back to the ad­
justment problem as outlined in Figures 1 and 2.
One possible means of rectifying this situation would be to 
introduce policies designed to equalise rates of growth of prod­
uctivity (raising WI in our example). Investment incentives to 
raise the amount of capital per worker in country 1 could be one 
answer. There appears to be some evidence for the U.K., for ex­
ample, that regional differences in labour productivity can lar­
gely be explained in terms of the amount of capital per head1. 
There still remains, however, the problem of differences in labour 
market structure as typified by the different slopes and heights 
of the Phillips curve in our example. Such factors would perhaps 
prove even more difficult to influence, although certain policies 
such as retraining programmes to reduce structural unemployment 
are fairly obvious methods of improving the Phillips curve trade­
off by shifting it downwards.
A number of writers have argued that the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment, if it exists, is of such a short-term 
nature as to be of no use to policy makers. In particular, Fried­
man's2 criticism has been based on the proposition that the rate 
of inflation is not solely a function of the rate of unemployment,
XDixon (1973). ^Friedman(1968), see also Parkin(1972).
^¡89
and that the Phillips curve is shifted vertically upwards by 
the expected rate of inflation. Any attempt to maintain the 
rate of unemployment below its "natural" rate would merely 
lead to a process of accelerating inflation. Hence, the 
"Phillips curve" under these circumstances can conveniently 
be represented by a vertical straight line. Figure 4 is drawn 
under these assumptions. According to this theory, if national 
governments have been convinced that monetary expansion to in­
fluence the rate of unemployment is ultimately self-defeating, 
it can be shown that monetary union can be achieved without 
cost. In our present example,country 1 has a rate of inflation 
of p. and a rate of unemployment of U.. In country 2, inflation1 o ^
is at an<^  unemployment U2 • Clearly flexible exchange rates" 
would permit the national authorities to maintain these dif­
ferent rates of inflation (§ = ^  - f>2) , as in our previous 
example. However, the outcome of a devaluation in this case may 
be somewhat different. Since we have assumed no money illusion 
in the labour market, a devaluation may be transformed into 
higher wage settlements in subsequent periods, until eventually
FIGURE 4
ur,
hfo.
the devaluing country is back to its pre-devaluation position.
In the absence of money-illusion and under the aforementioned 
monetarist hypothesis, a policy of devaluation, by itself, is 
clearly self-defeating. In this case there would be no cost in­
volved in maintaining unemployment at its "natural" rate in 
botlj countries and establishing a common rate of inflation. The 
alternative for country 1 if it attempted to reduce unemploy­
ment below this rate, would be continual devaluation and spir­
alling inflation.
Clearly the validity of the above analysis depends crucially 
on both of the two extreme monetarist assumptions relating to 
external and internal balance. Moreover some of the subtleties 
of this argument should be weighed carefully. "The argument is 
only that in the long run —  once the various countries have
135restored monetary stability —  the main case against monetary 
integration disappears . . . ". The path to such stability may be 
somewhat longer and harder than is envisaged in the above ana­
lysis. Some doubt may also be expressed as to whether the ex­
pectations coefficient is in fact unitary, and it is only under 
such conditions that the original Corden/Fleming argument is
quantitatively destroyed. Even in this extreme case, however,
2it may still be argued that the process of adjustment of ex­
pectations is sufficiently slow as to provide an effective role 
for exchange rate movements to accommodate structural demand 
or supply shifts.
What would be the role of long term transfers under the 
circumstances outlined in Figure 4? Clearly the fixing of a 
common rate of inflation does not preclude differences in rates 
of growth of productivity and, hence, real wages. Investment 
incentives to raise the capital/labour ratio in country 1 could 
bring about some convergence in this respect;however the fact 
that natural unemployment rates differ would still lead to 
1Corden (1977), p. 146. *My italics.
2Laidler, 1972.
regional variations in unemployment even if productivity growth 
rates were in fact equalised. These differences would then be 
mainly attributable to variations in regional levels of struct­
ural unemployment, and labour market mismatch, which could at least 
partially be alleviated through appropriate labour-market policies 
(see ch. 10.4).
Whilst improving productivity and raising lagging regions 
growth rates is not simply a case of pumping in an endless stream 
of investment, it is a significant and general observation that, 
"low levels of productivity are found in the weaker regions 
(E.C. 9) in association with low capital stock" . As we have dis­
cussed in previous chapters there are a number of convincing 
arguments to explain why, in the past, rather substantial rates 
of private and public investment in a number of peripheral areas 
have failed to achieve desired or expected results in terms of 
productivity growth.
In the European context, the process of regional develop­
ment and adjustment is, in conclusion, likely to require a long 
and sustained effort, involving both qualitative and quantiative 
improvements in..industrial and induced activities.
10.1.8. Conclusions
In the context of economic integration and Customs Union 
formation, regional divergence may occur due to the intensific­
ation of competition and the increased peripherality of the 
l.d.r.'s, with respect to central markets. As we have argued, 
the further step towards monetary integration (in particular 
the question of fixed exchange-rates), is likely to give greater 
impulse to such divergence. Two types of "costs" for member 
states participating in such a system have been distinguished. 
Firstly in respect to loss of output and employment during a
■''European Commission, "The regions of Europe", a first periodic 
report, 1981, p. 113.
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transitional stage when inflation rates have to be aligned. Se­
condly, concerning the longer term adjustment problem when the 
exchange-rate tool is ruled out to achieve internal and external 
equilibrium.
Whilst there are certainly gains to be achieved through 
monetary union, such as, improved conditions of trade in the 
absence of exchange risk, improved capital mobility, and savings 
in foreign exchange reserves (especially important for smaller 
countries), there is no guarantee that the increased liberalis­
ation of trade and capital flows will lead to greater economic 
convergence. Moreover,.as some authors have argued, it is not 
at all clear that trade-liberalisation under conditions of eco­
nomies of scale will necessarily result in optimal specialis­
ation (Grubel, 1967). Neither can we be sure, under these cir­
cumstances, that capital-market integration, by improving intra­
union capital mobility will not lead to flows of an essentially 
disequilibrating nature (Fleming 1971).
The above arguments are probably even more relevant for the 
new and prospective members of the E.C. some of which have built 
up their industrial base under tariff protection, and may have 
additional problems in adjusting industrial output from import 
substituting activities towards exports and the demands of in­
ternational trade —  a function that may be rendered even more 
difficult if exchange rates cannot be easily adjusted to reflect 
internal price levels and changes in the composition of imports/ 
exports.
The question of whether monetary union will be seen as bene­
ficial by the weaker members of the Community can therefore be 
seen to depend critically on the nature and size of compensat­
ing measures intended to mitigate the short and long term costs 
of joining such a union, and the following sections will deal 
specifically with this question.
ANNEX 1
Taking a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form :
X = A. K* NCV assuming + «*- = 1
in perfect competition the real wage W/P = the marginal product
of labour dX/dN
<•--» iThe marginal product of labour dX/dN, = A.aN .K
x.The average labour productivity X/N , = A.N . K 
Therefore, dX/dN = a(X/N)
Hence,from (1) W/P = a(X/N)
Let X/N = q
so, W/P = a.q , or p = a. W/q 
Totally differentiating with respect to time (t) we have
d£ 
dt
= a dw w dq q dt dt
(1 )
(2 )
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6 )
(7)
Separating terms in 
brackets = a
1 dw _ w dc[ 
q dt ~2dt (8)
Factoring out w/q, 
we multiply the first 
term inside the brack­
ets by w/w.
From (6), we see that
a w 
o
1 dw 
w dt
_1 d£ 
q dt
•g dividing both 
sides of (9) by p we obtain
_1 d£ = _1 dw _ 1 d£ 
p dt q dt q dt
(9)
(10)
(10) states that the proportional rate of change of prices equals 
the proportional rate of change of wages minus the proportional 
rate of change of productivity, or,
p = w - q (given constant labour share a)
10.2. European monetary integration and the E.M.S.
Whilst our preceding discussion has outlined some of the issues
involved in E.M.U., with particular reference to the implications
of the decisions to maintain rigidly fixed exchange rates, this
analysis should not be confused with the present reality —  that
is, the new European Monetary System (EMS) and its immediate
limited objective of creating a zone of monetary stability in
Europe by means of closer monetary policy cooperation1.
In fact the present EMS which we will outline shortly, may
be seen either as one small step in the direction of monetary
2union in Europe , or, as a means of achieving greater exchange 
rate stability. Such stability had already become threatened 
by destabilising capital movements in the mid-l970s^, and*was 
fundamentally incompatible with the aims of maintaining the 
smooth functioning of the European Customs Union, both with
4regard to trade flows and the free movement of capital .
The foundations for the present EMS were set in the December 
1978 Resolution of the European Council^. The arrangements for 
linking exchange rates included, (i) parities to be fixed ac­
cording to a basket of the Member States currencies at the 
centre of which is the European Currency Unit**. The E.C.U. 
serves as numéraire for the exchange rate mechanism and denom­
inator for intervention and credit operations. After two years 
the ECU would take on a fuller role as reserve asset and means of
7settlement ; (ii) provisions for realignment of parities and
1 E.C. "European Economic and Monetary Union", Periodical 3/79.
2See for exanple, Tindemans Report (1976) to the European Council on European 
Union, Bull, of the European Ccmnunities vol. 9
S^ee for ex. 0. Brminger, 1979.4"La proposition de relancer le processus d1 intégration par un système moné­
taire ... est née du risque réel et très grave de désintégration que comportent 
le désordre monétaire et la fluctuation généralisée des monnais'.' M. Ruffolo in 
Parlement Européen, 30 mai 1979, PE 57.519/Déf. , p. 111.
^Following fran the Bremen Surnnit in July 1978.
^Which is also equivalent to the European Unit of Account (E.U.A.)
7This however was delayed, together with the E.M.F. proposals following the 
meeting of French & German heads of state in February 1980.
a 2 1/4 per cent margin arrangement (for Italy 6 per cent) on 
either side of the basic rate; (iii) intervention facilities.
All E.C. Central Banks that are members of the scheme deposit 
20 per cent of their gold and dollar reserves with the European 
Monetary Co-operation Fund (E.M.C.F.) and receive in return 
an equivalent amount of drawing rights denominated in E.C.U.'s. 
Equivalent amounts of own currencies are also to be deposited, 
in order to enable the Fund to meet this obligation. For the 
moment these reserves remain the property of Member States 
and are lodged with the Fund on a revolving swap basis.
The move to the second stage of the EMS whereby a European 
Monetary Fund would be established and extend the role of the 
aforementioned E.M.C.F., together with the implementation of 
the E.C.U. in its full capacity as reserve asset and settlement 
currency, still remains to be seen1. Neither, one must observe, 
is it quite clear precisely what this would involve. Certainly 
the ECU would move up from its present status as a mere accoun­
ting device —  however at the limit it could also imply a move 
towards an essentially independent Central Bank with control 
over 20% of the reserves at present lent to the EMCF. The pos­
sibility would then be open for the EMF to eventually create
ECU's against credits and thus assume an important monetary
2role within the Community . However such developments remain 
to be seen.
As concerns credit facilities, the EMS includes very short­
term, short-term and medium-term provisions. The total amount 
of these credits was extended (to 23 billion ECU's) as were the 
periods within which repayment was to be made (between two to 
five years for medium-term financial assistance). As one ob­
server has remarked, "where the decision is taken to intervene, 
the credit available to members is now of substantial proportions
*This move was to occur in March 1981 as agreed at the Dublin 
Summit in November 1979.
Joint management of reserves would also imply that the Community 
would have to adopt a common exchange rate policy towards other 
trading blocks, in particular the U.S.
2
to give credibility to any stand which is taken."1
(iii) Supporting concessions; one condition for the success of
the EMS would clearly be the improved coordination of economic
policies. If monetary discipline leading to the convergence of
inflation rates is necessary to make the fixed rate system
workable, and if this is not to have a deflationary effect on
weaker members, then accompanying measures should be implemented
to offset this tendency. As it happened, doubts as to the
precise status of the EMS and even more on the role that budgetary
transfers should play, led to considerable disagreement over
2the nature that such concessions should take . In any event, 
the measures introduced were only designed to play a support­
ing role, the primary responsibility for economic adjustment
3being with the Member States themselves . The parallel meas­
ures finally agreed on, added up to an extention of the 
"Ortoli facility" whereby loans (of up to 1,000 million EUA 
per year) are made available over a period of five years with 
an interest-rate subsidy of 3 per cent. These loans are con­
tracted via the Commission on the international money market,4and administered through the European Investment Bank , and
E.R.D.F. The loans are for projects relating to infra-structure, 
energy and regional and industrial development. The interest 
rate subsidy is however available only to Member States ac­
tively participating in the EMS. The effect of this "New 
Community Facility" was firstly, to supplement funds available
1Hodges and Wallace (1981), p. 117. Moreover as Van Ypersele, 
former Chairman of the E.C. Monetary Committee, pointed out,
"to the extent that changes in central rates are smaller than 
twice the width of the margin of fluctuation, it is not at all 
sure that speculation will gain." Ibid., p. 118.
2For an account see Hodges & Wallace(1981), p. 118 et seq.
3 See the Resolution of the European Council, 5 Decerrber 1978, Section B. In 
this respect, the Carmissicn has on occasion made sane very strong policy re- 
caimendations not only in the monetary field to Msnber States in relation to 
the opération-of. the'E^ E, see e.g. Bull. No. 6 1981, point 2.1.2.
4See Article 4(3), Council Regulation (EEC) no. 214/79.
from the E.I.B. and in general overcome some of the limits 
posed by the E.C. budgetary problems, and secondly, to provide 
an instrument with selective stimulus to investment with 
minimal inflationary effects.
In essence the approach embodied in the E.M.S. is monet­
arist in character, and along similar lines to the Barr.e Plan 
discussed at the Hague Summit in 196 9; the reasoning being 
that once exchange rates are fixed, Member States would be 
obliged to coordinate monetary policies in order to maintain 
these rates (subject to'realignment by mutual consent). Where 
exchange rates were under an adjustable peg system, and in 
the context of capital liberalisation, "speculative flows 
could develop with which official reserves could not cope, 
forcing exchange-rates to move in the anticipated directions." 
Hence, to be workable, the commitment to maintain exchange 
rates would have to be serious indeed and accompanied by ap­
propriate economic and financial policies. As regards the 
workability of the system, one observer has remarked,
"Viewed as an approach to monetary integration, the main 
difficulty with any such system is simply that until an 
irrevocable commitment is made to staying in the snake, 
as evidenced for instance, by the pooling of reserves and 
the establishment of a common central bank , there can be 
no certainty that national monetary developments will 
produce uniform inflation rates and stable exchange rates .. 
operationally. There is no way of guaranteeing that monet­
ary targets, even if agreed on by policy makers and adhered
»2to, will be consistent with exchange-rate targets.
For example, the British government at the time feared that 
its participation in the scheme might compromise domestic 
goals and policies if it were forced to follow a deflationary
^Robson (1980), p. 84.
^Robson (1980), p. 85.
course1, and considered parallel measures to be of utmost
importance. Other countries however took a different view. In
particular the Bundesbank and German government felt that "in
agreeing to accept the dangers of increased inflation ...
they had sacrificed as much as could be asked by the weak
currency countries ... (and) ... could not be expected to
'pay twice' in the form of further concessions such as re-
2source transfers." Hence, a substantial degree of ambiguity 
remained and remains as to the place and function of parallel
3budgetary and financial measures , and we shall return to 
this subject presently. "Doubtless however , the ambiguity that 
remains on this question will prove to be one of the major 
stumbling blocks to an extention of the European Monetary 
System.
As a final reflection on the E.M.S., it is probable that 
acceptance of the scheme on the part of the weaker currency 
member was at least partly due to the growing acceptance of 
the monetarist conviction that exchange rate changes were no 
longer ultimately effective in altering the terms on which 
a country engaged in international trade. Moreover,*the rather 
substantial intervention facilities in. the scheme which will 
certainly help to mitigate destabilising speculative flows, 
are likely to prove a valuable asset for the weak currency 
countries especially. One may even ask whether such countries 
could have afforded not to enter the scheme. Given, furthermore, 
the facility of making periodic realignments, it is possible 
that more rather than less control over domestic variables is 
ultimately derived from membership of the system, as opposed 
to being out of it —  at least in the short to medium term.
1Green Paper on the E.M.S., 1978, HMSO Cmnd 7405.
^Hodges & Wallace (1981), p. 114.
In particular, the Ruffolo Report (1980) of the European Parliament, was 
led to conclude that the extenticn of the "Ortoli" facility previously men­
tioned, does not in fact involve a redistribution of resources, and as such 
has minimal importance as a parallel measure.
Another factor- to be recalled, i/s that the balance of pay­
ments situation in 1978/7 9 following the realignment of cur­
rencies in 197 8 was particularly favourable to the operation 
of the E.M.S., France and Italy had strong surpluses which held 
up the Franc and the lira, whilst Germany acquired a current 
account deficit which helped to hold down the Deutsche Mark.
However, the events since 1978 have posed some serious 
questions as to the future workability of the system. In par­
ticular the much hoped for convergence of inflation rates has 
not occurred . Moreover, it is difficult to see how convergence 
could be achieved over a relatively short period without sub­
stantial "real" costs for weaker members in terms of lower 
growth rates and higher unemployment.
1See European Economy, Nov. 1980, no. 7, table 2.1.
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10.3.1. Strate2ies_for_re2ional_harmonisationj__the_alternatives
Within the context of our preceding discussion on economic 
and monetary integration we should distinguish at least three 
broad types of transfers necessary for the long term economic 
convergence and stability within the system: (i) long-term
transfers aimed at correcting and improving the industrial 
structure and productivity of the weaker regions; on the one 
hand to achieve the convergence (or prevent divergence) of re­
gional growth rates, and on the other, to compensate for the 
potentially adverse competitive and locational aspects deriving 
from the formation of a Customs Union and operation of a unified 
Common Market; (ii) transfers aimed essentially at compensating 
for adverse cyclical and secular movements in regional economic 
activity and incomes; and (iii) in the context of public and 
Community finance, transfers for the provision of general infra­
structure and essential services vital to improving the develop­
ment potential of weaker or disadvantaged regions (and comple­
mentary to (i)) .
Regarding the above approaches it seems clear that the 
level of integration and political cohesion will ultimately de­
termine the nature and level of the transfer redistribution sys­
tem adopted. Whilst it is at present possible to conceive of 
a restructuring of Community funds and policies (see on) which 
would achieve greater convergence in terms of (i) and (iii) , 
the scope for more automatic financing in the context of (ii) is, 
in the absences of a federalist approach to public finance, 
limited to specific ad hoc measures delivered essentially at the 
micro-economic level.
A further point to note is that one should distinguish between 
net transfers in the context of the Community budget (or inter­
state net public finance transfers in a federal system), and loan 
systems (e.g. through the EIB, subsidied or not through the bud­
get) . If the regional problem, as evidence shows, is one of
■To/.
long-term structural imbalance expressed in persistent regional 
differences in productivity levels, one may be led to doubt 
whether a transfer system based essentially on loans would be 
at all realistic under fixed exchange rates, since there is a 
distinct risk that it could merely push them into long-term 
indebtedness. A similar criticism can be levelled at medium/ 
long term reserve transfers to support fixed exchange rates, 
and more so, in the latter case, if there is no guarantee 
that such transfers would be used for productive investment in­
stead of, say, deficit financing1.
On the other hand one is also led to the conclusion that 
neither would full fiscal integration (although contributing 
substantially to reducing income disparities), provide an obvious 
solution to long-term structural imbalances. Whilst such a sys­
tem, based on a common Community scale of public services and 
common basis of taxation, would automatically provide 'aid" for 
regions or countries whenever their trading relations with the 
rest of the Community deteriorated , national experience un­
fortunately abounds with examples where such transfers have 
become permanent and even expanding in character with presum­
ably little impact on correcting the underlying imbalances (see 
ch. 4.2.).
Automatic equalising and stabilising inter-regional flows 
of this type may however be seen as an essential accompanying 
measure under E.M.U., particularly if it is expected that dy­
namic gains and losses through integration will take on specific 
sectoral and regional dimensions. Moreover, it is probable that 
the amount of net transfers involved under fiscal integration 
could be substantially limited (as compared to national systems), 
by concentrating on a relatively limited number of highly re- 
distributive measures (see on) .__________
1In this respect there is a good argument for claiming that support for the 
Belgian Franc in the EMS totalling sane Bfrs 340bn. (B 4.2bn.) up to autumn
1981, must have gone a long way propping-up the current high levels of de­
ficit spending in that country.
2As Kaldor (1970) has argued, this would occur since taxes paid to the central 
authority vary with the level of local incanes and expenditure whilst pu­
blic expenditures do not, hence, "any deterioration in the export-import ba­
lance tends to be retarded (and ultimately arrested) by the change in the 
regions' fiscal imbalance", op. cit., p. 345.
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Whilst taken alone, none of the abovementioned transfer 
systems by itself provides an adequate answer to the problems of 
integration, each has its own particular function and is com­
plementary to the others. As such, progress towards further in­
tegration would necessarily imply an extension of Community 
financing in all three directions.
At the moment,however, existing provisions within the E.C. 
budget appear inadequate even for the present purposes of main­
taining exchange rates within the present E.M.S., let alone the 
demands of closer monetary union. Within any closer arrangement, 
and indeed for the continued workability of the present system, 
given serious and growing disparities in economic performance 
and unemployment within the Community, it may be necessary to 
provide a budget which operates to provide a -clear net trans­
fer of resources between regions and countries on the lines 
described above. The problems incumbent on establishing such a 
budgetary system are not to be underestimated, and in the fol­
lowing section we shall consider and assess some of the relevant 
proposals that have been made in this direction.
10.3.2. The_role_of_bud2etary_transfers_and_public_finance_in 
Eurogean_integration
The role of Community finance is, of course, a central ques­
tion in any discussion of future European integration, quite 
apart from any amendments that may, in the meantime, be necess­
ary to adapt to changing economic and social conditions within 
the Community. The subject by itself constitutes a third major 
aspect of economic integration along with aspects concerning 
free trade and monetary integration.
In the present Community context, the subject has been given 
its most thorough treatment in a report prepared by a group of 
independent experts set up by the Commission, and presented in 
19771.
The report considers firstly, at the level of individual 
Member States of the Community and in several existing federations, 
the financial relationships between different levels of govern­
ment and the economic effects of public finance on geographical 
regions within these countries. Secondly, the report outlines 
the kind of expenditures and taxes existing in fully integrated 
economies which could be adopted at the Community level, under 
three hypothetical stages towards closer union.
The main findings contained in the report may be summarised 
as follows:
- the equalising effect of public expenditure and taxation in 
the countries studied was considerable and reduced regional 
inequalities in per capita income by, on average around 40%.
Net inter-regional transfers were not, however, found to be 
very substantial expressed as a proportion of G.D.P., being 
some 2.5% in the United States, 3.7% in the U.K. and 4.2.% in 
Italy. Such transfers tend to offset, by a roughly equivalent 
amount, the balance of payments deficits (current account) 
of the poorer regions (the former being in the range of 3-10%, 
of regional product and up to around 30% in a few instances), 
and are often of a continuing nature;
lnReport of the study group on the role of public finance in Euro­
pean integration"(MacDougall Report),vols. 1 & 2, European Com­
mission, Brussels 1977.
Measured by the change in Gini coefficient of regional personal 
income inequality due to public finances.
2
- public finance also plays a major role in cushioning short-term 
and cyclical fluctuations, offsetting between one half to two- 
thirds of a short-term loss of primary income in a region.
The study cites the lack of this mechanism at the Community 
level as a major reason why monetary union under present cir­
cumstances is impracticable1;
- in considering the functions and raison d'être of inter-regional 
redistribution in maturely integrated economies the study 
notes;
"Inter-regional redistribution produces a reasonably equit­
able sharing of both the cyclical and secular fortunes of 
an economic union, and thereby helps to maintain its polit­
ical unity; it helps as far as possible attainment of com­
parable economic performance between regions; it compensates 
for the inability of regions or states to use trade or ex­
change rate policies in the management of their economies, 
and it limits the extent to which migration has to serve 
as part of the economic adjustment process."2
In the light of these and other findings, the report con­
siders three hypothetical degrees of integration which the Com­
munity might achieve towards closer union, and outlines the 
implications concerning the role of public finance. These three 
stages are;
(i) pre-federal integration
(ii) federation with a small public sector at the Community 
level
(iii) federation with a large public sector at the Community 
level.
At the fullest stage of integration, it is conceivable that 
federal public expenditure would come to account for between 
20-25% of GNP. Here, many of the major social and welfare ex­
penditure functions would be administered by the federal govern­
ment which would also, on the tax side, take predominance over 
state revenues. Whilst gross intergovernmental and other inter­
regional flows of funds would be very substantial, performing 
important equalisation and stabilisation functions, it would also 
be possible to perform the same functions by means of net inter­
state financial transfers which would imply a much lower level of
7 2Ibid., vol. 1, p. 12. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 61.
federal integration.
For example, under hypothesis (ii) it is possible to envisage 
the supply of social and welfare services remaining at the nat­
ional level, whilst the eguilisation of public service provision 
would be achieved by inter-regional financial transfers.
In a similar way, federal aid programmes for particular in­
dustries and regions could be limited to selective intervention,
• %*■ 1 topping-up national efforts (by means of variable matching ratios
for greatest effect, where fiscal capacity varies significantly).
As the MacDougal study points out, in order for the small
public sector federation model to be capable of sustaining an
economic and monetary union,
"the transfers and expenditure under the budget equalisation 
mechanism for 'social and welfare' and 'economic services' 
would have to be not only strongly redistrbutive but also 
capable of a sensitive and large-scale response to short- _ 
term changes in the economic fortunes of regions and states" .
Conceivably, and if the budgetary instruments were "strongly 
and deliberately biased in favour of these objections"3, total 
civil Community expenditure would then account for 5% to 7% of 
Community GDP.
The work of the study group was however largely centred 
around the transitional scenario of a "pre-federal budget", 
since this posed questions of more immediate relevance. Under this 
schema, public expenditure at the Community level would more 
than double from its present level to reach between 2% to 2.5% 
of Community GDP. The Community's economic policies at this stage 
are assumed to include intervention in some industries as well as 
structural and redistribution policies designed to bring about 
greater inter-regional convergence: they would assist in the com­
pletion of the Common Market (e.g. the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers, other distortions to trade, and fuller movement of 
capital and labour), and further steps towards economic and mon­
etary coordination (stopping short of monetary union).
The main directions in which the Community's expenditure
*See ibid., vol. 1 section 4.6. 2Ibid., p. 70.
3Ibid.
might be changed in the "pre-federal integration" phase, in­
clude the following;
(i) Community involvement where "economies of scale" can be 
achieved in one way or another —  e.g., development aid, advanced 
technology, energy. Since this would imply a transfer of oper­
ation from the national to Community level, the implications 
for net aggregate public expenditure as a share of GNP are quite 
limited;
(ii) The main need for substantial expenditure at the Commun­
ity level would arise in the area of structural, cyclical em­
ployment and regional policies. The purpose of these measures 
being to help reduce inter-regional differences in capital en­
dowment and productivity. Several possibilities are mentioned:
a) More Community participation than at present in regional 
policy aids (wide definition —  investment incentives, pu­
blic infrastructure, urban redevelopment)
b) More Community participation than at present in labour 
market policies (including vocational training and other 
employment measures)
c) The creation of a Community Unemployment Fund along the 
lines suggested in the Marjolin Report. This, according to 
the study, would have a strong redistributive (and counter­
cyclical) effect without leading to any great increase in 
budgetary expenditure. The latter assumption must now, how­
ever, be open to a fair amount of scepticism
d) A limited budget equalisation scheme for extremely weak 
Member States to bring their fiscal capacity up to around 
65% of the Community average to ensure reasonably equitable 
standards of welfare and public services
e) A system of cyclical grants to local or regional govern­
ments, dependent on regional economic conditions
f) A "conjunctural convergence facility" to make available 
packages of Community finance to weaker Member States aimed 
at preventing divergent structural gaps. Suggestions d), e) 
and f) are put forward as being to a high degree substituta­
ble, and therefore as possible alternatives.
The net cost of the above measures would come to around 1% 
of Community GDP; this would be balanced by savings in present 
policies, where possible (e.g. agriculture), the additional 
finance coming from some variant of the VAT tranche system, based 
on a formula using a progressivity key such as personal income 
tax capacity.
Concerning redistributive power, the study assumes that a 
selection of the abovementioned instruments —  if concentrated 
heavily on the weakest Member States and regions —  could result 
in an equalisation of around 10% of existing income per capita 
differentials between (9) Member States.
It is notable in the budget model described above that Com­
munity expenditure under "social and welfare" services would re­
main very limited; the largest component being in the form of 
a general purpose equalisation mechanism to enable weaker mem­
bers to top up their own budget efforts.
The general principle is that at a pre-federal stage the 
major part of payments to Member States should be on a conditional 
basis —  unconditional horizontal redistribution between states 
having its place at a later stage within a federation with a 
small "top" level public sector. Conditional transfers, however, 
in general are likely to be less efficient than unconditional 
ones as instruments of redistribution because it is improbable 
that all the recipients of benefit will be in the poorer coun­
tries1;
"The result is that the redistributive power of the extra 
expenditure most appropriate for the Community in the pre-federal 
integration period is likely to be substantially smaller than 
the maximum that could be attained if the same amount of spending 
took the form solely of unconditional net transfers from richer 
to poorer member countries" (ibid.).
The above analysis may, however, need some clarification on
a number of points. In the first place too much emphasis is
placed on "redistributive power" in terms of inter-state or inter-
2regional per capita average incomes , which abstracts from the 
problem that losses and gains from the integration process may be 
just as marked at an inter-personal as at an inter-regional or 
state level.
In the second place it is difficult to understand why the re­
port makes the specific exception to Community non-involvement 
in social security systems, in the field of unemployment benefit.
1Ibid., p. 63. For examples see discussion in ch. 10.3.
2See ibid., section 4.3.
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There is a certain amount of confusion on this general issue, 
since it is perfectly possible that such involvement could take 
the form of intergovernmental transfers, without the need for 
"national governments to transfer powers over "internal" in­
come distribution to the Community" (ibid., p. 59), as the study 
puts it. There is a clear contradiction between on the one hand 
dismissing Community involvement in social security systems, and 
on the other arguing for it in a very important field (unem­
ployment) on what are somewhat narrow, and probably misconceived 
political arguments and objectives.
What the study does not mention, but to which attention was 
drawn in Chapter 2, is-that very little effort has as yet been 
made by the Community in the field of harmonising social security 
systems. Whilst the present author would not attempt to argue 
for inter-state equalisation, the inadequacy or near total lack 
of such benefits in several of the poorest Member States is ob­
viously a matter of Community concern. Presumably, the lack of 
reaction on the part of the Community until now arises from 
placing too much emphasis on inter-regional imbalances and pay­
ing too little attention to inter-personal differences in living 
standards. However, if the Community continues to view divergence 
solely in terms of averages (e.g. regional per capita incomes) 
it runs the risk of totally ignoring adverse developments in the 
fortunes of very large sections of its constituent population.
Moreover, taking the findings outlines in Chapter 2 (with re­
gard to poverty-gap estimates), it seems clear that a system of 
limited, inter-state specific purpose grants aimed at filling 
gaps in certain national income-maintenance programmes, could 
achieve a substantial impact whilst representing only a relatively 
small net transfer of resources ccrnparable with any of the present major 
structural funds. This would furthermore help achieve one of the 
main aims of the pre-federal or small public sector federation 
stage, which is to provide a Community budget with strong re­
distributive and stabilising characteristics.
f.
To sum up the main conclusions to be drawn from the MacDougal 
Report and our preceding discussion, we may stress the following 
points:
i) advance in the sphere of public finance, and development 
and extension of the Community budget can be seen as a clear 
pre-condition for further levels of integration, most notably 
monetary union;
ii) to make integration acceptable to all participants may 
require an explicit redistributive mechanism to divide the gains 
from integration in a politically acceptable way. The costs as 
such may effectively be defined at a sectoral, regional or inter­
personal level. A partial solution in the latter case would be 
to ensure, at least, a minimum standard of provision of social 
security benefits, the establishment of which would require a 
limited net transfer of resources within the Community budget;
iii) the general considerations under i) and ii) suggest that, 
for present and future purposes, the Community budget should no 
longer be viewed independently of its redistributive consequences.
In a fundamental sense any discussion of the perspectives 
for future monetary integration and the extension or adaptat­
ion of the Community's budgetary system must be seen in the 
light of the regional and distributive impact of the present 
funds, and their scope for improvement.
On this point, the Commission together with certain 
Member States has stressed the need to view the E.C. budget 
and funds independently of any criterion of 'juste retour', 
arguing that the revenues accruing to the E.C. budget are 
fundamentally the property of the Community, to be dispersed 
in accordance with common needs as the Community sees fit.
Whilst such a view undoubtedly serves to increase political 
unity and coherence within the Community, and to minimize dis­
ruptive internal haggling as to who benefits most, the question 
of overall redistributive consistency within the system cannot 
be overlooked.
The Community budget itself is relatively small in compar­
ison to the total of Member States budgets (around 2 1/2 per 
cent), or to their total GDP (.81 per cent) . Whilst a certain 
proportion of this budget (around 18%) comprises expenditures 
on structural interventions in the regional, social and agri­
cultural fields, the largest slice of spending goes on market 
intervention in agriculture (around 70%). It is largely on 
this latter question that the British government in particular 
has criticised the E.C. budget for redistributing funds from 
poorer to richer countries. Following from the recent British 
demands for a review of their budgetary situation the Commission 
published a series of statistics relating to gross and net
^Figures relate to 1979. E.C. Commission, "Global Appraisals of 
the Budgetary Problems of the Community", COM(79) 85.
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budgetary contributions for 1980. Taking M.C.A.'s as export 
subsidies (which in fact conforms to administrative practice 
since 1976), gives the following overall figures1. Member
EXPENDITURES, RECEIPTS FROM AND BALANCES BY MEMBER
STATES IN 1980 , AS % OF TOTAL.
RECEIPTS BALANCEEXPENDITURE
FRG 22.0 29.81 - 7.8
Denmark 5.5 2.37 + 3.2
Netherlands 11.5 8.68 + 2.8
Belgium 9.7 6. 17 + 3.5
Luxembourg 2.2 0.12 + 2.1
France 19.7 18.96 +■ 0.7
U.K. 7.9 21.09 - 13.2
Italy 16.7 11.90 + 4.8
Ireland 4.8 0.90 + 3.9
100  100  0
E.C. Commission, COM(80) 147, 20 March 1980. The Commission 
also gives expenditures and receipts with reimputation of 
M.C.A.'s to the importing country —  that is, under the 
view that the economic effect of M.C.A.'s is to subsidize 
consumers rather than exporters. In view of the fact that 
M.C.A.'s have largely functioned as subsidies to trade 
between high-cost to low-cost producers, we consider it 
more realistic to consider them as export rather than import 
subsidies.
States in the table above are arranged in two groups in order 
of G.D.P. per capita. In general receipts, or gross contrib­
utions to the E.C. budget are fairly proportional to GDP of 
the respective Member States, being automatically determined 
by V.A.T. revenues, duties under the C.E.T. and levies under 
the C.A.P. Hence differences in the net balance are mainly 
attributable to the distribution of spending between the
various funds, and the EAGGF (Guarantee) in particular1.
In 1977 total E.C. commitments on structural funds (EAGGF, 
ESF, ERDF, ECSCF) averaged only .117% of Community GDP.
This is not in fact to criticise these funds themselves, 
but rather to point out that in their present form and size they 
are unlikely to bring about any significant tranfer of resources, 
productive or otherwise.
Budgetary expenditure of the European Communities, 1953-31, in million u.a-/EU A/ECU (a)
£CSCOOara-aonnBuOg«<
éurooean
Otvetoo»flWflt 
fvnd
E^ ruam tbi ■
£C audgtt *otai
feoga(el
SocialPuna
fl«groo*i
Fune
inCustry AORI«.-»aOOwrl
141
TotaiSC
‘S58 21.7 __ 7.9 ~_ _ — — 5.9 5.9 35.5
1959 30.7 51.2 39.1 — — — — 25.2 25.2 146.2
'.96C 23.5 63.2 20,0 — — — — 28.3 28.3 135.0
1S61 25.5 172,0 72,5 — 8.6 — — 25.4 340 305,0
1962 13,6 162.3 38.6 — 11.3 — — 31.0 92.3 356,8
1363 21.9 55.5 106,4 _ 4,6 _ — 79.5 34.1 267,9
•SS4 18.7 35.0 124,4 — 7,2 — — 85.9 S3.* 271.1
'965 37.3 246.3 120.0 1C2.7 42.9 * — — 55.5 . 201.1 507.2
1956 23.1 157.3 12S.2 310.3 25,2 — — 65.3 402.2 717.3
*967 10.4 105.8 158.5 562.0 35,6 — — 77,5 675.1 949.3
1968 21.2 121.0 73.4 2 250.4 43.0 _ — 115.3 2 4C8.5 2 324.2
'969 40.7 104,8 59.2 3 818,0 50,5 — — 182.7 4 051,2 4 255.9
1970 £6.2 10.5 63.4 5 228.3 64.0 — — 1*6.1 5 446,4 5 579.5
1971 37. A 236.1 — 1 883.6 56.5 — S5.0 234.3 2 269.3 2 562.3
1972 43,7 212.7 — 2 477,6 97,5 — 75.1 424.3 3 0744 3 330,9
1973 96.9 210.0 _ 3 768.3 269,2 — 53.1 533.3 4 641,0 A 337.9
197 A 92.0 157,0 — 3 651.3 292.1 — 32 e 1 011.9 5 038 2 5 :S7.2
1S75 127.4 71.0 _ 4 536.6 360.5 150.0 99.0 1 C17.3 6 213.6 6 412.0
1976 94.0 320.0 — 6 033.3 176.7 30C.C 113.3 1 329.2 7 952.5 8 -.06.5
1577 (e) 93.C sco.c — 5 567.6 55.3 400.0 167.0 1 3G3.9 3 432.2 9 376,2
1373 149.8 394.5 9 552.3 256.5 254 9 266.3 S 430 3 11 334.2 12 422.5
1379 143.0 479.0 — 10 765.0 527.0 499.0 286.0 2 366.0 14 447.0 15 069.1
1930 __ 544.0 — 11 278,0 374,0 403.0 380.C 2 54a.O 15 683,0 16 415.5
1381 If) -- — — 13 436.3 560.0 1 774.7 . 337 3 3 131.1 19 239.3 —
Sources: 1953-79 ‘/ar,axemen: accounts 1950: G e ^ -a  
budget. ;a) j a 'j.-.ti; "377 EUA 1973 onwaros. ;5) '-tcorocrate: 
in the EC Sud?et iro n  1971. ;c( This so iu n n  ¡«eludes. ‘or thi 
years ¡3 i?7 0  sucitanriai am c-nts c a r r a i  forwa-d :c 
ÌOiìO’wing yuri In 1377 asorcoria::C '*s ‘O ' ths Soc:a; c c~c 
carnea 'cr-vars. <ci induc ing me iurocaar. ^ari'ar 'ent. :ne 
Council. the Court 01 „.¿ssics, the Court 0! s..jc.:ors ar,i the 
aimm '«tra:ive ?a*t of the =CSC  iud-jet *  1 197” acorccr - 
ations !cr ‘he So ca i ?M\<1 carr.ee ‘orwarC <rcrp. "275 irC 
subsecuentiy rar.ceiied ar-.cunted :o 22' v 5 6 ' i  u a . -while 
total exoenditure for 1977 amounted tc oniy ’72 A35 -99 u a 
giving me net figure shown nere (*} Crai; Sucget estaoi.shei 
 ________  _________________________________________  — — --------  Sy the Council on 29 Sestem ser 1930
iFor Italy the figure was .29% GD?, for Ireland .59% and for the 
U.K. .20% of GDP (figures derived from Eurostat, Regional Stat­
istics - Community's financial participation in investments, and 
European Economy, Annual Economic Review, November 1980).
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.4.1. Euro£ean_Re2ional_Develograent_Fund (E.R.D.F.)
The E.R.D.F. was set up in 1975. It had been given the 
basic aim of correcting regional imbalances within the Com­
munity resulting from a high dependence on agricultural em­
ployment, industrial change or structural underemployment, and 
as evidenced by (i) relatively low levels of per capita income,
(ii) high rates of outmigration and unemployment, or (iii) 
structural deficiencies in the labour market1.
The Paris Summit of 1974 agreed on the amount of the 
Fund from 1975-77 (1,300 million U.A.), to be distributed on 
a quota basis to those countries with the most serious reg­
ional problems. The Fund operated by partially reimbursing 
Member States' expenditures for infrastructure projects and 
aids to productive investment, falling into the coverage and 
working of the respective national regional policies. These 
rates of reimbursement amounted to between 10-30% for infra­
structure and 20% for expenditure on productive investment, 
with a ceiling of 50% of the national aid.
In 1980, 74% of quota-fund assistance went to infrastruct­
ure projects and 26% to industrial and service projects.
The Fund's operations were revised for 1978-80, one of
the major innovations being the creation of a 5% quota-free
section, which may alsjo, under certain conditions, he applied
in non-development areas. Other major changes included a wider
scope of elegible activities, including small and medium sized
enterprises, handicrafts, tourism and services, and a higher
maximum rate (40%) for infrastructure projects of particular 
2importance .
As concerns investments in industry and services, Fund 
assistance can be applied either (i) as a global addition to 
Member States' expenditure, thereby increasing the total re-
1See Council Regulation(EEC) no. 724/75, establishing a European 
Regional Development Fund, O.J. no. L73 of 23.3.1975.
2See Council Regulation(EEC) no. 214/79, O.J. no. L35/1, of 
9.2.1979.
sources available, or (ii) to "top up" the aid granted by a 
Member State for a particular investment. The principle of 
"additionality" holds in both cases, such that E.R.D.F. ex­
penditure should not be used by national authorities to make 
corresponding reductions in the funds they themselves make 
available. In practice, the latter alternative is generally 
avoided because of its clearly discriminative nature and is 
used mainly as a selective measure for particular high-pricr- 
ity projects and regions.
A final-.measure which has become effective is that the 
E.R.D.F. may now provide assistance (wholly ot partly) in 
the form of a rebate of three percentage points on loans made 
by the European Investment Bank1. Whilst it is as yet early 
to assess the use made or impact of this measure, we may note 
that one of its original functions was intended to be the
(indirect) relief of exchange rate risk associated with E.I.B.
2loans denominated in E.U.A.’s .
The overall impact of the new measures, in particular 
the non-quota section and EIB interest-rate subsidy, is to 
give much broader scope to the Commission both in terms of 
range of elegible activities and the possibility of interven­
tion in specific projects.
The provision of long-term loans for productive investment 
at beneficial rates, which could be expanded upon via the 
E.R.D.F., would undoubtedly play an important role in the pre­
sent and enlarged Community, providing an instrument which 
could be used as an additional incentive rather than as a mere 
token contribution to national expenditures on regional policies.
1Concerning projects (i) for developing less developed regions, 
or (ii) modernization, conversion or new activities which are 
of such a size or nature that they are unlikely to be financed 
by the Member States concerned.
E.C. Commision, "Community Regional Policy. New Guidelines, 
Bull, suppl. no. 2, 1977.
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This is particularly important if, as we have mentioned in pre­
vious chapters, lack of investment funds or differential inte­
rest rates in l.d.r.'s, provide a bottleneck to development 
potential in these areas. Given that regional policies in 
Greece and Portugal especially are still at a very early stage 
in spite of severe spatial and sectoral imbalances1, such 
intervention could provide a relatively quick and effective 
means of making resources available for productive investments. 
Moreover, since provisions already exist to provide EIB loans 
through the national banking systems, they are very amenable 
to extension on_a wide geographical scale and over a wide 
range of activities* (including smaller projects for which the 
grant system may be less suitable).
.4.2.The_European_Inyestment_Bank (E.I.B.)
The EIB was established by the Treaty of Rome (Arts. 129, 
130), with the task of contributing, by having recourse to the 
capital market and utilising its own resources, to the balanced 
and steady development of the common market in the interest of 
the Community. It operates on a non-profit making basis, grant­
ing loans and giving guarantees to facilitate the financing 
of the following projects in all sectors of the economy:
(i) projects for developing less developed regions;
(ii) projects for modernising or converting undertakings or 
for developing new activities, called for by the pro­
gressive establishment of the common market, where the 
nature or size of the project is such that it cannot be 
entirely financed by the individual Member States ;
(iii) projects of common interest where the same caveat as
(ii) applies.
1See European .Economy, July 1981, pp. 115-17.
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The EIB may provide loans to private or public enterpri­
ses and to states (e.g. Länder) and financially autonomous pu­
blic authorities (e.g. Italian regions)1.
Planned investment projects must be well-specified, 
pursue a defined objective and be capable of being carried out 
within a set period of time. Moreover, where projects are un­
dertaken by firms in the production sector, debt-servicing 
payments must be made out of operating profits. Thus, projects 
must be seen as viable where productive investments are con­
cerned, whilst for infrastructures the main consideration is the 
general economic benefit derived from the project.
Loans are only intended to cover part of project costs, 
the exact proportion varying from case to case but rarely ex­
ceeding 50% of the cost of fixed assets involved, and not nor­
mally exceeding 80 million EUA for any given project.
Whilst the EIB prefers to make individual loans of not 
less than 1 million EUA, finance for smaller projects may be 
made through the global loan system. These loans are in the 
first instance made available to banks or financial institutions 
for financing small and medium scale ventures, when projects 
do not exceed a total cost of 12 million EUA. The institution 
involved then becomes the contractual borrower. This process 
may also be used for individual indirect loans of a larger size 
where this method of financing is more convenient.
The EIB's rate of interest approximates closely to the 
cost of borrowing on international capital markets and is in­
dependent of the type of project, location or status of the bor­
rower .
As we mentioned earlier, the E.R.D.F. may provide assistance 
in the form of a three percentage point rebate on EIB loans pro­
vided that the latter also conforms to certain criteria and to
2the general objectives of the E.R.D.F. . The extension of the
*But does not make loans to be used for local government services 
such as health or welfare services.
Arts. 130(a) and (b) of the Treaty of Rome and Article 3, Regulat­
ion no. 214/79.
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interest rebate facility (previously available only to loans 
granted under Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty), has the direct 
effect of subsiding investment, and indirectly, the exchange- 
rate risk inherent with loans denominated in EUA's1, which is 
particularly relevant for investors in weak-currency countries.
Borrowing operations of the EIB have increased consider­
ably over the late 1970's —  from 826 million EUA in 19 74 to 
1,030m. EUA in 1977 and 2,437m. EUA in 19792. From relatively 
modest beginnings the EIB has now become a potentially major 
actor in the financing of regional development programmes and 
projects. However, as we have seen, a certain amount of flex­
ibility and extended provisions may be necessary if loans from 
the EIB are to become more readily acceptable to private in­
vestors, and especially those of small/medium size. This in 
turn is likely to imply a fair amount of delegation of authority 
to various banking and regionally autonomous financial in­
stitutions .
Concerning the distribution of EIB finance, an analysis 
of loan commitments for 1977 for example, shows that around 60% 
of loans to industry went to investments in the energy .and water 
sectors. The steel industry (particularly Scotland) also bene- 
fitted substantially. However, loans to manufacturing industry 
(excluding steel) amounted to less than 11% of total loans made 
by the EIB in that year. Loans for the financing of infrastruc­
tures accounted for around 30% of total lending, the greatest 
part being towards projects in transport and communications3.
In 1977, as in 1976, loans granted by the EIB were con­
centrated in relatively few regions —  some sixteen regions ac­
counting for three quarters of all loans.
ks one author points out: in the U.K., only those firms with 
sufficient foreign-exchange facilities have in the past been 
able to avail themselves of EIB loans, which have mainly 
benefitted public-sector undertakings where a Treasury gua­
rantee was available. In 1978 the Treasury took the decision to 
provide a limited measure of protection to private firms receiv­
ing such loans, against adverse exchange rate movements. Mac- 
lennon & Parr(l979), p. 265.
2European Economy, no. 7, 1980, Table 42.
Eurostat 1977, "Community's financial participation in investments"3
As a final remark, we should note that, as a banking 
institution the EIB is quite distinct from the other financial 
instruments and funds available in the Community:. As such there 
may be an increasing call to limit its present independence or 
to integrate it more fully with other Community instruments; as 
one report put it, "the more the Bank takes on tasks which could 
have been performed by the Commission ... the stronger will be 
the demand that its activities should be brought under proper 
control."1
10.4.3. The_Eurogean_Social_Fun.d (E. S. F .)
The E.S.F. was established by Article 123 of the Treaty 
of Rome with the task of rendering the employment of workers 
easier and of increasing their geographical and occupational 
mobility within the Community.
Initially, the main aim was to help reduce unemployment 
by facilitating the mobility and retraining of workers. As such 
the "regional dimension" of the fund was essentially limited 
to stimulating the migration of workers from backward areas and 
easing congestion and mismatch on the labour market. There were 
two main weaknesses of the original E.S.F.; in the first place, 
it could only intervene retroactively —  i.e. when the retrain­
ed worker had been actively employed for 6 months; in the second 
place intervention depended heavily on the availability of pro­
grammes and funds available for retraining and resettlement in 
the respective countries involved. One resulting anomaly of the
system was that W. Germany received a total of 44% of funds
2granted between 1960-76 . "The Federal Republic benefitted more 
because the authorities there were sufficiently well-organized 
to put in claims that were likely to be met, and were in a position 
to contribute their half of the aid in question."^
In 1971 the E.S.F. was revised and extended in order to
^European Perspectives, "The Finances of Europe", E.C. 1981, p. 159.
2"The Social Policy of the E.C.", E.C. Documentation periodical 
3/1981, Table 4.
^European Perspectives, "The Finances of Europe", 1981,p. 234.
better fulfil the obligations covered in Article 123, and to 
remedy some of the shortcomings of the previous fund.
Two types of intervention under the new fund are to be 
distinguisged; under Article 4, the ESF can intervene (only) on 
the basis of a proposal by the Commission and subsequent de­
cision by the Council, when the employment situation is affect­
ed by Community policy or when the need arises for joint action 
to improve the balance of labour supply and demand within the 
Community.
In the past nine years only six decisions have been made. 
They relate to retraining and reintegration schemes and aids to 
promote geographical mobility for the following categories:
(i) persons leaving agriculture who take up employment else­
where (Decision 72/428/EEC)
(ii) workers in the textile and clothing industries who move 
to other employment within or outside that sector 
(Decision 72/429/EEC)
(iii) migrant workers (Decision 74/327/EEC)
(iv) young persons under 25 who are unemployed or seeking 
employment (Decision 75/459/EEC, Decision 78/1036/EEC, 
Regulation (EEC) no. 3039/78). Resulting from the latter 
regulation, direct financial assistance of up to 30 
EUA per person per week may be given for up to 12 months
(v) operations aiming to promote the employment of women 
over 25 years (Decision 77/804/EEC).
Apart from the decision (i) above (for which there is no time­
limit) , unless renewed all the remaining decisions lapse at the 
end of 1980.
A second type of assistance from the new E.S.F. (Article 
5), in which the fund may intervene without a specific Council 
decision, concerns (i) the various employment problems affecting 
underdeveloped or declining regions; (ii) sectors particu­
larly affected by technical change and (iii) the handicapped.
The types of aid given under the reformed E.S.F. can be 
classed as follows:
(i) aid to facilitate training, or retraining, or the
improvement of skills
(ii) aid to facilitate the mobility of workers and their
S'lo.
dependents
(iii) aid to remove obstacles to the employment of certain 
workers e.g. the handicapped
(iv) aid to promote employment in economically disadvan­
taged regions, e.g. temporary income support.
Concerning the distribution of assistance, the Commission 
put a series of proposals for reform to the Council, which 
has resulted, since 1978, in at least 50% of the Fund's appropr­
iations being reserved for operations (under Article 5) designed 
to resolve employment problems in the less-developed areas of 
the Community —  assistance for these operations being given 
at the increased rate of 55%.
In terms of available funds, the ESF is being placed 
under heavy strain. In 1977 the number of applications exceeded 
budget resources by 52.3% and. in 1977 by 70.4%.
In terms of persons benefitting from ESF programmes, it 
has been estimated that in 1979 around 460,000 received money 
by way of ’regional' aid, 450,000 benefitted as young people and 
285,000 as migrant workers1. Moreover, by 1979 around 85% of 
the ESF's resources were being allocated to regions with prior­
ity status.
In conclusion whilst the E.S.F. can be seen to be pro­
gressively favouring the less-developed regions2, the type of 
aid is essentially passive in nature, and should be used in 
coordination with other structural instruments to obtain max­
imum effect. The system of integrated operations introduced by 
the Commission in 19 79^ (although still in a trial stage) is 
surely a step in this direction, and will hopefully allow a 
somewhat better and more specific matching of regional problems 
and policies.
At present, and at a regional level the major instruments 
of the E.S.F. concern vocational training and aids by way of tem­
porary wage supplements to newly recruited workers or income
^European Perspectives(1931), op.cit., p. 234.
2In practice the regions eligible for assistance under the E.R.D.F. 
^See ibid., pp. 238-9.
supplements to the unemployed or short-time workers. (In general, 
Articles 3(2), 3(3), Regulation EEC no. 2396/71.) On the other 
hand, it should be pointed out that the EC Commission has been 
slow to establish programmes which touch on the subject of 
income-maintenance expect in very special circumstances1.
In fact, the measures proposed by the Commission (and 
adopted by the Council in July 1975) concerning the social ac­
tion programme in the field of pilot schemes and studies to 
combat poverty, can only be described as minute (around 20m.
EUA from 19 75-80) compared to the size of the problem, and neat­
ly avoid the question of direct income supplements. It should 
be noted however that these projects represent only a tentative 
first step in dealing with what is essentially a partially un­
derstood and multi-faceted question.
Aid under the social action programme falls into four 
2categories :
(i) renovation of particularly poor urban areas;
(ii) meeting needs of social groups which are particularly 
poor or threatened with poverty;
(iii) reorganization of special services to help poor per­
sons and their families;
(iv) adapting existing social services more closely to 
the specific needs of poor people.
In view of the results of our surveys in chapter 2 we 
should perhaps stress that, whilst poverty is induced by a num­
ber of causes and characterized by a number of factors, some of 
which may be remedied by measures aiming at improving job op­
portunities or living conditions, in most cases the source can 
be traced to inadequate incomes (especially in agriculture) and 
in particular to state transfers (especially in pensioners, large 
families, unemployed). At some point, any programme which aims 
at relieving poverty in Europe cannot avoid the question of 
dealing directly with poverty and the individuals concerned.
1An example being the supplementary Welfare Allowance Scheme in 
Ireland (only 25% financed by the E.C.), see E.P., "The effects 
on Ireland of membership of the E.C.", June 1979.
2"The social policy of the E.C.", European Documentation, 1981, 
p. 36 .
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This would however pose a considerable budgetary problem, both 
for political and financial motives, but cannot be avoided if 
the problem of poverty is to be dealt with directly. Moreover, 
given the very marked geographical concentration of poverty 
in Europe (see Ch. 2), the result would be inter-state transfers 
rather than merely transfers between social groups, and there­
fore presents a general budgetary problem (see ch. 10.3).
10.4.4.The_Cominon_Agr¿cultural_Policy —  an introduction to the questions 
involved relating to regional development.
Whilst at an early stage it had been proposed that the guidance 
section of the EAGGF should play a major role together with 
other policies in the overall development of the problem agri­
cultural regions of the Community1, the results up to now have 
been disappointing and the link between the EAGGF and regional 
development policy remains particularly weak.
The aims of the C.A.P. outlined under Article 39(1) of 
the Treaty, although not specifically related to regional de­
velopment, do imply that the C.A.P. should be consistent with
granting a fair standard of living to the agricultural popul-2ation . Article 39(2) states that in implementing the C.A.P., 
account should be taken of differences in structural and nat­
ural disparities between the various agricultural regions, and 
the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees.
Overall, the C.A.P. comprises a number of objectives 
and instruments, not all of which are fully compatible or con­
sistent with each other. Perhaps the most obvious aspect of this 
problem concerns agricultural incomes, and there is a clear di­
chotomy of interests between on the one hand avoiding structural 
surpluses and on the other promoting farm incomes. For example,
■^See, for example, O.J. C90, of 11.8.1971. Commssion memorandum 
to the Council regarding the coordination of and proposals for 
regional development measures in the priority agricultural re­
gions .
>^ther aims include: the achievement of increased productivity in agriculture 
and the optimum use of factors of production, market stability, fair prices 
to consumers and the assurance of availability of supplies.
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under one estimate, around 75% of the increase in income through 
work in agriculture derives from the increase in surface area 
cultivated per worker and only 25% results from increased pro­
ductivity1. This in turn implies that attempts to raise agri­
cultural incomes through the price system and via increased 
output are likely to be rather costly. As one report put it,
"the principal difficulty encountered by the CAP is 
the lack of sufficiently adequate controls to adapt 
production to conditions of the internal (self-suf- 
ficiency levels) and external market. Since the CAP 
depends essentially on a mechanism which supports 
agricultural income through guaranteed prices or aid 
directly linked. to the product, the continuing increase 
in output creates an uncontrollable increase in ex­
penditure. " 2
One suggestion, in order to alleviate the income ef­
fects of present budgetary constraints on agricultural price 
levels, has been to introduce a system of direct aids to agri­
cultural incomes (not linked to products)3. This would have 
several advantages, namely (i) that of leaving agricultural 
prices their role of economic indicator with no distortion of 
the optimal combination of factors of production, and (ii) that 
of avoiding aid being nullified by a corresponding rise in 
factor costs and the price of final products.
According to the previously mentioned study such a policy4would be prohibitely expensive . The study estimate , however, 
would seem to be much too pessimistic given the generally high 
incidence of part-time farming, especially for smaller farm 
sizes, and the recourse to alternative non-agricultural employ­
ment characteristic of many regions (see Ch. 2). Whilst, as 
such, the indiscriminate levelling of farm incomes (independent 
of the amount of work performed), has little economic justific­
ation and could act as a disincentive to find alternative forms 
of employment, on the other hand it must be recognized that in
1E.C. "Study of the regional impact of the Common Agricultural Po­
licy", Regional Policy Series no. 21, 1981, p. 85.
2COM(800) 80 final," Reflections on Agricultural Policy".
3See E.C. , "Study of the regional impact of the CAP", 1981, p. 90/1. This 
is not to be confused with, for exanple, the direct aid granted per livestock 
unit under the mountain and hill farming directive,75/268 (see on).
4) Ibid., p. 91; around 10,000 million UA to achieve the target minimum of 75% 
of average E.C. agricultural income (in 1976/77).
many cases, particularly in certain mountain and hill farming
areas, and especially for older farmers, no realistic alternative
may often exist1. In this respect therefore, and under the con-
2dition that they form part of well-defined programmes , there 
is a good case to be made for direct aids of the sort described 
above, as they would provide a much more efficient means of 
support than either subsidies related to products (e.g. Regul­
ation 75/268 —  see also Ch. 2) or price support3, from which 
the less well-organised and smaller-scale farms are least like­
ly to benefit.
The argument for direct income support is furthered by 
the findings of the aforementioned study of the regional impact 
of the C.A.P. which concluded that whilst C.A.P. mechanisms have 
contributed generally to maintaining a growth rate of agricult­
ural incomes equal to that of other sectors (from 1968-78), 
in general, regional imbalances in agricultural incomes were 
aggravated over the period considered (1964-77), and, on the 
whole "the CAP does not seem to have been able to improve the 4situation of less favoured regions at the agricultural level."
In conclusion, whilst a policy of price support, giving more aid 
to those who produce more may be largely acceptable in a situation 
of deficit, it is certainly open to criticism in a period of sur­
plus and it may then be argued that "the direction of expendit­
ure ... should lead more to establishing balance in support for 
farmers in accordance with their respective income level."^
1For example, it has been estimated that around 60% of smallhol­
ders in S. Italy have only part-time occupation in agriculture 
and no activity in other sectors. Ibid., ff. p. 78.
2One example of a redistributive measure within the CAP price sys­
tem is the co-responsibility levy on milk production, which, if 
recent Commission proposals are carried through (see Le Monde, 
25-26 Oct. 1981), will act as a progressive tax on milk product­
ion and increases in output.3One criticism of direct support has been centred around the ad­
ministrative problems it could present (E.C., "Improvement of 
the CAP", European Community, Nov. 19 73). These are certainly not 
to be underestimated, not least because of the practical non­
existing national progranmes (agricultural or not) especially in sane of the 
poorer member states (see ch. 2).
**E.C. 1981, op. cit., p. 86. 5Ibid., p. 72.
Although no clear proof emerges as to whether or to what 
extent the CAP has been responsible for the abovernentionad regional im­
balances, two clear statements can be made1:
(i) that the supports for agricultural production pro­
portional to volume produced and the higher support 
given to milk, cereals and sugar have above all fa­
voured the large and medium size farms of Northern 
Europe
(ii) the weakness of socio-structural policy to develop
supports for production in regions of Southern Europe 
and the lower support given to fruit and vegetable 
type products have served to maintain the relative 
poverty of these regions.
Hence, whilst on the one hand the present system of 
guaranteed prices may be favourable to. achieve increases
in output, on the other hand it can largely be said that is it 
not, at the same time, capable of promoting either regio­
nal balance in farm incomes or redressing imbalances in agri­
cultural structures. As one author (Ritson 1977, p. 354) has 
pointed out, whilst the European Commission proposals for the 
reform of the CAP rejected direct income support on the grounds 
that it would hold up structural improvements, there is no 
reason to suppose that the outcome would be more onerous in this 
respect than support given via the market. The contrary may in­
deed be the case if price support gives false expectations con­
cerning long-run farm viability.
Regarding the last two issues, coordinated structural 
policy can be seen as the only solution to low incomes in agri­
culture which attempts to deal with the causes rather than the 
symptom of the problem (Ritson 1977). It is certainly doubtful 
whether the problem of agricultural incomes can be solved as 
long as the basic structure of the sector remains deficient.
1Ibid. , p. 81, see also Map 5, p. 38, vis. estinates of total EAGGF 
expenditure (1976/77) by region, per person employed in agri - 
culture —  clearly disadvantaged regions include, the West & 
Midlands of Ireland, the South of France and most of Italy.
S'Lé.
Structural policy in agriculture therefore needs to concen1 
trate on two issues; firstly, on measures directed towards in­
creasing farm-size and thereby raising efficiency through im­
proving the allocation and use of resources/ capital in parti­
cular; and secondly, but linked to the first point, measures 
aimed at reducing the farming population with a view to making 
land available for redistribution into larger or less frag­
mented units.
The success of these measures will largely depend on the 
extent to which the agricultural population can be induced to 
leave farming (retirement or transfer to other sectors of the 
economy) and the use that can be made of the subsequently 
available land.
A number of aspects of this process are worth considering 
in more detail since they will be important in assessing the 
present structural policy of the C.A.P.
In the first place, it is generally recognized that the 
rate of decline of the agricultural working population bears 
a close and inverse relationship to the growth of non-agricul- 
tural employment1. This implies that measures to improve the 
regional economic environment and promote employment in in-
^Economie et Statistique no. 101, 1978, Table 1, p. 33, notably, 
"lorscue les créations d'emplois sont vives l'exode agricole 
s'accélère, alors que pendant la crise l'agriculture semble 
constituer un refuge pour l'emploi”. Ibid., p. 37.
^2-?.
dustry and services are likely to have an indirect but impor­
tant and positive effect on the development of agricultural 
structures, incomes and productivity. This effect would cer­
tainly be increased if, in particular, inter-sectoral linkages 
with agro-industries were encouraged, which could furthermore 
induce supply effects in the agricultural sector.
In this respect, two observations should be noted1, 
namely, (i) that regions characterised by low agricultural 
incomes are located mainly in areas of unfavourable economic 
development (low income and regional growth levels), and
(ii) that the greater the share of agricultural working pop­
ulation in regional employment, the lower the agricultural in­
come per worker.
This brings us to our second consideration, which con-- 
cerns regional growth and its impact on the development of 
agricultural incomes. In this respect the existence of a close pos­
itive relationship between the decline in agricultural employ­
ment due to take-up in more productive sectors and growth in 
agricultural and overall (regional) per capita income has been 
postulated on theoretical and empirical grounds by a number of 
authors (see Bull, 1978). However, evidence for Italy in the 
1960s and early 70s, would seem to suggest firstly that employ­
ment transfer to other sectors has been particularly low and 
secondly that improvements in agricultural incomes may have 
arisen mors from the exodus of small-scale farmers —  accompa­
nied by a fair degree of land abandonment —  than from any 
particular improvement in the use of resources (Bull 1978).
1-E.C., "Study of the regional impact of the CAP", p. 77/78.
r *  s.
The improvement in agricultural income per worker re­
sulting from this process may therefore exist more in a "sta­
tistical" than in any "real" sense, being essentially due to 
the elimination of least-productive producers. In other 
words, a high regional growth rate would appear to be a ne­
cessary but not a sufficient condition for the improvement 
of agricultural incomes and structures.
The third consideration on structural policies concerns 
the cost of improving agricultural structures. Practice, and 
French experience in particular has shown that areas in which 
farming is already well-established and structures relatively 
sound, prove to be the most profitable and easy areas of in­
tervention (for regrouping or consolidation and structural 
improvement), when compared to more disadvantaged agricultural 
zones . At a national level, also, such factors have doubtless 
retarded the implementation of structural policies in agri­
culture in accordance with E.C. directives (e.g. Italy —  see 
on). The general corollary is that unless social, regional as 
well as environmental considerations are specifically at the 
basis of structural policies, the latter are likely to find 
greater use in regions where structures are relatively good and 
the less-developed agricultural regions are least likely to 
benefit.
10.4.5 •The_EAGGF_Guidance_bud2gt_and_exgenditure.
Whilst the aim of the C.A.P. Guidance price support and 
intervention is essentially to guarantee a fair standard of 
living to competitive agricultural holdings, that of the 
Guidance budget is to correct regional handicaps in production, 
trade and processing.
Whilst recent developments in C.A.P. socio-structural 
policy, especially those concerning aids to the Mediterranean
'''See for example Clout (1973) , pp. 30-32 with respect to conso­
lidations! farm improvement in the Massif Central. Whilst the low 
cost of land in disadvantaged areas often tends to facilitate 
the process of consolidation (e.g. S.A.F.E.R. activity in France}, 
speculation in real estate has often eliminated this advantage, 
by pushing up land prices.
regions, promise a more active and regionally oriented in­
volvement in agriculture for the future, it must be recognized 
that up to now, involvement in structural policy has proved 
to be little more than a token gesture, with "no more than a 
minor effect in restoring structural imbalances in regions 
over the years 1964-77.1,1 Structural expenditure as a pro­
portion of the total EAGGF budget decreased from 15% in 1964 
2to 3% in 1978 . Moreover, partly due to difficulties encoun­
tered in making disbursements for individual projects (effect­
ed only after actual completion), commitments be­
gan to pile up, at one point reaching some 3,155m.
e.u.a. or 77% of all the appropriations (1965-71?) in question3. 
Community agricultural socio-structural policy has4evolved in four stages : (i) policy for financing individual
projects, (ii) the Mansholt directives of 1972, (iii) the 
first structural régionalisation measures in the form of aid 
to less favoured areas, and (iv) the new (regional) structural 
policies for specific areas and problems.
The corresponding aids are summarized as follows:
(i) Individual projects (Regulations 17/64, 355/77).
For a long time the Guidance Fund financed only indiv­
idual projects related to improving structures of production, marketing and 
processing. This was accomplished in the framework of national quotas and in­
volved investment subsidies, generally up to a maximum of 25% . The im­
pact of this measure was particularly weak given substantial 
gaps between approvals and payments, and overall, less than 
1,000m. u.a. was paid out over a period of 14 years. A new reg­
ulation concerning the processing and marketing of agricultural 
products replaced regulation 17/64 in 1977. Projects in South
*E.C."Study of the regional impact of the CAP", 1981, p. 40.
2 3Ibid. European Perspectives, 1981, op.cit.,
pp. 234-5.
^Figures and information taken from E.C."Study of the regional 
impact of the CAP".
iTjo.
of France and Italy received higher rates of subsidy of 35% and 
50% respectively.
(ii) Mansholt directives (159-61/72)
In 1972 three directives were adopted with the aim of 
rationalizing farm structures in the medium to long term and 
ensuring a fair income and working conditions for those con­
tinuing in the agricultural sector, with a view, in particular 
to achieving price cuts on surplus commodities1.
(a) aid_to_modernising_a2riculturalfoldings
This measure wa's designed to assist investments in far­
ming which, within the context of a development plan, would 
help to establish structures capable of providing an income 
at least comparable with the average regional reference wage.
Over the period 1973-77, almost 78,000 plans were ap­
proved. Of these less than 11,000 were located in less favour­
ed regions in spite of the fact that the latter accounted for 
around 4 5% of all agricultural holdings. France and more notably 
Italy have been slow in applying this directive —  by 1977 only 
3,300 plans had been approved in France (of which around one 
third in the less favoured regions), and none in Italy.
(b) Incentives_for_withdrawal_from_a2ricultural_activitY
Whilst the aim of this directive was essentially to com­
plement aids to structural improvement providing an incentive 
for farmers over 55 years of age to retire, and releasing land 
for enlargement and improvement, its implementation has remained 
very restricted. So far it has only affected some 37,000 recip­
ients, releasing less than 500,000 hectares of which only 14% 
have been taken over by farms in receipt of development plan 
aid. Surprisingly, countries with the largest proportion of the
1See, European Commission, "Memorandum on the reform of agricult­
ure in the EEC" (Mansholt Plan), 1968.
^ 3 /
agricultural working population in the highest age groups have 
benefitted least from this measure (Ireland and Italy).
(c) Aid_for_the_grovision_of_socio-economic_information_and_voc­
ational tr ainin2_ for _per sons_workin2_ in_a2ricultur e_
This measure was intended to complement (a) and (b),
but up to 1978 was carried out only to a small extent. Here
again, Italy and Ireland have yet to implement the directive.
(iii) Aid to mountain and hill agriculture and to certain 
less favoured agricultural areas1 (75/268)
The objective of this measure was to maintain agriculture 
in areas suffering from special handicaps and help prevent de­
population through means of selective income maintenance.
The modus operandi whereby each country fixes the amount
of aid to be granted per livestock unit, tends to result in
substantial differences in aid levels as between farm sizes and 
between countries, in spite of the fact that the Guidance Fund 
rate of reimbursement is somewhat higher (35%) for Ireland 
and Italy than for other countries (25%). In 1977, for example, 
the U.K. received around 40% of total aid granted and a.level 
of grant per farm three times the E.C. average.
(iv) New guidelines of Community structural policy (1978-81) 
In 1978/9, the Council approved a series of measures under
the form of regional programmes in an attempt to deal more di­
rectly with the problems of the less favoured regions.
(a) Aid_to_Mediterranean_areas_and_the_west_of_Ireland
Aid under this programme is mainly aimed at selected infra­
structure projects such as irrigation (S.Italy, Corsica), recon­
version and restructuring of vineyards (S.France), drainage
2(Ireland), afforestation , and improvements in rural infrastruct­
ures. The rate of Community assistance varies between 25% and 50%^ 
The above measures are intended to remove natural and structural 
XAround 25% of surface area, 15% of farms and 12% of E.C. output.
Covered by a separate regulation concerning common measures for 
forestry in certain iMediterranean areas of the Community (OJ 
L38, of 14.2.1979).
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bottlenecks to agricultural development and are complemented by
(i) further aids to withdrawal from agriculture and increased 
community participation in selective income-maintenance (now 
50% in certain areas of Italy and Ireland) and (ii) the in­
troduction of specific regional programmes in an integrated 
framework (RDF, Social Fund, EAGGF) and adapted to local sit­
uations .
Several conclusions are to be drawn from the above accounts.
In the first place the Guidance Fund, at its present level 
can only have a very limited impact given the magnitude of the 
problem; and consequently the regional effect of the CAP is 
therefore likely to be dictated mainly by prices and market pol­
icies. Furthermore, budget estimates for 1981-83 Guidance ex­
penditure come to no more than 5% of the EAGGF total which 
gives an indication of priorities for the near future.
Secondly, the fact that often, countries with the most serious 
structural problems in agriculture have been the slowest to im­
plement the above E.C. directives casts some doubt on the prob­
able impact of the aids in question.
In this aspect, there are obvious arguments for providing 
higher rates of Community participation in priority projects and 
regions, not least because countries where agricultural struct­
ures are weakest are often in a less advantageous position to 
finance such projects.
Moreover, in some respects the problem probably goes even 
deeper; in particular it could be asked whether income-support 
measures for farmers on a larger scale than at present are likely 
to be seen as either practicable (administrative complexity) or 
equitable (e.g., what about low-paid farm workers).
A further complication is that, in general, income-maintenance 
programmes in the regions most concerned by these problems are 
often deficient if not inexistent (see ch. 2). A more consistent 
and less piecemeal approach would be to operate such benefits 
under an integrated Community social security system —  an ap­
proach which, however, the Community, for the present, seems in­
tent to avoid.
10.4.6. Some_general_remarks_on_the_Funds
Apart from the more specific comments made on the individual 
funds up to now, it is worth considering briefly some more 
general aspects of Community financial participations in invest­
ments. Some key figures and relationships are given in the table 
below for 1977.
Assessment of the impact of these funds is particularly dif­
ficult, but moreover as the table below shows, the matter is 
further complicated by the fact that incidence of these aids 
(ratio of E.C. aid to investment or project costs) varies con­
siderably between the various funds, and countries concerned.
(a) (b) (a) as % (b)
Funds Amount of
investment
grants
Investments
financed
EAGGF 249,017 n. av.
ERDF industry 
& services of 
which:
(i) pro­
ductive 
invest­
ment 208,239 2,520,053 8.3
WG 2.9%
France 6.2%
Italy 15.5%
UK 10.8%
Ire 11.1%
WG 19.7%
France 29.7%
Italy 15.7%
UK 9.0%
Ire 24.6%
WG 7.6%
France 11.2%
Italy 31.5%
UK 34.5%
Ire 43.8%
(ii) infra­
structure
274,303 1,898,524 14.4
(c) amounts of loans 
EIB 1,352,530 6,078,870 2 2 . 2
*E.C. funds; expenditure and associated investments, 1977, 1,000 
EUA. Source: derived from Eurostat Regional Statistics; Commun­
ity's financial participation in investments, July 1978.
Given the complexity of the factors involved, it is of course 
difficult to tell what the precise relationship is between 
aid incidence and impact. However, with incidence figures as 
low as 2.9% (W.G., ERDF), one is compelled to ask if the par­
ticular ECfand in question has played any decisive role in 
determining whether the investment took place or not. Again, 
average figures as high as 30% (France, ERDF, infrastructures), 
particularly concerning infrastructure investment where state 
or local authority spending is also concerned, many raise 
doubts as to whether spending is fully consistent with principles 
of additionality . On .this account the U.K. government has re­
ceived much criticism, culminating recently in the European 
Parliament budgetary committee taking the unprecedented step 
of voting to withhold half of the U.K. ERDF allocation for
1982.
Differences in incidence levels are of course also due to 
the nature and the complexity of the problem involved, and the 
type of E.C. intervention. Hence, the relatively high figures 
for the incidence of EIB lending in Italy and Ireland must be 
seen in the context of the various problems of raising capital 
in these countries and the nature of the projects concerned. 
Moreover, EIB operations which essentially transfer capital 
funds must clearly be assessed in a different manner from funds 
where there is a grant element.
Some points in our preceding discussion are brought out in
r-ecent Commission proposals for the modification of Community 
2policies .
Taking account of various observations as to the working of
^See for example, House of Lords, 13th Report, Select Committee 
on the European Communities, EEC Regional Policy, "the public 
authorities normally retain the ERDF assistance towards infra­
structure costs although, because of central government con­
trol of capital expenditure, there can be no corresponding in­
crease in expenditure...", Art. 4 para. 1.
‘TRapporto della Ccroiissione delle C.E.,al Consiglio in esecuzione del mandato 
del 30 maggio 1980. Boll, suppl. 1/81. For further elaboration of these pro­
posals see interview with A. Giolitti, Guardian, 22.10.1981. See also, E.C. 
COM(81)639 final/2 "Pour developper l'industrie en Europe: une strategie 
caimunautaire".
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these policies, namely:
- given limited resources, that funds are being spread too 
widely both in geographical terms and with respect to pro­
jects (esp. infrastructures);
- that a greater effort should be made to incentivate pro­
ductive investment and job creation particularly with res­
pect to growth industries (new products and services) and 
helping to foster small/medium sized firms;
- that problems of additionality in the way certain funds oper- 
are may ultimately reduce their overall impact;
- that the present range of E.S.F. activities in particular 
should be reviewed with the aim of rendering them less 
administratively complex and more directly related to the 
process of job creation.
The Commission would recommend the following general lines 
for reform1,
(i) that national quotas for the bulk of E.C. regional aid 
be removed and the money concentrated on regions with particul­
arly serious structural problems
(ii) that in future the E.C. would want to negotiate legal 
contacts for regional development programmes (as at present oc­
curs under the non-quota system) with national governments and 
regional authorities, instead of merely reimbursing national 
spending on regional aid with little assurance that the E.C. 
funds will effectively be additional
(iii) more direct involvement with regional bodies responsi­
ble for development policy, which would directly identify E.C. 
aid with the regions, and would help ensure the principle of 
additionality at this level^
(iv) that the non-quota section of the ERDF should be expan­
ded considerably (up to 20%) , enabling a greater concentration of 
resources notbaly in the poorest regions of the E.C. and those 
suffering from industrial decline. In particular, changes in the
working of the ERDF should lead to its passage from a system of
aids to isolated projects, to a new system of co-financing re­
gional programmes in infrastructure and productive investment 
into which individual projects supported by the Community would be 
integrated
(v)specifically, and related to (iv), if on the one hand it
is possible to increase the volume of Community financing in the
form of loans, this should not result in a lowering of their im­
pact. Particular attention should be paid to:
1See also Bull. Vol. 14, no. 10 1981, pp. 8-10.
2See Evidence of the Development Board for Rural Wales, (DBRW)
House of Lords, 14th Report of the Select Camittee on the E.C., p. 101 and 108; 
"The rule of 'non-additionality operated by the U.K. Government means there is 
little incentive for the D.B.R.W. to seek, or pranote others to seek, ERDF 
assistance for projects".
- small and medium sized enterprises
- interest-rate subsidies in priority regions in favour of large 
infrastructure projects
- expanding the utilization of loans facilities in combination 
with structural funds, such as the ERDF. The latter for exam­
ple is already in a position to provide interest subsidies
on EIB loans.
Whilst the above changes might partically solve some of the 
problems associated with the present funds in terms of (i) add­
itionality, (ii) impact, (iii) administrative complexity, a 
number of points remain to be answered.
In particular, with respect to Community enlargement, if the 
E.C. is to get to grips with the severe regional imbalances within 
the prospective member countries, and between these countries and 
the rest of the Community1, then it will have to develop greater 
involvement and a more positive approach towards guidelines and 
instruments relating to regional development.
Moreover, regional policy in Greece and Portugal is still very 
much in its infancy, and would probably benefit from more positive 
guidelines towards policy-making and institutional and admini­
strative organisation on the part of the Community.
Indeed, if the ERDF is to play a larger role in regional de­
velopment, there are good arguments,as we have seen, for inte­
grating it, and other funds, more fully into national development 
programmes. In an institutional framework this would call for 
more direct and coordinated action through national development 
agencies on well-defined programmes.
On the latter question it should be considered how the attempt 
to provide a more comprehensive and integrated approach to region­
al development aid would fit in with recent Commission proposals
on the coordination of industrial policies. Indeed, if the Com-
2mission proposals for more concerted efforts (and financial in­
tervention by the Community) in energy, research and development 
and industrial innovation, are to be realised, there would cer­
tainly be considerable regional implications, not only because 
of differing national or regional capacities to finance such pro-
1See European Economy, no. 9, July 1981.
2COM(81)639 final/2, op. cit., esp. p v . 9, 11, 25.
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grammes, but also and primarily, because of the spatial dis­
tribution of such activities themselves (see ch. 5). Previous 
chapters have already emphasized the need to develop positive 
adjustment measures to promote industrial innovation, and re­
structuring. In this respect policies to promote research and 
development and improve access to finance, in particular for 
small/medium sized firms in l.d.r.'s where these bottlenecks are 
hardest felt, could well be fully integrated into Community policy 
rather than being carried out on a piecemeal basis as largely 
occurs at present1.
2On the other hand whilst the Commission has also suggested , 
albeit in vague terras, -that the Community give special support 
to developing and applying new technology, and at the regional. 3level to encouraging labour-intensive activities in such sectors , 
little attention is given to the details and even less to the 
precise reasoning involved. Whilst it may certainly be desirable 
to speed up the process by which new technologies are absorbed, 
direct state intervention is, other objections apart, often a 
risky business (e.g. over-capacity, of which there are many exam­
ples) , and probably more so if labour-intensive activities are
4to be picked out for support .
One further element of development policy, not touched upon 
by the Commission relates to location controls. Whilst a number 
of Member States have found it necessary to implement such pol­
icies in congested areas and as part of an overall regional plan­
ning strategy, no attempt as yet has been made by the Commission 
to coordinate such policies or to propose guidelines. In so far 
as location controls relate primarily to national boundaries and 
objectives, and very often entail a fairly delicate process of
:See e.g. E.C. Bull. no. 6, 1981 on schemes vis Bavaria and Emilia 
Romagna (points 2.1.33 and 2.1.38 respectively).
^Suppl. Bull. 1/81, pp. 10,11.
3See Bull. 7/8 1981, point 2.1.59.
4That is, apart from the question of whether it is particularly de­
sirable to direct these activities to the development areas in the 
first place - see discussion in ch. 5.
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bargaining between the firms themselves and the authorities in­
volved, there are certainly reasons for leaving such policies 
in the hands of the respective national governments1. However, 
insofar as internationally mobile investment is concerned, 
location controls may become a question for Community-wide con­
cern. Previous chapters have already pointed to the growing 
importance of the MNE in regional development, and it is notable 
that many of the new or potential members of the E.C. (Greece, 
Spain, Portugal) have experienced industrial development typic­
ally characterised by a high level of dependence on such enter- 
2prises . The consequences of this phenomenon, by which MNE's 
may effectively be able to bargain for better deals with national 
authorities, suggests that some coordination of instruments 
affecting internationally mobile investment might be desirable.
A coherent Community policy towards the MNE would furthermore 
go a long way towards preventing the unnecessary and artificial 
inflation of incentives at the periphery to attract these firms 
(which are generally in the least need of such favourable treat­
ment) . The situation where some of the most profitable enter­
prises operating in Europe are also in receipt of some of the 
most substantial levels of subsidy, to establish themselves in 
locations that are perhaps no different from what they would 
have chosen anyway, is one that certainly begs a number of 
questions.
A final point in relation to the above arguments concerns the 
need for continuous monitoring of industrial structure and changes 
therein (e.g. takeovers/mergers) at a regional level. This can 
be seen as an essential prerequisite for policy formation (see
1Although as the MacDougal Report, 1977, pointed out there 
is a logical case to be made for introducing a fiscal com­
plement to the E.R.D.F., "taking the form of a tax on new 
investments in regions fulfilling criteria that were the in­
verse of those used for eligibility for regional aids (e.g. 
centrally located agglomerations with labour shortages, high 
income levels, high levels of congestion etc.)", op. cit., vol.
1, p. 65.
^SeeSeers et al. (1979), chs. 8, 9, 10.
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ch. 5), and up to now one which has received far too little 
attention in assessing the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of regional development and new job creation.
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Conclusions
In the introduction to this work we established the methodology which 
would be adopted and the questions to which we addressed our analysis. In 
answering these questions it is apparent that five broad subject areas 
emerge; in the first place, we attempted to define and quantify the nature 
and extent of the regional problem.in searching for an explanation of 
regional disparities we examined ,in the second place^the relationship 
between regional structure and growth; thirdly we examined the pattern and 
characteristics of regional development. Related to the above points, in 
the fourth place, we extensively considered the empirical and theoretical 
questions surrounding the use of regional policy in its aim of improving 
economic structures in the less developed regions(l.d.r.'s) and promoting 
regional economic growth. Lastly, we considered whether the process of 
European integration could be seen to have influenced the pattern of regional 
development, and we examined the role of the l.d.r.'s in the increasingly 
integrated Europea»- common market. The role of the European Community and 
the structure of the Community budget was critically examined in the light 
of past, and possible future developments.
Whilst more detailed comments are to be found in the summaries to indiv­
idual chapters, we must now conclude by outlining, in the context of the 
five areas mentioned above, the main conclusions and policy recommendations 
reached in this study.
1. The regional problem in the E.C.
i) The regional problem is characterised by significant and persistent 
spatial disparities in levels of economic development. The economic position 
of thel.d.r.'s in general appears to be influenced mainly by national as 
opposed to Community wide developments andwitiiincountries the relative position 
of l.d.r.'s has often remained very largely unchanged over quite a number of 
years. However, the circumstances surrounding such developments vary from 
case to case.
ii) Growing pressures towards disparities via developments in regional 
labour markets could be observed in a number of cases. In this context, 
three broad categories of l.d.r.'s could be defined;
a) regions(often the least peripheral) which appear to have benefitted to 
some extent from the gradual 'spread' of industrial activity, and where 
demographic trends were favouable in terms of a balanced regional labour market,
b) regions with poor economic performance and unfavouable demographic trends 
leading to excess supply in the regional labour market,
c) regions showing evidence of a cumulative decline in economic activity, 
population and employment(mainly France, Massif Central)
iii) In general, great difficulty was encountered in assessing whether 
relative trends in regional incomes were mainly the result of allocative 
factors such as improvement of competitivity and output, or essentially 
redistributive factors such as public capital expenditure, inter-state 
transfers or welfare benefits of one kind or another. In a number of cases
, the persistence over quite long periods of relatively sizeable trade-gaps 
in the l.d.r.'s, led us to conclude that such transfers, whilst often sub­
stantially reducing income disparities as between regions, had very little 
perceivable impact on the economic performance of the l.d.r.'s themselves. 
Undoubtedly however, disparities would have been even more marked in the 
absence of such transfers.
iv) Both within and between regions, wide disparities in the economic welfare 
of individuals or socio-economic groups were particularly apparent. Such 
disparities were especially marked in the case of the l.d.r.'s which were 
characterised by high rates of poverty as compared to the respective national 
situations.
a) In spite of the existence of real growth over the 1960's and 1970's, and 
of income-maintenance programmes towards the unemployed, pensioners, and 
families with dependents, there was found to be conclusive evidence that 
very substantial and diverse groups in society remain firmly at the bottom of 
the income distribution. This applies not only in relative terms but, more 
importantly, in terms of absolute levels of disposable income or consumption 
representing what can be considered to involve a substantial degree of depriv­
ation. Whilst there were a number of explanations put forward(eg. low-earnings, 
family size) the fact remains that a direct and very important cause of pov­
erty in a number of cases could largely have been avoided if there had been
a greater degree of redistribution involved in national income-maintenance 
benefits(as oppose to any substantial increase in overall expenditure as such 
on these programmes).
b) At the E.C. level, three broad lines of action directly relevant to the 
poverty problem may be suggested:
—  Community led efforts to coordinate national income maintenance benefits 
with respect to coverage, levels and procedures. Whilst the introduction of
some European minimum-guaranteed family income would probably be desirable, 
it would almost certainly prove to be politically unfeasible. Some compromise 
based partly on average earnings in the respective countries could however 
provide a useful and feasible alternative,
—  resulting from the above, some contribution by the Community to help the 
less well-off member states meet any extra expenditure involved,
—  some statistical basis at a comparative and Community level to enable 
periodic analysis to be made of the extent of low-incomes and poverty. Con-
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-sumption surveys, based for example on Italian practice, would prove 
especially valuable in comparing real standards of living between countries 
and regions.
2. Regional structure and growth.
i) From a theoretical viewpoint, there were found to be few convincing 
arguments to suggest that, at a spatial level, there can in general be 
assumed to be some 'natural' equilibrating or convergent tendency in the 
process of economic development. On the basis of the growth model outlined, 
regional growth rates were seen to depend in a fundamental sense on the 
structure of regional output. Whilst a disequilibrium situation was seen to 
be unlikely, the persistence of different growth rates, where as evidence 
showed,1 .d.r.'s start from the bottom, is disturbing enough in itself. Supply 
factors were seen to be of vital importance here in bringing about changes
in regional structure, and hence, the possibility of overcoming low or lagg­
ing regional growth rates. The importance of regional policy in encouraging 
such changes was seen to be central.
ii) In many instances the economic performance of the l.d.r.'s could be traced 
to structural factors which clearly limited or otherwise influenced the dev­
elopment potential of such areas. Economic structure is in general character- 
sed by high but declining levels of agricultural employment, relatively low 
levels of industrial employment, and a tertiary sector often exhibiting 
marked deficiencies in certain sub-sectors. Within each of these sectors, 
structures are characterised by a range of deficiencies in a number of res­
pects ;
In many cases the farming sector was found to be in real need of improv­
ing agricultural structures (farm-size, infrastructures). However, the persis­
tence of near subsistence farming and the lack of ready employment alternat­
ives, implies that efforts to restructure this sector should not overlook 
the potentially serious social and economic consequences that such rational­
isation might induce.
—  In the service sector, the generally weak urban framework of the l.d.r.'s 
together with the relatively low level of induced demand (especially viz. 
business services) by newly located externally-based firms, creates little 
prospect for the successful longer term development of such activities 
unless specific efforts are made to encourage movement, in particular of 
business related services, to these areasCor other inducements to ensure 
greater local placement of demand for such services).
Employment in industry in the l.d.r.'s was generally below the Community 
average. In the past, industrial development has been characterised by relat­
ively high rates of employment loss(and closures) in smaller scale firms often 
in more 'traditional' lines of production. More recently, and linked to this 
point, there appears to be a general tendency in many development areas towards 
higher levels of external ownership of the regional industrial base.
Factors of the type mentioned above must go a long way in explaining 
the static or negative growth rates of total employment common to most l.d.r.'s 
over the 1970's. Moreover, these events are likely to be compounded in the future 
by demographic problems in many areas - high birth-rates, immigration, rising 
dependency ratios and general mismatch in the labour market. Unless over the 1980's 
the l.d.r.'s are able to achieve growth rates in total regional product sub­
stantially higher than those in other areas , divergence in regional per capita 
incomes is inevitable.
3. The pattern and characteristics of regional economic development.
i) Concerning industrial development the evidence seems to suggest a growing 
concentration of industry in the central areas of the Community at least until 
the mid-late I960's. For more recent periods there was clear evidence to 
suggest a growing 'spread' effect, which has however benefitted the l.d.r.'s to 
a much lesser extent than those regions in the more immediate vicinity of the 
European industrial axis. The l.d.r.'s relatively poor performance in this respect 
is presumably in part due to their more distant location from central markets, 
and in part due to a certain 'inertia' in the industrial location decision 
-making process itself.
ii) Whatever pressures may have led to the spread of industrial activity, it 
is certainly the case that such spread which has occured, has invariably been 
marked by the development of well-defined qualitative and functional differ­
ences in productive structures as between regions. Evidence also suggested that 
in a number of cases, the location of M.R.E. branch plants in l.d.r.' over 
the 1970's had (a) directly served to widen such regional differences, (b) been 
accompanied by substantial acquisition activity and a decline in the number of 
locally based firms, resulting in (c) the the possibility that the effective 
elimination of local competitors in local markets may have ultimately resulted 
in less rather than more competition at this level. Certainly there is no 
shortage of arguments to suggest that the market shares of leading firms will 
often tend to remain stable even under conditions of fast market growth, with 
the result that market dominance may spread from central to peripheral areas 
as the scope for exploitation of peripheral markets unfolds. Indeed,the availab-
-ility of regional incentives may even have served to accentuate this process, 
and an argument can be made for greater selectivity in the award of incentives 
to encourage effective competition by promoting new and small-firm development,
iii) Consideration of the growing role of the multinational enterprise and 
foreign direct investment in regional industrial development led us to examine 
evidence of the way in which this, in turn has increasingly come to be associated 
with the functional sub-division of activities at a spatial level. One concl­
usion drawn was that it is often difficult to provide any economic justification 
for the rather large amounts of aid typically made available to such enterprises 
given that these firms could hardly claim to face impor­
tant bottle-necks to firm development, and that such aids must have contributed 
several times over to any additional costs associated with l.d.r. locations.
An appropriate policy towards such firms might therefore be to limit substan­
tially the amount of aid directly available in the form of investment grants/ 
soft loans, and expand indirect aid made available for specific infra-structure 
or human-capital bottle-necks, thus making incentive awards to some degree 
proportional to actual and additional costs involved.
4. The impact of regional policy on employment in the l.d.r.'s.
Reviewing the imact of regional policies in France, Italy and Ireland, we 
come to the following main conclusions:
i) From econometric testing, it was found that whilst regional policies had 
been largely 'successful' over the period considered, there was a fundamental 
difference between the number of jobs aided in development areas, and jobs 
actually 'created'(that is jobs which would not have occured in the absence of 
regional policy). Hence, incentive cost per job created was invariably higher 
and substantially so, than national figures on'cost per job' would suggest.
ii) As a reault, in many instances, regional policies appear to have proved 
very costly in relation to the number of jobs actually created, or altern­
atives that might exist. They have also proved least effective(apart from 
Ireland) in inducing firm location and indigenous firm development in the 
less-developed and peripheral regions.
iii) Certain important differences arise in the operation and effectiveness 
of the various instruments, in particular,
a) there are very strong theoretical reasons for making regional incentives 
conditional upon increase in capacity (or important changes in the production 
process) rather than merely for replacement investment. Even where investment 
grants/loans are concerned, there is no reason why such aids should not also 
be linked in value to the creation of additional employment.
6.
b) greater spatial selectivity - perhaps on the basis of objective indic­
ators- than at present exists could usefully be made to ensure that l.d.r.'s
achieve clear net locational advantage, with,
c) greater selectivity in the application of aids towards;
high growth sectors and supplier firms linked to such sectors,
skilled employment and high-level headquater functions, 
conditional upon,
given level of use of local inputs,
maintenance of competitive structure or competitive conditions in 
markets concerned.
d) Greater use should be made of schemes tailored to the needs of individual 
sectors. General aid schemes tend to overlook the demands of service-sector 
activities and small-scale local enterprises. Concerning the latter, it may 
for instance be important to examine how more emphasis could be placed on 
strenghening advisory and information networks.
e) Concerning the aids themselves, considerable doubt was raised on the desir­
ability of direct employment subsidies. With respect to other aids, desirability 
would seem to depend very much on the type of frim or activity involved; 
specifically, soft-loan or guarantee systems may well be more attractive to 
smaller firms which experience greater difficulty (and higher cost) of access
to risk capital. It may also prove easier by this method (eg. compared to 
grants) to ensure that the amount of subsidy paid actually bears some relation 
to the extent jota targets are in fact met.
f) At the other end of the scale, tax(profit) incentives may be particularly 
useful as a basis for attracting larger firms to development areas. Although there 
are a number of drawbacks and qualifications to be made on the use of such in­
centives, several advantages are apparent; in the first place larger companies 
generally have fewer problems in raising investment finance, which consequently 
weakens their argument for capital grants or soft loans. On the other hand they 
are more able to take advantage of profit-concessions which may only accrue at 
some time in the future. Secondly, such concessions may fairly easily be worked 
into an overall incentive/disincentive policy, possibly at the Community level, 
whereby the same companies which pay congestion 'taxes' in central areas are 
offered suitable advantages if they locate in a development area. At the limit 
such a policy might even turn out to be largely self-financing; it would also 
have the advantage of being non-inflationary - thus avoiding one of the critic­
isms often raised against congestion taxes.
As such, we would advocate a 'two-tier' approach to regional policy 
with considerably greater spatial and sectoral discrimination. Regionally 
differentiated profit-tax concessions might thus form the cornerstone of such
a policy(complemented by congestion taxes in central areas), but policies 
towards larger and smaller firms would be greatly different from present, 
such that the former would receive less direct but more indirect aid, and 
the latter would benefit from a greater range of incentives, not all of which 
of a directly financial nature.
5. a) A final point in our study concerns the question of European integration 
and regional development. If at one level progress towards a unified common 
market can be seen to bring with it a tendency towards concentration of econ­
omic activity, at another level monetary union is likely to bring additional 
problems; in particular, the possibility of destabilising flows of capital and 
labour from the l.d.r.'s (and less developed member states) when the exchange 
rate instrument is ruled out. Whilst monetary integration should also bring 
certain advantages in the form of greater stability in monetary and trading 
transactions, the overall welfare advantage to be gained will necessarily be 
determined by the extent to jvhich 'gainers' are willing to compensate 'losers' 
in this process.
b) Reorganisation of the Community budget will clearly be of major importance 
in this respect, involving some degree of net transfer from stronger to weaker 
members. Such transfers, if concentrated on productive investment and selective 
redistributive measures might imply far lower levels of budgetary finance than 
is popularly recognised.
c) In this context there is also a growing need for a review of Community funds 
which in their present form cannot hope to achieve any significant impact on 
regional disparities. In particular, if the major slice of Community expenditure 
which is at present used to support agricultural prices can be reduced, there 
would be much greater scope to expand the structural funds and achieve a greater 
overall degree of redistribution - an event which, it should be emphasised, is 
not only necessary for further moves towards E.M.U., but which may also prove 
essential merely to maintain present levels of integration under the difficult 
economic conditions of the 1980's. In other words it may no longer be possible 
to stand still. Without budgetary reform it ceases it ceases to be clear what 
the Community itself can be said to represent. Moreover, with the entry of Greece 
Spain and Portugal into the E.C., it is evident that there are certain impor­
tant gaps in Community policies towards the less developed regions which must 
urgently be filled.
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